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TURKISH NATIONALISM AND 
WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

SELECTED ESSAYS OF ZIYA GOKALP 


Translated and Edited 
mth an Introduction by 
NIYAZI BERKES 

fnmtuti of ItlamK StuJUs 
McGJI UfUvtruty 


Rusim House 

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD 


MUSEUM STREET LONDON 




PUBLISHED I 


This took u copyright wider the Berne Convention 
Apart from any far dealing for the purpoiet of 

permitted under the Copyright Act , 1956, no portion 
may he reproduced hy any process without written 

© Niyajt Beriet, 1959 



PREFACE 


The purpose of this volume is to provide the English reader with 
samples of the writings of Ziya Gokalp (187G-1914), the Turkish 
thinker, regarding Turkish nationalism and its meaning in terms of 
Islam and Western civilization. It must be emphasized, therefore, that 
the present volume is not a complete edition of Gokalp’s writings. 

Gokalp’s writings can be classified roughly into three groups: 
(a) literary works, (b) writings on folklore, history, and sociology, and 
(<r) prose writings dealing with cultural matters in short essay form. 

The first and second categories are left entirely outside the frame- 
work of the present work. In excluding these, I believed that the 
Western reader w ould lose very little. Gokalp’s poetry was devoid of 
art and was extremely didactic. He seems to have written poems as a 
hobby and never posed as a poet. He used poetry, however, to popular- 
ize his ideas in the form of rhymed slogans. This, I believe, helped to 
popularize some of his ideas, but, on the whole, was a factor m causing 
his ideas to be understood partially or inadequately. Another of his 
aims seems to have been to develop a modem literature which would 
develop into the writing of religious hymns as well as folk stones for 
children, but, unfortunately, his lack of artistic genius made this 
attempt almost a complete failure in so far as art went. 

The second category of his writings have been excluded because of 
their length and technical nature. Among them must be mentioned his 
Turk Medeniyttt Tardit ( The History of the Turkish Civilisation), of 
which only the first volume appeared, then posthumously. 

The present volume has been compiled from his essays Again, it is 
not a complete collection of this type of his writings. It contains 
selections which I found to express Gokalp’s often repeated basic ideas 
best, to demonstrate the changes that took place in his formulations, 
and to show inconsistencies or contradictions in his ideas. 

This volume will be found lacking by some readers because it 
includes nothing specific to one issue. Gokalp was believed to have 
been the prophet of Pan-Turamsm. The belief was widespread and 
was shared by me when I began making an assortment of articles for 
translation. Upon completing a first selection, 1 found, to my surprise, 
that I had not included a single essay dealing directly or exclusively 
with. Pan.-Tmiu.sm. On revvewsng Oaks’, p's works, l fouwi, to my 



PREFACE 


greater amazement, that he wrote only tw o short essays on this subject 
(‘Turk Milieu ve Tunin', Turk Yurdu, Vol. VI, No. < 5 i (1914), P?- 
2053-8, and ‘Turan Nedir ? ’, Yeru Mecmua , No. 37, February 1918, 
pp 82-3), neither of which were representative specimens of his 
writing, neither of which contained any theorencal formulations of his 
ideology, and neither of which contained a formulation of the Pan- 
Turanian ideology itself. To be sure, these essays favoured the tdea, 
but they w ere not of a nature to be written by a prophet of a movement. 
Furthermore, Gokalp ceased even to mention the word ‘Turan’ in his 
poetry after 1915, when he developed his theory of nationality (F. A. 
Tansel, Ztya Gokalp Kulhyati, Vol I (Ankara, 1952), p, xv), and he 
dismissed die idea after 1918 as one which ‘may only serve to inspire 
the too imaginative poets’ (cf the second article mentioned above, 
p 82) The present work, therefore, contains neither of Gokalp’s two 
essays impingtng upon Pan-Turantsm, neither would add to our 
knowledge of the ideology itself or to our understanding of Gokalp’s 
system of ideas 

Both chronological sequence and topical interrelationships were 
kept in view in arranging the selected articles In other words, the 
essays w ere arranged in a chronological order modified by the second 
criterion Fortunately, this scheme has not created much difficulty, as 
Gokalp’s writings underwent a logical development with time Hence, 
only a few essays had to be introduced out of their chronological order 
— to provide die reader with certain background information. 

The majority of the essays have been reproduced in their entirety. 
Brief excerpts from a few have been included. Some omissions have 
been made from otherwise complete essays when (a) statements were 
repeated, (i) the author digressed in order to clarify some points for 
his Turkish readers, or (r) the author repeated ideas elaborated m other 
included essays Short addmons, within brackets, have been made tn 
order to complete a sentence or to make it more readily understandable 
to the English reader 

The sources from w hich the selections have been taken are given in 
the footnotes in their original Turkish, transliterated into the modem 
characters. The English tides are not always Literal or exact transla- 
tions of the originals in order (a) to adapt, without making too great 
deviations, the tttles to English usage, and (i) to give a more coherent 
appearance to die Table of Contents with a view towards facilitaung 
an understanding of the intellectual content of the volume. 



PREFACE 


Despite efforts to do otherwise, it has been necessary to use many 
Turkish or Turkifietf words in the text. (A glossary of the Turkish and 
Arabic words retained in the translation is appended.) Words which 
have been anglicized— such as Ottoman, sultan, and caliph — have been 
used in their English forms. Words derived from the Arabic but used 
in Turkish in their Turkiiied forms have been rendered according to 
the present-day Turkish spelling Where relevant, the Arabic equiva- 
lents of these words are given within brackets. In cases where Gokalp 
used Arabic words in their original rather than in their Turkified 
forms, these have been rendered according to their Arabic translitera- 
tions. (The following letters in die modem Turkish alphabet are 
propounced as indicated c, English j, f, English cA, §, almost the 
English y, S, German o, u, German u, f, English sh, and t, the 
actual sound value given to the English tion in addition or ton in 
carton.) 

The translation is neither strictly literal nor fully adapted to the 
English literary style. I have sought to solve some of the problems 
posed by the fact that certain figures of speech are amenable to direct 
translation, while others are not by following a middle course I believe 
that in taking some liberties with the text I have remained true to the 
meaning of the original, or at least have not rendered the material tn a 
way contrary to the original It was hoped that by not seeking to 
achiese a fully polished English rendition the reader would get some 
feeling for the style of thinking and writing of a non-Enghsh-speaking 
writer. 

In concluding this Preface, I should like to express my gratitude to 
those who have made the appearance of this work possible. I wish to 
thank the Faculty of Graduate Studies, McGill University, for a grant 
towards the preparation of the translanon I am particularly indebted 
to Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the Director of the Institute of 
Islamic Studies, McGill University, for his constant and generous 
encouragement. My thanks are due also to Dr Howard A. Reed and 
Professor F. Rahman, both colleagues at McGill during the prepara- 
tion of the volume, for their help and encouragement. I am grateful to 
Mrs Nora Groshemtz-Laval and Miss Judy Speier for reading, correct- 
ing, and typing the text. I thank the editors of the Middle East Journal 
for permission to reproduce the following Introduction which ap- 
peared onginally as an article in that journal ( Middle East Journal, 
VoL VIII, Na 4, Auteram spfj). 



Finally, 1 want to express my gratitude to my brother, Enver 
Berkes, who, as always, did not fad to give me all the necessary support 
in obtaining materials for this work. To him this volume is affection- 
ately dedicated. 

Montreal, January 1958 


NTYAZI BERKES 



CONTENTS 


PREFACE P°g* 7 

TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION *3 


PART I 


I AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 

My Father's Testament 
My Teacher's Testament 
The Testament of My Spiritual Guide 
My Nationality 

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OP VALUES AND IDEALS 

The Philosophy of Today 
The Philosophy of Idealism of I bn Al-Arabt 
New Life and New Values 
Historical Materialism and Sociological Idealism 
The Nature of Ideals 
HI THE IDEAL OP NATIONALISM 

Three Currents of Thought 
Nation and Fatherland 
The Ideal of Nationalism 
National Language 

PART « 

IV CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 
Civilisation of the People 
Tradition and Formalism 
Community and Society 
Culture and Civilisation 


PART III 

V. THE EVOLUTION OP SOCIETY 

The Scientific Study of Communities 

Classification of Social Species 

A Note on the Terms ‘ Society ’ and ' Commumy ’ 

The Rise of the Nations 

JVhat is a Nation f 

Villages and the Commune 

Is Turkey a Modem Nation* 

The Turkish Renaissance and Literature 


35 

37 

39 

43 


7« 

7<S 

79 

8l 


*9 

9* 

97 



CONTENTS 


VI SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 

Value Judgments 148 

Moral Values and Society 149 

Mores 15* 

Manifestations of the National Ethos 15 6 

The Methods of Cultural Sociology 171 

VU RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 

Social Functions of Religion 184 

Islamic Jurisprudence and Sociology 193 

The Social Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence 196 

Religion and Law 199 

State and Religion 101 

Islam and Modern Civilisation 214 

The Caliphate 223 

The Nature of Islamic Education 233 

National Education 23 J 

Modem Family and National Culture 247 

Foundations of the Turkish Family 2JI 


PART IV 


VIII NEW ORIENTATIONS 
Towards the People 
Towards Genius 
Revolution and Conservatism 
Towards IF t stern Civilisation 
Towards Modern Science 
Culture and Refinement 

IX THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISM 

IChat is Turkuml - A Recapitulation 

The Aim of the Turkisu 

The Turkui Pioglammi Language 

Literature and Musk 

Religion 

macs 


TRANSLATOR s 


284 

289 

290 
298 
301 
302 
304 

3°f 

306 

3 '4 
3*3 
328 



TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION 


£ 


Thirty-four years after his death, Ziya Gokalp still stands as the 
most original and influential among the T urkish writers of the twentieth 
century.* Bom in 1876, he died at the age of forty-nine on October 25, 
1924 He produced his basic writings between 1911 and 1918 and 
between 1922 and 1924. He initiated in the first period a new approach 
to the discussion of the fundamental problems which had become acute 
in Turkey following the restoration of the constitutional regime m 
1908. He conanued along the same lines in the second period, although 
many of his ideas had materialized already with the establishment of a 
nauonahst regime m Anatolia under Ataturk. 

The recurrent theme in Gokalp’s wriungs was the quesuon of how 
the Tuiks should adopt Western civilization, and how this effort 
shoutd be harmonized with the Turks’ two historic traditions, 
i e. their Turkish and Islamic backgrounds, or, in other words, what 
the Turks as a nation and Islam as their religion would look like under 
the conditions of contemporary civilization Raising this question was 
not on Gokalp’s initiative. There had been others in Turkey who had 
anticipated or influenced him, as we shall note below, but his unique- 
ness lay in the fact that he was able to discuss this question in terms of a 
coherent, although too schemanc, intellectual framework, analyse all 
of its ramifications, and draw certain conclusions, setting them up as 
formulae for a cultural policy. 

This he did first amidst the throes of the declining Ottoman Empire, 
and then at the rather nebulous stage of the nse of a new nationalist 
regime, both of which, of course, conditioned his work to a great 
extent in form and content, in its merits as well as in its shortcomings. 
However, the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, following its defeat in 
World War I, prepared a more favourable ground for the materializa- 
tion of his ideas. Although he died in the early phase of Ataturk’s 
drasuc reforms, one will find in Gokalp’s writings the ideas behind the 
mam trends of these reforms. His ideas with regard to the particulars 

* The best account of Gskalp’t life anil works to date is to be found in Unel Heyd, 
Fowuluioti of Turkufi A jnoWum (London, 1910). The reader will find there, p 174 , 
a selected list of books and articles on Gekalp. 



14 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
of the Islamic reform suffered most during the ensuing period of drastic 
secularism However, I believe that if he had lived longer he would 
have been able to reconcile himself to the Ataturk policy because his 
ideas on the cahphacy w ere already at variance with the logical conse- 
quences of his Westenust nationalism, being rather fanciful utopias 
designed to find a basis of lntemanonahty to Turkish nationalism. 
Furthermore, we know that the constitutional clauses on secularism 
and the freedom of conscience and thinking were from his pen, as he 
was a member of the committee which prepared the new constitution 
in 1924 Probably it would have been more difficult for him to recon- 
cile himself with the radical purist language-reform policy followed by 
Ataturk. Nevertheless, he remains as the best intellectual formulator 
of the mam trends of the Turkish Republic Westernism, democracy, 
political and economic national independence, and secularism. 
Although in actual practice there have been devianons from some of his 
contentions, it is still his style of thinking with regard to the basic issues 
which has intellectually dominated the modem reforms in Turkey. 

The practical orientation of Gokalp’s ideas and their close associa- 
tion with political action during the years preceding and following 
World War I have led many critics to blame him for Turkey’s political 
misfortunes But in spite of this ideological association, he always 
remained outside of politics and lived as a teacher and writer. He never 
assumed any responsible public office and never aimed at any political 
or personal gam He lived almost in pnvauon He had none of the 
aptitudes of the man of action He was extremely shy and mtroversive. 
At the same tune, he had an exceptional charismatic power over the 
youth of Turkey and even over the pohucians of the Party of Union 
and Progress He was the type of intellectual not infrequently found 
in the East a spiritual guide, an mspirer, a mur/id , , as he was called in 
Turkey. He had marked Sufi inclinations, and the influence of tasawwuf 
always remained conspicuous in his thinking. This helps to explain a 
paradoxical situation with regard to his position today. In spite of his 
enormous influence during his lifetime and the prestige he stall holds, 
his writings, with the exception of some scattered publications, are to a 
large extent unknown and unread Certain slogans and catchwords 
which he popularized have remained in the mem ones and on the bps 
of the people. Some of his ideas are completely forgotten or have 
become distorted; a few which he clearly rejected are still ascnbed to 
him. Socialisccally inclined Statists, extremist masts, Westemists, and 



translator’s introduction ij 

liberals saw him in different ways. His solidansm, or syndicalism, and 
his caliphate utopia are completely forgotten. Only a fraction of his 
writings have been printed in the Latin script, these repeatedly. Until 
now, no edition of his complete WTiungs has appeared* and not even 
a complete and reliable bibliography of his writings exists, f 

One of the reasons for this situation is, of course, the change in the 
Turkish alphabet. There are, however, other reasons to account for it. 
One of these, perhaps, is the fact that he published most of his prose 
writings in periodical reviews, or even in daily newspapers, in the form 
of short essays. Even the few books published in his lifetime, with the 
exception of one or two, were collections of his essays Some of the 
review's or newspapers to which he contributed are not easily available 
today — they were short-lived, and few copies still exist 

Another factor was that Gokalp’s most acuve period of writing 
corresponded to the most unstable and critical periods of Turkish 
history, unfavourable to continuous, careful, and detailed book writing 
For this reason, as he confessed himself, he never had time to write 
comprehensive studies to elaborate his historical, sociological, or 
philosophical ideas. And, finally, there is a social-psychological fact 
to be remembered in this connection. In periods of upheaval, trans- 
formation, and confusion, ideas which win mass appeal tend to become 
myths Under such circumstances, people miss the fine distinctions a 
thinker makes in his concepts, the precise and subtle definitions he 
gives of his terms, and tend instead to make stereotypes. Thus, for 
example, even today many people fail to undeistand Gokalp’s insistence 
on a distinction between culture and civilization or between race and 
nauonality; and one wonders how an anti-Western jingoism or a 
doctrine of racism has come to be derived from his wnungs. 

Gokalp himself, how ever, was very systematic in the use of his 
terminology. On this matter he was perhaps too mechanistic and 
arbitrary. He used to pigeonhole his facts and put labels on them, and 
then proceed with his discussion by manipulating these symbols In 
doing this, he had little regard for exisung terms or even for the facts 

• Hie Turkish I hstoncal Society recently announced the publication of his complete 
writings. So far, however, only the first volume has appeared, containing his poems and 
tales Ziya Gskalp KuUiytm, VoL I, purler V4 Hoik Masallan, edited by Fevziye A. 
Tansel CTttrk Tanh Kururnu Yaytnlanndan, Sen II, No tS (Ankara, ipja) 

t The best bibliography go far pubbshed is Cavit Orfun Tfltengil, Ziya Gokalp 
ItaXku^Li hr BiSliyograJya Dtnrmrn (Istanbul Univctsiresi Iknsat Fakdtesi Yaytnlann- 
dan, No ij (Istanbul, , WJ ) 


I <5 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
themselves. He either used hxs symbol-terms in the meanings he 
ascribed for them, or else invented new ones which were unknown 
until then. This, too, has been one of the reasons for the confusion in 
the exact meanmgs of his symbol-terms. He felt he had to do this 
because, in order to find his solutions, he had to revolutionize the 
sociological and political language of the Turkey of his pme. Those 
who fad to see his ultimate aims usually tend to miss the exact meanings 
of his terms as well, and to turn them into mystified fetishes. 

Bearing in mind these points about Gokalp’s personality, influence, 
language, and symbols, we shall discuss first the general intellectual 
situauon before him and the problems he faced, then how he ap- 
proached these and how he treated them anew in terms of his early 
philosophical oudook, and finally the general conclusions which he 
proposed as a programme of action with regard to the economic, 
poliucal, religious, legal, and cultural problems of Turkey. 

II 

The beginnings of the major problems with which Gokalp dealt are 
to be found in the first half of die nineteenth century, in the Tannmat 
period of Turkish history They came about mainly as a result of 
attempts to reorganize the poliucal, legal, and administrative structure 
of the Ottoman Empire Turkey, it is true, had already been touched 
hy the impact of the West There had been signs in the eighteenth 
century that, in spue of resistance, the idea of Turkey’s having to adapt 
herself to the requirements of European civilizauon gained ground 
continuously * But neither in political orgamzauon, nor in social life 
or in the cultural and intellectual spheres, can we find any substanual 
change in the older Ottoman system, which was dien m a state of 
corruption and disorganization In the political field sultanism still 
reigned as a polmcal-military-fiscal system of the Ottomans Its two 
pillars, the benefice system of the Sipahis and the Janissary organiza- 
tion, still remained, although only in an entirely degenerate form 
Why the vast and efficient military, agrarian, and administrative 
orgamzauon of the Ottomans was disrupted before the effective 
modern European economic and poliucal impact started in the nine- 
teenth century is a question sail almost untouched today but beyond 

* Thu is discussed m detail in the writer s forthcoming study of the history of reform 
ui Turkey 



translator's introduction 17 

the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say here, however, that these 
factors were not much different in nature from those which had given 
rise to modem European economic and political institutions. Our 
present concern is to note that in the eighteenth century — in spite of 
such novelties as the introduction of the printing press — intellectual 
life in Turkey was still under the domination of the medrtse , the 
medieval colleges, and was thoroughly scholastic. Likewise, literature 
and art v ere in a state of a rigid formalism and conventionalism 

It was only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the feeling 
of dissatisfaction which had run through the eighteenth century turned 
into a decision to introduce Western methods The first radical step 
was the destruction of the Janissary system, together with a fight 
against feudalization, which was taking the place of the previous 
benefice system. For the first time in Ottoman history it had become 
necessary to destroy an important institution in order to introduce new 
ones, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Peter the Great’s reforms 
in Russia a century earlier. The Tanzimat edicts of 1839 and 1856 were 
but official confirmauon of this movement, henceforth it became an 
established policy to abolish old institutions which were found to be 
incompatible with corresponding modem imaeuaons and to found new 
ones on the European models. 

Tv.0 factors, however, led to the unsatisfactory application of this 
idea. To follow this ptinaple would necessitate ultimately a radical 
change in the ruling institution itself, which was the only force to put 
the policy into practice. In other words, a despotic monarchy had to 
democratize itself — a situation observed also in Russian history. The 
second factor was the inevitable economic and political consequences 
of the contact of a medieval society with the full-grown European 
expansionist economy and politics Under the pressure of the diffi- 
culties arising mainly from these two factors, the leaders of the Tanzi- 
mat reforms failed to pursue wholeheartedly their programme of mod- 
ernization, as well as to understand the full scope and nature of the 
social transformauon in which they were involved. This hesitancy 
inevitably led to imitation, opportunism, and inconsistencies. One of 
the consequences was the creation of a senes of dichotomies in almost 
every field of life In politics, in administration, in the legal and juridical 
system, in education, in intellectual life, two sets of insututions, two 
sets of ideas, t*o loyalues — one to the old and the other to the new — 
stood side by side. 



l8 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
The man who diagnosed the morbid nature of this situation and 
recognized » as a major obstacle to progress towards the establishment 
of a modem state was Namik Kemal (1840-88). He attempted to 
show the original, or rather idealized, forms of the religious, moral, 
and legal institutions which were associated with Islam, and the origi- 
nal, or idealized, forms of the political institutions of the old Ottoman 
tradition at the time of its prune, and, at the same time, those aspects 
of civilization of the West which had given progress, prosperity, and 
superiority to the European nations. By his discussion of these three 
elements, he arrived at the conclusion that there were no basic contra- 
dictions among them Islam, according to him, would provide the 
moral and legal bases of society, the Ottoman tradition of statecraft, 
together with its multinational and multirehgious cosmopolitan policy 
of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman (not 
Turkish) state, and Western civilization would furnish the material 
and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive 
in the contemporary world of power and economic progress 

In this way Namik Kemal distinguished the areas of the three ele- 
ments in the life of the nineteenth-century Turks For him, the most 
important factor in the failure of theTanzimat was the mental confusion 
with regard to these three elements Thus, for example, the shenat, the 
Islamic law, was dropped in order to take codes from France, while 
European methods in techniques of education, government, science, 
economy, and agriculture were not introduced By their naive wish to 
modernize the state, the men of the Tanzimat reforms unnecessarily 
undertook economic and political obligations towards European 
powers which robbed the Ottoman state of all independence and 
integrity They did not apply any of the principles of modem demo- 
cratic regimes in their administration. But neither the old Ottoman 
political institutions nor Muslim law were in reality incompatible with 
democracy and progress or with modem science. The mam reasons 
why they were thought to be so were, first, the fact that all of these 
traditions had lost their original functions, and second, that the impos- 
rng penetration of European imperialism prevented their smooth 
adaptauon 

The course of events at first ran counter to Namik Kemal’s ideas and 
led to their repudiauon. Following the constitutional revolution of 
1908, however, they were almost completely revived, but in a different 
atmosphere Under the previous suppressive regime the attempt at 



translator’s introduction 19 

reconciliation among the elements that Namik Kemal had discussed 
gave rise to three ideological movements, each of which capitalized 
one of the three elements at the expense of the others. Thus reactionary 
Islamic groups, zealous to defend Islam against the increasing criticisms 
of the missionaries and the new group of European orientalists and 
thinkers, like Renan, provided the support for Sultan Abdul Hamid’s 
pan-Islamic policy. Over against them, the secular intelligentsia — 
now increased in number because of the new secular educanonal 
institutions and enlightened through increasing contacts with European 
literature and thought — stood up as protagonists of the idea of 
Westernism. In addition to these, there arose a small, weak group 
interested in an entirely new concept. Turkishness. Stimulated by the 
polmcal, economic, and literary awakening of the Turkish-speaking 
peoples under Russian rule in the nineteenth century, by the new 
interest of certain romantically inspired European writers (such as 
L^on Cahun), by the increasing effect of the movement ‘towards the 
people’ initiated by Namik Hemal's teacher, Shinasi, and of its interest 
in the basic Turkish language and past, and, finally, by the nauonalist 
movements of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities of the 
Ottoman Empire, together with those of certain European pan- 
movements, such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, a group of 
writers shifted the attention which the Islamists paid to the Islamic past 
of the Muslim-Turkish Ottomans to the ethnic past of the Turks 
themselves.* 

However, the Islamists and Westemists, as well as those interested 
in the Turkish masses and culture, were all Ottomamsts at heart so 
far as political problems were concerned. Even the Young Turks, who 
were active in foreign countries beyond reach of the suppressive 
regime, were not clear on these issues Only gradually and through 
discussion in party conventions, or through communications and pub- 
lishing, did they come to ask the question For what are we fighting* 
For a new sultan 3 For a new consututional Ottoman state which 
would guarantee the rights and privileges of the non-Muslim and non- 
Turkish communities of the empire* All of the Westernise Ottomamsts 
were highly shocked when they were confronted with the nauonalist 
demands of the representatives of these communities For obvious 


* * tecent account of the nse and development 1 

Turkey, tee the admirable article by Bernard Leu-11, 
Revival ui Turkey', MMU Euurn AJatrt, \oL 4 (June 


of nationalist historiography in 
History- wnong and National 
i-July iJO),pp a>S 



TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


German Romanticists or the Russian Slavophils and Populists. He 
believed that it is the people, or the nation, which is the final and 
unemng criterion of what is desirable or undesirable, what is to be 
taken and what rejected. Whatever the ‘collective conscience’ of the 
people accepts is ‘normal’, whatever it rejects is ‘pathological’. As the 
ultimate reality of contemporary society is the nation, and as national 
ideals are ultimate forces orienting the behaviour of the individuals, so 
the most urgent task for the Turks consisted of awakening as a nation 
m order to adapt themselves to the conditions of contemporary 
civilization. He transformed the Turkism of the punst pan-Turkists 
from a mere polincal concept into a cultural one. 

Having an unlimited faith in sociology as the supreme posmve 
science,* Gokalp felt that it was the primary task of this science to 
determine what the Turkish people already possessed or lacked to be a 
modem nation 


To investigate this quesuon, Gokalp began by describing what he 
believed to be the basic malady of the then wasting cultural situation 
in Turkey This consisted of a diagnosis of the dichotomies in every 
field of Turkey’s social life. On the one hand were the people with 

.™£ 0kl!p ’“TA* ,de ? of ma ' or ‘ chool » of European sociology of the late nine- 
'tenth century He found most congenial to his own thinking Emile Durkheim's con- 
JT?' * n*^ 0 ' 0 ^’ “ ™' hod5 > dlv,nons . etc., as well as us philosophical basis. His 
MM in Durkheim s sociology as ih, science of society led some critics to the convicuon 
that Gokalp merely imitated Durkheim It is true that he did not deviate from a Durk- 
nomian understanding of sociology This was not fortuitous, because, like Durkheim, 
Gokalp too was a student of philosophy tiyrng to develop a philosophy of values and of 
* reconciliation between positivism and idealism, which he attempted before 
of the iXlriTroble™ *<■ DurUwun'* wntmgs. In developing his sociological analyses 
called T f T “I key : Proved wuh this philosophy, which he later 

tothosefounrf'w! I, n ^ S*?* ***• "d ^od, no. ahke 

“nmulrd 'u* ? Urkh “? His discussion of culture and cmloacon and his view. 

-™ "rsit;, Si'dr”"" fc ■ it • u °? ty 

nearer to J. ^ ,It ) rd . V ca . P On these points he u 

Weber, and even <**• P* ** •“* *&* 

direct nfl„,rlr.r , ldc “ “pressed m W G Sumner's Folkways No 
thiTwnterdiat cLfab 'T* Ver ' has b « n esndilished so far It JL* to 

pendendy, although they 1 ^ e - menao,1 ' d P°“>N <PUtc <**'- 

distinction of the m assets of W esJ^W !<>S«aI consequence of Nairuk Kemal a 
sociological uleasT^T^Tu^ W F ? a bnef >«ount of the vanou. 

■Sociology in Tutk^#lX 7 before a^d after Gokalp, see die wotet'a arocte, 
aj»-4«. ’ Journal ef Sociology, Vok a (September 1956), pp 



translator’s introduction 23 

their intimate, informal institutions, their religion, their art, and their 
thinking; on the other was the official organization with its formal, 
artificial institutions, all borrowed from the civilizations of the East 
and the West - its fikh, its divan literature, its hodgepodge of unin- 
telligible language, and all its imitations of the superficialities of French 
civilization None of these latter had taken root among the people, 
they remained not only alien but even irreconcilable To Gokalp, the 
reason for this anomalous situation was a lack of adjustment between 
the two essential but distinct aspects of social life — civilisation and 
culture. 

The concepts of culture and civilization thus occupied a major 
position in his thinking, yet they puzzled many of his cntics who tried 
to see wherein lay the importance of making a sharp distinction be- 
tween the two If his analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two 
concepts do not represent antithetical and mutually exclusive entities, 
but rather two closely related and complementary traits of social 
reality. Briefly sated, civilization refers to modes of action composed 
of the ‘traditions’ which are created by different ethnic groups and 
transmitted from one to another Culture, on the other hand, is com- 
posed of the ‘mores’ of a particular nation and, consequendy, is unique 
and sut generis The 'traditions’ are rational forms of behaviour 
imposed upon individuals by their common civilization, white ‘mores’ 
represent the specific value judgments, or ethos, of a particular nation 
Culture constitutes a system whose elements have an integral connec- 
tion with one another on the basis of a peculiar logic which constitutes 
the ethos; civilization, on the other hand, is a product of detachment 
from that logic. Civilizanonal elements assume meaning and function 
in the life of men only when they enter into the service of culture 
Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of 
mechanical imitation, it never penetrates into the inner life of a people 
and never gives fruit of any kind 

That was exactly what had happened in Turkey and perhaps in 
other Muslim nations, where civilization had come to be a mere 
skeleton corroding and annihilating all cultural flesh and blood of the 
social body. When a new civilization presented itself from the West, 
tins lifeless skeleton lost all meaning and creativity With this addition 
of the impact of Western civilization, the situation presented a three- 
fold difficulty to thinking minds, but the question was basically the 
*ame dichotomy between civilization and culture. 



24 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


The remedy, according to Gokalp, lay in discovering the basic social 
unit which is the source of cultural values To him, that source was the 
form of society which he called ‘nation’. The nation, he furthermore 
belies ed, is that independent social unit which is at the basis of modem 
(Western) civilization In other words, modem Western civilization is 
the international product of several peoples who have reached the 
stage of nationhood m the course of social evolution. Turkey was in 
turmoil because it was in the process of transformation from a theo- 
cratic ( ummet ) civilization to a civdizauon based on modem nationality, 
the full nature of which was snll unknown. In order to prove these 
points, it was necessary for him to establish the sociology reality of 
the nation’ in teims of social evolution, trace its historical formation, 
analyse us elements, and, finally, develop a method of cultural criticism 
with a view to discovering the roots of maladjustments and the means 
of their amehorauon 


Gokalp’s ideas all revolved around his understanding of 'nation', 
and undoubtedly this constitutes his major contnbunon to Turkish 
thought The word m,U, r, which notv sand, f„, 'natton', „ omt 
simply meant a religious community Even Nam* Kemal, tvho for the 
, ' i a ™aonal consciousness among his people, failed 

" „ “?* k“T“ ,Sm ? “ * e v ° r » concept of 
natron within die framework of comemponuy civtliaanon. Gokalp set 
about giving d* Turks a new defimuon, a7d dus he surpassed ,n 
d’ 0 " rV? » '» contemporaries He mobilized 
i™ HT ^ ll " OC " M conception of nattonahty. 

LTmri T T a , ‘‘i™”" *bat die average Turk, who a, di. 
St c „ s y h,n "' lr “ * blusbm member of the O, roman 
One way ” " 8 I"* »° »*« soetologtcal enmies. 

was a political mtematlonal reh g 10us community, and the other 
™l irot—T"™” ! '” E ” l[S elf severalnanonaliues as 
the rue ^ Gokalp penned out, with 

with two other rom ^ P “- T " k “"' ="« to be confined 
f ™ iy ' and '™ h 

fled wadi neither of these ^ ,PJa "a" 0 " coul d be tdcr.tu 

mem 

rary Western civilization. I„ d» cowW.lT ° rcom '”I>°- 

develops a specific culture There 7 f ' v0,u “ on ™y '“'■f 
nere is no continuous process of evolution 



translator’s INTRODUCTION 2J 

of the totality of human society. Societies may, however, be grouped 
by species. Interdependence, factual relations, and similarities between 
societies of the same species lead to the formation of mtersoctety 
groupings or ‘civilization circles’, but, according to Gokalp, these are 
'communities’ rather than 'societies’. From a sociological point of view, 
they remain vcak and loose formations because they lack common 
binding cultural values. Only civihzational links tie them together, 
whereas societies, or nations, follow charactensnc life attitudes and an 
immanent development. 

Hon ever, throughout the social evolution from the primitive seg- 
mental type of society to present-day organic society, the confines of 
the nation have widened, chiefly through a civilizauonal process Thus, 
the modem nation is a new type. The primary factor in its formation 
is neither race or ethnic unity nor a symbiotic coexistence with other 
nations within a political, religious intemationality, or a civilization 
circle. The modem nation is a community in a unique complex of 
cultural values, on the one hand, and a society based on organic 
solidarity, division of labour, and functional differentiation, on the 
other. The ethnic soaeues which have emerged as modem nations 
v enc through a sort of period of captivity within wremauonal potmco- 
religious civilizations and, as a result of the disintegration of these 
avilizauons, have come out as entirely new formations with the 
development of the processes of secularization and democratization 
Nanons never come into existence out of nothing, as we see in all the 
vain attempts at creating artificial nationalities They must have an 
ethnic basis, must undergo a process of transformation within supra- 
national formations, and must experience the revival of national 
consciousness under great events Although nations turn to their ethnic 
past during their revival and think that they are continuations of it, 
they are no longer the same ethnic units and cannot return to archaic 
conditions. Neither can a modem nanon carry on the hang-overs of its 
imperial or theocratic civilization It is a homogenized product of 
various racial, ethnic, and religious elements welded to one another by 
historical catastrophes, and ts no longer reducible to its elements. In 
this new form of nation, all hang-overs from the tribal or theocratic 
civilizauonal elements become ‘pathological'. Only cultural remains are 
normal, because it is only these that are alive and capable of giving 
cohesion and orientation to die life of the nation 

The modem nanon is an independent cultural unit within the con- 



26 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
fines of contemporary civilization- However, the two stand in rather 
precarious relation to each other As in the past ethnic societies uere 
swallowed by larger civilizanonal groups, so modem nations have to 
remain in the orbit of contemporary civilization Would this lead to 
merging in a larger international society* Gokalp was scepdca! of the 
expectations to that effect and dismissed them as utopias Only civiliza- 
tions! organizations might arise in the future, and of their effecnvenesshe 
was not fully convinced Like many of his contemporaries, he did not 
attach much value to the high-sounding international ideals of con- 
temporary civilization For Gokalp, only muons had social reality as 


However, Gokatp’s mam concern was not the fiiture problems of 
modem nations within the contemporary cvilizanona! mtemanonality, 
but rather the immediate problems of Turkey Western civili- 

zation His purpose m dealing with die relations between culture and 
h™on„°h “ 7 '“' ^ of productng adiustment and 

when , ctai L uytng to 
Dishatmo ° n4 ^ e a vl,IM,l0n U1 order to enter another. 

ifaT rA "J e ' C os ' of Turkey, that which 

nations anstng ou, of *e folds of 
E urop ean Chnanantty. The Turks .Rented from then past thetr 

fceb^d F I , *' ™P'« of » highly 

a a vibration before which th J w^T’. ? r me 

Turks obviously could not ceaTe to £ " *, p > ” f collapse. The 

to do so neither cnnW . ^ ur ^ s » nor would they desire 

succeeded Jn doing so. But as a nation T* ItS ™ Jres< had never 

contemporary\ secular Western CMltzauTr “ d, “ nseIve » “ 
xvhtch they belonged in the past was neither secula^^'m' 1 “ 
modem nauonal.fy. This was the problem of o.ln i adaptabl . e *? 
Gokalp finally aimed at solving P * ^ raI cnt,asm which 



translator’s introduction VJ 

V 

Gokalp’s distinctions and definitions had been aimed at a clearer 
discussion of this problem. He believed that he had formulated the 
outlines of a branch of sociology which we might call a sociology of 
culture, a normative discipline based on the general positive science of 
sociology. By applying the principles of his sociology of culture, he 
came to the conclusion that the three factors represented by the three 
ideologies (Islamism, Westernism, and Turkism) were not, in reality, 
incompatible with one another, provided that the areas of the national 
social life to which they referred were viewed from correct angles 
Then would it be seen that they are even complementary to each other 
within the framework of the modern nation. 

The Islamists were wrong because they did not see the reality of the 
nation as distinct from the theocratic ummet They insisted on the 
restoranon of, or return to, the shenat, which was, in feet, nothing but 
a civikzational crystallization of law fitted to an ummet They failed to 
distinguish the universally valid truths in Islam from those aspects 
which were only socially and temporally relevant, and therefore 
identified the first with the second. They identified religion with law 
and ntual, as would be normal within the framework of a theocrauc 
ummet. Thus, they failed to see Islam as having a universal message 
for the pious, good man, and a moral, ethical character That is why 
one found religious fanaucism and moral laxity side by side They made 
Islam something concerned with Only the technicalities and intricacies 
of the observance of ntual and legal rules, and inevitably stood against 
everything new because they identified life wnth rules They wanted to 
maintain the same rigidity, nay, even to tighten it, in the face of the 
increasing pace of progress under contemporary conditions, and as a 
result came to dash more violently with the needs of the nation. Here 
lay the source of the idea that Islam and contemporary civilization are 
incompatible — the basic conviction of the Westemists 

But the latter were wrong in their convicuons, too Gokalp con- 
temptuously called them the zealots of Europeamsm, as he called the 
former the zealots of fkhism. In spite of the undeniably great service 
performed by the Europeamst leaders of the Tanzimat reforms, they 
were WTOng because they did not take care to proceed in terms of a 
cultural framework. They were like automatons m what they did, 
devoid of meaningful objectives. They were under the illusion of 



28 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
certain avilizational fictions, for example, as they desperately tried to 
convince the people that the Ottoman community was a nation. Thetr 
political sy stem had nothing to do with the political structure of modem 
democratic nations. They thought that an autocratic and theocratic 
system would be modernized when partially modified by a half- 
hearted Europeanization which allowed all meaningless superficialities 
and formalities to enter full sway. 

Viewed from the right angle Westernization was not only com- 
patible with Turkey’s national culture, but was even indispensable to 
ns flourishing. A full-fledged national culture could come into existence 
only when its raw material, still on an ethnic and folk level, was 
worked with the fresh techniques of a civilization to which many 
nations had contributed Similarly, there was no incompatibility be- 
tween Western civilization and Islam In order to defend this latter 
thesis, Gokalp had to refute two contentions of the Islamists which 
were shared by many Europeans and were a constant sore point and 
dilemma for the Westernises - he rejected the idea that Islam was a 
civilization and that Western ovdizauon was synonymous with 
Christianity It is true, he said, that religions have developed civiliza- 
tiona] forms, but it is equally true that they have giv en cultural content 
to the ethos of nauons Civilization is basically free from value judg- 
ments , it is a matter of factual reality And, furthermore, contemporary 
civilization, arising out of the victory of the rauonal mind and positive 
science over avilizational Christianity, is desuned to become more 
secular as it encompasses Muslims, like the Turks, and non-Muslims- 
non-Chnstians, tike the Japanese. Therefore, the acceptance of con- 
temporary Western civilization has nothing to do with either national- 
ity or faith The confusion on this point is due to a confusing of culture 
with civilization. 

There emerges in connection with the problem of the relationship 
between culture and civilization an interesting question which w r e 
would expect Gokalp to discuss To what extent were the cultural and 
the religious backgrounds of the Turkish nationality receptive and 
stimulating to contemporary Western avalization 5 Many Europeaiusts 
of his tune thought that they were not. Gokalp, on the other hand, 
wanted to demonstrate the contrary. In order to prove that Turkish 
culture was not only favourable but even conducive to the require- 
ments of modem civilization, he preferred to resort to dubious history 
rather than to examine die present existing institutions of the people. 



translator's introduction 29 

Apparently he felt it necessary to discover the original ethnic basis of 
Turkish culture. But the infancy of the Turkological studies of his 
time, his questionable competence in the field compared to the authority 
of such present-day scholars as Fuad Koprulu, the insufficient charac- 
ter of the materials he used, and his too-evident bias in using these 
materials, cast shadows on the credibility of his findings or at least on 
his methods. However that may be, Gokalp’s conclusions were entirely 
new and fascinating to his contemporaries. With bold generahzanons 
he proclaimed that the basic Turkish cultural traits were not those 
salient features of the so-called Oriental institutions which were 
regarded as contrary to modem civilization and had long been associ- 
ated with the Turks, such as polygamy, the seclusion of women and 
their low status, fatalism, and asceticism Neither was that sickly 
Oriental music or that fearful conception of a transcendental God 
Turkish at all. These were imposed upon the Islamized Turks, chiefly 
through die infiltiauon of the cxvihzationa! traditions of the Near East 
into the fikh books, into the medrese teaching, and into the endenm 
(palace) etiquette and the divan art. They never got a hold over the 
Turkish ethos. They had a place only among the de-Turkified and 
'civilized' Ottoman intelligentsia 

The same features were also traditionally attributed to Islam. But 
to Gokalp they were not inherent in Islam, as he found their origins 
elsewhere. Certain elements of Arab and, secondarily, Persian culture 
bad crept into die shertat When cultural elements of a certain social 
species of a particular time became common avilizational elements, 
they tned to impose themselves as value judgments on the national 
ethos by book, law, court, or state But, in spite of the sanctioning of 
these institutions, certain tribal customs, such as Ux tahonts, or polyg- 
amy, remained only in the fikh books and never became universal 
institutions of Turkish culture. 

The only customs or habits or ideas existing among the Turkish 
people which were not compatible with modem cmlizauon, Gokalp 
believed, were those which remained as survivals or fossils of such 
dead instituuons and were, therefore, easy to eradicate. He always 
urged die men of reform not to be frightened by them since they were 
vestigial structures in the social body, to be cut out with one stroke 
without damaging the life of the nation — provided it was nourished 
by fresh cultural and avilizational nutrients. (Ataturk, in his icono- 
clastic decisions, later proved him to be right.) 



JO TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
Gokalp tried to find yardsticks to judge the genuinely basic culture 
traits and thus to distinguish, in terms of his understanding of good 
and bad, the normal from the pathological, 1 e. those elements which 
were incompatible with modem conditions. As mentioned earlier, he 
found one in the pre-Islamic origins. He accepted, as a second rule, the 
ethos of the nation as expressed by the Great Man, the genius, the hero, 
and the sage. These men, with their excepuonal power of insight and 
intuition and utmost sincerity, were the real representatives of the 
national ethos as well as the mainsprings of progress. It is absurd, he 
believed, to take the opinion or behaviour of the average man as a 
criterion of action Thirdly there were the works of the anonymous 
collectivity The people learned humanity, goodness, and meaning m 
life not from the dead books of the doctors of law or the artificial, 
unnatural literature of the courts Their hearts and imaginations for 
centuries had been nurtured not by these, but by their own humble 
religious experiences in their mysttc fraternities and by their aesthetic 
experiences in their rich folklore These institutions of the people, 
which constitute a virgin and ferule soil for the creation of a modem 
culture, should be studied, learned, and cultivated by the elite of the 
nation, who are the bearers of modem civilization and the builders of 
the future modem national culture Their cravings to create will be 
satisfied, not by blind imitation or parrodike repeution of the cultural 
products of the nations of Western civilization, but by refining this 
store of raw material through the knowledge, techniques, and skills 
which they acquire from modem civilization 

VI 

This was, in short, the message which Gokalp brought from his 
cultural analyses to the leaders of Turkish national reconstruction 
His programme shows that his original three-fold treatment, m the 
final analysis, amounted to a two-fold directive, towards the culture 
of the people and towards contemporary civilization Uncover culture 
in order to reach civilization Base on a secure foundation in order to 
achieve progress 

What were die tangible effects of his teachings 5 By taking the 
nation and the people as the ultimate cultural, political, and economic 
unit, he paved the way to a view of Turkey as a nation, as a national 
state, and ultimately as a democracy. By differentiating Turkey from a 



translator’s introduction 31 

theocratic conception of theummet, he prepared the Turks for a secular 
view of religion, culture, and civilization Stressing the possibility of 
incorporating Western civilization on a Turkish cultural foundation, 
he prepared the nay for a dynamic policy. He also initiated a new 
historical and sociological interest in the pre-Islamic past of the Turks 
and in the history of the actual institutions of Islam in contrast to 
Islam as conceived within the theoretical framework of the sheriat He 
stimulated a vigorous and passionate interest in folk culture If his own 
researches on history, folklore, and sociology have little value com- 
pared to the works of Turkish and foreign scholars of our time, this 
does not at all minimize his significance as a pathfinder and explorer 
If some of his ideas are almost forgotten in present-day Turkey, and if 
some of them, quite new in his time, seem merely commonplace today, 
it is because they have become facts. All this shows the depth of his 
influence and the scope of his vision 

We see, therefore, that Gokalp was not a philosopher, although 
there was a philosophy at the base of his social thinking He was also 
neither a sociologist nor an historian tn any real sense Equally influ- 
ential as a talker, lecturer, professor, and man of public affairs, Gokalp 
consecrated his writings as well as his teachings to giving a new 
onentation to the thinking of a people which was, as he believed, in a 
stage of transition from one civilization to another and to pointing up 
new goals for the achievement of this transformation Whatever his 
shortcomings as a philosopher or sociologist, he will remain in Turkish 
history as a genuine thinker who had exceptional insight into existing 
problems and a vision of a brighter future. 


NIYAZI BERKES 



CHAPTER I 


AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 


MY FATHER’S TESTAMENT 1 

I HAD just entered the fourteenth winter of my life I was the laziest 
student in the military high school I had, however, an inborn aptitude 
for mathematics and a passionate inclination toward poetry and litera- 
ture. The courses in mathematics did not prevent me from being a lazy 
student because I could solve the problems and prove the theorems 
with ease And since I read books of poetry and literature with great 
delight, I was never tired of them. As to other subjects, I disliked and 
hated them, for, in accordance with the pedagogical methods of the 
time, they required a great deal of rote learning 

My father was not like the other fathers of those days, but a man 
who was able to combine within himself both piety and free- thinking. 
He had freed himself of all kinds of superstitious beliefs, old and new. 
Like all timid and introspective persons, he had an inborn insight into 
matters of the spirit Once, a friend of his who had heard about my 
tearful reading of books like Shah Ismail and Kerem the Lover, advised 
him to keep me away from these books of the folk minstrels and to 
induce me to read serious books in their stead. 'A child', my father 
replied, ‘should read only what he understands and enjoys If you 
impose books on a child, and if he is not interested in them, he may 
hate them.’ In fact, it was because I was allowed to read what I enjoyed 
that I was able to progress from the books of the minstrels to w orks of 
drama and short story, and then to pure poetry and great novels, 
reading at last works of history, science, and philosophy 
Although my father left me free to read what I wanted, he did not 
miss any opportunity — at critical psychological moments — to impress 
me deeply enough to evoke new interests in my soul One evening 
when I had come home from school I found him very sad and unhappy 
'Come here', he said as soon as he saw me, ‘I have some sad news to 
tell you. You will certainly weep and mourn Today wall be a day of 
great sorrow for you and for your friends, because your greatest 



3 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
teacher and the greatest man of this nation, Namik Kemal, has died*' 2 

I was acquainted with the w orks of Namik Kema], even with his 
unpublished and forbidden storks, but I did not know that he was a 
great teacher and a great man My father told me, in a sad voice, the 
story of his struggles, his ideals, the injustices he suffered, the heroic 
resistance he shoved, and finally he said. ‘And now, you will be a 
follower of this man. You also will be a patriot like him, and a lover of 
freedom as he was.’ 

The moment chosen to impress me, and the manner in which it was 
done, could not have been better. My father’s words were so inspiring 
that they created in my soul an entirely new strength — the strength 
of an idealism of which 1 had not been aware until then* From that 
moment on, my thinking was that of a conscious lover of freedom 
and of an awakened patriot. I began to become alive to the ideals 
of liberty, fatherland, and nation above everything else. My soul had 
been suddenly changed by a creative elan 

But let me come to my main point As I said, I was just beginning 
my fourteenth year. One day my father was talking with one of his 
friends who was wiling him something about my great ambition for 
learning He said that if I were sent to Europe to study, the country 
would gain a man of learning My father said: ‘The youth sent to 
Europe to study learn only European sciences, but remain Ignorant of 
our own national learning Those who attend the meJrese s* may learn 
something about our religious and national learning, if ihey happen 
to have good teachers, but they remain ignorant of the European 
sciences I believe that for us the most useful teachers will be those 
who know the truths which are most immediately necessary for us. 
And these truths cannot be discovered by the European sciences, nor 
do they exist now in our national learning in a real sense. Our youth 
must study carefully French, on the one hand, and Arabic and Persian, 
on the other. They must come to a position where they can master 
both Western and Eastern learning And then they must discover the 
great truths which our nation needs, by comparing and combining 
Western and Eastern learning. This is die way 1 want to educate Ziya, 
if I can only live long enough to see to it.’ 

My poor father did not live for even a year after the time he said 
these words. He could not reakte his plans. But his words remained 
engraved on my soul m distinct letters, as a sacred testament. 

I have never forgotten and will never forget them as long as I live. 



AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 37 

His words had initiated a great change in my life. Till that time I 
lacked any critical sense in my reading, entertaining a boundless trust 
in authors. Books and authors had tremendous influence and authority 
over me Now, before my eyes, the words of my father dethroned the 
hbranes of the East and the West at one stroke, and gave unlimited 
freedom and independence to my own mind and intelligence. 

Furthermore, they invited me, as a member of the whole body of 
youth, to the fulfilment of a long and very difficult task. 

MY TEACHER’S TESTAMENT* 

In the college we had begun to study natural sciences on the one 
hand and theology on the other. These two opposite currents, one 
charged with the posiuve and the other with the negative electric 
power over morality, do not long fail to strike shafts of scepticism 
instead of sparks of truth as they collide in a spiritual void. Thus, 
posiuve truths and ideals began to vie within my soul with an intensity 
increasing every day. My heart could not remain content while seeing 
Man — virtuous and heroic, the only source of my inspirauons — turned 
into a Machine, devoid of will and freedom, and made only of Matter, 
low, base, servile — sterile. 

My greatest desire was to know whether my people — threatened by 
a thousand dangers and yet unaware of them because of the narcoucs 
of Tyranny — w ould be able to save themselves by some miraculous 
effort. What I needed was a philosophy of hope, a theory of salvation. 
If Man was nothing but a Machine, if he lacked the miraculous power 
to raise himself above Nature, then my people would not be able to 
survive. And Humanity, too, would be destined always to flounder in 
the wilderness. 

Neither theology nor mysticism could give me this philosophy of 
hope and this theory of salvation. They were unable to penetrate into 
the ideals of modern life I wanted to see Humanity, Man, elevated, my 
people and my land freed But within my head was living a hidden 
personality weighing all my judgments with only mathematical 
measures, evaluating with logical standards, refusing to accept any 
judgment without subjecting it to the touchstones of facts and 
experience. That was my reason It was a rebel, struggling to break 
my hopes and choke my illusions My sole support at that tune was 
escapism, by which I could more or less maintain an equilibrium in 
my soul. 



38 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

But one day a line from my own pen took even this support from 
me- 

Wh3t is the use of evading the Truth 9 
It was dunng these days that a teacher — -a philosopher — <wM appointed 
to our school to teach us natural history. Besides bemg acquainted with 
European philosophy and French literature, this man had also studied 
the modem period of Turkish literature. He was an odd man, a 
physician who yet did not believe in medicine. ‘There is no positive 
truth in medicine,’ he used to say, ‘excepting Epsom salt*-’ He was a 
Greek, and jet a friend of the Turks. Or at least, we used to think 
he was 

Dr Yorgi had come to our Eastern provinces as an army doctor after 
his graduation from the [Turkish] Medical School. He had travelled 
many years from town to town and had seen many places- He lived in 
solitude How did he spend his leisure erne 9 By doing one thing only: 
reading 1 Maybe it was his constant reading that had made Dr Yorgi a 
learned man, a philosopher 

When Dr Yorgi came to the school, he used to read daily the 
compositions we wrote as class assignments for our teacher of litera- 
ture This was the most intense penod of my internal crises. The 
bitterness of my conflicts was intensely reflected in my compositions 
irrespective of the subjects our teacher assigned Dr Yorgi apparently 
found a smell of philosophizing in my troubled reasonings Whenever 
he came to our classroom he used to talk about my compositions. 
I listened with great attention, each word opening new horizons 
tome 

It is not necessary that I now describe at length the crises I was 
going through Suffice it to say that they led me finally to attempt 
suicide, and to insomnia which continued for several years and left 
me almost a skeleton. I did not have any organic disease, nor had I any 
social discomfort The source of my trouble was my thoughts. I used 
to believe that if I were able to reach what I then called the Great 
Truth, I would be relieved from all pain. But where could I find it 9 
When I was writing a revolutionary poem, another line flowed sud- 
denly from my pen pointing out where I should seek: 

The honour of the Nation is today entrusted to tiS-* 

The Great Truth, then, was nothing but ideals. And the highest 

* Thu poem was published two yean btet in ImUal, edited by Ah $efl*ti in London 



AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 39 

ideals were those of nationality and liberty. I described the power of 
the ideal of freedom on the human soul in the following stanza: 

The passion of life had shackled me 
Until I broke ns chains, I was free! 

But now Being has caught my soul 
In us ubiquitous chains of steel 
I am free, and being free 
I am enslaved by Freedom's passion. 

I had come to Istanbul to fight for the cause of these ideals. At that 
time there was a secret organization* there, formed by the students of 
the Medical School. I began to work with them 
After a while. Dr Yorgi too came to Istanbul. One day, Abdullah 
Hafim, one of my former classmates, proposed that we pay a visit to 
the Doctor. He knew his house in Moda. We went there together. Our 
former teacher talked about the recent movements in Istanbul. ‘The 
Turkish youth’, he said, ‘want a political revolution, the foundation 
of a constitutional r 4 gime This is a praiseworthy movement. How- 
ever,’ he added, ‘a revolution cannot be achieved by imitation A 
revolution in Turkey must suit the social life and the national spirit of 
the Turkish people The Constitution must emerge from the soul of 
the Turkish nation. It must fit into ns national structure Otherwise a 
revolution may do harm rather than good id the country To make a 
good constitution, you have to study, first of all, the psychology and 
sociology of the Turkish people. You know the revolutionaries, more 
or less, I presume. Have they made these studies* Do they base their 
programme on them * Are they, in short, prepared in a scientific spirit 
for the fight they are initiating*' 

We 'were unable to answer these questions. As a matter of fact, they 
were asked not in order to be answered, but rather to tell something. 
He knew very well that the studies he had in mind were not what 
either of us was doing Certainly he wanted only to give a final lesson 
to his two former students, to leave them a philosophical testament 
I never forgot my teacher’s testament, as I always remembered that 
of my father From that day on I set out to study the fundamentals of 
psychology and sociology in order to understand the Turkish nation. 

THE TESTAMENT OF MY SPIRITUAL GUIDE* 

In the year 1900 I spent ten months in Tajkijla prison. These ten 
months, during which I lived in solitude in the clothing depot of a 



40 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
dormitory lull ofsoldiers, delivered me for ever from my psychological 
depressions. From Ta$ki?la I was moved to Mehterhane, and then to 
the police gaol. 

There I met a revolutionary whose name was Naim Bey. This old 
man, who belonged to a distinguished family of Istanbul, was im- 
prisoned, as was I, in the building of the police general headquarters, 
for political reasons. During the time I stayed there, I used to listen to 
the words of this enlightened old man, full of idealism, hope, and 
inspiration On the day of my departure, he took me to a comer and 
said ‘As Peter the Great had a testament to his nation, I too have a 
message to leave to the youth of my nation. For some years I have been 
telling it to every young man I have met If only one among them 
could fulfil my testament, it would be enough for me to rest peacefully 
in my grave until eternity. I am convinced that one day freedom will 
surely come to my country, though I do not know how it will be 
attained Perhaps when the present ruler dies, the one to succeed him 
will restore the Constitution to please the people I am old and I do 
not hope to see that day. But I am sure you will live to see it. 

*You must know that the first constitutional regime, in whatever 
way it might be achieved, will not be a genuine one. It is not enough 
for it to be wanted and established by a few persons. To be real it 
has to be understood by the people. Today, however, our people are 
in a deep slumber. Can a sleeping people understand the value of free- 
dom J The first constitutional regime, therefore, cannot live long. The 
doors of the Parliament will be closed once more We can understand 
how this will happen by comparing it with similar events which have 
taken place in Europe and by looking at the state of affairs in our own 
country. 

‘I visualize the situation in my imagination thus, as there will be 
no moral control over the people, the deputies will soon start a race for 
spoils, newspapers will start blackmailing; the extremists will attack 
even die most vigorous traditions This will naturally distress sup- 
porters of thii constitutional regime. Some people, on die other hand, 
will start Pan-Ctslamic organizations and campaigns. The British, be- 
coming suspicious of these organizations and propaganda, will put 
pressure upon the Palace to suspend the Parliament. The Court, already 
realizing that its influence is diminishing under the democratic opinions 
expressed in speeches and in the press, will readily give way to this 
pressure, and, hiring one or two papers, will start a wild campaign 



AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 41 

against the constitutional regime. And then one morning we shall read 
the Holy Decree declaring that the Parliament has been suspended 
until a more suitable moment comes for reopening it. Such will be the 
fate of the first parliamentary administration I can see it now in detail. 
If you had lived through my experiences, you too would be able to 
visualize it. 

‘And yet you should not be discouraged by this quick ending It 
could not have been a genuine parliamentary regime 

“The most important thing, however, is to maintain the freedom of 
the press. And my testament will be only on this point I said that the 
nanon is in deep slumber The people will awaken only when they 
themselves are aware of their own aims and goals. But if there is no 
free and independent press, how will they ever be brought to this 
realization 5 

‘In order to do this, however, our own thinkers should know these 
ends first Today they do not have any definite and clear nouon of 
them. The danger frightening me most is the absence of thinking minds 
who will be ready at the coming of the consututional period. If such 
people do not exist, what is the use of having a free press 5 It is this 
worey th3t is guiding me to leave a message to die youth. You will 
have ten more years nil the day freedom comes The youth must spend 
these years reading, thinking, and searching day and night You must 
disco\ er w here the salvation of this nation lies. Which ideals and behefs 
should be inculcated in our people 5 Which ideals will waken them, 
wall move and lead them in the new direction 5 Which pnnctples can 
elevate them towards civilizauon 5 You must discover all these funda- 
mentals in order to have a clear scheme by which to lead the nation, 
or you may be lost when the day of freedom comes You ought to 
know what to do and say In preparing your course in tins way, you 
must take over the leadership of a paper or a review as soon as the press 
gets its freedom. You must publish your guiding principles untiringly, 
principles w hich will bnng the new ideals and new orientations before 
the people I say untiringly because this initial freedom will not last 
long, since it will not be 3 genuine one. Freedom of the press w ill also 
be of short duration. Therefore, you must write as much as possible, 
you must incise every vital wound, every grievance of the people, as 
quickly as possible, so as to get the maximum benefit from this short 
period. The opportunity is elusive like a bird, it slips out of your hands 
quickly. In such periods you cannot move slowly and cautiously, for 



7 Tl ”“' SH AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

if y™ do h™ rale „ ta you ^ ^ 

JK 

«tE2rsr " d "”** ° r to 

again, a thousand nm« ^ on S er - Let Tyranny come 

wider chains much heav”E btforeTe’all U ' d “ l”? 1 >* P"' 

printed tn the days of freedom k» a i j U P 3 ?” 5 and reviews 
doesn’t matter On the contrarv ,1^ ^ noxlous and forbidden It 
becomes, the stronger the r2on to ** 

awakening People are mo,. 10 U ^ 1116 morc ra P ,d dlc 

been dec.fred XSve ZT" T* *?* ^ ** ^ 
braving all dangers, so will « be in £?7 '“r S “ b * ers,ve maKnals 
They will be sought for imn..i T * f ays of tfie future Tyranny, 
the ideals shown are valid Vihe ™ ,*"** ? 3SS fr ° m ^ hand If 
stings CMudy^SL^JT? 0 !^ P ro P°*d useful, these 
fote ,„,o their ^ 2 thnD,( > 0i ' l,1 “ 

awakened that they can win freedom k ** pe0 P Ie have ***" 

freedom they will find indispensable . by , thelr own effons > «be kind of 
"This fast comumtionT ^ ,° thtIf own «hwk*. 

» will give permanent freedom^ Ae beco " le ^us a genuine one and 
"bat I want to convey ,o,hZ u / e0p,e > 10 *>“ press ‘ The* « 
Time has 

came again and dispersed the P,,i ^ * Ann,sace . Tyranny 
and thinkers uere KliJ^T 1 Severf waters, journalists, 
of 'll. pro. A. cC, ° “ d “ ^ ™ pw to 4c freedom 
nude 4e people ,hake *em,e|,£'!tT ?“ gmt Ueji > ■>“ 

dence. A hero, a s»».’ u s h .°™” “ d 

extraordinary even,, fad „ 0 , liT? ™nes. If 4ese 

predm ° f ^ ou 

myself to the truth he had^h™" 8 ’ ** » Sked me t0 P r °mise to commit 

<C ■">; “ 1“ fad sealed „ ‘ °7e “h, mid ' h ""”' S P™”> G"' d « 

should consecrate myself patb t0 *b e goals for which I 



AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 


43 


MY NATIONALITY* 

... A person’s nationality cannot be determined arbitrarily. It is a 
matter to be solved scientifically. When, in my youth, I went for the 
first time to Istanbul to study, I was forced to make this scientific 
inquiry for myself because there, in accordance with a bad habit which 
had survived of old, people from the Black Sea coast were called Lazes, 
those from Syria and Iraq, Arabs, and those from Rumeli [Turkish 
territories in the Balkan peninsula], Albanians, all those who belonged, 
like myself, to the Eastern Anatolian provinces were called Kurds. Up 
until that ume I had considered myself a Turk This feeling of mine, 
however, was not based on any scientific knowledge In order to dis- 
cover the truth, I began to study the Turks and the Kurds. 

Above all, I began with language In the city of Diyarbekir the 
people know some Kurdish although their mother tongue is Turkish 
This bilingualism can be explained in either of two ways either the 
Turkish spoken in Diyarbekir was the Turkish of the Kurds or the 
Kurdish spoken there was the Kurdish of the Turks. My linguisuc 
Studies have shown that the Turkish spoken in Diyarbekir was nothing 
but a natural language extending from Baghdad to Adana, to Baku and 
to Tabriz — the Azeri dialect peculiar to Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu 
Turks. There is nothing artificial in this language, and, therefore, it is 
not a language corrupted by the Kurds (The fact that the Diyarbekir 
dialect is the Azen dialect also disproved the thesis that the urban 
population spoke Turkish under the force of the Ottoman govern- 
ment, because if it were so the dialect spoken in the cities would be the 
Ottoman dialect.) On the other hand, the Kurdish spoken by the people 
of Diyarbekir, consisting of a limited number of words, is, as I dis- 
covered, different from the pure Kurdish spoken in villages. Kurdish, 
although related to Persian, does not resemble it at all in syntax In 
Kurdish there are masculine and feminine genders as well as case- 
endings as in Arabic and Latin, whereas none of these exists in Persian. 
Therefore, Kurdish is a more complex and mixed language than Turk- 
ish As the Turks were not accustomed to masculine or feminine 
genders, nor to case-endings, tt would inevitably be difficult for them 
to understand these peculiarities in Kurdish. In reality, that h3s been 
the case, and the people of Diyarbekir have invented an artificial 
Kurdish by discarding these rules of Kurdish and fitting the Kurdish 



44 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
grammar to Turkish syntax. It is entirely correct to call this Kurdish 
the Kurdish of the Turks. 

This fact, very important from a linguistic point of view, is the most 
significant evidence tn provtng that the people of Dtyatbekif are Turks. 
Furthermore, the people of Diyarbekir use this language only when 
they speak to Kurds. Among themselves they speak Turkish. The 
vocabulary of this artificial Kurdish, which the people of Diyarbekir 
do not master very well, is also very limited. For this reason, they fill 
in the gaps with Turkish wotds As a matter of fact, the Kurdish 
known by most of them consists of a few simple words, such as ‘come’ 
or ‘go*. 

I found another proof of the Turkishness of the people of Diyar- 
bekir in their division into religious sects. The bulk of the population 
are of die Hanafi nte like all Turks, whereas die Kurds are Sh3fi*ls in 
general These two charactensacs are peculiar not only to the inhabi- 
tants of Diyarbekir but also to those of all the eastern and southern 
provinces. 

Besides these differences, there are other important differences such 
as those relating to cultural matters like clothing, eating, bidding, and 
furniture. 

These evidences demonstrated to roe that the inhabitants of Diyar- 
bekir are Turks I have learned also that I am racially a Turk, since the 
two grandfathers of my father came a few generations ago 
Chermtk, which is a Turkish area. 

Hon ever, I n ould not hesitate to believe that I am a Turk even if I 
had discovered that my grandfathers came from the Kurdi5h or Arab 
areas, because I learned through my sociological studies that nationality 
is based solely on upbringing I believe that my researches have solved 
an exceedingly important question, not only for myself but also for all 
the people of the eastern and southern provinces, urban as well as 
rural, nhose population has so far remained Turkish. 

The inhabitants of Diyarbekir* have been Turks since the times of 
the Seljuks, of Benalogullan and of Amkogullan, Later, with the 
coming of the Khwartzm Turks, Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu Turks, 
the area became more extensively Turkified- Even if this historical 
wformauon, the divans of scores of poets, inscriptions on mosques and 
aty walls did not exist, the language, customs, and traditions of the 
people would sufficiently testify to their Turkishness. The culture 
found in Diyarbekir is Turkish culture at its richest. The folklore 



AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 45 

materials we have collected clearly prove this In addition to the fact 
that the old inhabitants of Diyarbekir were Turks, all of those who 
came from this tribe or that district and settled there a few generations 
ago are Turks In that they were raised in the Turkish culture and spoke 
the Turkish language from infancy. 



CHAPTER II 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 

A 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF TODAY 1 

In the past, philosophy was regarded as the mother of all sciences. 
It was believed to have given birth to the sciences and other disciplines. 
But when positive sciences bom of observation and experimentation 
began to establish themselves, philosophy gave up its maternal duty 
and became instead the policeman of the sciences The young sciences, 
in their zeal to extend their realms, -were transgressing iheir boundaries 
and were trespassing on the neighbouring domains. To maintain an 
accord between these quarrelling neighbours, it was necessary to 
demarcate the area of each carefully and to put them all under the 
administration of the same laws Philosophy thus finally succeeded in 
unifying the various sciences under one science by realizing this task 
of reconciliation and unification. But the solidary system of sciences 
which came into existence through this co-ordination began to clamour 
for independence. It wanted to gam autonomy by freeing itself from 
the tutelage of philosophy' 

When philosophy thus lost its authority in the field of science, it 
was forced to retire to a domain far bejond the realm of science. Upon 
the advice of a great reformer, the young sciences had chased meta- 
physics from their precincts When the sciences had established a 
united front among themselves, there remained beyond their frontiers 
only the mysterious ghosts of metaphysics. 

As the tw o watchful ej es of science, observation and experimenta- 
tion, could not see these ghosts clearly, the field be) ond the frontier 
seemed always to be a mysterious and unknowable land of darkness. 
Philosophy, dnven out of its estate of science to the realm of darkness, 
was respectfully w elcomed by metaphysics. The latter entrusted to this 
fertile mother the task of enlightening and ordering its dark realm. 
Mindful of the w ould-be attacks of science, philosophy, to feel itself 
on a sure ground, also accepted the guidance of observation and 
expenmen tan on. 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 47 

As the data of science are external phenomena, known through the 
senses, science had always relied on observation and experimentation 
as the only sources of knowledge of the external world. As the data of 
metaphysics, on the other hand, are internal experiences known only 
through consciousness* metaphysics relied only on introspection and 
internal experiences But since it was not forgetful of the truths which 
science had discovered, it always avoided arriving at conclusions con- 
trary to those of science Science had studied the external appearance of 
nature, and attempted to reduce all qualitative properties to a single 
quantitative property of motion. As qualities are primary and not 
irreducible to each other, science had succeeded only in reducing the 
quantitative aspects of these qualities to the quantity of motion 
Science saw every phenomenon as a mechanism, it measured, weighed, 
and calculated all inorganic, organic, and superorgamc factors. 

Philosophy had assigned the inside of nature to metaphysics as its 
subject-matter. The outside of nature consisted of observable phen- 
omena The visibility of phenomena requires the observation of an 
observer In other words, there must be observing beings as well as 
that which is to be observed. Science dealt ruth the things observed, 
but as long as the inside nature of the observing beings remained un- 
knowable, the reality of the observed thing could not be totally 
grasped. Who would deal then with the observer * As this aspect of 
existence belongs to the inside of nature, this task obviously belongs 
to metaphysics. Thus, metaphysics started its job with the analysis of 
mind. 

Saence had scrutinized the material nature of man in every detail 
Its branches, such as anatomy, histology, physiology, pathology, and 
anthropology, always dealt with the outside of man, that is, with those 
aspects which could be observed with the naked eye or by microscope 
His bones, his flesh, his blood-vessels, and nerves, the most minute 
comers of his brain — the structure and fiincuons of each were studied. 
It was found that all were nothing but mechanisms, and that man was 
nothing but a machine with a consciousness But there was one point 
still to be explained. Why did this machine have a consciousness while 
all other machines worked without one* When saence was busy in 
the fields of physics and chemistry, it had not encountered any 
phenomena associated with consaousness Thus when it attempted to 
apply the laws it had denied from the study of the phenomena with- 
out consaousness to the organism of man, it came face to face with a 



4S TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
shock with the phenomena of consciousness. What was the origin of 
this consciousness which was also called ‘conscience’. 5 Did it also 
originate as a product of some chemical process? 

Metaphysics made this question, to which science failed to give an 
answer, its own starting-point. It accepted the consciousness or 
conscience as the first dev elopmem, as the first emergence of Being. 
Seeing, thinking, understanding — all imply an observer, a thinking 
person, an understanding person, on the one hand, and die things to 
be seen, to be thought of, to be undemood, on the other, thus two 
kinds of being are implied The first was called the ‘subject’ and the 
second the ‘object’. In fact, that which exists is not the thing seen, 
thought, or understood, but die subject which sees, thinks, and under- 
stands. The subject w hich sees, thinks, and understands is nothing but 
the consciousness or conscience, and the things observed are nothing 
but the impressions of consciousness. If w e liken consciousness to a 
minor endowed -with the capacity to understand, the dungs observed 
become nothing but the reflections in this mirror As consciousness 
projects these reflections back to the outer w odd and puts them into 
space, we accept the reflections as the things themselves. Just as a 
mirror which is supposed to have the quality of consciousness might 
mistake the images appearing on its own surface as the real objects, 
we also suffer from a similar illusion. J ust as the surface of the mirror is 
a pseudo-space, we too see the impressions in an imaginary distance. 

Metaphysics did not content itself wnth saying that ohjects are noth- 
ing but reflections in the mirror of consciousness, it searched also for 
the reflectors of these reflections, the original sources of these shadows. 
It believed that these reflectors or originals were themselves also sub- 
jects or consciousnesses. Therefore, all existence consisted of more or 
less dim, more or less distinct, consciousnesses occupying different 
positions in the scheme of evolution. Consciousness sees the conscious- 
ness [in others] as matter, but sees itself as consciousness As science 
studied observed phenomena, it became materialistic, but as meta- 
physics took observed beings as observed beings, it became spiritualis- 
tic. Science studied objective phenomena, metaphysics subjective 
phenomena. As objective phenomena consisted of quanuues, science 
could not go beyond the quantity and failed to explain the quality. 
As quality consists of die subjective elements of sensation, metaphysics 
studied the quality and found the essential nature of being OT these 
different irreducible manifestations. Science had affirmed observed 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 49 

phenomena, metaphysics disclosed the nature nf the observer and the 
observed. 

Science discovered determinism in physics ana tne laws or natural 
selection and evolution. Metaphysics disclosed spiritual determinism, 
spiritual selection, and evolution. It proved that quality, like quantity, 
can be a factor tn determinism, selection, and evolution 

When metaphysics had acquired a positivisuc character based on 
observation and experiment, it did not need philosophy any more, and 
said to it: ‘You may go, I can take care of myself’. Philosophy remained 
homeless. The realm of observed beings was taken over by science, 
the realm of the observer by metaphysics. Where should this aged 
explorer find a new, an unoccupied, and unknown continent for itself* 

Yet, there was an entirely unknown virgin land for philosophy' 
Like Christopher Columbus, it discovered the America of the world of 
the intellect. It is not sorry for its loss of the realm of the observed to 
science and the realm of the observer to metaphysics, because the realm 
of ‘things desired’ is now providing it with a ground far richer in 
potentialities for fighting. Philosophy wanted to like what it thought 
and to think what it liked Neither the generahzanons reached by 
science nor the qualitative essences discovered by metaphysics had ever 
satisfied the aspirations of its heart. It wanted always to reach the 
essence of the beautiful and the sublime The new field presented to 
philosophy the treasure of the world of values. 

Value is not something static like quantity, nor is it something 
incapable of evolution like quality Ir acquires a desired perfection, 
and it is subject to evaluation It may not have an objective existence, 
but its existence in the mind is sufficient, because metaphysics has 
proved that the mind, too, has a reality of its own. And again the dis- 
coveries of psychology and metaphysics have shown that this existence 
does not consist of an inert being, but is an active power. This force 
definitely shows its effects in the external world. Values are nothing but 
i Jus- forces. They appear at first to be of an intellectual nature, then 
acquire a psychological character, and at last become an external 
reality, on condmon that they correspond to what is possible in the 
actual situation. Thus, when philosophy wants to evaluate and create 
new values, it has to take real and actual trends into account. The 
aspirations to perfection pointing to the ends in the evolution of 
external and internal reality are ideals Ends having no basis in the 
evolutionary process, and bom out of ihe speculative desires of the 



WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


50 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND 
person are nothing but fictions Thus, to provide a positive basts for 
the values to be created, philosophy must not contradict science and 
metaphysics, but must value only those ideals which will be in harmony 
with them 

Philosophy, conscious of these conditions, began to attach value to 
aspirations after perfection, and to serve a creative function. It offered 
sublime and pure quiddities existing in the mind and yet realizable in 
the objective world — things which the noble heart could find neither 
in material truths nor in spiritual quiddities. Philosophy has proved 
that man is able not only to see but also to effect It bas proved that 
man has a creative power and a faculty for perfection. It now became a 
new nsing sun for our hopes It gave rise to the contention that a super- 
man can emerge from man, that a life higher than mortal life can be 
experienced. 

This is the state of the philosophy of today. At first it was believed 
that philosophy could be reconciled with science and that it consisted 
of logic Then 11 began to roam over the territory of metaphysics, and 
turned into a general theory of aesthetics. Now philosophy has found 
Its proper domain. It has begun its own work — that of evaluating the 
political, legal, and moral values that regulate our social life, and of 
creating the new values that will elevate humanity The philosophy of 
today, therefore, is a theory of ethics Once it searched the laws of 
thought, the intimate details of sensibility, and now it is searching for 
the sublime ends of the Will Its present method is not inductive and 
analytical, but normative and creadve. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISM OF IBN AL-‘ARABI S 

Among Muslim thinkers, the one who is closest to present-day 
philosophy is Muhyi’l-dm Ibn al-‘Arabi 4 He was an innovator who 
gave rational expression to the intuitive states which the Suf ii reached 
through dhawk (direct experience) 

It is erroneous to equate sufism with that school of thought called 
mysticism in Western philosophy Sufism corresponds, in its general 
meaning, to idealism. Among the sufis there were those who repre- 
sented different forms of idealism, and among them there were those 
who were mystics The term tasavwuf is a general term covering various 
doctrines which did not ascribe a real existence to the world ofsensibles. 
Some of the idealists reduced reality to ideas, some to sense-experiences, 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 51 

and some to will. In sufi doctrine these corresponded to what the sufis 
themselves called stations ( makam ) When the sufi denied the real 
existence of the world of sensibles, he formulated his idea by saying: 
‘The realm of existence is of the order of idea’ (‘ innama al-kawnu 
hJiaya! 0 ”'), Those who remained at this stage of knowledge and did 
not go beyond were idealists. 

But as the sufi was a seeker after perfection, he could not remain at a 
fixed station. He sought for continuous progress, continuous elevation 
Thus, when he discovered that the idea is a reproduction reflected from 
outside on consciousness, and chat the objects which we perceive have 
an external source and become coloured by the sensibility of our 
consciousness, he summarized this discovery m the saying - ‘The colour 
of the water is the colour of its container’ ('/awn al-mai lawnn tna'ihi’). 
Those who remained at this station were sensationalists 

Sense experiences are the acts of expansion and of contraction, which 
are the results of sausfaction and thwarting of the will. The will is the 
most absolute, the most real part of the being which, not content with 
existing perfecuons, strives to perceive and construct those perfections 
which ought to exist Muhyi’l-din calls these perfections inherent in 
things which ought to exist , the ‘eternal essences’ (’ a'ySn-t-tkahta ) 
These real goals of the will which are real existents are the real mouves 
and factors of universal evolution, of the universal apogee of perfecuon 
He formulated this great truth by saying The decree of divine provi- 
dence on things takes place only according to the nature of those 
things’ (Vra kakama al-kada 'ala al-akky3'i ilia bika ) 

The three stages through which idealism passed in the history of 
modem Western philosophy exacdy correspond to these three ‘stations’ 
of the sufis formulated in the above three Arabic sentences. When 
Berkeley believed that the things which we perceive consists of our 
sensations, he had just repeated the sufi’s saying 'The realm of exis- 
tence is of the order of idea 1 Thus, Berkeley's doctrine of phenomenal- 
ism was the first step for the sufis. And when Kant declared that our 
perceptions do not consist of objecuve forms, he only explained the 
insight formulated in the saying ‘The colour of the water is the colour 
of its container’. Thus, philosophy of cnucism corresponded to the 
second 'station* of the sufis And, finally when recent philosophers such 
as Alfred Fouill^e, Guyeau, Nietzsche, William James declared that 
ideals are nothing but idees-forces, or that hope, will, belief are forces 
leading to highest and purest happiness by creating new values, they 



J2 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
did nothing but interpret the sufi dictum: ‘The decree of divine provi- 
dence on things takes place only according to the nature of those 
things ’ It seems, therefore, that upon a closer examination v, e can find 
the philosophy of values of today in the rich treasures of tasawwuf. 

Muhyi’l-din Ibn al-‘Arabi had taken the haditk, which says. ‘I am 
what My worshipper thinks (jonn) of Me, so let his thought be good’ 
{'ana 'inda {arm 'abdi falyajunna bi ( kK)ayT an ’) as the torchlight of his 
doctrine and illuminated reality under its light. ‘Opinion’ {{arm) is an 
idee-force, which is a factor and a mouve in our life and conduct as our 
good opinions are useful forces which regulate our life, and the bad 
ones are those harmful forces ruling our life 

Psychological facts, which we call opinion, ideal, belief, are not mere 
passive ideas and ineffective representauons. In them, creative and 
destructive forces, posiuve or negative values, are inherent. Everybody 
carries an ideal perfection in his thinking, opinion, and beliefs. He 
moves upwards towards these ideal perfections through the creative 
force of his ideas, opinions, and beliefs. He follows the evoluuonary 
path of a universal zenith, sets out towards an ideal perfection. There- 
fore, the past, present, and future states of the person are transitory and 
momentary shadows If there is something unchanging, it is the ideal 
perfection which is the end of evoluuon Muhyi'I-dln al-'Arabl called 
this ideal perfecuon ‘eternal essence’, which corresponds to our term 
‘ideal’. He did not ascribe an external existence to these eternal essences 
or unchanging patterns When he said ‘The eternal essences have not 
smelled die smell of existence’ (‘ al-a'ydnu al~(th)abitatu ma ( sK)ammat 
raihata l-wujudi"), he meant that they had only a mental existence. 
However, he regarded these quiddities which exist only in the mind 
without having an external existence as the sole factors of nature. The 
decree of divine providence on things takes place only according to the 
nature of dungs in themselves For him, divine providence does noth- 
ing but put into execution the decisions of the eternal essences just like 
a consututional monarch. In a poem that he wrote as from the mouth 
of the eternal essences, he said ‘If He did not exist and if we did not 
exist, that which exists would not have existed’ (‘falaw Idhu wa law 
land / lama kdna’ !la{dh)i kana) Thus, he dearly stated that in nature 
divine providence and eternal essences are the sole factors. In the same 
poem, in the line reading- ‘The things which He manifests in us and 
gives us have only been given to Him by us’ {‘fa Stayndhu. md yvbdihi 
find wa aidna'), he shows that the legislating power is in the eternal 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 
essences and the executive power lies in the hands of the divine provi- 
dence. The couplet saying 

God is servant and the servant is God 

Would that I knew who is the compelled [or compelling] one* 
expresses the same idea. 

Eternal essences are not confined only to human beings. As matter 
is the manifestation of spirit, everything consists of spirit more or less 
consciously. Spirit is the real being and matter is its manifestation. As 
everything is spirit, in all inorganic, organic, supra-organic things there 
are eternal essences immanent in them. He calls matter and the extension 
which is the ulnmate reality of matter kursi (the seat of God), and calls 
that universal spirit which forms the dimension of this infinite exten- 
sion, ‘arsh (the Throne of God). And he finds the mystery of God’s 
ascending to the throne in the Absolute Perfection winch leads things 
to a universal zenith by showing a goal of perfecuon as eternal essences 
for every parade of this universal spirit. He calls the world of eternal 
essences the 'supernal plenum'. 

‘Ponder upon the lines of nature 

Because they are messages to you from the supernal realm *f 
In other words, what we see are rough copies of eternal essences. 
Everything is a perfection in embryo. Wherever you look, you will 
see that hidden perfecuon which is the aim of evolution The objects 
which we see are the words, lines, and pages of the Book of Universe 
on which are written poems not adequately expressed because of the 
insufficiency of the words However, if you read them carefully you 
can discover the hidden meanings behind these verbal imitations 
(symbols). These pages are like letters sent to you from the supernal 
realm. 

After having explained that the eternal essences or ideals are baste 
factors in cosmic perfection, that everything aims at a goal of perfec- 
tion, and that all being aims at absolute perfecuon, he states that each 
of these eternal essences or ideal perfecnons has received a divine name. 
As things are mamfesnuons of eternal essences, the latter are also the 
manifestations of divine names. According to him, the God whom we 
• Fa‘I-nbbu aM“ w» l-'abdu rabb^, 

Yi byo tha’rt man al-mulallaf [mulullifl 
f Ta'ammal P| sufural kitnla, b ‘uinahi 
Mm *l-oiala’ aba'll ilaykanai'ilO. 



f4 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
can reach is as He is believed by us; we can never reach the Absolute 
God The God whom prophets and saints reached is only die believed- 
in God Even prophets and saints did not reach the Absolute God. 
However, we can approach the Absolute God even if we cannot reach 
Him In order to do this, it is necessary to reach the beheved-in gods 
of inanimate things, plants, animals, men, and all existence, and thus 
unite them into the Absolute One. He expressed this idea in the follow- 
ing couplet 

The people have various kinds of beliefs in God 
And I testify all that they believe * 

Those who thought that Muhyi’l-din was a pantheist were mistaken. 
To consider existents as the manifestation of the eternal essences, and 
the eternal essences as the place of manifestation of divine names, does 
not mean believing m pantheism. The eternal essence of any thing 
existent is the mamfestauon of the bekeved-in God Every individual 
analyses the concept of God which transcends our capacity to conceive 
it in accordance with its own being When Junaid of Baghdad was asked 
about the know ledge of God, he answered ‘The colour of water is 
the colour of its container ’ This truth, which some people tried to call 
anthropomorphism or sociomorphism, was expressed by a sufi poet 
in the following way • 

Those who would look at Thy beautiful face 
When observing from a distance 
Would see their own face in Thine — 

In their position lies the difference of features 

Muhyi’l-dln did not ascribe a material existence to the eternal 
essences. The names which are described by these eternal essences and 
the Absolute, the One named by these names is naturally free from any 
material existence and contingency. However, he did not, as Plato 
and Kant did, ascribe a transcendental existence to the eternal essences- 
He disclosed this when he said The eternal essences have not smelled 
the smell of existence’ For him, eternal essences have an immanent 
existence They are latent and immanent and hidden in the will which 
is the deepest element of the being Primeval chaos is nothing but a 
hidden treasure of the zenith of perfection. 

* 'Alf adal khaljiku f i* F i ' iM ‘aki'id*' 1 
W, ana shahideu praTa ml ’takadu. 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS J5 

Being has three manifestations — as 'divine sear’, 'divine throne’, and 
as ‘the Merciful’. The degree of coarseness and rarefaction m this senes 
is proportional to the ratio of coarseness between matter and spirit, 
between sptnt and ideaL ‘Praise be to God whose self is refined which 
He called truth and whose self is coarse which He called creation’ 
(‘ al-hamdu !i' llahi Ua(dK)l latufa nafsuhufasammahuhakk 3 ’' wa ka(iK)ufa 
najsuhu fa sammaku khal<f n "), states that the state of coarseness of 
being is Creaaon and the state of rarefaction is Truth Coarseness is 
the state of deficiency of being, and rarefaction is the hidden perfection 
immanent in the constitution of this deficiency But the natural motion 
of things is to approach this unattainable end. Universal praise and 
glonficanon of God is nothing but this course of evolution Muhyi’l- 
din tells that the power which manifests the things is just an exercise 
of these things for perfection, and that every existent is nothing but a 
deficient and rough copy of Absolute Perfection, when he says- 
‘Glory be to God who created things, being Himself their essences’ 
suihan aUa(dk) I a^hara'l a(sK) ya a fahuwa ayanuha). 

We conclude from this that although philosophy has undergone 
great developments during the last fewoentunes, its spint has remained 
unchanged Ghazzali had anticipated Descartes’s methodical doubt. 
Berkeley's and Kant’s philosophies were also anucipated. Muhyi’l-dln 
al-‘Arabi had shown long before Alfred FouilI£e that ideals are creative 
factors in evoluuon, and had laid the grounds of present-day philos- 
ophy The spint of his philosophy is telling us human beings 
You are the vice-gerent of true Being, 

All the Universe is under your sway , 

That which is conceived in your heart 
— the preserved tablet — is just what is predestined.* 

NEW LIFE AND NEW VALUES® 

We have achieved the political revolution,® now we are confronted 
with yet another task to prepare for the social revolution' 

The political revolution was easy to realize because it meant merely 
applying the machinery of the constitutional regime to government. 
The social revolution cannot be attained by a mere mechanical action. 

* Zit i hakkcn balrfcszsa sen, 

Eutun eVvin Sana musahhardir , 

Le%h-i tnahftz olan zammnde 
Muosawer olan roukadderdir 



56 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
It will be difficult to achieve because it roust be the product of a long 
process of organic evolution. 

In order to put die political revolution into practice, it was enough 
to disseminate certain idea- forces, such as liberty, equality, and 
fraternity which symbolize the spirit of the constitutional regime. The 
social revolution, on the other hand, is dependent upon the growth and 
consummation of certain teniwienu- forces. Acceptance or rejection of 
the ideas is within the power of reason. The sentiments, on the other 
band, cannot evolve easily because they are the products of social 
habits developed m the course of several centuries. Hence the social 
revolution is a most difficult and a most time-consuming struggle, for 
which we have to mobilize all our forces from now on. 

There are non-Muslims among us. As they have remained outside 
active political life, they have been occupied primarily with economic 
activities. Since our governments had left all [religious] communities 
to organize themselves [under their religious leaders], their organiza- 
tions became the bases of their social enterprises, and in this way our 
non-Muslim compatriots have been able to dev elop a special aptitude 
in economic enterprises. 

When all of us realized the inevitability of a social revolution follow- 
ing the pohacal one, our non-Muslim compatriots had already attained 
a more favourable position in the economic and social spheres of life. 
Political preoccupations had forced the Muslims, however, to remain 
very weak in respect to economic and social activities. 

What does a social revolution mean* It means simply the creation 
of a New Life by discarding an older one. The concept of life has \ ery 
general connotations. It covers the economic, domestic, aesthetic, 
philosophical, moral, legal, and political spheres of living A New Life 
means, obviously, a new form of economy, a new form of family-life, 
new aesthetic standards, a new morality, a new conception of law, and 
a new political system. Changing the old life is possible only when a 
new way of living is created, with its economic, domestic, aesthetic, 
philosophical, legal, and pohacal features 

It is obvious also that the factors which determine the orientation of 
a mode of living are die human values which it fosters. As the old mode 
of living had »s own specific economic ethics, it bad also its specific 
domestic, aesthenc, philosophical, moral, legal, and political values* 
To attempt die creation of a New Life necessitates the discovery and 
the fostering of genuine values with respect to each sphere of Ufe. 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS J7 

When the youth will have taken the New Life as their goal, they will 
be m fact in search of these genuine values. To understand the New 
Life presupposes a knowledge of these values. Are they known? 

You will be mistaken if you think that we are in a position to give a 
definite answer to this question. You should, above all, remember that 
a value can be appreciated only when it is known. And it is generally 
accepted only when it is appreciated, for it is only then that it begins 
to reign in our life. To know them now means, therefore, that they are 
actually dominating our conduct. If this is so, then, why should we 
need a new way of life and its values’ — we would then believe that our 
present values of living are the most valid ones, and there is no need 
for a new way of life 

But we do not approve of the old life and the old values. We strive 
for the new ones There are then some values, which w e not only are 
not living up to but which we are not even m a position to know. But, 
you will ask, what is meant by that mysterious life which we are not 
experiencing and which we have not even imagined until now’ And 
what is the use of thinking about the unknown values which will 
make up that life’ 

This objection seems to be logical but not psychological It is un- 
deniable that the real factors in the evolution of humanity are ideals 
Ideals are those vague and unknown ends which have driven human 
beings only through the attraction of their vagueness, by the mystery 
of their ambiguity, and have led them towards progress Sometimes 
they have even led mankind to unexpected and unforeseen achieve- 
ments Here are two examples. Those who were in pursuit of alchemy 
finally discovered chemistry, those delving into astrology emerged 
with astronomy The Crusaders wanted to capture the Holy Land, but 
instead they captured Arab civilization. Vague goals like socialism 
and feminism have contributed to progress and social justice and free- 
dom It is true that some of their protagonists had clearly defined their 
objectives and had constructed utopias in their minds. But today we 
see clearly that the movements of socialism or feminism themselves are 
not advancing towards the exact realization of these utopias While 
they progressed, they got farther and farther away from the utopian 
paradises which the theoreticians had constructed in their imaginations 
The followers of the New Life will not entertain such utopias, will 
not go forward towards preconceived goals with preconceived pro- 
grammes as the Utopians did in following their fictions. The New Life 



58 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
ss a movement, but not a definite and a straight-line movement. We 
cannot ascertain and predict the ends to which it will lead us and the 
consequences which it will bring forth. 

The New Life has no pre-defined goal and no programme, but it 
does have a disciplined method. A programme necessitates a prophetic 
prevision of the future idea before it is realized. The method is not so 
haughty. It does not propose unattainable goals Sciences have methods 
but not programmes, because they do not determine m advance what 
truths they are going to discover. They only follow their own discip- 
lined methods, and the truths emerge slowly m the course of their 
investigation. 

What will be the method of the followers of the New Life? First of 
all, they have made a division of labour among themselves. The values 
relating to each sphere of life are going to be studied by various research 
workers in special monographic works. None will ever attempt to put 
forth his own opinions as the final truths of the New Life. The new 
values that will be agreed upon, and es en those w hich by then have 
been implemented, wall have only tentanve validity and be subject to 
evolunonary selection. In fact, to claim no final truths will be the most 
important principle of the followers of the New Life. 

Researches in connection with the New Life will be based on the 
most recent practices and philosophical views, and will avoid all kinds 
of arbitrary speculation. They will be written m book form by our 
young intellectuals, whom we shall ask to write on the subjects in 
which they have specialized Everyone’s contentions will be respected. 
The ‘Outlines’ on the values of the New Life will be published tn cheap 
booklets, and although the values proposed in them will be nothing 
more than mere incomplete sketches of the genuine values, they will 
certainly gain acclaim and wide acceptance. 

Let us explain the method of the New Life a little further. Tout par la 
scierure et pour I'htarutnue said Dr Isnard The followers of the New 
Life believe that humanity today is exemplified in the nation, and thus 
the phrase is resated to read in the following form* ‘Every advance 
through science and for the fatherland’. The first duty of the follow ers 
of the New Life is to work for the strengthening and elevation of the 
Ottomans by means of literature, science, and philosophy. The New 
Life is not a cosmopolitan but a national life. 

I had pointed out before that our non-Muslim compatriots are ahead 
of us with respect inexperience in economic enterprises and matters of 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS $9 

social organization. Let me now describe another aspect of their 
favourable position • they were not in need of a painful search for a 
New Life. For them the civilization of Europe, like the ready-made suits 
sold in department stores, was easily available for wear. The majority 
of the Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians living among us have readily 
accepted the manners and habits of European civilization. Because of 
the existence of certain conditions peculiar to our life, we Muslims could 
not imitate the ready-made norms of Europe and its standardized ways 
of living. For us, it was necessary to have them made to order, like 
tailored suits, to fit our own body. Our non-Mushm compatriots were 
in a position to take European standards as their models as soon as they 
discarded their old ways of living But, since ne belong to a different 
ummet [religion] 7 we did not reproduce these models, believing that 
we should create a new mode of civilization from our own understand- 
ing. It is this belief which has given birth to our New Life. 

The New Life will be created, not copied. Our new values will be 
economic, domestic, aesthetic, philosophic, moral, legal, and political 
values bom out of the soul of the Ottomans. To create their own 
civilization, the Ottomans themselves have to work out a new form of 
family life, new aesthetic standards, a new philosophy, a new morality, 
a new understanding of law, and a new polmcal organization Only 
through the knowledge of these national values will the national civil- 
ization of the Ottomans inspire the praise of the Europeans 

I have already pointed out the more favourable posiuon of our non- 
Muslim compatriots with respect to economic and social conditions. 
This observation, however, does not tell the whole truth They are in a 
more favourable posiuon only with regard to economics and social 
living Because we are going to benefit from the achievements of 
modem science and philosophy in our search for a New Life, the methods 
we shall follow in every aspect of life will be more up-to-date Thus, for 
example, we shall not waste time on small crafts, but will immediately 
introduce modem industry. We shall have the most modem merchant 
marine to master the seas Our social life will not be based on the 
communal principle, but wall be founded on the principles of the 
solidarity and fellowship of free walls. We shall benefit from the most 
recent discoveries and theories in every field of civilization Our non- 
Muslim compatriots are only anxious imitators of European life. We, 
as I have explained, should create a new synthesis. We certainly shall 
seek, discover, and appropriate the genuine values The belief that they 



6o TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
are in a more favourable position as compared to ours seems therefore 
nothing more than a pseudo-truth The New Life will expose the real 
nature of this belief, which represents us always in dim and them in 
bright lights. It will show also that the foundations of European 
civilization are worn, sick, and rotten, that they are destined to fall and 
disintegrate We shall create a genuine civibzauon, a Turkish civiliza- 
tion, which will follow the growth of a New Life. The Turkish race 
has not been degenerated like some other races by alcohol and de- 
bauchery. Turkish blood has remained rejuvenated and hardened like 
steel with the glories of the battlefield The Turkish intelligence is not 
worn out, its sentiments are not effeminate, its will is not weakened. 
The conquest of the future is promised to Turkish resolution. 8 

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL IDEALISM* 

Among the sociological schools trying to interpret social phen- 
omena, there are two schools of thought which are close to each other 
m one respect but divergent in another. I mean historical materialism 
and sociological idealism The first is represented by Karl Marx and 
the second by fimile Durkheim. 

At first glance, these two schools appear to be quite close to each 
other, because both admit as a principle that social facts are produced 
by certain natural causes, and that social facts are subject to natural 
laws just as are physical, biological, and psychological facts. In other 
words, both accept the principle of determinism in social science. 

From this point on, however, the two begin to diverge. Marx 
claimed a kind of monopoly for a single determining factor, for him 
the privilege of being the determining cause belongs only to the 
economic factor among other social facts. The remaining social facts, 
such as religious, moral, aesthetic, poliucal, linguistic, and intellectual 
facts, cannot by any means be the causes of other social facts, but can 
be only the products of [economic] causes. Therefore, for Marx all 
social facts other than the economic facts are epi-phenomena If a 
social fact is an epi-phenomenon, it cannot exerase any effect upon 
other facts, just as the shadow of a person obviously does not produce 
any effect upon the action of the person Just like the shadow, it merely 
follows For Marx, only economic facts are genuine realities. The rest 
are neither realities nor phenomena, but simply the products and 
shadows of economic facts. In terms of this view, Marx would interpret, 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS <Jl 

for example, the origin of religions, the differentiation of religious 
sects, the rise of the ascetic orders or of mystic fraternities, the Reform- 
ation, the separation of the State from the Church, as well as the rise, 
growth, and decline of cettain moral, legal, political, aesthetic, linguis- 
tic, and intellectual traditions and ideals, mainly by the changes which 
take place in the techniques of production. 

According to the sociological school of Durkheim, such a single- 
factor interpretation is wrong Economic facts do not hold any par- 
ticular pnvilege against other social facts. In the same way as econo- 
mic mstitunons are facts and realities, other social institutions . . are 
natural facts and realities. To regard them as epi-phenomena, as 
shadows of realities, ts missing the objective reality As there are no 
shadow-facts m physics, chemistry, or biology, why should they exist 
in sociology* It is true that in the past some psychologists, such as 
Maudsley, called ‘consciousness’ an epi-phenomenon, and claimed that 
it exercised no effect on psychic phenomena. Recent psychologists, such 
as Alfred FouillSe, Theodule Ribot, William James, Ilarald Hoffding, 
Henri Bergson, Pierte Janet, Alfred Binet, and Paulhan, have definitely 
rejected this theory, so that the term epi-phenomenon is no longer 
used in psychology. 

To believe that only economic facts consutute reality m the social 
realm is similar to the belief that only the facts of the gastric and 
digestive foncuons are the real facts among all other physiological 
funcvons, and that the latter are nothing but unreal and ineffective 
shadows of the first No physiologist can accept such a view 

Warx fell into another error when he extended this single-factor view 
from theory to practice. For him, the common people (the proletariat] 
consists only of the working class, and this class will abolish all other 
classes. But the common people means all, that is, the sum total of all 
classes accepted to be equal before the law It is true that the imperialis- 
tic, aristocratic, and feudal classes who refuse to be equal with all are 
to be excluded from the common people. Equally, those among the 
bourgeoisie and the intellectuals who claim special privileges for them- 
seUes are also cut off from the people. But everyone who admits the 
equality of all before the law belongs to the common body of the 
people, regardless of the class to which be might belong 

In Durldieim’s sociology, economic facts are capable of affecting 
other soaal facts, as all other social facts may be the causal factors of 
economic frets. Thus, this sociological school does not deny the 



62 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
significance and importance of economic facts Durkheim himself has 
shown that economic factors have an increasing importance in modem 
society, in which economic life is even the basis of the social structure 
He has shown that social solidarity in primitive societies is a ‘mechani- 
cal solidarity 1 based on la conscience collective He called these societies 
‘segmentary’ because they are composed of similar segments such as 
family, dan, phratry, and tribe. In complex societies there is, in addi- 
tion to 'mechanical solidarity’, an 'organic solidarity’. Thus, he called 
them ‘organic societies’ Division of labour is the basis of the economic 
life of these societies Religious, political, scientific, aesthetic, and 
economic groupings in modem societies are occupational and profes- 
sional groups arising out of the division of labour. We see, thus, that 
Durkheim has given to the economic factor the recognition that it 
deserves. 

However, it is true that Durkheim also reduced all social facts to a 
single factor, that is, to ‘collective representations’. What he meant 
by this term may be explained by examples rather than by a definition. 
There were, for instance, working men m Turkey before the 1908 
revolution, but there was no working-class consciousness in the mind 
of these men, no realization of 'we are the working class’. As long as 
this consciousness did not exist, a class of workers did not exist. And 
again, before the same revolution, there were Turks, but there was no 
idea ‘we are the Turkish nation’ in ihe collective consciousness of that 
people, in other words, there was no Turkish nauon at that ume. It 
follows that a group is not a ‘social’ group so long as its existence has 
not been felt in the common consciousness of individuals In the same 
way, an originally Turkish word is not Turkish, and hence is not a 
social fact as long as it is not alive in the linguistic consciousness of the 
Turkish people Similarly, a custom originally a pan of the customary 
law (rote) of the Turks is not a social instiruuon, is not an element m 
the moral life of the Turks, so long as it remains forgotten in the 
consciousness of the Turkish people 

These examples show that social facts exist only when and if they 
are experienced as conscious realizations in the collective consciousness 
of the groups to which they belong Now, these conscious realizations 
in the collective consciousness are called ‘collective representations’. 

Collective representations are not ineffective epi-phenomena in 
social life, as Marx would believe On the contrary, all spheres of our 
social life are shaneH Kv tl™ As soon as such representations as ‘we 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 63 

belong to the Turkish nation’, ‘we are of the ummet of Islam’, 'we are a 
part of Western civilization', become disunct representations in the 
common consciousness of the Turks of Turkey, every aspect of our 
social life wall begin to change. The more we say 'we are of the Turkish 
nation’, the more we shall be able to show originality and personality 
in terms of the Turkish taste and values in language, in art, in morality, 
in law, and even in religion and philosophy As w e say ‘we are of the 
iimmec of Islam’, we shall behave in accordance with the belief that the 
Kur’an is our sacred book, Muhammad our sacred prophet, the Kaha 
our sacred place, and Islam our sacred religion As we say ‘we are of 
Western civilization’, we shall behave as do the European peoples in 
science, philosophy, techniques, and in all other aspects of civilization 
Collective representations do not consist only of group concepts. 
Myths, tales, legends, proverbs, beliefs, moral, legal, economic, and 
technical rules; and even scientific and philosophical views are all 
collective representations Even rituals and practices which are not 
based on a faith or a theory are collective representations because 
people do them after they have conceived them mentally 

Individual ideas are the private ideas of persons Collective repre- 
sentations, on the other hand, are mental patterns which are common 
to the members of a society, and winch are consciously realized in the 
collective consciousness Individual ideas exercise no effect upon 
society. But when they become collective representations based on a 
social force, they are factors of great importance in social life The 
thoughts of a saviour, of a man with great charismatic power, 1 ® sooner 
or later become common ideas of the masses Individual ideas of this 
nature have always been influential in social life When a nation pro- 
duces a great personality who actually proves his genius, the heroic 
and self-sacrificing power of his great deeds achieves great changes 
easily through his power to create collecuve representations Today 
we have such an inspiring genius As a single person he is capable of 
realizing great changes which ordinary persons and even men of great 
learning or skill are utterly powerless to achieve, and he does this by a 
single word, speech, or appeal to the people 

Colleens e rep resen tauons gain their utmost power and prestige by 
enveloping themselves with a halo of ecstasy during times of excite- 
ment and fermentation Then collective rep resen tauons are called 
‘ideals’. They become the source of genuine revoluuons only when 
they become ideals. The idea of Turlusm was merely a representation. 



<s4 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
shared only by a part of the youth. The forces which spread it to the 
entire nation and made it into a national ideal w ere the disasters follow- 
ing the Tnpohtaman and Balkan wars, and the single person who 
transformed it into a national policy and made it a reality was Gazi 
Mustafa Kemal 

As we have seen in the foregoing examples, Durkheim explained 
idealism tn sociological terms as the product of collective social 
behaviour. For him, all social phenomena consist of ideals or, their 
lesser equivalents, collective representauons. Collective representations 
are more or less charged with value judgments. We evaluate social 
insututions as sacred, good, beautiful, or true Evaluation by such 
adjectives shows chat institutions are not free from the attachments of 
sentiments or emotions We regard an object as ‘sacred’ whenever se 
feel a religious attachment to that object, r e call something ‘good’ for 
which we experience a moral feeling, Re call something ‘beautiful’ 
which stimulates an aesthetic emouon, Re believe something is ‘true’ 
when we have a rational attachment to it In other words, all collective 
representations express our ideals 

Although collective representauons or ideals are the causes of social 
phenomena, they themselves are dependent upon certain social causes 
for their nse, growth, decline, and disappearance. These consist of the 
changes taking place in die social structure. According to Durkheim, 
the primary causes of social phenomena are those of social morphology 
such as the degree of density, and of conflict or homogeneity of 
populauon, and the stage of development of the division of labour. 
The nse of the Turkist movement has also been socially condiuoned. 
Here, too, r e find the two views, of historical materialism and socio- 
logical idealism, conflicting. According to the first, the Turkist move- 
ment is die product of economic factors, and according to the second, 
it is the result of those changes taking place in social ideals which were 
caused by certain changes in the social structure. 

There were two main religious communmes in Turkey — one the 
Muslims under the Caliphate, and the other the Christians under the 
Greek Orthodox Church. If religion had maintained its previous hold 
with the same intensity, these religious communities would not have 
disintegrated. With the increase in social density in the Clues, die social 
division of labour expanded and gave nse to occupational groups 
Rhich, in turn, gave nse to die occupauonal consciousness Thus die 
collecuve consciousness of the Muslim and Chrisuan communities 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 6; 

began to weaken. This weakening led to the disintegration of the com- 
munal solidarity which ■was based on religious collective consciousness. 
Newspapers and schools, literature and poetry, replaced the unintellig- 
ible ummet and Church language with the vernacular of the people 
Collective representations of both communities changed In the past 
men accepted their religious communities as social organisms of which 
they themselves w ere an indispensable part, now they have begun to 
see their own language groups as the basic social organism and them- 
selves as indispensable parts of it The disintegration of the religious 
community and its replacement by language groups cook place in the 
end. The separauon first of the Armenians and then of the Vlachians, 
Serbians, Bulgarians, and even of the Greeks from the community of 
the Byzantine Church, and the establishment of Exarchates by some of 
these peoples, are telbng evidences of our argument The fact that the 
separation of these language groups from the political collectivity, 
called the Ottoman Commonwealth, took place only after the religious 
separauon shows that the real factor was purely cultural rather than 
political. 

Nationalities consisung of language and culture groups did exist in 
the past, but were restricted by religious and political imperialisms to 
the confines of impenum and Church When the chains of these politi- 
cal and religious commumues broke, the groups imprisoned within 
them began their struggles for liberation. Nationalist movements in 
Turkey thus started first as movements of religious autonomy, and 
then as movements of political autonomy and independence The 
movement started in a similar fashion among the Muslims The Toscan 
Albanians, who were the backbone of Albanian nanonabsm (Bashktm), 
had long ago dissented from the Muslim community by accepting 
Bektashism. They wanted first to use their nauonal languages in order 
to enjoy the new institutions of the modem age such as the school, 
press, literature, and poetry To revive their language they needed a 
script, and accepted the Latin script, which shows that the Toscans at 
that time broke from the religious community. They put cultural 
solidarity into the place of the weakened religious solidarity 

Among the Arabs and Kurds, too, nationalism started as a cultural 
movement. Political and economic forms of nationalism foltowed as 
second and third stages We know that Turkish nauonalism also started 
as a cultural movement. One of its early fathers was die founder of our 
oldest university, and the other that of our miliary schools If the 



66 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
medrese had been powerful enough, the university could not have been 
founded. As long as the Janissaries, the armed forces of the medrese, 
could survive, [modem] military schools could not have been founded 
As a result of the social division of labour, the strength of the religious 
communal solidarity among the Turks declined The foundation of the 
Academy and the University, and the attempts towards the reorganiza- 
tion of the military schools towards the end of Abdul Aziz’s reign, 
were the products of this religious decline. Ahmed Vefik and Suleyman 
Pasha, as heads of these modem institutions, realized the need to 
revitalize the nauon by a linguistic, cultural, and historical spirit. Since 
it had lost its orientation with the disintegration of the community of 
the ummet and of the Sultanate. They also saw how necessary it was to 
educate the youth according to the ideals of this new spirit. The punst 
movement and the new language movement, which followed it twenty 
years later, show that language and culture were the chief factors in the 
rise of Turkish nationalism. 

It is true that towards the end of the Turkist period, ideas of national 
economy were bom as well But file men who initiated them were 
neither economists nor business men, but the leaders of cultural 
Turkism who were in search of legal, educanonal, and even philo- 
sophical manifestations of nationalism. The idea of national economy 
was bom ftom a purely disinterested idealism and began to be applied, 
in an entirely theoretical way, to the economic conditions of the 
country, to legal conditions and technological forms current in agri- 
culture, industry, and commerce Our national economists would be 
in a position to disunguish between ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ and 
prescribe remedies to ameliorate economic conditions, only after hav- 
ing surveyed our economic life 11 Unfortunately, the [tst] World War 
stopped these scientific studies and led in practice to the nse of various 
policies National economy is not something to be exploited for specu- 
lative purposes, but a school of economy, founded by Friedrich List 
in Germany Durkheim’s comment on List’s w ork on national economy 
was: 'This is the first book on economy written objectively and based 
on facts.’ National economy does not produce the national ideal, but 
is itself a product of it. 

THE NATURE OF IDEALS 1 * 

Germinauon of a seed takes place in two phases: the first is the act 
of impregnation, which is a matter of a moment, the second is the 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALVES AND IDEALS 67 

period of growth, which is a matter of time The first phase is the 
creative event for the seed. Without impregnation it cannot grow into 
an organism. 

The same phases may be observed in the creative activity of a poet or 
in the thinking of a philosopher The inspiration of a poet requires the 
germinadon of his imagination Revelation of an intuition to a thinker 
is nothing but the germination of a mind. It is only after germination 
that the imagination of a poet and the mind of a thinker conceive, and 
sooner or later give birth to, a literary or philosophical product. 

A people without a national character is comparable to the seed 
before it becomes a living organism. It may be likened further to the 
imagination of a poet or to the mind of a thinker Nations, too, need 
to pass through the stages of germination and growth When a nation 
experiences a great disaster or when it is confronted with grave danger, 
individual personality disappears and becomes immersed in soaety In 
Such times it is only the national personality which lives in the soul of 
the individual. All souls feel nothing but the great desire to see the 
continuation of the national personality. In ume of crisis a person does 
not worry about his own liberties, but thinks only of the survival of 
nauonal independence. Now, this sacred thought, fiised with cherished 
sentiments, w e call Ideal, and the time of crisis the period of germination 
of the ideals. 

Meals are always created in such critical moments They are bom in 
hearts in communion — hearts unified by nauonal disasters which 
create one single heart. In their period of growth, they flourish into 
institutions which are new in all their nrrufi canons. The Germanic 
ideal was bom in this manner, in ibe face of the great calamities which 
arose when Napoteomc armies humiliated Prussia. Even Fichte, who 
until then would have said: 'My people is nothing but mankind — my 
fatherland the enure world', 1 ’ felt to his bones that he was a German 
Nippomsm was the product of the dangerous and humiliating pressures 
put on the Japanese by the United States and Europe When the 
French nation was endangered by the possibility of British invasion, 
the consciousness of the nauon was ignited by a crazy peasant girl, of 
whom it made a saviour. The bondage of the children of Israel in 
Egypt was followed by the rise of Moses. The suppression of con- 
quered peoples under Roman rule gave rise to Christianity, The rise of 
Islam took place when Arabia was threatened by polmcal and religious 
invasion from three directions. 



68 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

When a nation faces danger, individuals cannot save it- The nation 
itself becomes its own saviour. At these times, the individual is en- 
chanted by the spell of a supra-mundane spirit, his will becomes silent} 
a general will becomes the only T in every consciousness. The nation 
then appears to its members as a divine or collective ideal, and invites 
them to a promised victory or to a heralded paradise. It is the nation 
that creates self-sacrificing fighters out of egoists and danger-seeking 
heroes out of cowards. It is the nation that gives intelligence to the 
dull, diligence to the lazy, and zeal to the indifferent. 

When the time of disaster and crisis has passed away, the fire of the 
ideals is not extinguished in their hearts, it continues to motivate the 
people constantly, as if it were a spring inside them As the ovum gets 
the vital impulse necessary for its growth from seminal germination, 
so the institutions of the nation get their evolutionary direction from 
its ideals. The lore (irfan) and the civilization ( meJentyet ) peculiar to a 
nation come into existence only tn this manner 14 Genuine ideals, bom 
out of the emotional outbursts of the national soul which invades the 
soul of the individual in times of crisis, are the true creators of the 
future No one has any material instrument at his disposal to discover 
the future of a nation, and the ideals are the only moral instruments by 
which it may be foreseen. 

Once a nation creates its own ideals, it never turns its face towards 
a dark future, on the contrary, a promised land, a heralded Garden of 
Eden, unfolds itself, day by day, in an ever-clearer and more inviting 
prospect. Nations without ideals think that they are doomed to catas- 
trophies, nations with ideals, on the other hand, are destined for resur- 
rection even if they are politically dead A nation w ith a resurrecting 
and creative ideal never dies. 

Psychologists have argued over whether or not there is a power of 
will to overcome our desires But they have searched m vain for the 
answer because there are equally cogent arguments for and against its 
existence. Those members of a nation who have an ideal may have 
this wall, but those who belong to a nation without it do not. Great 
sacrifices, extraordinary renunciations, which are the indications of a 
strong will, are seen only at times of great events In the beginnings of 
the French Revolution, nobles renounced their rights during a meet- 
ing of great enthusiasm. Under the impact of the national fervour 
created by the war of 1870, the smaller German states renounced their 
independent sovereignty and accepted Prussia as their sovereign state. 



PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AND IDEALS 69 

Again, at the time when Japan had to deade either to live decently or 
to die with honour, the Shogun willingly renounced its sovereignty 
and the nobility its fiefs, and the Mikado, renouncing his absolute 
rights, proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. The old fatalist 
philosophy which explained this will by supra-individual power was 
right because the power which creates and directs the wall is ideals 
Men think that the inspirations of national grace are their own wills, 
they do not seem to realize that this wall emanates from the soul of the 
nation. 

The ideals manifest their power in two forms - by the power of 
popular appeal and by that of sanction. The power exercised by popu- 
lar appeal ensues from the direct manifestation of the ideals m the souls 
of the people When men are under the spell of the ideals, their souls 
are filled with an intense enthusiasm. They plunge into an exalted, 
zealous, extravagant state of mind At these moments, their only 
response is an experience of holiness Their exalted spirits believe in 
the sancuty of their ideals, and condemn everything that is contrary to 
them. They not only sacrifice their lives, interests, and happiness for 
the sake of them, but they want to worship and glorify those who culti- 
vate them, they want to destroy, bum, or tear up those things or 
persons who seem to be against them. The ideals, by the power of 
their popular magneusm, almost make somnambulists of men, leading 
them to superhuman deeds by the enthusiasm which they kindle in 
their souls. 

The sancnonmg power of the ideals is a natural consequence of their 
power of appeal Even those who at the beginning are not profoundly 
affected by the spell-binding power of the ideals soon experience it 
indirectly. They realize that any action congruent or incongruent wnth 
the ideals will be met with the reactions of others who ha\e been 
directly capuvated by them This reaction of approval or disapproval 
by those who believe is the sanctioning power of the ideals which, 
because of their undetermined form, first exert themselves by means of 
public opinion, but soon become legal norms Appeal is the property 
of the ‘beauty’ (lamal) and sanction that of the ‘majesty 1 (jaldl) of the 
Ideal. 

Through these two powers the ideals merge all individuals into a 
united, homogeneous, moral oneness. Children experience impersonal 
sensations; it is only when they become aware of the T that the 
personality, which unul then had experienced only vague sensations of 



70 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
existence, suddenly comes into being. A nation realizes its ideals in 
the same way as the child becomes conscious of his T. National crisis, 
the experience of calamity, is a ‘social Gabriel’ which breathes the 
spirit of nationality, a feeling of family unity into a dispersed people 
Once infused with this spirit, a nation awakens to its identity, its 
origin, its destination, and its historical mission, and sets about pur- 
suing them 

Postscript This discussion shows that the ideals are actually experi- 
enced by a nation in the times of great events in its past. They are 
neither utopias never experienced, nor goals to be reached at some 
future nme The ideals are the educators of the present, the creators of 
the future, and the realities of the past. They are mental outbursts which 
derive from the past and push die nauon towards the future. As the 
term 'ideal' [in European languages] is derived from the word ‘idea*, 
so I use the word 'mefkGre', derived from the word ‘fikr to denote it 
[in Turkish] 



CHAPTER III 


THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 


THREE CURRENTS OF THOUGHT 1 

In Our country there are three currents of thought. When we study 
their history, we see that in the beginning our thinkers realized the 
need for modernization The current of thought in that direction, which 
originated during the reign of Selim HI [1789-1807], was followed 
later by another — the movement towards lslamization. The third, the 
movement of Turkism, has come forth only recently. 

Because the idea of modemizanon has always been a mam theme, 
it has no particular exponent. Every journal or paper has been an 
exponent of it in one way or another Of the doctrine of lslamization, 
the chief organ is Stral-t Mustahm ([later] Sebil-ur Refat), and of the 
school of Turkism, Turk Yurdu. We can easily see that all of these 
trends have been the expression of certain real needs. 

Gabriel Tarde tells us that the idea of nauonalism has been the 
product of the newspaper, and gives the following explanation- the 
newspaper has given a common consciousness to those who speak the 
same language by uniting them into a ‘public’. In addition to this 
influence, which has been made rather unconsciously and unwillingly, 
the newspaper which has spurred the feelings of honour and sacrifice 
in die masses, merely to increase its circulation, has consequently 
aroused a consciousness of national traditions and of cherished ideals. 
The sentiment of nationality once it arises amongst the masses spreads 
easily over neighbouring peoples. Once awakened, it leads to revivals 
in moral life, in language, in literature, and m economic and political life 
by reinforcing the feelings of solidarity, sacrifice, and struggle among 
its supporters. Naturally the idea of nationality spreads quickly when 
emulated by neighbouring peoples, especially if they also have the 
press appealing to the masses in the vernacular. 

The ideal of nationalism appeared [in the Ottoman Empire] first 
among the non-Muslims, then among the Albanians and Arabs, and 
finally among the Turks. The fact that it appeared last among the 



•Jl TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
Turks was not accidental: the Ottoman state was formed by the Turks 
themselves The state is a nation already established ( nation it fait), 
whereas the ideal of nationalism meant the nucleus of a nationality 
based on will (nation it volonii). With intuitive cautiousness, the Turks 
were reluctant, in the beginning, to endanger a reality for the sake of an 
ideal. Thus, Turkish thinkers believed not in Turkism but in Otto- 
tnantsm 

When the movement of modernization started, the supporters of the 
Tan^unat 1 reforms believed that it would be possible to create a nation 
based on will out of an existing 'nation' composed of several nationali- 
ties and religions, and they thus attempted to give a new meaning, 
devoid of any colour of nationality, to the older term 'Ottoman’, which 
had a certain historical meaning Painful expenences proved that this 
new meaning of ‘Ottoman’ had been welcomed by no one save the 
originators of the term Inventing this new conception was not only 
useless but also detrimental, for it gave nse to harmful consequences 
for the state and the nationalities — and especially for the Turks 
themselves 

Today the West as well as the East shows unmistakably that our 
age is the Age of Nations The most powerful force over the mind of 
this age is the ideal of nanonahsm States, which have to govern on the 
basis of national consciousness, are doomed to failure if they ignore 
the existence of this important social factor. If our statesmen and party 
leaders do not hold this ideal, they cannot establish a spiritual leader- 
ship over the communiues and the peoples commuting the Ottoman 
state. The expenences of the last four years have shown that the 
Turks who, in order to maintain understanding between the nauonah- 
ties [under the Ottoman rule], denied Turkism and proclaimed Otto- 
mamsm have, at last, realized bitterly what kind of a conciliation the 
rationalities would accept. A people moved by the sentiment of 
nationality can be ruled only by men who have the idea of nationalism 
in themselves 

The Turks’ avoidance of the idea of nationalism was not only harm- 
ful for the state and irritating to the diverse nationalities, but it was 
fatal for the Turks themselves When the Turks identified the nation 
and the state with the already existing nation and state, they failed to 
see that their social and economic existence was deteriorating When 
economic and soaal ascendancy passed into the hands of the [non- 
Muslim] communiues, the Turks did not realize that they were losing 



THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 73 

everything. They believed that they were the only class constituting 
the Ottoman nation, and did not pay attention to the fact that they 
were excluded from certain classes, especially from those that consti- 
tuted the most important strata of their age They were not bothered 
by seeing the existence of economic and occupauonal classes of which 
they were not a part, from which they were excluded As a conse- 
quence, they ceased to constitute the masses of peopte even in Anatolia. 
They were merely government officials and farmers. Farmers and 
animal breeders live only on the creative powers of nature, and are not 
themselves creative powers. Government officials also are not actively 
productive. The growth and development of the mental faculties, of 
will and character, are the products of active occupations as in industry 
and manufacturing, and of practical arts like trade and the liberal 
professions It is because of this that it is almost impossible to create a 
national organization out of a people composed solely of farmers and 
civil servants Our incompetence in administration, our difficulties in 
strategy and logisncs, which led to the Balkan disaster, are all due to 
this state of affairs The non-existence of efficient government in our 
country is mainly due to the non-existence of economic [commercial 
and industrial] classes among the Turks Wherever the government is 
based on economic classes, there an efficient government exists Busi- 
ness men, artisans, and traders want an efficient government for their 
own interests. Wherever the government is based on the class of state 
functionaries, it is always inefficient because those who are dismissed 
from government service always have their eye on government jobs, 
and those who are in the administration always have an eye on higher 
posts, and both are for ever discontent with the existing govern- 
ment. 

As the non-existence of the ideal of nationalism among the Turks 
resulted in the lack of any national economy, so the same factor has 
been an obstacle to the development of a nauonal language and to the 
appearance of national patterns in fine arts And, again, because the 
ideal of nationalism was not present Turkish morality remained only a 
personal and familial morality. The notions of solidarity, patriotism, 
and heroism did not transcend the confines of the family, the village, 
and the town. As the ideal of ummet [religion] was too Urge and the 
ideal of the family too narrow, the Turkish soul remained a stranger to 
the son of life and to the intensive moral feelings that should be the 
bases of sacrifice and altruism. The disintegration seen in our economic. 



74 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
religious, and political institutions is the consequence of this state of 
affairs. 

Turkish nationalism is not contrary to the interests of the Ottoman 
state, in fact, it is its most important support. As m all young move- 
ments, there are some extremists among those who uphold Turkish 
nationalism, mainly among a portion of the youth, who have caused 
certain misunderstandings to anse. In fact, Turkism is the real support 
of Islam and of the Ottoman state, and is against cosmopolitanism. 

Tarde had also shown that the idea of internationalism is a product 
of the book Since the newspaper appeals to the sentiments of the 
masses, it uses the vernacular, the living language. Books, on the other 
hand, appeal to the abstract thinking of the scholar and the scientist, 
and are dependent upon neologisms rather than the living word 
Scientific and philosophical terms, as a rule, do not grow out of the 
vernacular of the people, which is natural and living, but are arti- 
ficial constructs, lifeless words. The natural words of the vernacular 
carry vita! and emotional meanings, and as such are not suited to 
abstract and conceptual usage For this reason, every nation has 
borrowed its neologisms from its religious language. European nauons 
have derived their scientific terminology from the Greek in which the 
Gospels were written and, as Latin became auxiliary to Greek in the 
Church, the Germanic and Slavonic languages also inherited much 
from the Latin Islamic peoples derived their neologisms mainly from 
Arabic and, secondarily, from Persian Even today, when we translate 
contemporary scientific works [of the West] into our language, we com 
Arabic and Persian words for the Greek and Latin terms [therein]. The 
earliest books were the Scriptures As ethics, law, literature, science, 
and philosophy w ere developed out of religion as separate branches, 
books began to be wntten about them as well. 

It follows, then, that as the newspaper helped the nse of the ideal of 
nationalism by expressing the social and local sentiments of the masses 
in a colourful way, so the book has been instrumental in the creaaon of 
the idea of internationalism, or those aspects of life commonly shared 
by vancus nations, by formulating, in an abstract and exact style, the 
principles, rules, and formulae of civilization whose foundation of 
knowledge and science originated in religion. 

It is not true that the sennment of internationalism prevailed among 
men during the earlier stages of history It is true, however, that there 
was a sentiment qf internationalism during the European Middle Ages. 



THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 7J 

But if we analyse this sentiment, we see that the international love and 
solidarity of that period was confined only to Christian peoples, and 
international law likewise pertained only to the rights of the Christian 
states The Balkan wars demonstrated to us that even today the Euro- 
pean conscience is nothing but a Christian conscience. If we analyse 
the conscience of the Turk, we shall see that he agrees, for instance, to 
wed his daughter to an Arab, to an Albanian, to a Kurd, or to a Cir- 
cassian, but not to a Finn or to a Hungarian He will not wed her to a 
Buddhist Mongolian or a Shamanist Tunguz unless he embraces Islam 
During the Tnpohtantan and Balkan wars, those who shared the griefs 
of the Turks and gave freely of their moral support were not Hun- 
garians, Mongols, or Manchurians, but Muslims of China, of India, of 
Java, and of the Sudan, whose names we do not even know. It is 
because of this that the Turks regard themselves as one of the Muslim 
nations, although they belong to the Ural-Altai group from the linguis- 
tic point of view 

Anthropologically, human beings of the same anatomical types 
constitute a race, but sociologically the nations that belong to the same 
civilization constitute an ‘mtemationality'. When the Turks, as an 
ethnic people, joined Islamic civilization, the Turkish language 
assumed an Islamic character with the introduction of the Arab script 
and terms. 

Thus, the factor that creates the spirit of mtemationality, and hence 
civilization, is the book Consequently, there is no incompatibility 
between Turkish nationalism and Islam, since one is nationality and 
the other is mtemationality. When Turkish thinkers entertained the 
idea of Ottoman nationality composed of different religious com- 
munities, they did not feel the necessity of Islamization, but as soon 
as the ideal ofTurkism arose, the need for Islamization made itself 
felt. 

However, as nationality is the creation of the newspaper and mter- 
nauonahty the creation of the book, modernity is the product of 
technology. Those peoples are ‘contemporary’ who make and use all 
those machines made and used by the peoples most advanced in the 
techniques of the age. For us today modemizanon [being contemporary 
with modem civilization] means to make and use the battleships, cars, 
and aeroplanes that the Europeans are making and using. But this does 
not mean being like them only in form and in living When we see 
ourselves no longer in need of importing manufactured goods and 



■j6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
buying knowledge from Europe, then we can speak of being con- 
temporary with it. 

As there is no contradiction between the ideals of Turkism and 
Islam ism, there is none between these and the ideal of modernism. The 
idea of modernity necessitates only the acceptance of the theoretical 
and practical sciences and techniques from Europe. There are certain 
moral needs which will be sought in religion and nationality, as there 
were in Europe, but these cannot be imported from the West as tf they 
were machines and techniques. 

It seems, therefore, that we should accept the three ideals at the same 
ume by determining the respective fields of operation of each. To put 
it in a better way, w e have to create ‘an up-to-date Muslim Turkism', 
realizing that each of the three ideals is an aspect of the same need 
taken from a different angle. 

Contemporary civilization, which has been coming into existence 
for some time through the development of modem machines and 
techniques, is in the process of creating a new international! ry. A true 
intemauonality based on science is taking the place of the inter- 
nationality based on religion The participation of Japan, on the one 
hand, and of Turkey, on the other, in Western civilization is giving a 
secular character to European intemauonality, as we shall show bier, 
and thus the area of the unmet is differentiating itself from the area of 
intemauonality increasingly. 

In short, the Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai group 
of peoples, to the Islamic unmet , and to Western intemauonality. 

NATION AND FATHERLAND* 

. Currently discussed in the press are three concepts dealing with 
soaal questions that need definition- Turkism, Islamism, and Otto- 
mams m. These concepts cannot convey any meaning unless they 
become symbols of certain soaal facts and unless they derive their 
value from soaal reality. Without this understanding, they will not 
yield anv fruitful result, even if people continue to quarrel over them 
for j eats to come. 

When ft e look at soaal realines, we cannot fail to see that an Islamic 
unmet, an Ottoman state ( Jevlet ), a Turkish or an Arab nauon ( millet ) 
do exisL However, if this statement corresponds to any reality, the 
term 'Cmmet' must denote the totality of those people who profess the 



THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 77 

same religion, the ‘state' all those who are administered under the 
same government, and the ‘nation’ all those who speak the same 
language. The statement will be valid and will correspond to reality 
only If the above definitions are accepted It seems, then, that those 
who do not accept this statement deny it, not because its meaning does 
not correspond to reality, but because they do not believe that these 
words are suitable for denoting the respective meanings. 

The Islamists say that the word ’nation’ [millet, Arabic nulla] 
denotes what we cover by the word 'ummet'. The term 'nulla', they 
say, means ‘sect’ in Arabic. The perfection of a language means the 
existence of a meaning for every word and a word for every meaning, 
and also the existence of words expressing several meanings Even if 
v.e ourselves do not do this, the language itself wilL It is for this 
reason that the current [Turkish] language uses the word 'ummet' 
for those who belong to the same religion, and the word ‘millet’ for 
those who speak the same language As the majority of the people 
uses them with these specific meanings, we too must accept them 
There is no use creating difficulties on questions of terminology. 

The Ottomamsts, on the other hand, believe that the 'state' and the 
‘nation’ are synonymous. To them, the sum total of the citizens of a 
state constitutes a nation. This might be true, tf we disregarded reality 
and took only the logical relauon between the concepts into account 
As a matter of fact, to have a state composed of peoples who speak 
the same language, or to make only those peoples who speak the same 
language an independent state, seems more natural and most desirable 
But are existing states formed that wray* If not, then how is it justifiable 
to disregard that which tt existing and to believe that what ought to 
exist is really existing* 

The Turkists, on the other hand, criticizing the dieses of these 
groups, come to the following conclusions (a) the ummet and the 
nation are different things , (A) the nation and the state are also not the 
same. One may object to these conclusions, but only m so far as they 
do not correspond to sociological realities, and not by insisting that 
these realities should not be so. We must fit our concepts to the 
realities and not the realities to our own concepts' 

How e\ er, the external realities of the concepts of ummet, nation, and 
stare are not 2! together tndepen dent of each o ther Therelaaon between 
the ummet and the nation is a relanon betw een the general and the 
particular. The Ummet u a whole which comprises several nations 



78 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
belonging to the same religion. Individuals actually constituting a 
nation are not the only members of a nation. All those who may speak 
that language in the future wall also be members of that nation. Thus, 
for example, the Pomaks [Bulgarian Muslims] now speaking Bulgarian 
and the Cretan Muslims now speaking Greek may learn Turkish in 
the future and cease to be Bulgarian- or Greek-speaking peoples. This 
means that nationality is not determined by language alone but also by 
religion. 

There is a more or less similar relation between the terms ‘nation' 
and ‘state’. For example, the Ottoman state is a Muslim state — that is, 
it is formed of Muslim nations Two great nations, the Turks and the 
Arabs, by their numbers as well as by their culture and learning, served 
as the bases of the Ottoman state in such a way that the Ottoman state 
might even be called a Turkish- Arab state. It should also be remem- 
bered that the Turkish and Arab nations are not confined only to those 
who live within the Ottoman temtones. Those who speak the same 
languages but live under foreign rule also belong to these nations. 

About the concept of 'fatherland'. It means a sacred piece of land 
for whose sake people shed their blood. Why is it that all other lands 
are not sacred, but only that which is called fatherland 5 And how does 
it happen that those who believe this way do not hesitate to sacrifice 
their lives, their families, their most beloved ones* Evidently not 
because of any utilitarian value. The sacredness is certainly derived 
from something sacred But what can that sacred thing be* 

Is it the state 5 We have already seen that the state is not a power 
existing by itself. The state derives its power from the nation and from 
the ummtf. sharaf al-makan btl-makjn. ['the glory of the residence ts 
with the resident^' Thus, there are only tw o things which are sacred, 
the nation and the tZmmct. As the objects of reverence are two, their 
symbols or the homelands which are the seats of these two sacred 
objects should also be two: the homeland of the tmmit and the home- 
land of the nation. 

There is, in fact, a homeland of Islam which is die beloved land of 
all Muslims. The other one is the nauonal home w hich, for Turks, ts 
what we call Tufan . 1 The Ottoman temtones are that portion of 
Islamdom which have remained independent A portion of these is the 
home of the Turks, and is at the same time a portion of Turan. Another 
portion of them is the homeland of the Arabs, w hich is again a pan 
of the great Arab fatherland. 



THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 79 

The fact that the Turks have a special love for the home of the 
Turks, Turan, does not necessitate that they forget the Ottoman land 
which is a small Muslim homeland, or the great land of all Muslims 
For national, political, and international 5 ideals are different things 
and all are sacred ideals 


THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM* 

Youth is asking: If we believe that ideals are the product of histori- 
cal disturbance and social crises, will it not then be necessary to assume 
that another ideal, one which may be bom from the impulse of different 
circumstances, will succeed the ideal of nationalism 3 Will not, for 
example, the idea of socialism supercede the sentiment of nationality 
in the near Or distant future*’ 

My answer to this question is as follows Essentially an ideal is the 
actualization of the existence of a social group by its members The rays 
of the sun do not have the power to bum unless they are intensified 
through a lens Similarly, the group is unable by itself to manifest its 
‘sacredness’ unless it reaches a state of social combustion This 
sacredness, even before it has reached consciousness, exists in an un- 
conscious state in the psychological unity of the social group. So far it 
has remained a hidden treasure (al-kanj al-makJtfi), with all its halo of 
sanctity. The function of the crowd situauon is to make this reality 
manifest to the members of the group by transforming the latter 
amorphous existence into a clear-cut form. Social agitation becomes a 
source of ideals by its capacity to transform the group, which until 
now has been m a loose state, into a compact body. The emergence of 
an ideal means its nse from the subconscious to the conscious level 
Before the nse of the ideals of Ottomamsm, Islamism, and Turkism, 
the Ottoman state, the Islamic Ummet, and the Turkish nationality all 
existed. The working class existed m a scattered state before the ideal 
of socialism was bom, the latter emerging as a consequence of the con- 
centration of workers, which itself was a result of the development of 
large-scale industry in Europe. 

Therefore, a social group must have an existence, an organized form 
and institutions, m order to assert its existence in the consciousness of 
its members in a croud situation. Its institutions, political, religious, or 
linguistic, must certainly have an existence No crowd situation or 
condition of soaal agitation can create a group from nothing. Not only 



80 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
do ideals not emerge from a crowd situation that has no organizational 
basis, but such a crowd is itself inconceivable. Only something which 
exists in a state of laxity may be transformed into a state of solidity. 

It follows from what has been said that any major social emergence 
taking place in the future must have its basis in already existing con- 
ditions. In order for an ideal to arise m the future, it must spring from 
the intensification of one of the existing groups. Therefore, a great 
ideal should be bom out of the intensification of only that group 
which, m addition to being the richest and most powerfully organized, 
is in a position to bring together and assimilate all other groups in its 
own organization 

Which, then, is this inclusive group* Among the existing ones it 
is the language group — that is, the nationality group — which is most 
capable of fulfilling such a function 

First, those who speak the same language are usually descendants 
of the same stock, and thus a nation also means an ethnic unity. . . . 
Secondly, language is the earner of ideas and sentiments, the trans- 
mitter of customs and tradition, hence, those who speak the same 
language share the same aspirations, the same consciousness, and the 
same mentality Individuals thus shanng common and homogeneous 
sentiments are also naturally prone to profess the same faith. It is 
because of this that language groups tn many cases are of the same 
religion Even if in the beginning certain condiuons interfered some- 
what with this religious homogeneity, historical events show that 
peoples of the same language groups do tend to embrace the same faith. 
Thus, the Latins have been inclined to Roman Catholicism, the Ger- 
manic peoples to Protestantism, and the Slavonic peoples to Eastern 
Orthodoxy. Of the Ural- Altai group, die Mongols adopted Buddhism, 
the Manchurians Confucianism, and the Finno-Ugrians Christianity. 
Various sections of the Turks, in the beginning, had accepted Buddh- 
ism, Manichaeism, Judaism, and Christianity, but with the conversion 
of the majority to Islam, all became Muslims with the exception of the 
Shamamsc Yakuts, who consutute only some two hundred thousand 
people The mam reason why the latter remained outside Islam is that 
their home lies far out of the Turkish lands They will either embrace 
Islam and remain Turks or become Russified by accepting Christianity. 

As language plays a part m deciding religious affiliation, so religion 
plays a part in determining membership in a nationality. The Protes- 
tant French became Germanized when they n ere expelled from France 



THE IDEAL OP NATIONALISM 


and settled in Germany. The Turkish aristocracy of the old Bulgars 
became Slavicized following their conversion to Christianity. And 
today, the non-Turkish Muslims migranng to Turkey in a scattered 
way are becoming Turkifled because of their religious affiliation. We 
may conclude, therefore, that there is a close relationship between 
linguistic and religious association. 

Thirdly, when universal military service and sovereignty of the 
people were introduced, national defence ceased to be the monopoly of 
a trained and privileged sipahi order, and admirustrauon of the govern- 
ment was no longer the privilege of a ruling class directly responsible 
Only to the ruler The peasants who previously had no arms except 
their ploughs, and the townsfolk who were used to staying at home, 
now became soldiers, the people, who had no notion of administration, 
came to the point where they could control the government It became 
necessary to instil in them a sense of patriotism and to teach them how 
to assume the responsibiliues of voting When the needs of adult and 
universal educanon became apparent, conflicts arose among the differ- 
ent ethnic groups in die state over die question of which language 
should be spoken in the schools. The government began to insist on 
the dissemination of an official language, but each ethnic group de- 
manded that its own language become the main channel of education 
and instruction Thus, in the last century it came to be realized that 
confining the state and the country to a single language was no longer 
possible, and, as in the case of Austria-Hungary, the state adopted two 
main languages Today in Europe only those states which are based 
on a single-language group are believed to have a future Every 
national group is demonstrating the kind of future to which it aspires 
by voicing its wishes for a national home, with or without an historical 

Today all of us realize that die idea of a stare or homeland sup- 
posedly common to diverse nauonalities, is nothing but a mere concept, 
devoid of any zeal, enthusiasm, and devotion Just as it is inconceivable 
for more than one person to win the love of one individual, so there 
can be no real common home and fatherland for diverse peoples A 
state that is not based on a united spint can be only a common source 
of subsistence and nothing more A land that is not the home of a 
nation is Uke a public kitchen where everyone merely feeds himself 

The institutions of sate and fatherland achieve permanent life only 
when based on a national ideal, but they are destined to fell if they are 



82 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
based only on individual interests Men without ideals are egoistic, 
self-seeking, pessimistic, faithless, and cowardly; they are lost souls. 
A state must be founded on national ideals, a country has to be the 
home of a nationality if it is to have permanent existence. 

V7e see, therefore, that the concept of the language group encom- 
passes the concept of state as well as that of national home. Smaller 
units, such as family, class, corporation, village, tribe, and religious 
community, exist within the confines of the national unit. The family 
is composed of individuals of the same faith. They speak the language 
of a single nation. Other groups share a common religion and language. 
They are all, therefore, but smaller, constituent organs of the nadon 
In short, all ideals connected with the ethnic umt (kavm\ religion, 
state, nauonal home, family, class, corporation, etc., are auxiliary to the 
national ideals. As long as social evoluuon substitutes intellectual and 
sentimental for material factors, the value and effectiveness of the 
nauonal language as a means of expressing these ideals will increase, 
and in this way the sentiment of nationality will become a permanent 
ideal. 

It is true that, as large-scale industry grows in Turkey, the ideal of 
socialism will arise here too. But this ideal is destined to remain 
auxiliary to the national ideal, as have all other secondary ideals. 
Although socialism m Europe is constandy gaining strength, we see 
clearly that it gives way to the national ideal in times of war. Not only 
dunng political wars, but even in economic competition, class ideals 
are subordinated to national ideals. 

Furthermore, we can easily detect that the substance of all aspects 
of social life — such as religion, morality, law, politics, economics, 
science, and fine arts- is language Any increase in the importance of 
these spheres of social life means an increase in the importance of 
language. Language is the basis of soaal life, ihe texture of morality, 
the substratum of culture and civilization. AH future social movements 
with respect to any group or activity — will always solidify language 
groups directly or indirectly, and out of every crisis the ideal of 
nationalism will effervesce, each time more powerful and with increas- 
ing vitality. 

NATIONAL LANGUAGE* 

Just as physical bodies have length, width, and depth, so the soaal 
consciousness also has three dimensions— nationality, religion, and 



THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 83 

modernity. I propose to test the validity of this observation first with 
regard to language, which is the best mirror of soaal consciousness. 

The Turkish language has been in a process of growth for the last 
fifty or sixty years As the lights of modem civilization penetrate our 
country, every day our eyes see new products, our minds think in new 
concepts. Since the new objects and ideas cannot remain unnamed, 
our language becomes richer by the addmon of several new words 
every day. We also make translations from the papers and books of the 
leading nations of our century. In this way, several new concepts 
which formerly did not exist in our store of knowledge require the 
creation of new words in our speech. 

Thus, the more our language meets the advanced languages, the 
more it tends to imitate them word by word. It sometimes imitates in 
form newly corned [Western] w ords, as we see 1 n the case of words such 
as hurjebin (microscope) or durbin (telescope), or jehkdr (masterpiece), 
or mefkure (ideal) Someumes it coins new words by imitating mean- 
ings, as we see in the case of words such as tayyarc (aeroplane), ukdrrml 
(evolution), mejrCnyet (eonsimmonalism), and beduyat (aesthetics). 

This tendency suggests the following points for consideration a 
day will come when the Turkish language will have all the words 
corresponding to those that exist in French, English, or German As 
speech is an expression of subjective thinking, there grows a language 
expressing the concepts of our century, to which every national tongue 
must adapt itself. Until the Turkish language fulfils this requirement, 
it will not be a modem language — a language fully evolved from the 
point of view of the needs of our time. 

The new words entering our language are of three kinds ( 1 ) foreign 
words; (2) words derived from Arabic and Persian, or those which 
were coined from these languages, (3) and those derived or corned 
from the original Turkish. 

The w ords of the first category enter the language through smuggl- 
ing. The taste of the language tends to reject these words, and replace 
them either by Arabic (in the case of saenufic terminology) or by 
Persian words (in the case of general vocabulary) This feature of 
rejecting foreign words by putting Arabic or Persian roots in their 
places is peculiar not to Turkish only. All Muslim languages show- the 
same tendency These languages, which have something in common 
in so far as the religious terms or the scientific terms derived from 
religion are concerned, have to maintain this unity in connection with 



84 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
the derivation of new expressions. If, for example, the Turks living in 
Russia derive their terms from Russian, those in China from Chinese, 
and if we do it from the French, the Turkish of these peoples will 
vary from one to the other. But if we take these terms from Arabic or 
Persian, or from Turkish, they will be more uniform. The terminolo- 
gies used in the languages spoken in Christendom (ummet) were 
basically derived from Greek and Latin. The Muslim languages are 
threatened by the loss of unity in their religious-community (ummet) 
background by borrowing these terminologies 

However, Muslim languages will not fulfil their duties with respect 
to this question of religious-community (ummet) background merely 
by deriving their terminologies from Arabic or Persian. If each one 
denves its terms from different roots, the desired unity is sull not 
going to be obtained and the religious-community basis of the 
language will not be maintained It is for this reason that we [Turks] 
have to build our terms by adopting those which have already been 
accepted by other Muslim peoples, or those likely to be accepted by 
diem. To realize this aim, it is necessary to organize societies for intro- 
ducing new terms into the languages of the Muslim peoples. These 
organizauons must sponsor meetings from ume to time to discuss the 
problems of terminology. When the terms to be used in Muslim 
languages are decided upon systemaucally through such meetings, it 
will be possible to say that our language has completed its growth 
from a religious point of view, that is, that it has become thoroughly 


Once our language acquires a dicuonary of terminology common to 
the ummet of Islam, it should avoid any further borrowing from Arabic 
and Persian Arabic and Persian words introduced into Turkish have 
not been confined only to terminology. Several unnecessary words of 
the vernacular have also been taken from these two languages. Further- 
more, the influence of these tongues has not been confined to the mere 
transmission of words Certain Arab.c and Persian rules of grammar 
have .I,o entered ntro Turk,,!, »d, . way rha, Turlrsh grammar 
languageT' 3 C ° mp ° Und ° f thc Smmnvtr and syntax of the three 

!rh '° mod ”"" our language from the pent ofvtew 

l^o7.».', “"“P 0 - “ d » .. from the pom, of 

"r”'” « equally necessary to 

Turkrfy from the pent of view of grammar, syntax, , pt iimg. 



THE IDEAL OF NATIONALISM 85 

Every word m our language, with the exception of scientific terms, 
must be in Turkish if possible, and, if not possible, at least Turkified. 
Arabic and Persian rules of grammar should be expelled entirely. We 
should say, for example, not fuara-yi ccdidt but yen i f airier, not 
tdebiydt-i Turkiyyt , but Turk, edebtyatt, not taiuyyet but tabuhk, not 
serbestt but serbestltk, not muct^ bir muhamr but icatfi bir muharrir ; 
not mGcii bir ifade but iea{h bir ifade. However, it is not enough to 
restrict Turkificauon only to vocabulary (lugat). If possible, it would 
be even better to create all terms from Turkish roots; but if this is not 
possible, it is preferable to derive them from the Arabic and Persian 
roots rather than from French or Russian. In any case, it is necessary 
to make the terms as well as the vocabulary common, if not among all 
Muslims, at least among the Turks, in other words, all Turks should 
have a common literary and scientific language. We must not forget, 
therefore, that when we Turkify our language, we have to develop 
towards a common Turkish which will be understood by all brothers- 
in-race. 

To summarize, the new concepts are the expression of the modem 
age, the terms used are the expression of religious-community and the 
vernacular form, the expression of the nation Unless Turkish becomes 
a sensitive reflection of the three aspects of our social consciousness, 
we cannot speak of a well-established and fully developed language. 



CHAPTER IV 


CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 

«h 


CIVILIZATION OF THE PEOPLE 1 


Every nation has tv o civilizations One is its formal civilization, the 
other is the civilization of the people Sociology, which studies civiliza- 
tion in general, should have a branch to study this folk civilization. 
The field w hich comprises this traditional, unw ntten, and oral civiliza- 
tion is folklore. 

In other nations not much disparity may be seen between the two 
civilizations Among the Turks, however, it strikes the eye immedi- 
ately Among them there is the language, ihe literature, the morality, 
the law, the economics, the organizations of the folk w hich are entirely 
different from those w hich are formal. The reason for this dichotomy 
lies in the fact that the Turks have borrowed the insutuuons of foreign 
peoples and produced an artificial civilization out of them, instead of 
creating their own by developing their own institutions. In ancient 
times their spirit inspired them with certain healthy feelings and pre- 
vented them from creating such disparities. They believed in their 
nobility and used to call others tats to distinguish them from them- 
selves They used to distinguish those among themselves who had 
imitated other peoples as sorts They distinguished their own civiliza- 
tion wluch they called uygarlik Their tradiuons were called tore , their 
laws were called tu^ui, and their constitution was called yasa As a 
nation they called themselves tuJun, a word derived from butun [whole], 
as they believed themselves as free as the whole world They called 
their deity the God of Turks, and believed that it took care of their 
welfare alone, as we see in the Gultekin [Ockhon] inscriptions 
In spue of this idealism inspired by their ethos, die official leaders of 
the Turkish people forgot national traditions for the sake of their court 
life. They believed in the superiority of the tat and mutated them, 
and thus the official flue of the Turks headed towards the abyss of 



90 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
aermess. Fortunately, the folk dine preserved their oral traditions and 
saved the nation from tool emulation. When Melamed Bey of Kars- 
naan had put Prance Giyas-ud-dm on ahe Selptk throne, he immediately 
forbade the use of Persian as the official language and of Greek os the 
cultural language, replacing them avail, Turkish. This etplains achy the 
Greeks of Karaman of today Icnoav no language other than Turkish. 

Ottoman Turks aaere able to found a powerful empire svithin a 
T 01 ! of ™ onl y hra “ ! ' *•» government nets an the hands of 
the folk flite. There tvere three pracnca! schools, the Palace School 
u u ’ ll '5, Sch001 Png'S (-*erm O^on), and the Vezrr House- 
holds (Rye ZW , ,), winch, no, ahe avnuen lore of the Arabs or 

Persians, bur the oral lore of the Uygur Turks-the products of then 
polinca and social eapertenees—avas used (and not taught'). Pashas 
hke Lala Sahm Fethat, Ozderauroglu Osman had been arained in 
accordance w uh this foba-iore, dae Turkish yuan, which „ no. 
wnuen m books but lived in memory. The sdtolare and poet, tramed 
an dae officual medreres dad notluug but praise in their feaaaks daese 
oasarf f^,h“1 f °' ‘ ht T’/g n ? n "«. k'focs It Wsas tvhcn government 
*' •'»* of thts folk «ne (the men of the sword) to die 

ZeXrar. T ( of ,ht scho °® *Isat dae Cteonaan 

power lost , a centre of gravuy and headed downwards 

besoatuhtui'rhedttt^ *' f “ ors r '’P°'” lbfc for our rise should 
be sought m the folk civdtraoon, and those ftetore responsthle for our 

wfa sfd,” “J ° mal I' should not be forgotten 

disparity costs hem ecu die oral uad.uons md die 
I”™ 1 '■f'ltaton draws dae mands of the 
there is an umnterru ^ ^ “ ™™ c «»*«■. I» other nadons 
Se "dTe^r^' ° f ,dt ” >" d sotitunents beawren the 
Sd to emst al t''V S T ™”™>" b =»een the wo 
among the official mm f I ^ S> neidler a nanonal consciousness 
reToeLm „ *e J T dt.caphne and 

resulr of tht. cond.Uon, di^TariS a^Tf P “ S ' b1 '' A ‘ ‘ 

became denahonalared Th ,s “ m , , dechned and 
of Turkish folklore ^ shouId ** lnvesQ S ated a study 


fromofBado^S” gOVernment » 11,31 

h ° n ’ G ovem ment * the mind and the people the 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 91 

matter. We believe that the opposite is true: the people certainly are 
the spirit, and the government the matter of a nation. 

Government consists of certain formal bodies, such as the cabinet, 
the parliament, the army, the cm! service, local councils, official 
schools, and institutions They are tied together in every respect by 
strict rules and laws. The status of their functionaries is determined by 
unchanging regulations. Formal rules put seniority before efficiency, 
office before intelligence. As government bodies are run by inflexible 
rules, they fail to adapt themselves to the needs of the dynamics of 
social and political life. They are like the organic mechanisms of our 
bodies Dr like certain machines connected and geared to each other. 

The whole which we call the people, on the other hand, is composed 
of informal groups* — such as family, village, tribe, artisan guilds and 
corporations, assoaanons, political parties, rebgion and language 
groups. These bodies are not ruled by formal laws, but by living and 
growing traditions whose roots are in the past and whose branches are 
growing towards the future. There are no hierarchies in them to check 
the growth of intelligence and aptitude, unless they too degenerate by 
becoming formalized into official bodies 

To show that folk organizations constitute the spirit of a nation, it 
is enough to indicate that it is the informal group which is the real 
motivating force behind the formal mechanical bodies. For example, 
in the machinery of government the most important bodies arc parlia- 
ment and cabinet, behind which, as everybody knows, is the force of 
political parties. Polmcal parties are nothing but fellowships or people's 
insutuuons Local government councils are also directed by local 
parties or bodies of citizenry, economic corporations, spiritual councils, 
voluntary aid assoaanons. . . . 

If we ask si ho is profiung from the organizations of government 
which dominate all the sources of our country’s wealth, we find that 
it is those who have their own economic communities. The Muslim- 
Turkish populauon, unfortunately, does not get even a small share from 
this wealth because it lacks this kmd of organization. 

These examples are enough to show us that it is the organization of 
a community which motivates formal machinery. Therefore, we must 
realize how funle it is to rely only on government bodies and neglect 
the organizations of the people. We must become not only a nation 
with a body but also a nation with a spirit. 

During the foundation of the Ottoman state, our ms a unions were 



92 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
of the nature of confraternities. Young minds used to enter these 
confraternities and acquire status ranging from timar- holding to grand 
vizirate according to their talents. The levend confraternities used to 
produce men like Barbarossa and Turgut Reis, who could conquer 
lands with their corsair ships. Janissary corps, sipahts, West [African] 
confraternities, Kokmens of Egypt and Baghdad were all organized as 
confraternities. They had their own traditions, spiritual guides, and 
peculiar sense of solidarity. 

Transformation of these organizations into formal institutions marks 
the senility of a nation From the time when folk organizations began 
to be official institutions in our history, Ottoman power began to 
decline. Non-Muslim peoples, on she Oliver hand, rejuvenated thesn- 
selves by reviving their folk organizations. Church organizations, 
community schools, companies, trade organizations, [Macedonian 
revolutionary] committees were centres of struggle, and finally, from 
these centres, nauons and states came into existence by gaining inde- 
pendence from the Ottoman Empire These independent small states 
formed their official institutions, but they always retained their spirit 
of confraternity Thus they have succeeded in developing themselves 
as nauons with Ispm dt corps We, on the other hand, continued in 
our decline and disintegrauon, because our spirit was numbed. 

Nations are not like biological organisms. Biological organisms, 
once aged, never rejuvenate Nauons can rejuvenate themselves by 
reviving their nauonal folk organizations Some believe that a young 
nation can emerge only after a resurrection. In other words, they be- 
lieve that a people can rebuild its msunmons only after its govern- 
ment has collapsed We are not of this opinion. We believe that such 
a miracle, if it is to be realized by a natural process, can be achieved by 
an (Ion vital. 


TRADITION AND FORMALISM* 

When we look at any aspect of our social hfe, we can observe two 
conflicting attitudes radicalism and conservatism These ra o attitudes 
represent two ways of thinking that are usually thought to conflict 
with each other, whereas, in fact, both are based on the same principle' 
formalism. 

The conservadve tends to see an ousting social convention as an 
unchangeable truth, and regards any attempt to revise it as blasphemy. 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 93 

The radical, on the other hand, makes the rationalizing of a convention 
an absolute formula, and regards those who do not accept it as re- 
actionaries. Neither ever attempts to question the origin and growth 
of the old or of the new, or the way in which norms adapt themselves 
to different environments at different times Both believe that the rule, 
or convention, is somedung above time and space, that it exists by 
itself For both a rule is not merely the product of a stage, an inter- 
mediary stage, in the evolution of a society. To them it is an eternal 
truth or principle, definite and fixed in an objective reality above time 
and space. 

As the repeated observance of rules establishes habits, aged persons 
usually tend to be conservative Youth, on the other hand, tends to 
attribute the causes of the progress of the advanced nations, shining 
with the wonders of modem civilization, only to the validity of die 
rules that these advanced nations apply, thus they tend simply to 
imitate them and align themselves with the radicals. 

A rule— whether it is a rule of fashion, of manners, or of etiquette, 
whether it is a rule with regard to matters of belief or opinion, whether 
it is a rule of sacred or secular law — -always has a certain character 
that seems to inhibit people from taking it as something transitory or 
as a part of a development However, as soon as a rule is taken in this 
nay, as a fixed and inflexible entity, it assumes the character of a life- 
less skeleton, whereas the essence of life is a creative evolution. Only 
lifeless things are outside of creanve evoluuon The formalist then 
mistakes the effect for the cause The rule is only the temporary product 
of a process. The formalist, however, tends to think of the rule as the 
cause of the process, and thus, as the cause is known to him, he does 
not care to study the process itself 

As one secuon of die people of this mentality regards the rule as an 
absolute monarch, another part of the same bent of mind puts all 
blame on the wretched rule whenever it is realized that its application 
is useless Then the radical immediately raises his voice to hush the 
conservame For him die thing to be done is very simple* depose the 
Old Rule and put a new one tn its place 1 But the sovereignty of the 
New Rule does not last very long because during the period of its 
application new incongruities soon arise. Then the custodians of habit 
raise their heads and order the tmitaaomsts to withdraw from the 
scene. 

Now, this is n hat happens to us all the time! Study the past of the 



94 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
Turks, and you will find that they have always lived their history in a 
variety of disconnected stages. Our institutions have been like the 
treasury of invading conquerors, becoming suddenly fiitl with the 
booty of victory, but destined to be suddenly empty again because its 
sources are not within the national culture. Instead of making our 
institutions living traditions bom out of an evolunonary process by 
maintaining their historical continuity, we tend to take from every 
country institutions devoid of any history and tradition and to discard 
our own traditions. 


The Bnmh are a people without rules, but we find in them the best 
example of a tradiuon whose historical continuity and evolutionary 
significance is weU known We Turks, on the other hand, are formalists, 
and yet we lack traditions We do not trace the historical continuity 
of our Turkish and Islamic traditions, and we do not study the origins 
of the advancements which characterize our age. We think that we 
need merely the results Our Turkish and Islamic past, after successive 
ebbs and flows has left us with only the precipitates in the form of 
certain practical and ritualistic rules. European civilization seems to us 
only a collection of certain theoreucal and practical formulae. One part 
of us is content just to use the precipitations while the other wants 
simply to loot imported formulae. 

The rule, whether it is habitual or imitauve, is always devoid of 
creativity and growth because discrete imitations are not reconcilable 
with each other and are without foundations Each of them, being an 
independent and absolutely separate ennty, remains as it is It does not 
°7 n *i tUre - Tradiaon > on the other hand, means creativity 
andprogress. Tins ,s so because tradition has a past which knits the 
drereete tnontenre anothet, „ hmonol „„ vmralt „ hlch 
5“T forward a, a tnottwanog fora . j m 

laT T* T™""”- .> somrfmg growing and 

“re S'™6 Ifc '■> die botrow-ed innova- 

dro on^?!^ *">• *» *o foreign element, do no. 

d^outandbeerenerotren, » happero „ otdmry laa> 

f ° f *' “ d ™ d "ol » die som total of 
? ° f * l,ln ‘™ «nl»d.ed m .re read,. 

™ rofa ” r*” ° f Th “. dadioon ronstt- 

““ the sp.nt of a natton, the total roles .re body. One reoresenre the 
meaning, the other the words Th.. ►, , represents tne 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 95 

the Balkan wars, the Bulgarians were inspired by their fiery traditions, 
we were inspired by our cold rules. The result was the victory of history 
over geography. 

It follows, then, that both conservatism and radicalism, both of 
which so far have had a following among us, are blind roads Our New 
Life should avoid both. We must, first of all, know the tradiuons and 
the historical growth of the institutions peculiar to the Turks. Turkish 
literature, for example, begins neither with Ajik Pa$a nor with Neva!. 
We must look for the sources of our literature on the stone engravings 
or deer skins, on the one hand, and in the folk poems, folk tales, and 
epics, on the other. Our national language must be based on Turkish 
grammar. Our national literature must take its ihemes, its symbols, 
from Turkish social life, from Turkish social organization, and from 
Turkish mythology and epics We must discard foreign rules from 
our grammar, foreign metre from our poetry, foreign symbolism from 
our literature. We must realize that the periods of foreign invasion 
since the beginnings of our linguistic and literary traditions have been 
transitory and pathological periods for these We must revive the 
history of Turkish law by studying Turkish folkways, mores, and 
tnbal laws. As we find Turkish architecture and painung in the artistic 
works of the age ofi immei, so we must discover Turkish music as well 
as Turkish poetry in the oral traditions of the folk The Turks will 
find their Turkish Ideal still surviving in the life of their words, 
proverbs, folk-tales, and folk epics. It is their duty to collect them 
from the scattered remains, and to discover the ethnic pre-history 
hidden in them. 

Yet, at the same time the Turks have to study the traditions and the 
history of our Islamic institutions. They have to know the history of 
Islamic theology, mysticism, and jurisprudence When the develop- 
ment of these institutions and the manner in which they have accom- 
modated themselves to manifold drcumstances in terms of time and 
space become clear, then it will be evident which elements of con- 
temporary civilization will be adopted and how they will deselop in 
the future. 

Tradmon not only establishes continuity and harmony betw-een the 
forms that an institution assumes at various times, but also shows how 
all of diem are derived from the same origin, thus serving to cement 
them together. Durkheim believed that institutions such as those of 
law, morality, politics, logic, aesthetics, and economics are all derived 



ILIZATION 


96 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVI 
from religion These brandies gain a living force and a dynamic life 
only by deriving their roots from a religious origin. As tradition 
requires continuity and harmony, it becomes necessary to find die 
connection between the pre-history of the Turk and the metaphysics 
of religion, and by so doing to develop an Islamic-Turkish philosophy 
of history. And, thirdly, it is necessary for us to study the historical 
development, the conditioning soaal circumstances, and applications 
of technology and science, and the methods and philosophies of our 
age in order to use them. 

The history of civihzanon shows that whenever industry develops 
in a country, the sciences develop as well. Science is bom out of 
industry, and aims at regulating and organizing it. Among us, how- 
ever, the study of science is not a means but an end. Our scientists only 
talk about science, they do not see its apphcauons. In this way, there 
is among us neither science nor saenust in the true sense. Science is 
bom of technology as philosophy develops out of methods [of saencej 
The philosopher is not a man who merely puts together and organizes 
the discrete truths that others have discovered. The real philosopher is 
one who knows the methods of seeking the truth and actually applies 
them Today we can no longer regard philosophy as the sum total of 
a senes of truths already established. Philosophy consists of the methods 
that are continuously discovering and modifying these truths There- 
fore, it is clear also that w e do not have philosophy and philosophers 
in the real sense 

It is, therefore, necessary for us to direct our development towards 
a nation based on history and tradiuon, on the one hand, and to develop 
a science actually based on technology, on the other. Furthermore, v.e 
must create a philosophy that is fed continuously by [scientific] 
methods. When we have merged and combined the science, philosophy, 
and technology of our age with our national and religious traditions 
in the manner that we have discussed so far, we shall be able to create a 
contemporary Islamic-Turkish civilization And it is only when we 
have reached the promised land which the spint of the people calls 
‘Red Apple (Aijt/ Elma) that we shall be free in culture and indepen- 
dent in civilization in their true sense. 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 


97 


COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY* 


The reason why students of sociology amve at conclusions so 
divergent from one another is that some of them view social life in 
culture-groups (commumnes), while others observe it in terms of 
civilization-groups (societies) This divergence in viewpoint is seen 
first of all in the definitions of the ‘social fact’ Gabriel Tarde, for 
example, defined a social fact as that which consists of ‘invennon’, 
made by individuals and socialized through ‘imitation’. Durkheim, 
on the other hand, opposed Tarde’s view on the grounds that a fact is 
not social simply because it becomes common through imitation He 
believed that a fact becomes common through imitanon simply because 
it is social Durkheim believed that the facts that betong to the realm 
of the individual are those which present themselves to the individual 
as a purety internal constraint such as pain, durst, or sleep The social 
facts, on the other hand, are those that present themselves to the 
individual as external constraint, for example, religious beliefs, moral 
duues, legal rules, polmcal and social ideals. 

These definitions show that Durkheim found social life in culture- 
groups, whereas Tarde found it in civilizauon-groups 

The individual needs mentioned above, and the sensations such as 
seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling which are called indi- 
vidual facts, are, in reality, biological phenomena of the human species 
It ts erroneous to call them individual facts 

The ideas which are called social facts and excluded from the first 
category may also be divided into two categories subjective and objec- 
tive facts. Beliefs, moral duties, aesthetic feelings, and ideals are, in 
general, of a subjective nature and are the accepted norms of a certain 
culture-group Scientific truths, hygienic or economic rules, practical 
am pertaining to public w orks, techniques of commerce and of agri- 
culture are all of an objective nature and are the accepted norms of die 
civibzation-gTOups The constraint exercised over the individual by 
die representations of the culture-group is called ‘power of sanction’, 
and the external validity of the concepts of civilizauon, ‘objectivity’. 
If we do not observe the rules of hygiene, we lose our health as a 
natural consequence of our disobedience to the laws of biological 
nature. When we neglect the rules of economy, we suffer as an inevit- 



98 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
able consequence of our disregard of the laws of economy. When we 
do not observe the directions of religious, or moral, or aesthetic ideals, 
then moral punishments of the courts of conscience or the conscience 
of the courts strike us. The punishments of common taste are expressed 
in the form of ridicule. All of these are natural and inevitable conse- 
quences. These punishments are a result of the fact that these rules are 
the accepted values sanctioned by the conscience of the culture-group 
The facts of culture produce in the individual the faculty of consci- 
ence,* which is charged with the task of evaluation and classificanon of 
the normative concepts or values; the facts of civilization produce the 
faculty of reasoning charged with the task of analysis and synthesis of 
empirical concepts or objective truths. The individual m culture has to 
appropriate to himself the commands of the social conscience as 
cherished ideals and norms of conduct, the individual in civilisation 
has to think in terms of the logical framework of the sodal intellect. 

Scientific concepts, technical knowledge, and the tools of economic 
production in a avilizauon pass from people to people by imitation or 
by exchange A civilization first appears as a local civilization, but soon 
expands itself over lands and conunents, and, finally, over the whole of 
mankind. It is only in this sense that the sociologists like Tarde or 
Karl Marx or Edmond Demohns were nghL But if humanity were 
composed only of a aviltzanon-group made up of individuals, it 
would be possible to attribute the diffusion of the social facts to imita- 
tion, or to believe that only technology is an important factor in social 
life. Humanity is, however, not a civilizanon-group composed of 
independent individuals Individuals are incorporated into several 
culture-groups such as family, clan, commune, corporation, class, 
ethnic unit. Church ( ummet ), and state 

If we are allowed to take an analogy from the physical world, we 
may say that the aggregation of the social atoms is not merely the 
product of a physical mixture but rather that a process of chemical 
synthesis, so to speak, combines these atoms to form compound 
parades, which constitute new units Similarly, in biology, the cells, 
with the exception of unicellular organisms, produce organisms in a 
variety of forms and qualmes, and their existence is dependent upon 
these compound ('social') organisms. 


* In French the term coru 
dull me the word ‘contact 
(yuivi) for ns sociological 


™ “ us'd differently in prychology and sociology W« 
* (/w) for ns psychological meaning and ‘conscience' 
ning 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 99 

Since the processes of assimilation and integration within society 
restrict the scope of free contacts, the processes of imitation and 
exchange necessitated by the bfe of a civilization do not take place 
smoothly States, for example, restrict the freedom of economic ex- 
change by levying high tariffs in order to protect their internal indust- 
ries. Ethnic groups ( kavm ) want to prevent the intrusion of foreign 
words into their languages in order to preserve linguistic punty. In 
their efforts to maintain the national character of literature, they try to 
take their topics and themes from their folklore and reject classical 
literature which has a universal character. Peoples who belong to a 
certain religion [ummtt) attribute the sanctity and inviolability of man 
only to those who share their own religious beliefs (as the Europeans 
have always done, especially during the Balkan ware) by making religion 
the basis of international law and morality The family creates a united 
in-group against outsiders with respect to livelihood and property by 
establishing ties between husband and wife, between parents and 
children, and among children. A tnbe transforms a handful of herds- 
men into a commune, a village, or a town, a corporation, the members 
of a trade into a sect, a church, the members of a faith into a kind of 
family, closed against outsiders. Men living in a vilizau on-groups 
share at the same time the ethos peculiar to each one of these culture- 
groups. 

Durkheim has been regarded as the most penetrating sociologist 
because he realized the importance of those groups that play the role 
of natural joints in the social organism The components of the ethos 
of a culture are in constant conflict with the reason and logic of the 
society. The individual may sometimes fail to think m logical terms 
when he becomes too much the slave of his conscience, and sometimes 
may choke the dictates of his conscience by subordinating them to his 
reason. This duel between conscience and reason, between culture and 
civilization, is not necessarily unavoidable. The function of the 
conscience is to evaluate the values that are upheld by society, the role 
of reason is to codify the objective truths The first answers the question 
‘why live*’ saying ‘for the sake of the ideals’, w hile the second answers 
the quesuon ‘how live 9 ’ by saying ‘in a rational way’. The first con- 
trols and guides our will by 1a normative judgments, while the second 
guides our practical reason by its empirical judgments. In short, one 
gives us the ends and the other the means- 

The aim of educauon and of politics as conceived by Edmond 



100 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


Demohns is, we might say, to transform men of culture into men of 
civilization, because this writer attributes the superiority of the Anglo- 
Saxons to their individualism (in our terms, to their civilization), and 
the inferiority of the Eastern nations to their collectivism (in our terms, 
to their culture) To attribute the progress or the decline of nations to 
a single factor such as this is not a scientific procedure. Besides, the 
claim that the Anglo-Saxons are of an individualistic and not of a 
collectivistic type is, in itself, untenable. It is true that the Anglo- 
Saxons do not put the state above the individual as do Me, but is the 
state the only culture-group’ The local administrations, the national 
sects, the organizations of nobility, which are all culture-groups, are 
more prominent in England than anywhere else. Their racialism is also 
an indicauon of their emphasis on culture. The point is that in England 
these organizations did not prevent the growth of civilization, in spite 
of their strength and vitality. 

Just as an unnatural conflict between culture and civihzauon may 
take place, there may also be contradicuons, of a pathological nature, 
between the values of the sub-groups within the whole culture-group 
ITius, family sentiments may sometimes weaken national solidarity by 
being too extreme and narrow. Religious zeal may take such a form as 
to exclude all ethnic allegiances Sometimes the sentiment of nauonahsm 
may tend to destroy the feelings for a common homeland and state. 

“»*“«•»■» »> Europe gives nse to ihe feeing of enmity against 
*e fatherland and mrlrtary serv.ee I, ,, rhe duly of the sociolomst to 
convert ihis unnatural stare of warfare ,o a peaceful condmon by d,s- 
covenng the natural hrerurchy between the social sub-groups Thus, 
when die smianon demands, rhe famdy should subordinate ..self to 
S' “ d ' corporation, rhe corponrdon to rhe sra.e, and all of them to 
ho uT™ ■""euage group (the nanon); and tt 

T “ wl " d > “ "‘rove >11 other soetal 

groups, ts a language group, and rha, miemanonabiy „ a cmhranon- 

B mSln‘T a °°i gr °7 °T" t ' S " a »> y *11 of a market 

=«-i=K= ssat- 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION IOI 

of national aptitudes a cultural division oflabour comes into existence. 
At first the peoples that are in proximity to each other initiate com- 
mercial, intellectual, and technological relations with each other, and 
then the area of these relations grows wider and wider From ancient 
times, the peoples of the Mediterranean basin were exchanging goods, 
knowledge, and tools with each other The discovery of the Cape 
Route and of the New World, the invention of printing, the opening 
of die Suez Canal, die construction of railways, and telegraph and 
postal services increased the contacts between these nanons and gave 
them a universal character 

Culture-groups, on the other hand, began as clans whose members 
regarded themselves as descendants of a common ancestor The earliest 
culture-group, then, was a religious and linguistic group. As this 
spiritual unit lived entirely a religious life, it was an entirely religious 
group in the beginning From this group, which had contained in US 
fold all the seeds of the tetter patterns of groupings, successively origi- 
nated the family, the phratry, the mbe, the village, the town, the 
classes, corporations, communes, and, at last, ethnic groups, the Church 
(iZm/nrr) and the state Therefore, the law regulaung the life of the 
culture-groups is the differentiation and multiplication of the primitive 
groups from an undifferentiated and mula-functioning unit to a state 
in which special groups come into existence to perform specific 
functions. 

It follows from these observations that modernization means die 
acquisiuon and equal sharing of the sciences and technical arts which 
contemporary civilization is continuously perfecting To share a 
common human life in a civilization-group is not detrimental to the 
existence of the family or state, nor to the integrity of religion or the 
nation We Turks have to work to create a Turkish-Istemic culture by 
fully appropriating to ourselves the mentality of contemporary 
Civilization and its sciences. 

II' 

— In present-day cmhzauon there is no genuine sentiment of 
humanity transcending the confines of religion The events of our lime 
show eloquently that there are as many intemationaliues and humani- 
ties as religions. For a European, humanity is nothing but Christen- 
dom. It is true that there are principles of jusnce and right, brother- 
hood and kindness in the West, but their application extends only as 



102 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

far as the boundaries of the Christian religion. And, again, it is true 
that there is morality, philosophy, and civilizaaon m the West, but on 
all of them there is the implicit or explicit stamp of the Cross. 

It is evident that certain things not coloured by Chrisuanity are not 
lacking entirely in Europe Science, technology, and industry are uni- 
versal and common to all humanity as they are not the products of 
‘community’ but of ‘society’. We as Muslims, under the guidance of 
our own style of social life, divide European civilization into two levels, 
and accept the ‘civilization of society’ because it is common [to 
humanity]. As to the other level, which belongs to the ‘community’, 
we are trying to build a civilization of our own out of our own ‘com- 
munity’ life, by profiting from the methods of the former [international 
civilization] In reaction to the treatment we received [from Europe], 
the sentiments of an Islamic mtemationality and humanity are rising 
in our consciousness 

In spite of the growth of several ideals, it is sail religion that exer- 
ases the most powerful force over the minds . . . We know how 
powerful a factor religion soil is in countries like the United States and 
Switzerland which are most free from medieval political msututions. 
We have seen a religious revival recently even in France which had 
declared war against the Church As it is evident chat religious con- 
sciousness has a lasting life, there remains only one means by which to 
attain the unity of mankind, and that is through the creation of a 
world faith (bayn al-’umam) which would be the product of conalia- 
uon and rapprochement among [existing] religions. Only in this way 
may a humane community be created to eradicate the misunderstand- 
ings between religions, and only then will real equality of nations, 
universal justice and kindness, brotherhood and solidarity be realized. 
Until the rise of such a new ideal, a religious mtemationality which is a 
partial humanity will inevitably rule men’s souls, m the East as well as 
in the West. 

By the term Tutkish-Islamic civilization, we mean a ‘community’ 
avihzauon There can be a ‘society’ avilization common to all Otto- 
man ‘communities’. This Ottoman avilization will consist of a local 
manifestation of the universal ‘soaety’ avihzauon. 

The separation between religion and state is a goal sought by all 
civilized nations Not only politics, but even ethics, law, and philosophy 
have freed themselves from their previous dependence on religion and 
have gradually won their autonomy. In spite of the separation of these 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION IOJ 

areas of social life, religion has not lost its appeal to the heart. On the 
contrary, religion has begun to fulfil its function more effectively as it 
has demarcated its private domain . . . 

Islam has not been a power in our country simply because it could 
not perform its private function independently within the framework 
of the state. If you want to understand the power of the religion of 
Islam, you must study it in India, in Egypt, in Java and China, and m 
the Turkish lands that are under the rule of Russia Then you will see 
that the attachment of religion to the state in our country has not been 
to its advantage, but rather to the extreme detriment of religion The 
reason for this can be seen easily. The state is a legal machinery, it 
tends to legalize and formalize any social force upon which it touches. 
It is because of this fact that Islam started to lose its vitality from the 
moment it began to be fused with the political organization and began 
lo be formalized as a system of law closed against all tjtthaJ. The 
religion that the state recognizes officially today and the shart'a which 
it formally holds is nothing but the fikji. But the fikh did not exist until 
one and a half centuries after the Hijra. Until that time religion and 
shart'a consisted of the Kur’an and Sunna. The state today officially 
recognizes only one shart'a, that of the Hanafi school. Thus, a sect 
that has only a scholastic value is held prior to religion which is the 
main thing. The situation is different in those places where Islam is 
independent As religion is understood to be a religious life in these 
countries, the shart'a finds its sources only in the Book [the Kur’an] 
and Sunna , on the one hand, and in social life, on the Other, and is 
increasingly becoming a social sharVa . . 7 

If we accept the existence of a social reality as distinct from physical 
reality, we cannot put religion and the ummer — that is, the community 
of religion— outside this social reality. Like all other ideals and values, 
these too have an existence in ihe social consciousness which is 
sanctioned by the pow er of their social appeal. 

It then follows that w e do noi hold the monistic view m sociology. 
People cannot live with only one ideal. As the ideal of nationality is 
imperative, the ideals of inter-community life, of international life, and 
inter-religious life are equally needed. With respect to ideals, we are 
pluratist. Our national ideal will be Turkishness, our international 
ideal wall be Islam. We also favour the ideal of Ottoman unity of the 
[religious] communities and the ideal of humanity among the great 
religions, to the extent that we see the same applied to us. 



104 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION® 

There are areas of convergence and divergence between culture and 
civilization. Convergence is due to the fact that both culture and 
civilization cover religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, 
economic, linguistic, and technological spheres of social life. It Is the 
sum total of these eight major spheres of social life that constitutes 
both culture and civilization. In this sense, culture and civilization 
overlap and appeal to be identical. 

Cut there are also certain differences between culture and civiliza- 
tion First, culture is national, civilization is international. Culture is 
composed of the integrated system of religious, moral, legal, intellec- 
tual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic, and technological spheres of life 
of a certain nauon Civilization, on the other hand, is the sum total of 
social institutions shared m common by several nations that have 
attained the same level of development Western civilization, for 
example, is a ci\ ihzation shared by the European nauons bving on the 
conunents of Europe and America. Within this civilization, however, 
there are English, German, French, etc., cultures, which are different 
and independent of each other 

Secondly, civilization is created by men’s conscious actions and is a 
rational product Our knowledge, theories, and techniques with regard 
to religion, law, ethics, fine arts, economy, science, philosophy, and 
language are all conscious and rational products of individuals. The 
sum total of these products within a certain area of attainment consti- 
tutes a distinct type of civilization 

The elements that constitute a culture, on the other hand, are not 
creations of conscious individual actions They are not created arti- 
ficially Just as plants and animals grow naturally, so the elements of a 
culture rise and grow spontaneously Language, for example, is not 
made individually and rationally. We cannot change the words of a 
language, and put new ones, invented arbitrarily, m their places. We 
cannot change the grammatical rules which have grown by them- 
selves The rules and the words of a language change, but they change 
by themselves. We are just spectators of these changes. Individuals can 
introduce certain terms into a language But these words can only 
become a part of the language when they are appropriated by special- 
ized groups as specific terms Even then, they remain the property of 
only a certain group. It is only when they are accepted by the people 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION IOJ 

that they become a part of everyday language. The acceptance or 
rejection of a new term by a people does not depend upon the will of 
its originators. Thousands of new words have been introduced into old 
Ottoman Turkish since Shmasi’s* time, but only a small number of 
them have been accepted by a certain group, and only a very few have 
been accepted by the general public. 

Thus, we find a good illustration of the meaning of culture in the 
words of a language, and a good illustration of the meaning of civiliza- 
tion in the invention of terms. Words are social insututions, while 
terms are individual products A term invented by a certain person 
may be accepted immediately by the public, but this general acceptance 
is not due to us inventor; u ts due to an unseen trend of society which 
is not consciously known to its members 

Until fifteen years ago there were two Turkish languages current in 
this country. One was official and was used exclusively for writing 
This was called Ottoman. The other was the language of the common 
people. It was known, in a derogatory sense, as Turkish It was 
believed to be the 'slang* of the common people. In fact, it was the real 
and natural language of the nation. The Ottoman language was nothing 
but an artificial mixture of the grammar, syntax, and vocabulary of 
Turkish, Arabic, and Persian Turkish developed naturally It was the 
language of our own culture Ottoman was a language consciously and 
rationally made by certain individuals Only a few Turkish verbs or 
prepositions found their way into this mixture of languages There 
was only a small fraction of our culture in it It was the language of the 
civilization of the Ottomans. 

Similarly, two metric systems existed in poetry The metric forms of 
folk poetry were not consciously cultivated Common men wrote 
their lyric poems without any knowledge of metre Their poems were 
the result of inspiration and creativity, and not of imitation and arti- 
ficial methods Thus, like the Turkish language, this metric form was 
also a part of Turkish culture. The metre used by the Ottoman poets, 
on the other hand, was copied from Persian poetry. These poets were 
imitative and followed certain strict rules Their prosody did not 
penetrate to the people. They studied Persian literature and adopted its 
rules of prosody Persian literature never became a part of our litera- 
ture. Among the Persians, even the peasants composed poems tn the 
anij metre, and thus it was a part of Persian culture 

Again, tw o systems of music existed side by side. One was Turkish 



10(3 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
music which arose spontaneously from the people. The other, Otto- 
man music, was originally adapted by Farabi from Byzantium. Turkish 
music was a product of inspiration, not an imitation of foreign music 
forms Ottoman music was imitative, and was nothing but a matter of 
technique One was the music of culture, die other of civilization. 

Civilization is the sum total of the concepts and techniques developed 
according to certain methods and transmitted from nation to nation. 
Culture, on the other hand, is composed of senuments which cannot 
be developed artificially and cannot be transmitted from nation to 
nation. Ottoman music consisted of a technique based on certain rules; 
Turkish music consisted of melodies bound not by stereotyped rules, 
methods, and tecliniques, but by a sincere expression of the emotions 
of the people . . , 

We find the same dichotomy in literature. Turkish literature con- 
sisted of proverbs, nddles, tales, ballads, epics, adventure stones, 
chants, hymns, humorous anecdotes, and folk plays. . . . Ottoman 
literature, on the other hand, consisted of short stones and novels— 
instead of anonymous tales — and imitative gabels or sonnets, instead 
of folk ballads and epics. Every Ottoman poet had his counterpart, 
in the past, in Persia, and, more recently, in France Even Fuzull and 
Nedim 10 are not exceptional. Thus, none of them had any ongmahty. 
They w ere all imitators. Their works were the products of intellectual 
craftsmanship, not of aesthetic inspiration 

The same dichotomy is found in the field of morality. It may be said 
that Turkish morality and Ottoman morality are diametrically opposed 
to each other. Mahmud of Kashgar 11 described the Turks briefly in his 
Dtvan-t Lugat as people devoid of pretension and presumption, un- 
aware of the heroism in their heroic acts. Jahiz 1 * described them in 
exactly the same terms Amongst the Ottomans, on the other hand, 
boasting in old poets, and presumptuousness and pretentiousness in 
the newer ones were normal. The writers and poets of the Servet-t 
Funun school of literature, 13 which represented the most outstanding 
period of Ottoman literature, were mostly sceptical, pessimistic, 
despairing, sickly spirits 

Even among the scholars, this dichotomy existed The traditional 
title of the Ottoman scholars was official ulema , while the educated 
men of Anatolia were called the ulema of the people The first had 
ranks and titles, but w ere ignorant. The second had practical wisdom, 
but lacked any official status. . . . 



CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 107 

The political and military successes of the earlier Ottoman period 
were due to uneducated and illiterate pashas who rose from the rank 
and file. But when affairs of state were entrusted to men like Ragip 
Pasha and the extravagant Ibrahim Pasha, who had a named high 
positions in Ottoman intellectual circles, decay set in. 

These dichotomies, however, were confined to intellectual activities 
As menial work was left to the common people, the privileged classes 
remained aloof from all technical skills Consequently, we find only 
one artistry — people’s artistry — in the pracncal arts architecture, 
calligraphy, engraving, book-binding, gilding, joinery, iron-work, 
dyeing, carpet-making, weaving, painting, and manuscript illuminating, 
Thus, these arts, which attained a high aesthetic level, may be called 
genuine Turkish arts They were a part of Turkish culture, not of 
Ottoman civilization. . . . 

What is the reason for the existence of this strange dichotomy which 
is peculiar to our country* Why was there such opposition be- 
tween the two patterns — the Turkish and Ottoman — existing side by 
side in this country? Why is everything in the Turkish pattern so 
beauti fill and everything in the Ottoman pattern so ugly* Because the 
Ottoman pattern took an imperialistic course, which was harmful to 
the culture and life of the Turks It became cosmopolitan and put class 
interests above national interests. The more the Ottoman Empire 
expanded through conquest, the deeper became the dividing hne be- 
tween the two classes of ruler and ruled The Ottoman class were the 
ruling cosmopolitans and the Turkish class their ruled Turkish sub- 
jects. The two classes hated each other. The Ottomans regarded them- 
selves as the ruling nation and looked down on their Turkish subjects 
as a subjugated nation. The Ottoman called the Turk 'the stupid Turk', 
while die Turks fled from their villages when an Ottoman official 
visited them. The appearance of the Red Heads'* among the Turks can 
be explained by this disparity. . . . 

The Ottoman dlite were known as the haras [khava%\, while the 
Turkish ilite w ere humble mtnstTels, poets, and dervishes. Thus there 
were two groups of ilites. The first represented, and was supported 
by, the court. Their poets and musicians received gifts, grants, and 
salanes from the court. The amsts of the people lived on the offerings 
of the people. The official is tana, as government dignitaries, recencd 
high salanes or benefices. The religious leaders of the Turkish people, 
imams and baba s, were supported by the people. The artisans, the 



I08 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
guild-masters and guild-eldere, who were the leaders of the people in 
the fine am as well as in die practical am, were always recruited from 
amongst the lower classes and always remained Turks. 

We see, therefore, that culture is composed mainly of emouonal 
elements, while civilization is composed of ideas; this is another 
difference between the two Emotions are not conscious and rational 
products of men. A nation cannot imitate the religious, moral, or 
aesthetic feelings of another nation For example, in the pre-Islamic 
Turkish religion, the sky-god (fiok-Tann) was a god of reward and 
did not have the power to punish. There was a lesser god of punish- 
ment, called Erhk-Han Because the Turks regarded God as beautiful, 
they loved Him and were not temfied by Him. The emphasis on the 
Love of God among the Islamized Turks was a continuation of this 
old tradition Fear of God among the Turks is very rare. The experi- 
ences of preachers show that sermons emphasizing beauty and good- 
ness gain larger attendances, while preachers who talk of hell and its 
demons find few listeners In the religious practices of the ancient Turks 
there were aestheuc and moral rituals but no asceucism. Consequently, 
the Turks, after Islamizauon, maintained a strong and sincere piety, 
but remained free from ascetic and fanatic practices The works of 
Yunus Emre 15 are sufficient evidence of this fact. The importance that 
the Turks attach to the singing of hymns and the Mtvlid [Birthday 
Poem] in the mosques, and to the performance of poetry and music in 
the tekkt s, is an expression of the aestheticism in the practice of their 
religion The aestheuc charactensucs which distinguish Turkish art 
are simplicity, gracefulness, and originality. These are found in their 
ules, nigs, architecture, calligraphy, and in their religious morality 

This show s that there is an intimate affinity, an internal unity, be- 
tween the different aspects of a culture. . . . But it is erroneous to 
believe that there is the same harmony between the elements of a 
civilization. 

The civilization of the Ottomans was a mixture of institutions bor- 
rowed from the Turkish, Persian, and Arab cultures, from the religion 
of Islam, from the Eastern and, more recently, Western civilizations 
These msutuuons were never really integrated and never produced a 
harmonious system A civilization becomes a harmonious unity only 
when it is incorporated into the national culture. CiviIi2auon in Eng- 
land is w elded into English culture, hence there is a consistency between 
the civilization and culture of the British. 



CULTURE AND CJVJL1ZATJ0N log 

Another relation between culture and civilization is this: ui its 
earliest stages each nation had only its own culture. From the growth 
of a nation’s culture stems its political development and the institution 
of the state. Although civilization arises out of culture, it borrows 
freely from the civilization of neighbouring peoples. But . the over- 
growth of civilization [at the expense of culture] results in the disinte- 
gration of culture and produces culturally degenerate nations. 

Finally, we note the following difference between culture and civiliz- 
ation: when a conflict occurs between a nation strong in culture but 
weak in civilization and one which is culturally disrupted but superior 
in civilization, the former always urns. When the ancient Egyptians 
developed their civilization, their culture declined. The rising Persian 
state, though backward in civilization, was culturally strong and 
defeated Egypt. After a few centuries civilization developed in Iran — 
and, consequently, its culture declined The Iranians were defeated by 
the Greeks whose culture was as yet intact. As Greek culture declined, 
both the Greeks and Iranians were defeated by the uncivilized but cul- 
turally vigorous Macedonians The same cause accounts for the defeat 
of the Macedonians who, w hen they lost their culture, w ere overthrown 
by the Parthian and Sasaru dynasties in the East and the Romans in the 
West. Finally, the Arabs, who knew nothing of civilization but had a 
strong cultural background, defeated both Sasams and Romans In 
turn, the Arabs loo lost their culture as their civilization developed 
They relinquished political supremacy to the Seljuk Turks, who had 
newly come from Turkestan with their traditional customs as their 
nauonal culture. The power of Turkish national culture was the only 
force that enabled the Turks to remain independent up until the ume 
when they expelled the British and the French from the Dardanelles 
and, after the Armistice, defeated the Greeks and Armenians and, 
indirectly, the Bnnsh who had armed and financed them. 



CHAPTER V 


THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 

ih 


THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF COMMUNITIES 1 

I 

In order to study an ethnic community scientifically, one has to study, 
not how it should be m the future but what it w as in the past and is at 
present. To propose measures to be taken in order to remove the 
factors that arrest the social evolution of a people, or in order to 
facilitate the evolution of society in accordance with a certain ideal of 
onentation, is not the business of [pure] science but the task of applied 
science. Science does not operate with practical aims in mind The art 
of social amelioration has to proceed by hasty judgments because of 
the pressure of practical needs Science, on the other hand, cannot 
sacrifice truth for practical considerations, and thus has to proceed 
with patience and freedom and avoid the haste imposed by practical 
interests. Scientists know, however, that the results of scientific 
researches are immediately utilized and applied by the social arts It 
may even be said that the spiritual incenuve leading the scientist to 
work pauently is his anticipation that his disinterested researches will 
one day benefit his own people or the whole of mankind. Without 
such an ideal, the scientist would not consecrate his life to such an 
arduous task. In spite of this, he must never forget diat practical results 
are not the ultimate aim of science but are only the necessary conse- 
quences of it. Just as an exists exclusively for art’s sake, so science 
exists only for the sake of science. . . 

To study a community scientifically, however, this disregard for 
immediate practical ends is not enough. Our own community is for us 
a cherished being to which we are attached with deepest sentiment. 
To be biased in favour of our own community or the communities 
*hich are of the same religion or race, or w hich are allied with us 
against our enemies, is not something that is within our own will It is 
especially difficult to nd ourselves of all bias in our feelings for our 



114 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

own people. Our greatest duty to our people is, however, to know it 
as it is. We must diagnose the ills from which our people suffer and 
discover their remedies. . . . 

In order to study our own community scientifically, therefore, it is 
not enough to disentangle ourselves from immediate, practical con- 
cerns, we need also to free ourselves from the cherished feelings of our 
conscience. The feelings from which we should free ourselves should 
not be, however, only those of an opumisnc nature; we have to 
liberate ourselves also from all pessmusuc sentiments. Certain persons 
who have not been educated in their own country tend to hold un- 
justifiably pessimistic opinions of their own people. To be biased 
either optimistically or pessimistically is equally detrimental to scienti- 
fic studies To pursue scientific studies, one has to free oneself from all 
sentiment and proceed with pure reason.* 

But to work scientifically, to maintain a disinterested approach, 
freedom from practical considerations and from naaonat or ann- 
nanona! bias is not enough. The objective of the scientist will be 
attained neither by pure objectivity nor by [pure] rauonahty. Reason 
implies two things, first, it means a totality ofhierarchically classified 
concepts independent of ourselves To think in terms of this pre- 
established hierarchy cannot be the sole basis of scientific research 
because to think in this way means to restrict the objecm e reality to a 
frame-work of preconceived concepts The function of reason is lo 
rearrange and reclassify the concepts of our intellect in accordance 
with objective reality. For doing this, the ability to think creauvely is 
indispensable, it is, in fact, the second function of reason. Reason, 
from the point of view of science, should be understood in this sense. 
To think m terms of mechanical, pre-established reason is deductive 
procedure, that is, to proceed from concepts already existing in the 
mind towards the objective reality. To think in terms of the creative 
and living reason means to observe objective reality and to derive 
concepts from this observation — a procedure which we call induction. 
The scientific investigator should nd himself of all the concepts that 

• Ai rational problems are generally problems with an emotional content, my state- 
ment about objectivity tn the study of eornttonuots may, at first sij^it, seem strange. Bur 
it will be understood that e-hat I mean is to disentangle the researcher 6otn his sentiments, 
but not to claim that the phenomena to be studied sociologically are not emotional facts. 
Facts relating to rational life are emotional. The sociologist should study the sentiments, 
the emotions, and the ambmons of a radon, but should never be confused by his own 
personal and private feelings about diem. 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY Ilf 

he has acquired in various ways about the people -whom he is going to 
observe He should follow Descartes’s methodical and temporary 
scepticism, and should doubt all traditional concepts current among the 
people and even die scientific investigations earned on before him He 
should proceed directly to the facts, avoiding all pre-existing, scientific 
constructions. He should try to observe inductively the particular and 
concrete facts which constitute objective reabty, and proceed step by 
step towards more general and more abstract concepts 
It is true that this procedure also will lead ultimately to a hier- 
archically classified system of concepts. But concepts derived from such 
a procedure constitute condensed statements of objecuve reality, while 
the preconceptions existing before the observation of objective reality 
are nothing but traditional conceptions which come down from the 
various stages of the past and survive only as sentimental or habitual 
residues The new concepts derived from scientific procedure may 
seem paradoxical compared to these traditional conceptions or to the 
mechanical reason which is commuted by the systematization of such 
conceptions As Durkheim stated, science is not in search of paradox, 
but if it arrives at such a paradox through its own invesagaaon, it will 
not reject it If science had to arrive at nothing but commonplace 
knowledge, why should it carry on all these painstaking researches’ 

We may conclude, therefore, that there are three main methodo- 
logical prerequisites to scientific research- (o) die procedure should be 
carried out with theoretical and not practical objecuves in mind, 
(i) it should not be emotional but rational, and (c) it should not be 
deductive but inductive. In short, it should not be subjective but 
objective. 

II 

Objectivity is dependent upon the realization of these three con- 
ditions. Ifowever, even objectivity is not sufficient There is a further 
and an important condition the object of scientific inquiry should 
constitute an independent reality Thus, if a community is not an 
independendy existing reality it cannot be the object of scientific 
inquiry The objective existence of the community depends, first, upon 
the objective existence of a social reality and, secondly, upon the 
objecuficauon of dus reality in what we all community Those who 
view the community as nothing but an aggregate of individual organ- 
isms or of individual psjehes deny the objecuve reality of the com- 



Il6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
munity. In order to recognize the peculiar existence of the community, 
it is necessary to recognize the existence of a social reality independent 
of biological and psychological realities. In this sense the community 
will mean nothing but that form of the social reality which has become 
a real organism through assoaanon in language and custom. 

We may state the same idea in another way the existence ofa science 
demands a corresponding reality As there are physical, biological, and 
psychological realities, physical sciences, biology, and psychology 
exist. Is community the subject-matter of any of these sciences 5 Or 
shall we assume the existence of a social reality and make the com- 
munity the subject-matter of a science w hich wall deal with it? There 
is no doubt that the community cannot be the subject-matter of the 
physical sciences. A community is composed of human individuals 
who have a biological and psychological nature Biology deals with 
these individual organisms and psychology with their individual 
psychic lives But the community is a reality which is completely 
different from both of the former Thus, for this reality we need a 
special science As community belongs to the category of the social, 
the science to study it is the science which deals with social reality; 
that is, sociology. 

When we accept that the community is an independent social 
reality, we must seek the causes of all the phenomena relaung to this 
reality only among social factors. As a matter of fact, for the existence 
of a science the mere existence of an independent reality does not 
suffice. This reality should, at the same time, be subject to the principle 
of determinism, m other w ords, there must be definite causes for every 
fact on this plane of reality If physical, biological, and psychic realities 
were not subject to the law of determinism, the physical sciences, 
biology, or psychology could not exist. Without accepting the principle 
of social determinism, we cannot attempt to search for the laws of 
social reality, and without this sociology cannot exist. It follows that, 
as we study the rational facts sociologically, we must look at social 
phenomena in order to discover the immediate causes of these facts. 

As in the realm of biological phenomena, so a fact must perform a 
useful function m the life of the community to which it pertains in 
order to be consul >red a part of the reality of social phenomena. It ts 
true that social facts no t exist to serve such functions They arise 
as the necessary consequence 0 f preceding soaal causes. But once they 
exist, ey must perform certain social functions in order to maintain 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 


I »7 

their continued existence. A social fact may adjust its previous function 
in accordance with changing social conditions. We should, therefore, 
determine not only the causes of soaal phenomena but also the social 
functions that they perform at different times. 

Besides the causes and the functions of social facts, their value has 
also to be determined. The only means at our disposal for measuring 
the value of soaal facts is statistics. Statistical data, showing the rates 
of crimes, such as homicide or theft, or the rate of divorce in a certain 
country, are indices which serve to measure soaal sentiments con- 
cerning the inviolability of the bfe of the individual, security of 
property, the sanctity of marriage. . . 

1H 

Having observed the characteristics of soaal phenomena, let us now 
see v hat constitutes the social facts themselves. As soaal phenomena 
constitute an independent realm of reality, they should be found out- 
side the realms of physical, biological, and psychological phenomena 
And the only phenomena which we can observe outside of these are 
soaal groups and msntuuons 

A soaal group is a totality of individuals connected with each other 
by a speaal solidarity, such as a family, a village community, a tnbe, 
a class, a caste, a corporation, a Church (unvnei), a state, or a nation 
The soaal msutution is a pattern of thinking or action, such as religious 
beliefs and ritual, norms of morality and law, the roles of language or 
aesthetics, economic methods, or saenufic techniques, imposed by 
these groups upon their members, who accept it voluntarily or because 
of constraint. 

Commumues dissimilar in respect of the groups and insutuUons they 
comprise may be classified, as plants and animals are, into speacs and 
genera. If the individual cases in a realm of reality cannot be reduced 
to spears and genera, or to general types, there can be no saence to 
deal with this realm of reality. Saence deals only with generalities. To 
discover general laws, it is necessary to ascertain general types 

A sausfaaory general classification of communities has not >et been 
devised. However, until a final classification has been formulated, a 
tentative and preliminary classification is obviously needed to serve 
researches. For this purpose w e propose below a tentative scheme of 
classification. 



Il8 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

Communities may be divided into two genera: ‘primitive communi- 
ties’ and ‘nations’ Primitive communities are the early social type for 
which the Germans use the term Naturvolker. The basic social unit 
which characterizes these peoples is the clan. The clan is a family group 
comprising hundreds or even thousands of persons who are related 
to each other by a religious kinship. The symbol represenUng the clan 
is the name of the fictitious or real being who is accepted as the ancestor 
of its members This common ancestor is also believed to be the private 
deity of the clan Among the members of the clan, the law of common 
responsibility or group talion operates. 

While there is the idea neither of pubbc authority nor of personal 
rights among the primitive peoples, there is belief in a private law in 
which the object of the law is the dan. It is true that several clans com- 
bine to make phratnes and tribes and confederations of tribes, but even 
these larger groups are, like the clan, still family groups. The tribes or 
confederauons of tribes are the first grouping of the clans; the other 
groupings come into existence as secondary groupings through the 
disintegration of these confederauons. Therefore, the chiefs of the 
phratnes, or of the tnbes, or of the confederations of tnbes, are still 
family heads, like the clan chiefs, exercising only a private authority 
Punishment in these societies is enforced in the form of retaliauon and 
vengeance, and may be bought with blood money. The authonty in 
the clan is of a religious character, and the chief of the clan has, at the 
same time, a religious function 

Primitive communities may be classified into four species: 

(a) Undifferentiated Communities with a Clan Basis, such as the 
Australian aborigines These peoples are composed of several totemic 
clans among whom there is no hierarchical differenuation. As the clans 
in these communities are not difFerenuated, they constitute the most 
simple organization of primitive communities. 

(b) Differentiated Communities with a Clan Basis In these com- 
munities, the totemic clans still exist, but they are in a state of disinte- 
gration. Upon this primary basis, certain soaa] organs such as classes, 
warrior bands, religious sects, and shamans begin to appear, all de- 
veloping from the clan The North American Indians belong to this 
category. 

(c) Tribal Communities in which Totemic Institution is Entirely 
Lacking In these commumues the totem (which was betieved to be 
the common ancestor and the emblem of die clan, in the form of an 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 119 

animal or plant, or in exceptional cases an inanimate object) is trans- 
formed into a real human being With the exception of certain vestiges 
of dan institutions, these societies cease to be totemic in any way. 
Descent in the clans of these tribal communities is patrilineal, while the 
totemic clans were matnlineal. In these communities, the clan loses its 
power of solidarity, and in its stead tnbal solidarity gains importance 
as the tnbe begins to realize its own distinctive homogeneity in contrast 
to the above types The Dahomey of Africa represent this category 

(d) Degenerate Primitive Communities, where the clan has entirely 
disintegrated and no national organization has developed Some 
ethnographers have mistaken these peoples for the most simple type of 
primitive community just because they are composed of families and 
lack any clan organization But this is not the case The small families 
seem to stem from patriarchal families, and these in turn have origi- 
nated from matriarchal clans Therefore, the simplicity observed has 
been the product of the disintegration of the clans resulting from a 
social retrogression The Veddas of Ceylon belong to this category * 

By the weakening or disappearance of the clan or tnbe, the nse of 
national feelings, which is the indication of the emergence of the 
institution of public authority and public law, is seen in nations. With 
the nse and development of wntmg, literature, and history, the com- 
munity feels itself a unified body. At the same time, with the develop- 
ment of the division of labour and specialization, different social func- 
tions are performed by special social organs. 

Nations are divided into four sub-species (a) The first is the theo- 
cratic nation. In this type the nauon senses its own existence and unity, 
and expresses it in a common deity and public authority Private law 
and the institutions of clan and tnbe disappear and give place to a 
religious public law as the law of God. In theocrauc nations, the law 
is of a ritualistic nature, and is laid down in the books of ritual which 
contain the commandments that govern ritual, as seen, for example, in 
the code of Manu of the Hindus. The religious public authority is 
personified in the ruler whose legiumacy is based on divine sanction 
When this authority extends from the ruler to the lords, a feudal 
organization emerges. Clans are transformed into village communities 
by settling a certain territory. The village community was autonomous 
so long as the dan organization existed, but failed to retain its auton- 

* Thu clataficanon is based upon die otic developed in V Annie Snnoiogurue, Vols. 

Xlindxn. 



120 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
omy with the disintegration of the clan system, and became dependent 
upon external supports. The ownership of land was transferred to the 
hands of the feudal lords, and the villages became fiefs and the peasants 
serfs As the interpretation of law lay in the hands of representatives of 
religion, the ruler was not vested with legislative authority; his was a 
purely administrative function We may call these communities nations 
wtth a village basis or administrative nations. The ancient Eastern and 
Medieval European states, and the Abbasi Caliphate belong to this 
category 

(£) The second type is the legislative nation. In these nations, the 
cities freed themselves from the authority of feudal lords and began to 
administer their affairs through their municipal organization or joined 
the ruler against feudal authority. When cities assumed this form, they 
became communes. Urban civilization extended to die country, where 
the msmutionsof private property and individual liberty found ground. 
Thus the villages, too, were transformed into smaller communes. The 
administration of the city was based on public opinion In the capital 
cities, a political public opinion arose apart from religious public 
opinion The ruler of the nation acquired a legislative authority and 
secular law came into being Government was no longer based on a 
divine law, but on the sovereignty of the people; that is, on political 
public opinion In the theocratic type, the nation personified itself lit a 
religious executive power, but now a political legislative power repre- 
sents the nation Communities of this type may be called nations with a 
city lasts. France or Italy may be a ted as examples 

(c) The third type is the culture-nation. Many of die institutions of a 
community may be shared commonly by several nations living in 
proximity. The whole of these communities which have common 
institutions may be called a ci nitration-group, and the whole of their 
common insututions a civilisation Primitive peoples and theocratic 
and legislauve nations do not have independent national civilizations, 
but participate in a commonly shared international civilization. 
Although they have their own peculiar language and customs, these 
institutions do not yet colour international institutions As soon as a 
nation puts the stamp of its own language and ethos on the institutions 
of an international civilization and adapts them to its own sptnt, it 
becomes a nation having an independent and nauonal civilization, that 
is, a culture. A community becomes a nation in tts real sense only by 
having such an independent culture With the beginnings of a national 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 121 

culture, an intimate harmony establishes itself among the institutions 
of the international civilization, and this integration makes them organs 
of a living organism. Culture is composed of interlocking systems, 
each being composed of interlocking institutions. The systems com- 
posing a culture are religious, moral, legal, aesthetic, linguistic, 
economic, and technical. There is an intimate harmony between these 
systems as well as among the institutions of each system The sources 
of this harmony existing among the institutions are the religious, moral, 
legal, etc., mores upon which the institutions are based. Harmony 
exists among the various areas of public opinion within a nation be- 
cause all are based on the same social structure The social life of the 
communities changes and evolves in accordance with the changes m 
their social structures. The classification of the communities, therefore, 
should be based on this principle. 

Just as there is in legislative nations a separate political authority 
parallel to the religious authority, so in culture-nations there are cul- 
tural authonues independent of the religious and political authorities 
Cultural authonues are great personalities recognized as leaders in the 
fields of morality, economy, fine arts, literature, and pure and applied 
sciences. As cultural interpretations onginate from these authonues, 
they are spontaneously recognized by the members of the nation be- 
cause of the universal confidence which their disunguished careers in 
their respective fields inspire In culture-nanons, the people are per- 
sonified by the representation of their culture because culture consists 
of a concrete mamfestauon of the nanonal consciousness expressed in 
vanous forms of msutuuons. 

Culture may also express itself in a material organization Vanous 
cultural corporatise organizations may be connected to a centre of 
specialization m the metropolitan aty where a great cultural league 
composed of the representatives of these centres may be formed We 
may call this type of nation a nation with a corporative basis 

A community does not lose ail of its previous institutions as it 
evolves from the lost er to the higher species. The basic organizations 
originally found in each species maintain their existence by performing 
a special function. Thus, the kinship organization of the pnmiuve 
peoples, the religious organization of the theocratic nations, the legal 
organization of die legislative nations, survive in the culture-nation in 
the form of ‘family’, ‘Church’, and ‘state’ respectively. The culture- 
nauon emerges v, ith the addition to the family, Church, and state. 



122 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
surviving from the previous stages of ethnic evolution, of a cultural 
organization. As the establishment of the legislative organ puts an end 
to the tyranny of the executive porter, so the emergence of the cultural 
authority will eliminate the corruptions of the legislative power and of 
the press. Therefore, it is only in the culture-nations that an indepen- 
dent judiciary may be instituted entirely separate from the executive 
and legislative powers. The most advanced nations are evolving to- 
wards this st3ge, although none has reached it. 

(J) The fourth type is constituted by those nations which have lost 
their independence after once having been independent, such as the 
Polish nation. 

Nations that are in a stage of transiuon from one species to another 
consutute a secondary category of species These are also of four types: 
(a) the tribal-theocratic peoples, such as the Moroccans; (i) theocranc- 
legislauve nations, such as the present-day [1915] Russians, (e) legisla- 
uve-eultural nauons, such as the Germans, the British, and the Atnen- 
cans, and (</) semi-independent nauons, such as the Finns. 

Once the genera and the species of peoples are established, it be- 
comes possible to determine which elements of the social structure as 
v, ell as of the insututions are of a pathological nature. It is obvious that 
the institutions that exist as survivals from an inferior species are 
pathological insutuuons. Thus, if in a culture-nation there are some 
survivals from the primitive peoples or from the theocratic or legisla- 
tive species, these insutuuons are of a pathological character. Once the 
maladies of the community are diagnosed their treatment becomes 
possible, as scientific research ts a useful guide to the practical arts. 

It follows that in order to derive scientific conclusions from the 
researches to be undertaken on the Turks, it is necessary to establish 
the following points firstly, to which civilizations have the Turks 
belonged at various stages of their history, secondly, to which species 
in the social evolution described above have they belonged, thirdly, 
si hat are the anomalies among their institutions that are irreconcilable 
with the insutuuons of the species to which they now belong; and 
fourthly, which insutuuons of international civilization have entered 
into Turkish life and what changes have they undergone? 

The dat3 to be used in the study of these points are provided by 
history, ethnology, and stausucs As the authenucity and value of 
those data w ill be scniumzed, it mil also be necessary to determine to 
which group, which social space and ume, the insutuuons indicated by 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY I2J 

these data belonged. The Turkish people have lived in different socie- 
ties in the same periods, and have joined various spheres of civilization 
at various times. Only through a scientific study of Turkish life from 
the beginning to our rime shall we be able to know in which directions 
it should be oriented and by what means this will be achieved. 


CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPECIES* 

For historians each tribe or nation or civilization is unique, having 
its own peculiar characteristics. For them, therefore, there are no social 
species, there are only social individualities. Each society is itself an 
individual which cannot be classified into a species 

For philosophers [of history], on the other hand, states, nations, 
civilizations, and tnbes are transitory stages or manifestations of human 
society in different times and places For them, therefore, there is only 
one social species — that is, Humanity All societies are individuals of 
this single species As soaaJ phenomena are, for them, products of the 
developments of tendencies rooted in human nature, all societies are 
essentially the same. There is only one social evolution and that is the 
evolution of Humanity. Various societies represent different stages or 
periods of this evolution. 

For the historian an historical event never repeats itself All histori- 
cal events are individual, unique, and unprecedented If science deals 
with generalities instead of individual cases, therefore, history can 
never be a science. Science seeks to discover recurring causal relations 
between facts; it seeks to discover laws Historians deny history as a 
saence when they deny general facts From this point of view it is not 
possible for a saence of politics or of education to be derived from 
history Institutions which may prove to be useful for one society may 
not be so for another The laws of each soaery constitute an indepen- 
dent system, suigintru. Soaenes cannot be compared with each other, 
nor can the institutions of one soaety be valid for another The institu- 
tions of each soaety develop spontaneously from its own particular 
soaal life. Soaal arts, such as politics and education, can cany on and 
strengthen the charactensncs of the national life, but cannot modify or 
ameliorate that life. 

For philosophers, all soaeties bear the same nature and character and 
are moved by the same needs Therefore, laws may be formed to suit 
all of them. A certain institution which is useful for one is applicable to 



124 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
all. (Not all historians and philosophers, of course, are of these opinions. 
Our description applies not to all but to the majority.) 

Sociologists find grains of truth in both views. They rather reconcile 
both views by their theory according to which society may be classi- 
fied into species and genera like plants and animals. . . . For sociolo- 
gists, institutions found in a certain social species will not be found in 
another one and are not valid there. . . . On the other hand, sociolo- 
gists believe that the institutions of a society of a certain species are 
common to all societies which belong to the same species- Therefore, 
the borrowing of msntunons between soaeues of the same species is 
natural, but borrowing from a society of a different species is not. 

Societies are divided above all into two genera: primitive societies 
and nations. 

A society is a group of men united by moral solidarity. Solidarity is 
of two kinds one consists of likeness of sentiments and beliefs; the 
other is the product of the social division of labour. The first is 
‘mechanical solidarity’, (he second ‘organic solidarity’. The first is the 
result of likeness of sentiments and beliefs, the second is the result of 
similarity of aptitudes and skills. The first makes individuals the cells 
of a social organism, the second die specialized organs of a sodat 
organism . . In pnmmve societies only mechanical solidarity oper- 
ates Division of labour in these societies is based on sex and age 
differentiations, but there » no social division of labour or it 5s in its 
beginnings. Primitive society is not primarily composed of individuals 
but of parts which are all alike, and each of these segments is composed 
again of like segments Each of these segments has its own sohdancy 
and produces a higher group by combining with corresponding seg- 
ments. These societies are called segmentary because they look like 
fissiparous organisms. 

In nauons, on the other hand, these segments disappear and give 
place to groups which are products of the social division of labour. For 
this reason nauons have both kinds of solidarity. Nations may also be 
called organic soaenes In segmentary societies individuals are only 
cells In organic soaeues, on the other hand, they are also organs 
having specialized functions. In segmentary soaeues there is a strong 
connection only between the individual and soaety. In organic soaety, 
on the other hand, the individual is ued to soaety both directly and 
indirectly (through other individuals who are dependent on, and com- 
plementary to, each other) 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY I2J 

Primitive societies are divided into four species undifferentiated 
clan societies . . . differentiated clan societies — tnbal societies . 
and primitive societies in which clan organization has disappeared 
Nations have not yet been subjected to a scientific classification We 
propose, without claiming scientific authority, to classify nations into 
five species according to their social structures (a) feudal nations . 
which may be called societies with a village hasu, (6) communal socie- 
ties . . . which may be called societies with an urban basts, (c) City- 
states. ..;(</) societies with a compound structure, in which towns 
are communes but villages are feudal domains (towards the end of the 
Middle Ages, German towns freed themselves from seignonal subjuga- 
tion and developed into communes, but villages remained seignonal 
domains. In France, on the other hand, urban civilization spread to the 
villages and brought them into a communal organization. After the 
sixteenth century, the sovereign authonty of kings and feudal lords 
increased as a result of certain new ideas and trends, and thus towns 
became again subjected to feudal domination This was the mam factor 
preventing the national unification of Germany unnl the last century), 
(«) corporative societies . . The basic unit in primitive societies is 
the clan as a unit of kinship and religion, in the species of nations 
mentioned above, the basic units are territorial groups, that is, villages 
and towns. The basic units in corporative societies, on the other hand, 
are corporate bodies which have a national character These latter are 
concentrated in metropolitan centres Guilds exist in communal socie- 
ties, but their activities are confined to the communes In corporative 
societies these orgamzauons assume a national character by having 
federauve councils in metropolitan centres composed of their delegates 
This form of civilization may be called metropolitan, and is today the 
highest form of civilization. The most advanced nations of Europe are 
developing in this direction. 

In the light of this classification, it will be seen that the Turkish 
nation belongs to the communal type and that in the future it will 
develop to a corpora in e nation. 

A NOTE ON THE TERMS ‘SOCIETY' AND ‘COMMUNITY’* 

... All social groups are made up of concentric aretes of varying 
sizes. From the point of view of [the degree of] social consciousness, 
sotidanty, and organization, there is only one which is more funda- 



Il6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
mental than either the larger or the smaller circles, we call this group 
‘society’. The group that is larger than societies and that includes 
societies we call ‘community’, and the groups that are narrower than 
societies and included in these we call ‘secondary groups’. Only 
‘society’ may be likened to a social organism. Secondary groups are 
merely various organs within this organism, and communities are 
unions made up of several societies. The collective consciousness in 
communities is always too weak as compared to that which exists in 
societies 

Societies, like plants and animals, are differentiated into speaes and 
genera Primarily, societies are classified into two big genera tribes 
and nations The nations are composed of two kinds of secondary 
groups territorial groups, such as provinces, counties, districts, and 
villages, and occupauonal groups, which are the products of division 
of labour. 

Although nations are big groups, diere are still larger communities. 
For example, the Turks of Turkey constitute a nation The Turkish 
ethnic unity, which comprises all Turks, constitutes a community. 
Similarly, the ummtt of Islam to which we belong consututes a com- 
munity, as does European internationality. Every society has a political 
organization, either as a state or as a tribe. Communities are weaker 
than societies because they are not states [they lack political organiza- 
tion] — they are only civilizauon-groups. 

Tribes are also composed of several concentric groups, but these are 
neither territorial nor occupational groups We call them ethnic 
groups As they appear, on the one hand, as families and, on the other, 
as political bodies, we also call them ‘poliuco-familial’ groups. They 
are usually based on a real or fictitious bond of kinship, and within each 
one there is a solidarity based on blood feud or on warfare. . 


THE RISE OF THE NATIONS 4 

In order to define the word ‘nation’, it is necessary first of all to 
distinguish it from other seemingly kindred concepts — race, ethnic 
community (kavni), Church (ummct), people, and state. The concept 
of race is essentially a biological concept used in zoology, and denotes 
types of bodily constitution, such as the Arab or Hungarian or English 
breed of horses Later on, with the birth of anthropology, this word 
was used to denote the bodily types of human beings. For instance, in 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 127 

Europe people are classified into three main physical types, under 
categories of dohcho-cephahc fair, dolicho-cephalic brunette, and 
brachy-cephahc. However, there is no society in which all of the 
individuals conform to any single type. In all societies there are 
individuals who belong to each of these types Even within a family 
these three types may be observed Thus the nauon as a social group is 
not necessarily identical with the concept of race 

The concept ‘ethnic community’ is a term which is mostly confused 
with the term race. For example, in French the term ‘4thmque’ was 
used to connote the idea ‘raaal’ Even today the Bnush writers use the 
terms ethnology and anthropology interchangeably Only recently 
have French authors disUnguished between these two terms For 
example, de Lapouge proposed the use of the terms ‘dthne’ or 'ethnie' 
instead of ‘race’. And thus, today, the terms ‘raciale’ and Vthnique’ are 
used to represent 'irk' and 4 kavm' in Turkish 'Kavm means a group of 
individuals who have a common tanguage and usage, le Arab, 
Turkish, German, and Serbian kavms. Thus it seems preferable toapply 
the term ‘ethnic family’ (Jamillt ethmque) instead of race w hen speaking 
of a group afkavmt that are related to each other For example, Semitic, 
Indo-European, or Ural-Altaic kavm s consumte in each case a separate 
ethnic family or group. 

The term 'iimmet’ or religious community corresponds in use to the 
term 'Iglue' (Church), and therefore we can use it in this sense because 
we already use such expressions as ‘Muhammadan iimmet', ‘Christian 
ummet' , ‘Mosaic iimmet', as well as the ummet of Islam, ummet of 
Ijabah [the people who obey a prophet’s call], of davah [die people 
invited by a prophet], etc. As ethnic groups consumte larger groups 
on the basis of affinity, so the iimmet s may constitute larger groupings. 
For example, the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish ummet%, in Kur’aruc 
terminology, consumte together the Abrahamic religion 

The term halk (people) is sometimes used [in Turkish] for kavm and 
sometimes for the ciuzens of a state, and at other umes for the nation 
For scientific purposes it is preferable to limit the use of this word so 
that it refers to the main bulk of a nauon excluding the ihte Thus we 
may use the w ord halhytu for 'folklore*. 

The state is a group that has its own government, lemtory, and 
populauon. States may be classified into ethnic, imperial ( suhani ), and 
nanonal states For example, the Umayyad sate was an ethnic sate 
because its organoauon was based on kavm instead of ummet The 



128 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
population was differentiated into three castes— Arabs, Mawall, and 
Ahl al-dhimma. The non-Arabs were called Mawall, and though en- 
franchised were deprived of many rights. The Ahl al-dhimma were 
non-Muslims, and were in the lowest status from the legal point of 
view. The Abbasi state, on the other hand, was an imperial state. This 
state was founded with the assistance of the Mawall , and, besides, 
there was a political sect called the Shu'uhiyak, which proclaimed the 
equality of the kavrm In the time of al-Ma'mun, the Shu'ubis began to 
predominate over those who believed that the Arabs should constitute 
the basis of the state. And thus, the Arab and non-Arab Muslims 
acquired an equal footing and the Abbasi state became an empire on the 
basis of ummet. The legal equality of the Ahl al-dhimma with the Mus- 
lims (in the Ottoman Empire] was accomplished only with the promul- 
gation of Gtilhane charter [of 1839] It was after that that the Ottoman 
state became an empire on the basis of equality. 

Nauon-stares, on the other hand, anse when these empires disinte- 
grate In Europe the nation-states arose only when the Roman and 
German empires disintegrated. However, today there is no pure 
nation-state except the German state. AH the other states of Europe are 
mixtures of nauonal and imperial forms of state For example, the 
Bnush state is a nauon-state in Great Britain, but an empire-state over 
in Ireland and overseas The people who constitute the nation-state 
in France are called citizens, whereas the people of the French empire 
are called subjects. During this war [World War I], the Austrian and 
Russian empires seem to be changing into confederations of nation- 
states. It seems, therefore, that the future of all states wilt be in the 
direction of nauon-states. The nauon is that ethnic group which, as it 
emerges after a long period of fusion within an empire, strives to regain 
and revive its identity. 

A kavm seeks to achieve perfection by creating an ethnic religion, an 
ethnic state, and an ethnic ayikzauon. But most kavms have been 
unable to fulfil these three aims of the ethnic character. Some of them 
remained politically as tribes and some of them became city-states. 
Sometimes their religions and civilizations were confined to political 
units, and sometimes extended to the whole kavm But kavrm as such 
rarely achieved both political and a vie unity at the same time. How- 
ever, it seems that there is a tendency for all kavms to achieve this unity. 
It appears that the mam obstacles in the way of this natural evolution 
of kavms, apart from certain geographical factors, are three social 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 129 

factors These are the emergence of universal states, or universal 
religions, and universal civilizations We have seen that the universal 
state was the imperial state. In this connecuon also we have seen the 
differences between the imperial state, on the one hand, and the ethnic 
and nation-states, on the other. 

The universal religions which unite several ethnic groups are ummet 
religions Thus Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism are u/nmer-rehgions. 
The teachings of these religions are organized into bodies or systems of 
jurisprudence, and apply to several socienes of different ethnic origins 
The ethnic religions, on the other hand, neither produce systems of 
jurisprudence nor apply to several ethnic communities They apply 
only to a certain ethnic community or one of its segments 

The universal civilizations are those that bnng several ethnic com- 
munities under their influence The ethnic civilization, in contrast to 
this, is one which is peculiar only to a certain ethnic community Its 
concepnon of the universe and humanity is confined only to the limits 
of itself An ethnic community loses its own original character when- 
ever it is subject to the effects of these three larger forces 

How can we understand the decline of the character of an ethnic 
community* The best guide for us in this respect is language. As soon 
as an ethnic community starts to lose its own language, it starts to lose 
ns character. As the disappearance of the language is a sign of loss in 
ethnic character, so the revival of that language after many centuries is 
the best sign that that ethnic community has started to revive once 
again, but this time under the guise of a nauon A nation, when it 
shakes off the forces of a larger state, religion, or civilization starts to 
awaken first by reviving its language Therefore, in studying the 
formation of nauons we must first find out how ethnic languages dis- 
appear under the influence of the above-mentioned larger unities, and 
then see how they revive again. . . . 

The universality of the state, religion, or civilization facilitates the 
assimilation of the various ethnic communities, but at the same ame 
this universality is not the factor that determines which ethnic unit will 
assimilate the others We can only say that, in general, the one with the 
strongest character assimilates those which have weaker characters 
But the dominance of the stronger character is not confined only to 
religious, political and cm! fields. Thus, the Romans were politically 
predominant over the Hellenes in the East, but they themselves became 
Hellemzed, and perhaps that was due to the superiority of the Greek 
TN *- c -~t 



t^O TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
civilization. On the other hand, the Romans were superior in civiliza- 
tion to the conquering Slavs m Dalmatia, but they became Slavicized 
under political dominance. And when the Bulgar Turks invaded the 
Balkans they forgot their religion, adopted the Cyrillic Chrisnanity of 
the Slavs, and became Slavicized When the Mongols of Jengiz's time 
adopted the civilization and religion of the Turks under Islam, they 
became Turkified. The Romans imposed their language upon the 
Gauls and Spaniards through their state, their religion, and their 
civilization The Arabs Arabicized the Syrians and Egypuans, but 
became Persianized under the superiority of the Sassaman civilization 
of Iran. The Franks who conquered France adopted the Latin used 
there. The Varangians invaded Russia, but became Russified The 
Normans became French in France and Italian in Italy. The conquering 
Germans imposed their language on the Baluc Slavs, and the conquer- 
ing Spaniards upon the Mexicans and Peruvians. The conquering Turks 
were assimilated into the indigenous peoples of India, Egypt, and 
northern Africa. 

If two ethnic commumues live together and if one does not assimi- 
late the other, it is because they have either differing religions or 
civilizations. We can, therefore, see in the Abbast and Ottoman 
Empires that the non-Muslims were not assimilated because of the 
difference of religion The Irish remained non-Anghazed because of 
their Catholic tradition. The Rumanian aristocracy of Transylvania 
became Hungarian as soon as it adopted the Catholic faith, whereas the 
masses who belonged to the Orthodox Church remained Rumanians 
in spite of all efforts on the part of Catholic Rumanians to assimilate 
them The Poles maintained their identity, in spite of all attempts by 
the Orthodox Russians to assimilate them, because they remained 
Catholics The Turkish tribes living in the province of Diyarbekir 
became Kurdish because both were Sunnis, while the Turkomans 
who were [Muslim heterodox] Alevt% continued to be immune to 
Kurdificadon. Prior to their Islamization, the Turks had been exposed 
to numerous attempts at assimilation both by the Chinese in China 
and ihe Europeans in Europe, but after their adopuon of Istam, their 
identity remained immune to assimilation in the same places. They 
became assimilated with the Islamic peoples Nizam al-Mutk in his 
Styasetname called Iramzed Turks ‘Turk’, whereas he called ‘Turko- 
mans’ those who had notaccepted the Ira man civilization but main tamed 
their older civilization. The Turkomans, thanks to their different 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY «JI 

civilization, had not been Persiamzed in Iran. But when they came to 
Kurdistan, they were assimilated with the Kurds. Ciues are an impor- 
tant factor in civilization. Since the urban population of Kurdistan is 
Turkish, Kurds became Turkified when they settled in the cities. Since 
the ones in Arabia are predominantly populated by Arabs, therefore, 
Turks, Kurds, eta, become Arabicized when they settled there 

We have seen how ethnic peoples lose their character together with 
their language. Some ethnic communities can never be reborn once 
they have been fused into a larger body. Since the Gauls became com- 
pletely assimilated with the Lanns and Franks, their language and 
nationality could never be resurrected. But many ethnic communities 
have achieved a rebirth after they had lost their character and language. 
In this process of rebirth, rejuvenation first appears in the language. 
Although the Czechs living in Austria had been assimilated to the 
Germans, they started a national movement with a Czech Renascence, 
so that the Czech language and literature, and thus the Czech national- 
ity, were reborn. In Britain the Insh are experiencing the same rebirth. 
In Russia the Ukraruans constitute another example In Turkey the 
Kara man Greeks and many Armenians revived their languages after 
they had been Turkified. 

Among some ethnic communines, assimilation occurs only on the 
level of the official and literary language, and then the rejuvenation 
becomes easier. The 'divan [court] language of the Anatolian Seljuks, 
for example, was Persian, but it was changed to T utkish when Mehmed 
Bey of Karaman took over the government. In Hungary the Magyar 
language was not used as a written language, as all documents referring to 
religious and official transactions were written in Latin until 1849 E\en 
unul recent times greetings in Latin w ere not uncommon Many authors 
regretted the disappearance of Latin when Hungarian was revived 

We have Stated already that the birth of a national language starts 
with the dissoluuon of the empire-state and the iZmmer-religion Thus 
in Germany the national language experienced a revival with Luther’s 
Reformation. Reformation means the dissoluuon of the ummet- 
religion. The revivals of national languages in Ireland, and in the land 
of the Czechs and the Ukrainians, started with the decline of the 
British, Austrian, and Russian empires. The birth of various nationali- 
ties m the Balkans similarly coincided with the breaking up of the 
Ottoman Empire. The beginnings of Albanian nationality started with 
a language revivaL 



IJJ TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

However, the birth of a nationality may be the result of a reaction 
against a universal civilization The German nationality started also as 
a protest against the influence of French civilization and literature The 
birth of a nation means using the national language in religion, giving 
national expression to that religion, regaining political independence, 
and establishing one’s own culture independently of a universal 
civilization. 

In short, ethnic communmes lose their identity in the course of 
history by becoming a part of a larger religious or political community 
and of a larger civilization, which itself is common to all ethnic units 
united within it They emerge once again as nations by rescuing their 
character from the bonds of these three larger unities They undergo 
important changes during their life in these three universal com- 
munmes It is because of this that when a nation is reborn it ceases to 
be the same old ethnic community It has undergone a transformation 
and, hence, it cannot aim at a return to its past in toto 

An ethnic community during its participation in the common life of 
the empire-state, church-religion, and the inter-ethnic civilization 
experiences an evolution even when it is under subjugation. Its 
language undergoes a religious and avil process of selecnon, and it 
gets the chance to setect the best from the various patterns with which 
it comes into contact Especially the subjugated ethnic units get nd of 
their own aristocratic strata, thanks to the persecution dealt out by the 
conquerors Because of this, they assume a more democratic character 
and, hence, tend to be more homogeneous nanons The Bulgarians, the 
Serbs, and the Greeks, for example, as soon as they had seceded from 
the Ottoman Empire, succeeded in achieving constitutional states 
better than those of the South American Spaniards. The dominant 
ethnic element, in spite of all the benefits it gets from assimilation, 
usually suffers from us own dominance because its governing class 
becomes cosmopolitan and remains above the masses The Germans of 
Austria and the Turks of the Ottoman Empire are examples. 

Ethnic society was a segmentary society composed of tribes and 
city-states, whereas a nauon has to he a democratic society through 
centrahzanon, homogeneity, and division of labour. This can only be 
achieved after a passage of time in common pardcipauon. Thus the 
S/nmct, the empire, and common civilization are stages of evolution 
prior to the rise of the nation. But when nations begin to organize 
themselves they cannot compromise with the imperial political organ- 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETT IJJ 

ization, with the ummet organization, or with their common aviliza- 
oon. Their political organization tends to be constitutional, their laws 
tend to be independent of religion; and the society tends to be demo- 
cratic. It also becomes necessary to achieve a modernization in religion 
because, if religion does not become translated into the national 
language, and if it is not experienced in a national life, it means that the 
ummet life sail persists Similarly, if national culture does not disen- 
tangle itself from international civilization, it means that a national life 
has not been started 

One of the differences betu een a nation and an ethnic society ts that 
the latter is monopolistic, it tends to monopolize religion to itself, it 
tends to think of humanity as co-extensive with itself, even through its 
cosmogony it tries to interpret the birth of the whole universe in terms 
of its own ethnic origin Thus, ummet is more humanistic than the 
ethnic societies because it does not monopolize humanity and civiliza- 
tion to any one ethnic community, it confines them rather to an area of 
religion which embraces several ethnic societies But, in comparison 
vmh modern civilization, the ummet too looks monopolistic. 

Modem civilization, on the other hand, is not a monopoly of the 
followers of only a stngle religion. Modem civilization, which is based 
on science, may compose nations that belong to other religions The 
nations are not parts of an ummet, but are units of modem civilization. 
Several imperial states could be the units of an ummet, but the nations 
or modem states cannot be units of an ummet The nation is not 
monopolistic, like an ethnic society or an ummet For a nation considers 
modem civilization a w hole and itself a unit of it. 

The Turkish kavm existed before the Islamic ummet and the Seljuk 
and Ottoman Empires It had its own ethnic civilization before it 
entered into a common Iranian civilization The Iranian ci vilization and 
the [Islamic] ummet and [Ottoman] imperial organizations in which the 
Turks participated destrojed many of their ethnic institutions, but this 
partiapauon prepared the way for the Turks to develop into a 
nationality The Tanpmat’* failure to revive national culture and its 
tendency also lo imitate European civilization more or less damaged 
the nation“s feelings But this served to sever it from the influences of 
the Iranian civilization and from the dominance of the spirit of the 
[Islamic] Ummet and [Ottoman] empire organizations 

Civilization is a w hole that is common to various nations, and is the 
product of the posiuve sciences, their methods, and techniques. A 



134 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
national culture, on the other hand, is the sum total of the religious, 
moral, and aesthetic values as well as the language peculiar to the 
nation. Nations tend towards homogeneity among themselves from the 
pomt of view of civilization, but towards differentiation from the point 
of view of culture. Thus, we can find those things which are inter- 
national only in civilization, and those which are national only in 
culture. 

WHAT IS A NATION?* 

Turkism means furthering the ascendancy of the Turkish nation. 
In order to understand the nature of Turkism, therefore, we have to 
define the nature of the group which we call naaon. Let us discuss 
various theories of nauonahty. 

i. According to the racist Turkists, naaon and race mean one and 
the same thing The term ‘race', however, is basically a term used in 
zoology. Animal species are classified into vanous types according to 
their anatomical characteristics. These types are called races For 
example, there are different anatomic types of horses called Arab, 
English, or Hungarian breed. Men also used to be classified into white, 
black, yellow, and red races. Though it is a crude classification, it is 
sail in use Anthropology divides the peoples of Europe into three 
main races on the basis of cranial forms and of the colour of eyes and 
hair — as dolicho-cephalic fair, dohcho-cephabc brunette, and brachy- 
cephalic. No naaon in Europe, however, belongs to only one of these 
races In every naaon there are men in varying proportions who 
belong to each of these Even within the same family there may be a 
dolicho-cephalic fair, a dolicho-cephalic brunette, and a brachy- 
cephalic individual. It is true that anthropologists once believed in the 
existence of a relanon between anatomical types and social traits. But 
several studies . . . have proven that anatomical traits do not have any 
effect whatsoever upon social characteristics, and thus this belief has 
been completely discarded. If racial charactensacs have nothing to do 
with social charactensacs, they have also nothing to do with national- 
ity, which is the sum total of social charactensacs Therefore, we must 
look to another field to discover the meaning of nationality. 

2. Ethmcist Turkists identify nauonahty with ethnic group (kavni) 
Ethnic group means a group of consanguines descending from the 
same parents and into which no foreign blood has ever been mixed. 
Men in ancient soaeoes believed that they were pure, unmtxed ethnic 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 135 

units. But even in prehistoric times they were not ethnically pure 
Events such as the taking of prisoners in wars, the capturing of w omen, 
criminals taking refuge in another society, marriages, migrations, 
assimilaaon, always led to intermixtures among peoples. French 
scholars, such as Camille Juhen and Meillet, believe that no pure 
people existed even in the most ancient umes. If this is so, is it not 
absurd to look for pure peoples in historical periods after so many 
ethnic intermixtures 3 Furthermore, from a sociological point of view 
men are bom as asocial beings. Social consciousness is not innate. 
Man does not bnng with him language, religion, aesthetic feeling, 
political, legal, or economic institunons All these he acquires later, 
from society and through educauon. Social traits are not transmitted 
through biological inheritance but only through education Therefore, 
ethnic punry does not play the slightest role in the formation of a 
nation. Although ethnic punty has never existed in any society, 
ancient societies did cherish ethnic ideals. This was due to religious 
factors, because in these societies the deity was believed to be the 
primordial father of the society. He was the god only of those who 
descended from him. He did not like foreigners to enter his shnne or to 
participate in the worship of his own children, and he passed judgment 
according to his own laws. Thus, in spite of the fact that several 
foreigners were absorbed in different ways, such as through adoption, 
the society itself was stall believed to consist only of die descendants 
of the primordial father We find this belief of pseudo-ethnic punty 
among die anaent Greek city-states, among the pre-Islamic Arabs, the 
anaent Turks, in short, in all socieues which were in the 'city-state' 
(1/) stage of social evolution While it was quite normal to have such 
beliefs at that stage of social evolunon, it is pathological to hold these 
same views at the sage of social evolution which we have reached to- 
day. In these ancient societies, social unity rested entirely on the ties of 
religious unity. And as religious unity was confined to the unity of 
kinship, social unity — in the final analysis — rested upon the sense of 
consanguinity. At the present-day sage of evolution, on the other 
hand, social solidarity rests on cultural unity And since the means for 
the transmission of culture is education, culture has nothing to do with 
ethnic affinity. 

3- The Turkists who believe in the primacy of geographical facton 
maintain that the nation is the totality of men who inhabit a certain 
geographic region. For them, there is an Iranian, a Swiss, a Betgian, a 



I3<S TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
British nation, ■whereas in Iran there are actually three nationalities — 
Persians, Kurds, and Turks — living together; in Switzerland again 
t ^ lree — ^ Germans, the French, and the Italians. In Belgium, the 
Walloons, who are originally French [Celtic], and the Flemish, who 
are originally Germanic, live together, and in Great Britain, the Anglo- 
Saxon, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish nationalities live together. As theseare 
all different from one another in language and culture, it is difficult to 
call these groups nations. Somenmes there are several nations within 
the same geographical region, and sometimes a certain nation may 
inhabit separate geographical regions. The Oghuz Turks, for example, 
are found today in Turkey, Azerbayjan, Iran, and Khwanzm. As their 
language and culture are the same, is it correct to call them different 
nations J 

4. The Ottomanists believed that all peoples living within the Otto- 
man Empire constituted a nation It was, however, a grave mistake on 
their pan to believe that the peoples of an empire consatuted a single 
nation, because within this collection of peoples there were several 
culturally independent nations. 

5 The pan-Islamists believed that all Muslims consntuted a single 
naaon In fact, people w ho belong to the same religion constitute w hat 
we call an ummet Therefore, all Muslims consatute an The 

naaon which is only a community in language and culture is something 
different 


6 The individualists believe that the naaon of a person is merely 
that society 10 which he believes he belongs It is true that, outwardly, 
people think that they are free in their choice of a particular society. 
In fact, men do not have this freedom and independence. . . . Every 
person be ongs to a naaon through his value judgments because he 
acquires all social sentiments through educauon, and becomes identi- 
fied with his naaon. . It ,s not in Ins hands to dissociate himself from 
his society Nationality is a reality external to the individual. A man 
may be ignorant of his naaonahty, but he may d 1S cover it by inquiry 
an stu y* 1 e a naaon is not a voluntary associaaon like a political 
party which he may join at his own voliaon. 

Whit, then, a a nation* Wha. fund of 00.1,0,5 force .j den, da. is 
supenor .0, and dominan. over, iaa>I, edrnc, geographic, pd.ncal, 
and vohoonal forces* Socology .cache, da, d„ umfy,„g force he, 
m edneanon and cnlrnre, „der »ond s , „ de tnmninS of sent.- 
ments. Man receives his most intimate, most inner feelings through 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY I37 

early education. As an infant he begins to be affected by the mother 
tongue through the lullabies to which he listens in his cradle. It is for 
this reason that the language love most is our mother tongue It is 
through language that we acquire our religious, moral, and aesthetic 
sentiments which shape our soul We become deeply attached to the 
society in which we acquire these sentiments Even when we can live 
in another society with better means of comfort, we prefer living in 
our own society with all its discomforts . . Our taste, our feelings, 
and aspirations are all inspired by the society in which we have spent 
our lives and in which we were educated. We hear their echoes only in 
that society The obstacle that prevents us from being cut off from our 
own society and joined to another one is the fact that we cannot 
possibly erase the imprints of the education we have received in our 
own society. 

It follows from these statements that nation is not a raaal, ethnic, 
geographical, political, or voluntary group or associauon Nation is a 
group composed of men and women who have gone through the same 
educauon, who have received the same acquisitions in language, 
religion, morality, and aesthetics. The Turkish folk express the same 
idea by simply saying ‘The one whose language is my language, and 
whose faith is my faith, is of me’. Men want to live together, not with 
those who carry the same blood in their veins, but with those who 
share the same language and the same faith. Our human personality is 
not our physical body but our mind and soul If our physical excel- 
lences come from our racial traits, our moral virtues come from the 
society in which we are raised . Thus, it is absurd to base national- 
ity on lineage. It is only shared education and ideals w hich are most 
essential to nationality. 

There is one practical conclusion to be drawn from these considera- 
tions Among us there are several citizens whose grandfathers, in the 
past, had come from Arab lands or from Albania. We should not, by 
any means, discriminate them from other citizens, as they w ere edu- 
cated as Turks and have remained faithful to the Turkish ideals How 
can we treat as aliens to our nationality those men w ho have shared 
not only the blessings but also the misfortunes of our national life s 
How can we deny Turkish nationality especially to those who have 
given great services and made great sacrifices for the cause of the 
Turkish nation * [There are many persons among us w ho, although 
racially not Turks, are thoroughly Turkish m culture and spirit . . . 



138 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
who cannot identify themselves with any except Turkish nationality 
and do not serve any except Turkish national ideals.] Genealogy is 
demanded only for horses, because among animals — whose excel- 
lences are all due to hereditary characteristics and to inborn instincts — 
racial purity is of major importance. Among human beings, on the 
other hand, it is absurd to insist on lineage. If v.e accept the doctrine 
contrary to this view, we will lose many of our intellectuals and fighters. 
As this is not desirable, it becomes necessary to consider everyone a 
Turk who calls himself a Turk and to punish only those who are 
traitors [To deny them Turkish nanonahty is an error which is due to 
the failure to know scientifically the nature of nation ] 


VILLAGES AND THE COMMUNE 

I« 

Village and town are tRO important forms of community v.hich 
develop naturally, they are created neither by legislation nor by ad- 
ministration Administrative divisions like province, county, or district 
are nothing but artificial units, r hde families, tubes, villages, and aties 
are natural organisms. . . As these natural organisms r ere not created 
by legislation, their narure also cannot be changed by it. 

There are several types of village and city. The oldest type of village 
is the oba, which is a collection of tents. It is called aid among the 
Eastern and Northern Turks and hayy among the Arabs. The earliest 
village came into existence with the settlement of the oba in houses 
instead of tents. In order to determine the various types of village com- 
munity, therefore, we must first see what the different types of oba are. 

There are three such types’ those based on the clan, those having a 
feudal structure, and those having a democratic form By comparing 
these three types, we can see the difference between the various types 
of village community. 

The first type is represented by the Arab hayy, which consists of a 
clan. The Arabic word sammtya (which we use for the terra clan ) 
derives from sammi , which means those named after the same name 
The Arab hayy consists of all individuals rHo carry the same family 
name. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of the Arab hayy is the 
equality of its members The head of the clan, who ts the first among 
equals, is called shaikh He is like the head of a family. The members 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY I39 

of the tammtya are tied to each other by the solidarity of blood revenge 
The whole clan is responsible for the crime of any of its members, 
and to take up the revenge of any member is the sacred duty of the 
clan. Diya [blood money] is paid and received by the dan. In addition 
to the legal solidarity, the members are also tied by an economic 
solidarity. Upon the death of a member, the others are his heirs and 
share his properties. Thus, the Arab hayy is a great family. 

In the feudal oba the conditions are different. First of all, there is a 
chief who is not equal to the other members. Secondly, the chief con- 
siders the oba the object of his exploitation In other words, the mem- 
bers of the oba are his serfs Thirdly, this chief is subordinated to a 
higher chief who, in turn, is under a sail higher one. Thus, the feudal 
ola is something like a migratory feudal domain. 

The democratic oba is unlike either the clan or the feudal oba. The 
Turkish oba, which belongs to this type, is a migratory community. 
Its families live side by side on the basis of neighbourhood Not all of 
them are necessarily relatives. The head ( aksakal , white-beard) is 
chosen by election. In the Arab hayy the shaikhs are the 'big in descent’, 
while in the Turkish type the head is elected either by the people or 
by the chiefs of tnbes or of a confederation of tribes ( beys of boy or il ) 
Unlike the case with the feudal chief, the oba is not the object of his 
exploitation. Legally, all members are his equals 

As we pointed out above, three types of village community — the 
clan-like, feudal, and democranc types — were bom with the settle- 
ment of these three types of oba Arab villages are based on clan organ- 
ization, while Turkish villages are democrauc communes. The latter 
were commune-like types even when they were unsettled obas But 
with their sedentanzation, their democrauc character developed more 
fully. The existence of that miraculous trait [of democracy] among 
Turkish villagers is the result of tins happy situauon The commune 
is like a small republic. And the Turkish villages, with their mosques, 
schools, common pastures, woods, and harvest places, are like small, 
self-governing republics. Each has its own treasure-chest, getting its 
income from vakfinA avanj taxes. Their administration is independent 
of the government. It operates without any written law and through a 
natural folk orgaruzauon. Arab villages never live without a chief and 
lord, whereas Turkish villages have neither. . . . 

While Turkish villages in Turkey are communes, the towns, unfor- 
tunately, did not develop into communes. In Europe, on the other 



140 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
hand, communes first developed in towns and then extended to the 
village communities. This failure of the Turkish towns to develop into 
communes ts, however, not without reason. In every town there were 
different religious communities Each religious community maintained 
itself as a religious commune through its religious endowment. Each 
had its own independent treasure, schools, hospitals, and chanty 
institutions, and thus did not co-operate to produce a common urban 
unity It is true that in each town there was a municipal adminisrranon 
instituted by law. But the maintenance of the autonomous orgamzauon 
of these communities prevented the towns from becoming genuine 
urban communes This is the reason why in [Turkish] towns, even in 
Istanbul, for example, all of the public utilities of the municipality, such 
as water supply, fountains, hospitals, and charity institutions, were 
owned by evkaf, that is, by a religious community. Conflicts between 
the [Muslim] administration of evkaf and the [Chnsaan] Patriarchates 
never ceased to exist The same conflicts were waged in other towns 
between municipal administrations, on the one hand, and the evkaf or 
religious community organizations, on the other. 

What can be done in order to make towns genuine ones, to create a 
genuine commune unity and solidarity* The only means to do this is 
to relegate the right to supervise . . the admmistrauon of vaJcf, and 
even all religious community affairs, to municipal administrations in 
the towns and to county councils in the villages ... In democratic 
regimes, public affairs should be administered or controlled by the 
representatives of the people . . . 


IP 

When we study the ethnic structure of our southern provinces, we 
find that the Turks are mostly concentrated in towns and the Kurds 
mostly m villages and obas . . The villages of the southern provinces 
are Turkish or Kurdish, but Turkish villages are outside of die areas 
where feudalism exists 

The basis of tribal and rural civilization is feudalism. In these prov- 
inces it has political and economic forms . . but in both forms 
villages are feudal domains Peasants are not unlike the medieval 
European serfs They cannot move to another village without the per- 
mission of the lord of the village. These lords are entitled to use any 
of the properties of the villagers at their will They can exact taxes and 



141 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
IS TURKEY A MODERN NATION? 8 

Societies may be studied either with respect to culture or with 
respect to civilization, and they have been classified from the point of 
view of either civilization or culture. It is thus possible to ascertain to 
which type of civilization, and also to which cultural pattern, a certain 
society belongs. In order to see the position of Turkish society, there- 
fore, we have to consider from these two points of view. 

F rom the point of view of civilization, societies have passed through 
the following stages : (a) the Stone Age, in which men made their tools 
from stones (the foundation of civilization are tools from the use of 
which certain techniques develop), (A) the Bronze Age, (e) the stage 
of handicraft, in which tools developed from simple to complex forms; 
(J) the Steam Age, which was followed by the use of coal and electric 
energy and gave nse to the age of machine industry. 

Civilization, however, represents not the real personality of a 
society but its acquisitions. Like learning in the life of individuals, 
civilization is something acquired and learned. It may be acquired even 
by borrowing from outside. Thus, the stage of avilizauon in which the 
society is found does not indicate to us the real objecm e of that society. 

From the point of view of culture, soaeues are found in the follow- 
ing forms, (a) tribal soaeues . . .; (A) ethnic states, m which . . . the 
state is soil based on kinship (people dependent upon the ethnic state 
do not yet enjoy rights of auzenship. Nobility is based on descent. 
The dominant ethnic group constitutes the nation in a real sense — 
Anaent Greek and Roman states belonged to this category); (c) 
imperial states, in which domination of one ethnic group disappears 

ough fusion between several ethnic groups. The governing class is 
segregated from the common people and consututes a aozen body . . . 
and is not based on heredity and descent, but selected through military 
organization or education. ... 

In the old Ottoman Empire, lords, scholars and peasantry were 
differentiated even if they all belonged to the same ethnic stock. Only 
those who were connected with the court enjoyed prerogatives. The 
Ottoman system passed through two stages: m the first there were 
Xuwut holders, the stpaAts, and high government offiaals; in the second 
period arose feudal djans who established their domination over certain 
districts, freeing themselves from the strict control of the central 
authority. In the later years of the Ottomans, the rulers could not rule 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY >4} 

without the support of these feudal lords. This "a as feudalism. This 
period was follow ed by a regime of political equality in which the state 
became legislative. 

There are three main points to be considered in discussing the cul- 
ture of a people; social structure, religion, and language. These are the 
cntena indicating to which soaal species a society belongs. 

When v. e look at Anatolia from the point of view of soaal structure, 
we find that neither a tnbal nor a feudal organization exists there now 
There are only village communities and peasantry who own their 
lands. Peasants are not dependent upon lords. They are under one 
[poliucal] rule. That means that there is an entirely democratic soaal 
structure . . . which is also homogeneous from the point of view of 
ethnic composition. Each community administers its mosque and 
school There exists, not a tnbal solidarity, but a unity within a state. 
The whole nauon is like a family. That means that a nauonal sotidanty 
exists m Turkey. . . . 

As to the religious aspect of the situauon, Islam is a religion which 
is compatible with the modem state. In Chnsuarmy there is a spintual 
sovereignty, headed by popes, which is incompatible with the modem 
state, because this spintual sovereignty has also a polmcal authonty. 
In this system, called Papalism, spintual and temporal authonties com- 
pete with each other for independence and preponderance . This 
led France to separate the state from the Church, to abolish the offiaal 
status of religion, and thus to secularize the state This means dial 
Catholicism is an obstacle to the foundation of a modem state In 
Eastern Christianity . . . after Peter the Great poliucal govern- 
ment completely overran the religious authonty This system is called 
Caesar o-Papism, in which religion has lost its autonomy in Russia 

Turkish culture, therefore, is based on a soaal structure which is 
democrauc, and on a religion which is modem. This religion know s no 
holy synods, popes, or religious councils. In Islam, truth is that which 
is held by the majority. Islam is not an obstacle to the foundation of a 
modem state. As long as Christianity wanted people to conform to the 
Church on everydung, religion proved to be an obstacle to the develop- 
ment of science and of the state in Europe. 

A modem nauon has to have its own language. From the point of 
view of culture, the Turks’ own language is die language of the masses. 
The revival of this language will lead to die realizauon of a modem 
life. It is imperative to turn to the people. 



144 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

Thus, we see that Turkey, from the pomt of view of social structure, 
is democratic and thus modem From the pomt of view of religion, « 
will be modem once it is secularized The movement towards the 
people will make it modem from the point of view of language. Thus, 
Turkey is capable of becoming a modern state- 

THE TURKISH RENAISSANCE AND LITERATURE® 

If we compare different societies with each other scientifically, we 
find that all societies pass through the same stages of evolution. Some 
thinkers do not believe in the validity of such comparisons. Yet 
sociology, like all other sciences which are based on the method of 
comparison between facts, can only be founded on such comparisons 
between societies and between social facts Rqecung the method of 
comparison leads to the rejection of the possibility of a science of 
society from the beginning It is true, however, that like all other 
sciences in their infancy, sociology too, in its early history, was not 
free from shortcomings in its application of the comparative method. 
Perfect classifications and definmons can be formulated only in the 
more developed states of a science. Thus it will be too much to expect 
such a perfection from a science which is sull in its primitive stage. 

Among human societies there have been three groups of peoples 
w Inch have entered into the stage of religious av llizauon. These are the 
Christian peoples, the Muslim peoples, and the Buddhist peoples. 

Since the historical evoluuon of the Chnsuan peoples has been 
studied so far more extensively, the historical stages these peoples have 
passed through may be taken as a basis of comparison for die other two 
groups. Let us take, for example, the evoluuon of die Germanic peoples. 
We know that these peoples passed from a 'tribal’ stage into an ‘ethnic’ 
stage, and then into the stage of Chnsuan Church-religion and civiliza- 
tion as a third stage, which historically corresponds to what we com- 
monly call Middle Ages. The Germans, how ever, following the Italians, 
entered a fourth stage, that of the age of Renaissance. Renaissance is 
that stage in which soaenes, finding themselves at variance with the 
religious morality and avihzauon of the Church, began to aspire to a 
secular art, morality, and civilization. First of all, the Italians, having 
experienced these aspirauons, led the others in creaung a new outlook 
in art, morality, law, and state. They turned to the pre- Chnsuan Greek 
and La on civilizations as the models of this new outlook. 



EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 


*45 

Other European nations gradually followed the Italians and reached 
this sage in their historical evolution. The spirit dominating this stage 
was characterized by human ideals which constituted the basis of 
humanism, the humamues, and classical education It was the stage of 
cosmopolitanism and internationalism, — in short, of humanism — 
through which societies pass upon the dissoluuon of the spint of the 
Church-religion and before the coming of the era of nauonality. In 
Europe, nationalism arose after the Reformation and Romanucism. 
The Renaissance, after having destroyed the literature and the arts of 
the Age of the Church, replaced them with the classical literature 
and arts which were modelled on the Greek and Latin masterpieces. 
This movement turned against the spirit of religiosity, then devoid 
of effective vitality, and unjustly extended its attacks to the sull-hving 
parts of religion. These living religious feelings, then, produced a 
twofold reacuon both against the Renaissance and against the medieval 
ecclesiastical civilization. From this reacuon was bom the Reformation. 

The Reformation, basically, was the first emergence of nauonal con- 
sciousness in die realms of religion and morality. The societies that 
achieved the Reformauon were the first societies to take die first steps 
towards nauonal unity. Then a second reaction against Classicism fol- 
lowed, in which there was a revival of the anaent legends, old folk- 
tales, and epics which had survived from the ethnic stage and lived 
through oral tradinons of the people From this reacuon arose the 
movement of thought which we call Romanticism. Romanticism was 
the second manifestauon of nauonal consciousness within literature and 
art. The economic and pohucal unifications were later manifestations 
of the same thing. 

We may nonce that the Turks also passed through such stages They 
also had their tribal and ethnic stages before they accepted Islam. We 
find the desenpuons of these stages in the book of Dtde Korhit 10 
When the Turks became Muslims, they entered into a new stage of 
ctvihzanon. they became part of the Islamic ummti Thus, they had an 
&nmet literature in place of their old ethnic literature. The Turkish 
literature from the time of Neva] down to the Tan^ynat period is the 
literature of the umnut stage. As the literature of the European peoples 
before the Renaissance had a character of religiosity, so the Turkish 
literature of that stage had its roots either direedy in religiosity (as, 
for example, ts the case in the MevltA of Sule> man Chelebi), or in 
iasav»uf t or indirectly in the reacuons against this religiosity. 



146 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
The Turkish Renaissance begins with the Tanymat. I use this terra 
to denote the movement of Westernization which had started with the 
Tubp Period and continued with interruptions. The Turks found the 
secular civilization which they w'anted to introduce over against the 
Civilization of religiosity, not in a dead past but in a living present, that 
is, in the WesL In literature this movement, which started with Shinasi, 
began to show to the Turkish people a new horizon of civilization, a 
new Weltanschauung, totally different from the spirit of religiosity 
which had then become distorted and totally lifeless 

Yet this movement, which was continued by Nanuk Kemal and 
Abdulhak Hamid, had not freed itself from the vestiges of the old 
ummet world-outlook. The flavour of the unmet period, through the 
influence of Arabic and Persian literatures, still persisted m their 
literature. The first radical innovator was Tevfik Fikret, who rebelled 
against this spirit of religiosity of the ummet literature. 

Tevfik Fikret was the man who completed the Turkish literary 
Renaissance, and w ho, by his unblemished, pure, and noble example, 
showed ihe Turks the new Weltanschauung which Western civiliza- 
tion represented Turkish classical literature, which started with the 
Tanjimat, found its best expression through him. 

Fuzuli, Baki, Nedim were not classical poets of the Turks because 
they belonged to the ummet period of Turkish literary history. There 
are not two separate classical literatures, one tn the West and the other 
in the East. There is only one classical literature and art, which arose 
only in the West. European artists created Western classical literature 
by imitating ancient Greek and Latin writers. Turkish writers, from 
Shinasi to Fikret, imitated that European classical literature and 
created their own classical period. Namik Kemal and Abdulhak Hamid 
were not romantics They were classical writers who, however, had 
not been entirely freed from the ummet literary traditions. 

We seem thus, that the real mission of Tev fik Fikret was to bring the 
Turkish literary Renaissance, in language, in art, and m morality, to 
its completion Fikret fulfilled his mission. If he was more humane and 
more of a humanist than the other representatives of the Turkish 
Renaissance, it was because he had genuine belief in his mission. He 
was the great radical who cast the final and the decisive blow to the 
spirit of religiosity of the ummet civilization. 

But, like the men of the European Renaissance, Fikret too had a 
mission only to put an end to the previous stage. As the men of the 



THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 147 

European Renaissance could not start the age of Nationality, so too he 
could not do it here. But as it was ui the West, so it was in Turkey, 
that if there had not been a Renaissance to give a decisive blow to the 
ummet spirit, there could not have been a turning towards a Reforma- 
tion, a Romanuasm, and towards the rise of the nationalistic spirit in 
their genuine forms. In between two positives there should be a 
negative! 

Fikret was the genius who fulfilled his role by secularizing and 
humanizing Turkish literature As the basis of classical education m 
Europe is the classical literature, in Turkey too the basis of classical 
education will be the classic works of its writers from Shmasi to Fikret 
As to Turkish Romanuasm, this could only nse from T urkish national- 
ism because Romantiasm means the expression of the national spirit in 

literature. 



CHAPTER VI 


SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 

£ 


VALUE JUDGMENTS 1 

Our statements about things are of two kinds: they are statements 
either of facts or of values When we say 'sugar is sweet’ or ‘the orange 
is round’, we express judgments about the properties of sugar and the 
orange When we say, ‘a father is respectable’, ‘home is dear’, ‘the flag 
is sacred’, we express judgments about the values attached to father, 
home, or flag 

Properties are intrinsic to the nature of the things. Sweetness or 
roundness are inherent in the nature of sugar and the orange. There- 
fore, the validity of a statement of fact depends upon its correspondence 
to an external object to space, or in other words to a material reality. 
Value, on the other hand, reflects the emphasis society places on cer- 
tain things which do not intrinsically have the properties implied in the 
value judgments. The family believes in the respectability of the father, 
the nation in the sacredness of the soil or of the flag Therefore, the 
validity of a value judgment is not determined by its correspondence 
to a physical object in the external world, but by its correspondence 
to a social reality which exists in the minds of people In other words, 
what the value judgment refers to ts found, not in the nature of dungs 
but in the beliefs of society. 

However, we may only conclude from these statements that value 
judgments do not reflect a physical reality. The beliefs which are 
referents of these judgments are as much external facts as they are 
mental ones. The beliefs are mental facts m relation to society, but 
external facts in relation to the individual. Tlus external reality is 
called social reality and has us ow n nature. 

As individuals are reared under the training of society, they partici- 
pate in the social beliefs in most cases unconsciously. In the course of 
this paruapauon, individuals feel only vaguely that them beliefs 
correspond to an external reality which is outside and independent of 
themselves. Failing to realize that this external reality is nothing but 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 149 

the beliefs of society, they tend to take it as a metaphysical or a 
mysterious thing When this act of participation ceases to exist, indi- 
viduals clearly perceive the existence of an external reality in the form 
of social beliefs because when they reject and deny the values based on 
social beliefs, they meet with the moral reaction of society or physical 
punishment, and thus actually experience its existence. 

Individuals derive certain judgments of fact from the physical 
nature of things, similarly, they derive certain value judgments from 
the social nature of institutions or practices of society Just as judg- 
ments of fact reflect an external reality, so do value judgments. As 
individuals by themselves cannot create the properties of things, so 
they cannot invent the values of the things As properties originate 
from die physical nature, so values are natural products of social reality 
Individuals discover properties or values, but cannot create them. Men 
who discover the laws of nature can control natural forces, those who 
learn the laws of society can regulate and lead social forces The 
effectiveness of men Over society is similar to their control over nature 
The second is possible only with knowledge about nature, the first 
with that about society Institutions which make up a society are based 
on numerous values deriving from social beliefs. These values are 
classified into religious, legal, economic, aesthetic, or linguistic values. 
None of diem derives either from the nature of physical reality or from 
the nature of man, all are bom from the beliefs of society and are living 
in die social consciousness. As societies are found in different species 
and genera, value systems differ with the societies of the various 
species and genera. . 

MORAL VALUES AND SOCIETY* 

Morality consists of certain rules that are distinguished by two 
characteristics they are obligatory and they are desirable. 

The obligatory character of the moral rules is manifested by the 
social sanctions they carry. When we do not observe moral rules, 
public opinion condemns us, or when we observe them, u approves 
our acuon. The existence of this sancuonmg power is an indication of 
the fact that moral rules are not products of our instincts It is the 
society dial proposes them to us Moral rules not only are not derived 
from die instincts, but also they are even antithetical to them Moral 
rules liav e an external pow er of constraint upon us just because of their 



no TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
opposition to our insnnas. Actions, such as eating, drinking, sleeping, 
fear, or anger, are ins tin case and, thus, they do not need an external 
sanctioning power Moral rules need such external sanctions because 
they tend to suppress or inhibit instincts and to further and encourage 
actions contrary to them. Therefore, morality is not, m origin, indi- 
vidual but social. 

Moral rules, although they are obbgatoty and supported by sanc- 
tions, are observed in most cases without a conscious awareness of 
their character of constraint because of their desirability to ourselves. 
A virtuous person in most cases does sot dunk of the approval or 
disapproval of public opinion; he is virtuous for the sake of virtue. 
However, again our inclination and attracnon to moral rules do not 
imply that they are products of our instincts because this moral attrac- 
tion may be seen only among socialized individuals. However, men 
have to exercise a great effort in order to conform to these rules. 
Being socialized implies the existence of a social consciousness as 
opposed to our individual instincts. Therefore, that which shows the 
attracnon towards moral rules is not our ins an cm e life but our social 
consciousness. It is the society to which we belong which becomes 
intenonzed in our soul and makes us attracted by moral rules. From 
the day we begin to experience social life, w e have not only a physical 
organism but also acquire a personality made up of our organism plus 
a social consciousness. Our organic make-up is dependent upon 
insnnas, while our social consaousness leads us towards moral 
behaviour It appears, thus, that morality is social and not individual 
in origin. 

The first of these two characteristics of moral rules is called duty, 
and the second goodness. The sense of duty is the marufestanon of 
moral rules in the form of obligation, and the sense of the good their 
manifestation m the form of desirability Among the moral philoso- 
phers, Kant emp h asiz e d the elements of duty in morality, while Guyeau 
emphasized goodness. The latter tried to establish a morality without 
obligation and sanction, on the basis of ‘goodness for goodness' sake’. 
For Kant the basis of morality is ‘duty for duty’s sake’. In feet, moral 
rules create in us both the sense of duty and the sense of the good. 
Perfectly so ci aliz e d individua ls view the good as moral without obliga- 
tion and sanction, because they are fascinated and enraptured by it 
with all their hearts, while those who are not socialized always feel the 
existence of the sanctioning powers behind the moral rules. 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 1JI 

The consciousness o f the society to w hich w e belong shows us which 
rules are to be taken as duty and which as good. We cannot determine 
moral rules by our individual consciousness or reason. It is the social 
consciousness which distinguishes and determines moral values. If so, 
then there are types of morality because there are types of society. The 
morality of a certain social type is normal only for that type , others are 
pathological for it. In the realm of living organisms we find the same 
thing. For example, breathing through gills ts normal for fish but not 
for mammals, just as the latter’s breathing through lungs is nor normal 
for the fish. Likewise, the institution of vendetta is normal in a tribal 
society wlule being pathological m nauons 

The foregoing analysis shows that society is the source of the moral 
rules and that u is the factor which determines moral values. Let us 
inquire now into the aims of the moral rules. 

Moral rules refer to certain actions which are opposed to our indi- 
vidual desires or msuncts. Therefore, they imply certain sacrifices on 
the part of individuals Every moral rule demands a sacrifice from one 
of our desires. The aim of morality is not the self, as it requires certain 
sacrifices from the physical side of human beings. Anything which is 
sacrificed cannot be the object of the sacrifice, the object of the sacrifice 
has to be something different from that which is sacrificed This object 
can neither be the material aspect of the individual nor that of other 
persons, as there is no difference betw een the two The thing for w hich 
the sacrifice is made must be superior to that which is being sacrificed. 
Only ihe inferior can be sacrificed for the superior and only the superior 
can be an aim for the inferior. If the self cannot be the aim of itself, 
another self also cannot be an aim for it Therefore, if the individual 
cannot be the aim of morality, and as there is no being inferior to 
individuality, only something which is superior to it can be the object 
of morality. And this being which is superior to individuality is nothing 
but society. Society has ns own consciousness from which the indi- 
vidual derives his superior qualiues or his moral being. Pnor to social 
life, human beings were no different from animal beings. That which 
gives them human qualiues is the culture which society provides. 
Elements of culture, such as language, knowledge, religion, morality, 
and aestheuc standards, originate in general in society and create 
higher faculties in men. Therefore, the object of morality is society 
which is nothing but supra-individuaL Moral sacrifices of the person 
are for the sale of soaety. 



Ija TURKISH NATIONALISM AND 'WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

Against this view which restricts the ulamacy of morality to society, 
it will be said that there are certain moral duties with regard to our 
own selves. It is true that there are certain moral duties for our own 
selves as well as for others. But this self is not our physical, organic 
self. We do duty to our own selves when we forsake our organic 
desires and interests for the sake of our moral elevation, which is 
nothing but an effort to be more fully socialized. Therefore, the basis 
of the duties towards the self is sacrificing individuality for society. 
That which is the object of morality is not the ‘individual’ but the 
‘social’. As a matter of fact, the word ‘personality’ does not mean 
individuality, but signifies ‘society’ as it exists in the individual. Culture, 
being the sum total of the precipitations [of society] in individual souls, 
is not individual but social. 

The personalities of others are moral objects for me because they are 
parts of the social culture. Individuals become moral objects because, 
and in so far as, they are socialized. This relativity shows that indi- 
viduals ate objects of morality not by themselves but m relation to 
society The reason why criminals cease to be objects of morality is 
that they are asocial, and the perfection great men attain is due to their 
high degree of socialization through their personifying society in 
themselves. 

If the object of morality is society, the nature of ideals becomes 
clarified Ideals imply something for which vie believe it is north 
sacrificing our lives and the object of morality implies the same mean- 
ing. Thus, an ideal is nothing but society or an miensive experiencing 
of social life 

AfOUfiS* 

In order to understand what mores ( € urf) are, let us first see what they 
are not. . . . Mores are generally mistaken for customs [Turkish ddet, 
Arabic War] There is a partial general-particular relationship between 
these two terms. In other words, some customs are mores and some 
mores are customs, but not all customs are mores and not all mores are 
customs. 

A custom is a social rule coming from predecessors It is something 
different from individual habit. Customs are not individual but are 
social, and they are socially transmitted from generation to generation 
A newly invented social rule is not a custom, it is an innovation (bid' a). 
Customs are always transmitted to the present generauon from previ- 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 153 

ous generations. This transmission takes place, not through biological 
inheritance but through social inheritance or education. 

Customs are not mores because there are both accepted and rejected 
customs. Rejected customs are also socially transmitted simply because 
they w ere appro\ ed customs in previous generauons Any action which 
had not, at least once, won the acceptance of the public cannot become 
transmitted socially, and thus cannot be a custom But a rule accepted 
by the public in past generations may become a rejected custom in the 
new generation In other words, it is natural that there are both 
approved and rejected customs There can never be rejected mores. 
Mores are those rules which are accepted by the whole community Thus, 
generally approved customs remain within the mores, but rejected 
customs are outside of the mores. Therefore not all customs are mores. 

Let us see now how all mores are not always customs Innovations, 
like customs, are either approved or rejected by die community An 
innovation is somedung which is not transmitted from preceding 
generauons It is something originated in a new generation I do not 
call it social because it is not yet accepted by the whole community. 
An mnovauon rejected by the community is not socul, it is only 
individual. In other words, it is a social rule in another community 
which has now been introduced into the community in question by 
certain individuals Therefore, social innovations — that is, innovauons 
that have become accepted by the community — are added into the 
mores, but individual innovations — that is, those that are not yet 
accepted by the whole community — are outside of the mores The 
general acceptance of the mores by a community is an essential condi- 
tion. Accepted customs and accepted innovauons which fulfil this 
condiuon become incorporated into the mores, rejected customs and 
innovauons which fail to fulfil tlus condiuon remain excluded from 
the mores. 

The term mores, however, docs not simply mean ‘rules accepted by 
the community”. It also implies the faculty of distinguishing the values 
of accepted and rejected rules. Rules of conduct accepted through this 
faculty are ma'ruf (approved, ‘moral’*) and those rejected are munkar 
(rejected). The first consists of those rules which are approved, and 
die second of those which are disapproved, by die community. Thus, 
die term mores means both social rules of conduct and the social 
conscience (vicJan). 

How do we d is anguish mores from individual actions’ To be a 



154 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

social norm, a rule should be above the biological nature of man as 
well as of his [individual] volition. Actions springing from the bio- 
logical nature of man are not social actions. Actions done instinctively 
are transmitted through biological inheritance. These are biological 
but not social phenomena. Actions which we do of our own will, 
actions which we are free to choose, are not social but psychological 
actions. Social actions exist outside of biological nature because just 
as life is qualitatively different from the chemical elements which make 
it up, so die community has a special quality which cannot be reduced 
to biological nature. Community is not a numerical sum total of indi- 
viduals, but has a reality rut generis, a product of the interaction of 
individual psyches Social reality has its own nature distinct from 
biological nature. As life is something more than the elements consti- 
tuting it (none of them — such as hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon 
— lias a trace of life), so what we call social reality is above organic 
nature Therefore, the representations and judgments of this new 
level of mind which is above the individual minds and the rules which 
they imply must also be above the individual level. 

Social norms are above individual wills The will of the individual is 
a product of his temperament and character. As each individual has 
temperament and character different from that of other individuals, 
actions emanating from individual wills are not of a uniform nature, 
and thus they cannot be rules for others. Even when, under certain 
conditions, these actions show certain accidental similarities, sail they 
are not norms A rule means an action whose execution is necessary or 
obligatory A mere accidental similarity between certain acnons does 
not imply identity in obligatory character. 

If social rules or mores are outside the plane of biological nature and 
are above the individual wills, they have to make themselves acceptable 
either through coercion or attraction. When we study accepted customs 
and approved innovations, we see that they really have these two 
qualities They maintain their existence and win general acceptance and 
currency either through their coercive power of punishment, or through 
their attraction by their power of gaining deference The first quality 
we call the sanctioning power and the second the prestige power of 
the mores 

Whenever vie fail to observe a social rule, expressed as an accepted 
custom or as an approved innovation, we encounter ridicule or re- 
proach or condemnation from the people This reaction of public 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS IJf 

opinion is a social punishment in fear of which we observe many of the 
positive or negative rules. However, observing these rules is not 
always due to the anticipation of a social punishment or to the fear of 
this social power. They are followed also because they are liked by most 
people; they attract them by their prestige power. We do not need 
to be afraid of a law of which we approve. Only those who do not 
like it are afraid of it. 

Thus, mores impose themselves through the love they inspire and 
through the fear they case The first is the quality of jamal (beauty), 
and the second the quality of jalal (majesty) of mores, so to speak. 
Once these qualities of the mores are clarified, it will be easily under- 
stood that acts which are approved ( ma'ruf, ‘moral’) are those which 
we like to do as well as have to do. They are both desired and obliga- 
tory, as well as possible Their obligatory character makes them more 
easily distinguishable from individual actions Some people think that 
their own opinions are social rules, and even claim sanctioning and 
presage powers for them The easiest way to test such claims is to 
invite such persons to do in front of the public what they claim as 
social rules. If they fail, it means tliat what they wanted to impose 
were not social rules A social action is one which is practicable and 
when practised, approvable There is a sanctioning power favourable 
to social action which facilitates its execution, whereas an impracticable 
action faces sanctions contrary to uself, and thus it can never become a 
social rule. Actions actually practised are done mostly either instinc- 
tively or consciously, or by following the customs of the community 
or by imitating the customs of other communities Thus, every action 
practised in a community is not necessarily a part of the mores Mores 
contain only those which have the above-menuoned qualities 

Mores are certain ideal rules proposed by the conscience of com- 
mumty-ideals which individuals aspire to reach w ith great enthusiasms 
but never do reach fully. Community, through us sancuonmg power 
and prestige, always drives individuals towards this social sublimity 
[‘i Uiyyin, the name of the highest of the eight paradises men Boned in 
the Kur’an]. But as die feet of men are in the animal nature, men cannot 
elevate themselves above this ‘biological inferior’. Only their ideas 
reach social sublimity. It was because of this difference between mores 
and individual behaviour iliac certain thinkers like Max Nordau called 
the mores ‘social lies’. Max Nordau is wrong in his opinion because the 
conscience of community is very sincere in its proposals of rules of 



IJ 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
conduct for its members, and individuals, too, are motivated by a 
sincere desire and aspiration to reach these ideals. The alleged be is 
due to the gap existing between biological nature and social nature. 
As life fails to conquer matter and does not produce intelligence in 
every organism, so society, too, fails to inspire its charismatic power in 
every individual and to make everyone a virtuous person. There is a 
great distance between bestiality and virtue. A Persian poet said: 'My 
hand is short w hereas the date is on the palm-tree'. Imam ‘All expressed 
the view that this is not a shortcoming for men when he said: The 
value of a man lies in his strivings after a goal' It was because individual 
actions are always separated from the marts by a wide gap that the 
Kur'an enjoins commanding the maruf and forbidding the munkar. If 
all actions practised in general were ma'ruf and those not observed at 
all were munkar, believers would not be invited to fight (rnujahaJa) to 
confirm the ma'ruf and reject the munkar. 

It follows that we have to discover the ‘urf, not in the actions ex- 
pressed in a community but in the rules which are believed in with a 
social faith and loved with a social love. Current actions approach 
these rules more or less, and in this they are always under the pressure 
of the powers of sanctioning and prestige of the social rules, but never 
completely reach them. The reason why social rules have an ideal 
character is simply that fundamentally they spnng from the social 
conscience. 


MANIFESTATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ETHOS* 


One of the problems for which sociology is trying to give an 
explanation is the question of the way in w hich great men arise in the 
evolution of society and the part they play in this evoluuon. Are the 
men we call ‘great men* the products of the concomitance of certain 
social factors or are they the products of a mysterious Han vital 3 
We must first of all discuss the last question because, while the view 
which believes that great men are products of social evolution does not 
invalidate the principle of social causation, the idea that great men are 
bom out of an impulse of the organism implies that society is deter- 
mined by external mysterious forces is governed by indeterminism. 
We must, therefore, first discuss the way in which great men originate 
before we discuss their role in history 



SOCIAL VALVES AND INSTITUTIONS 


«57 


It must be borne in mind that there is more than one type of great 
man. The nse of each type may be different from that of the others. In 
my opinion, these exceptional men may be classified mto two main 
groups: the reformer and the inventor. The reformer (messenger of a 
religion, a conqueror, a great revolutionary leader, a hero) is charac- 
terized by a strong faith and intense will powerful enough to initiate 
new movements in histoiy. The inventor, on the other hand, ts the 
man who has achieved great strides in the progress of a branch of 
learning and civilization by an intention or discos ery. 

The existence of these two types corresponds to the existence of the 
two types of social solidarity The two prerequisites of human society 
are the existence oflike sentiments on the one hand, and of the division 
of labour on the other. The first gives nse to the first kind of sohdanty 
which is based on the likeness of feelings. The second type of sohdanty 
is based on differentiation of works. The intensification of the first type 
of sohdanty gives nse to the reformer, while increasing division of 
labour leads to the nse of the inventor 

Among the pnmiuv es, division of labour hardly exists. Since every 
community is divided into several interlocking segments such as clan, 
age-group, phratry, there are no common sentiments shared by the 
whole. The community has common language, but common sentiments 
are found only w ithin the special confines of clans or phra tries. For the 
nse of common sentiments within the community as a w hole, this seg- 
mentary orgamzauon must disintegrate. In other words, clans or 
phra tries must disappear. The existence of these special units are 
obstacles id the nse of a common unity Among the pnmmve peoples, 
the clans are subdivided into smaller groups as they grow because the 
clan is a family sharing a common life. The growth of a family may 
continue to a certain limit until it breaks into more than one group. As 
the phratry grows, it provides a better secunty against external attacks 
Therefore, as the clan, on die one side, is divided into smaller units 
m accordance w ith the rule, the phratry, on the other side, tends to 
grow through propagation or through the assimilauon of conquered 
peoples. As this social expansion continues, it finally gives nse to the 
confederations of the phratnes. If the community lives in a moun- 
tainous or desert region, it cannot grow bey ond these limits. If it 
is setded in ihe plains with rivers or with sea-shorts, it setdes as a 
village or as a town, and finally ceases to need any orgamzauon of 
clans and phratnes. The main reason for this decisive dissolving in- 



If 3 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
fluence of the aty over the older organization is the division of labour. 

It is with the dissolution of the segmentary organization under cer- 
tain social factors that the sentiments common to the whole come into 
existence. It ts with the nse of the collective conscience, which is the 
expression of these common sentiments, that the people begin to feel 
their existence as a unity, and recognize the authority of one or several 
chiefs as representatives of the collective conscience. However, even 
the nse of common sentiments is not sufficient to explain the nse of the 
reformer For the nse of such men an extraordinary event, such as a 
calamity or a great victory or a crisis, should take place in the life of the 
community. The community does realize its own collecnv e sentiments 
as the expression of its unified existence only when such critical 
moments arise. Among the Arabs, for example, certain institutions 
common to the greater part of the people — such as the market-place of 
‘ Uka the month of taboos (skehr-i haram), and pilgrimage {hajj ) — 
had existed long before the so-called Elephant Incident. But, as Jurji 
Zaydan pointed out {Medemyet-t Isldmiye TanJu, Turkish trans , I, 
pp. 14, 13), neither great men of warfare nor orators appeared among 
them until this event. As the attack made by an enemy — entirely foreign 
to Arabs both ethnically and religiously — on the Kaba, the common 
symbol of the ‘sacred’ to all Arabs, meant the greatest of national 
calamines, it gave nse to a sudden burst of collecnv e consciousness 
and to a dear realizanon of national unity. Thus, following the Elephant 
Incident, we see the nse of a senes of great wamors, orators, the 
Aanifs, and the poets of the muallaqdt When we study the history of 
other peoples, w e find the same thing the nse of the collecnv e feelings 
following the dissoluuon of the segmentary orgamzanon of society, and 
later, when a national event lgmtes the collective consciousness, the 
nse of the reformer. 

The reformer, then, is a precursor w ho in his own soul experiences 
in a most distinct and intensified manner the trends of unification and 
rejuvenation already begun among the people. In the field of individual 
psjcaology, an unconscious state remains ineffective till it rises to the 
conscious lev el to gam a tremendous effectiveness. The same is true in 
social psychology. When the urge towards unity, remaining uncon- 
scious society, suddenly becomes expressed by a certain individual 
and becomes consciously felt, the movement invades all souls quickly. 
And once the consciousness of the people develops, it does not dis- 
appear again. It follows, then, that the reformer plays the role of cons- 



ifio TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
cluster of migrating families (pba) or scattered villages, and settles 
around a sacred place as the symbol of the new sentiments, a real 
urban centre comes into existence. The urban centre could not come 
into existence as long as common sentiments of clan or of pliratry, and 
their respective religious beliefs and authonues, continue to exist 
When a religion and a public authority common to the greatest portion 
of the community come into existence, the urban centre becomes 
organized around a sacred place and a citadel. Common sentiments 
lead people to be close to each other and to sacred symbols. The 
resultant situation is the settlement of a great mass of people in a 
relatively small area, i.e. an urban centre. The urban centre means an 
agglomeration of hundreds of villages clustered within the same walls 
When they were in a scattered form over a large area, they could get 
their subsistence merely through animal breeding and agriculture. 
When they are placed into the smaller area of an urban centre, the same 
population cannot be fed by the lands surrounding the urban centre. 
Darwin’s principle of the struggle for existence operates because, as 
this great naturalist has shown, the more the area narrows down and 
the more the food becomes scarce, the more intense becomes competi- 
tion bera een organisms of the same species. . . As long as the inhabi- 
tants of a city practise the same occupauons, they become compeutors 
to each other. With division of labour, the competition subsides Thus, 
there is one way to get rid of the intense competition produced by 
social density, and that is through the invention of new occupanons. 
Division of labour, therefore, is produced mechanically by social 
factors. Urban life forces people to invent and improve new trades 
With increasing specializauon in each trade, men acquire a better com- 
mand over their work, and hence there arises professional solidarity, 
in addition to social solidarity. The rise of professional values leads to 
the completion of the disintegration of the older mbal values, and 
causes the collective consciousness to decrease in quantity but to 
become more human in quality. With the progress of the division of 
labour, the segmentary organization disappears altogether. As the 
mbal organization disappears, foreigners from outside join the society. 
With the domination of one urban centre o\ er others, the ethnic state 
emerges. The dominating one, having become the capital centre, the 
seat of government, grows more quickly and leads to further differ- 
entiation of occupauons. The pressures put by the needs of new trades 
and new mvenuons become more conscious. Each inventor finds at his 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS !<Sl 

disposal previous inventions as an accumulated capita] and synthesizes 
them into new ones. 

It follows, then, that ... die nse of the inventor is a product of the 
division of labour. Like the reformer, the inventor too is, at first, the 
product of social evolution and then a factor of it. Just as it t$ the 
innovation itself which makes the reformer and not the reformer which 
makes the innovation, so the force which creates the inventor ij the 
need felt by the social conscience and pre-existing conditions In the 
absence of preceding conditions and the need created by social com- 
petition, no inventor ever anses. These conditions and needs are the 
creations of urban centres, and especially of the capital centres. It 
should be borne in mind also that division oflabour exists only among 
the members of a group having collective sentiments The specialist 
is not merely a supplement to another specialist, but also a special 
organ and thus an integral part of a nation. The differentiation of work 
and die exchange taking place between different nations, therefore, 
are not of the same nature with social division of labour Durkheim 
calls it ‘mutual parasitism* [symbiosis] It is because of this fact that in 
certain aues division oflabour does not develop and does not give nse 
to the inventor. Real urban centres are those which have at their 
hearts a ‘city’ as the spirit of the urban body, so to speak. Thus urban 
centres, such as those found in India, where the urban population is 
made up of castes among whom a avil unity does not exist, or those 
found in Turkey consisting of communities having no national unity, 
can only be called conglomerations of villages Naturally, there can be 
no social division of labour and no inventions under such conditions. 


n 

In order to distinguish social from psychological facts, we have to 
differentiate the meanings of ‘conscience" and of consciousness’ In 
French, both meanings are expressed b> conscience, but this is used in psy- 
chology in the first sense and in sociology m the second. As the w ords 
we use for them in T urlush [vtedan for conscience and f uur for conscious- 
ness] are different, we are m a better position to express social ideals.' 

Consciousness means perception of sensations, through our senses, 
of pains or pleasures within our organism, or of qualities outside of us, 
such as colour, smell, sound, taste, warmth, cold, etc. This faculty, 
which is also shared by animals, is of an individual and organic nature. 

TAVZ.-II 



1 6l TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

Conscience, on the other hand, is the faculty which perceives, not 
material qualities but values -which are spiritual. Acceptance of an 
object as sacred implies a religious value. Acceptance of an object as 
good implies an ethical value. Acceptance of something as glonous 
implies a political value. To take something as a matter of justice 
implies a legal value. Our judgment on the eloquence of a word implies 
linguistic values If something is regarded as beautiful, an aesthetic 
value is implied. The price of an object implies an economic value. 
Exactitude of an idea implies a logical value. Conscience means the 
state of expressing these values within ourselves. 

If we examine values more carefully, we shall see that they are not 
immanent qualities emanating from the nature of the things-in-them- 
selves. Values are certain qualities attached to and superimposed on 
their objects. Using Kant’s terminology , we may call them transcen- 
dental qualities Kant had perceived the existence of a reality abo\e 
individuals which was iraperame, but he had failed to see that it was 
social reality and called it transcendental reality. Modem sociology 
confirms Kant’s views by substituting 'soaaT for ‘transcendental’- 

Values, of whatever kind they may be, are basically subjective and 
not objective. This subjectivity, however, is with respect to society 
and not to the individual. The individual experiences values as external 
reality, independent of his feelings and desires. He is always under the 
impact of values. VTien the individual comes into this w orld, he does 
not bring with him any innate idea about values. He acquires them 
through education and from his social environment. Society, however, 
does not acquire values from any source outside itself. The only source 
of values is the society itself In fact, the real essence of society is 
nothing but the sum total of values. Whenever an emotional crow d 
situation arises by the gathering of individuals, the immediate result is 
the creation of a feeling of value. Common sentiments arising out of 
interaction within the crow d are nothing but sentimental attachments 
to the objects regarded as sacred or glonous or good, etc. Thus, values 
are social institutions, external to the individual bur internal to the 
society. Conscience is the intemahzanon of these external values by 
the individual minds.* 

* Fot further discussion see my articles 'On Good and Bad", 'Afore/, "Value Judgment/ 
ui Islam Utemuan [Nos. 8, to (these r»o translated m dus volume), 17, respectively, 
Istanbul, 1917]. and £. Durtheun, "Jugementt des valcurs cl jugpmenn da rfahids" 
[reprinted in Sociology a PhJoicpkic, Paris, 1914- English translation. Sociology anJ 
PUotopAy, translated by D F Pococlt, Cohen tc West tad., r pp . U>-yj\. 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 1 6 } 

In societies where collective sentiments exist but social division of 
labour have not yet developed, social values are common to all the 
members of the collectivity. The experience of these sentiments by 
individuals constitute collective conscience. In societies that have 
developed a division of labour, a professional conscience develops in 
each field of occupation, in addition to the collective conscience In 
such societies collective conscience has two contents In the beginnings 
both the collective and the professional consciences are experienced by 
individuals at an unconscious level. This unconscious sharing of collec- 
tive conscience, which is concomitant with the changes in social 
structure, is suddenly made the focus of attention of individuals by an 
exceptional man. The individual who is instrumental in bringing the 
unconsciously felt trends into a clear state of perception is the Great 
Man. The one who symbolizes a cultural mend of the collective 
conscience is the reformer, and the one who represents a trend in 
civilization in the professional conscience is the inventor 

We see, therefore, that as there is an individual consciousness, there 
is also a kind of consciousness of the nations. So long as national 
conscience is experienced by individuals, but only at an unconscious 
level and not in a distinct form, it is far from being a ‘national conscious- 
ness*. Sometimes even a reformer mistakes the national ethos for a 
religious or political ideal, a case in which v>e can only speak of the 
existence of an ummet consciousness Namik Kemal, for example, 
represented national consciousness as an Ummet consciousness and as a 
state consciousness, but not as a national consciousness National 
consciousness awakens only with the birth of national ideals in a dis- 
tinct form In certain individuals it may exist, seemingly but not really, 
because they do not experience collective conscience or national values 
in their souls, and thus their experiences of national consciousness are 
more intellectual and imitative than emotional and sincere. Great men, 
although they are the consciousness of social trends, do not calculate 
in most cases uhat they are doing in a conscious fashion or do not act 
wuh a reflective will or with a critical method . . They are in a way 

the mediums of social conscience. Nations are in a state of absent- 

mindedness under normal conditions Under such conditions, social 
trends are experienced unconsciously and are not intensified When a 
social trend develops into a conscious state in certain individuals, it 
assumes a thousand-fold intensitj. The nation, evolving in a gradual 
manner, suddenly undergoes an instantaneous and intensive mans- 



164 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
formation. It drives forward with an historical jump and puts an end 
to what Nietzsche called ‘social rumination’. They are the moments of 
revolution of a religious, political, and moral nature. 

The fact that men who are mediums of social conscience seem to be 
moved by an external inspiration, is another factor which enhances 
great men’s social effectiveness Great men constitute the creative 
imagination of nations and, as such, they are devoid of a reflective will 
and analytical method This inspired form of creative intelligence is 
called ‘genius' It is this absent-minded genius who awakens the nations 
from their absent-mindedness and makes them achieve histone drives. 
It should be home in mind, however, that just as their inspirations do 
come from the collective conscience, men of genius do appear only at 
the inspired moments of ingenious nations The man of genius is a 
person who, beyond his will, makes his own soul a reflecting surface 
to the ingenious pov. er concealed in the nation. The coming of a genius 
requires also certain organic preconditions besides social ones. Every 
person does not have the capacity to become a social medium. Social 
conditions, thus, are necessary but not sufficient causes for the rise of 
great men. — For the advancement of a nation, men of genius are 
not necessarily required. Because, besides the inspired imagination of a 
nation, there is also an analytic and critical mind which is expressed by 
its men of learning. 

IH 

It is seen, therefore, that sociology does not deny the influence of 
the individual over society, as some erroneously claim, but as Durk- 
heim said, it explains the nature of this influence The influence of die 
individual is exercised through men either of genius or of reason. 
Genius is the spontaneous realization of the changes taking place in 
society unconsciously, which can be earned out, hou ever, also through 
reason and science [of society] . . Genius is not acquired but is 
inborn, while any person may become a student of society. Not every 
nation produces men of genius, and this is not something to be 
ashamed of. But nations having no sociologists fail to plan their course 
of accon Furthermore, as we have shown, men of genius arise in most 
cases in a homogeneous social milieu. In a heterogeneous milieu the 
order and the progress of society is the art of [the experts of] sociology. 

In order to understand the role of sociology, «e must first distin- 
guish it from ideologies. An ideologist is a utopian who fails to see 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS l6j 

that nature is an ordered system governed by uniform bv,s, and thinks 
that he can impose over nature whatever he likes The utopian once 
had [cf,, supra , 'New Life and Values’] tried to control physical nature 
by magic, alchemy, and astrology, or to control biological nature by 
charms or tncantadons or witchcraft. When the lights of science dis- 
persed these myths, the only field remaining for him m which to play 
freely was the realm of social nature, which had so far remained un- 
known. The same men still believe that society is something to be 
shaped through legislation and instruction in any form they like 
But no legislation can make institutions of those practices which are 
rejected by social conscience, no instruction can make beliefs of those 
ideas which are rejected by social conscience Institutions and beliefs 
constitute an independent spiritual reality, the social reality of the 
sociologist, which has its existence in the conscience of the nation 
above the desires and wishes of individuals The laws governing this 
reality cannot be imposed, they may only be discovered To influence 
this reality one has to discover its laws and obey them The 
sociologist may influence the evolution of society only by knowing its 
laws and obeying them His function is not to impose and institute, 
but to discover the elements of nanonal conscience in the unconscious 
level and to bring them up to the conscious level, in other words, to 
bring them on to the written page Science has to assume the same 
attitude towards the social nature as it has taken towards physical and 
biological nature . . The social thinker must forget ideologies From 
now on he must listen to the nation which is crying "ideals are nothing 
but my tendencies; values are nodung but my sentiments, language, 
morality, law, art, in short, everything, is in me; don’t try to invent 
them by yourself, but try to discover them in me. Progress means 
going doun deeper into me I am jour conscience and you be my 
consciousness Seek me so that I may disclose myself to you.’ 

IV 

How to study naiions 5 How to discover the nanonal ethos 5 This, 
•he objective method of sociology will tell us It is the duty, especially 
of the Turkish thinker, to make national researches m accordance wadi 
these methods, because it is the Turkish nation whose institutions 
found in its life are in greatest opposition to die institutions found in 
its books, due to the fact that the Turks have Ii\ ed everywhere mixed 



l66 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

■with other nationalities. The Turkish sociologist should discover, on 
the one hand, the stage in which the Turkish people stand in the social 
evolution, and discuss such questions as the spheres of civilization to 
which it belongs, the differences that exist between these civilizations 
and Turkish culture. On the other hand, he should study the laws 
governing the order and the progress of societies and, by doing this, 
he should try to ameliorate, in terms of these laws, the pathological 
factors which have arrested the growth of the national life and should 
give a normative orientation to the evolution of the nation. . . . 

The rules of society exist in the social conscience, on the one hand, 
and are codified in the books, on the other. We call those which come 
under the first, culture, and those which come under the Utter, learning. 
Culture is the complex of the rules of language, politics, religion, 
morality, aesthetics, Ian , and economics, which exist on an unconscious 
level in the life of a nauon The culture of a nanon is not something to 
be imposed or instituted. As it is already exisvng, it is only to be dis- 
covered and codified It may be brought from life to the written page, 
from the unconscious to the conscious We cannot say ‘to build the 
national culture’, but we must say ‘to discover or to seek national 
culture’ This does not mean, however, tliat culture is something to be 
found in the individual. Culture is the complex of several normative 
rules to which individuals always aspire but never attain. The fact that 
we call those very rare persons who symbolize the national ethos in any 
one of the social groupings men of genius is an indication of the fact 
that the elevation of individual life to the level of national life is ex- 
tremely difficult and rare We call the man who discovers th e genie Je la 
langue the genius of language and the man who symbolizes the national 
morality a moral genius. Thus, national life should not be sought in 
the habits and conduct of the individual, but in ideals which are inspired 
in individuals by the national experiences and institutions. Secondly, 
it does not mean either that national life consists either of national 
conduct read in history books, or in a future stage contemplated in our 
imagination. National life is the life which actually exists. Life in the 
past ceases to be alive, and the life to come is not yet bom. Nauonal 
life is the life actually existing now * In our search for the nauonal 

* This does not mean that I am against the attempt to study our past and to discover 
out future I believe that we should study the past only to understand the present and not 
to mum to it, and as the future is something lo be bom out of the present, it can only be 

surmised by an adequate knowledge of the present 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 1^7 

language, for example, we shall find it neither in the Qamus or B urban- 1 
Qati nor in the Divan-t LUgat-ut Turk or Ldgat-i £agatay. It will not 
be found again in the creative imagination of the 'purists’. It will be 
enough to study by scientific methods the actual language as spoken 
in Istanbul I should not be accused of conservatism as I emphasize the 
present. The conservative is the man who believes in the unchangeable 
words of books To believe in life one should not be the w orshipper of 
the ‘unchangeable’. Life is a creative evolution, a moving ideal which 
changes perpetually. The ‘present’ in the social realm is not the sum 
total of the habits and the conduct of the individual, but of ideals and 
aspirations felt in the national conscience which are not attained by 
individuals, who may never reach them. Culture is the nation’s very 
intimate life which is lived above the individuals and is of an ideational 
nature 

V 

As no nation ever lived in isolation without having any contact with 
other nations, there has always been exchange of institutions among 
those who were in contact with each other. These exchanges took 
place only among (hose w ho were in contact w ith each other, and did 
not extend to all nations Thus, the nations are differentiated mtogroup- 
mgs on the basis of exchange of instituuons We call these groupings 
civtlization-groups, and the sum total of the common institutions a 
civilisation. In ancient ages there was a Mediterranean civilization consti- 
tuted by the common contributions of the nations who exchanged 
through the Mediterranean sea. Today there is a Buddhistic civilization, 
an Islamic civilization, a European civilization, etc. Furthermore, a 
certain nation may once, in one stage of its history, be a part of one 
civilization and of another in another stage. The Turks, for example, 
belonged once to the Taoist dvilizanon. They had several institutions 
in common with the Chinese, the Mongolians, the Manchurians, the 
Tibetans, the Cambodians, and the Finns Later, they entered into the 
Islamic civilization, and then they began to accept European civiliza- 
tion in the last century. Survivals of the Taoist civilization among the 
Tutks may be found today only among the tandimamc traditions of 
old w omen and, possibly, in the customs and folk poems, j et unknown 
to us, of the peasants and of nomads. The Islamic and European 
civilizations actually and formally exist side by side [within Turkish 
life] 



l68 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

If w e take European civilization as an example, we find that among 
European nations there are only common words, but each one under- 
stands a different meaning by the same word they use commonly. 
The word 'nation’, for example, has different connotations for the 
French and the Germans The word ’state’ means different things to 
the British, French, and Germans. The same is true for the word 
‘constitution’ or ‘freedom’. The word 'culture' might be a better 
example. The French understand ‘learning’ ( irfart ), while the German 
understands kart by the same word It might be concluded from this 
that the French put more emphasis on learning and the Germans more 
on culture, but this is not the case at all. It is true, however, that the 
French attach greater value to learning and the Anglo-Saxons to cul- 
ture As the Germans are attaching importance to both, they have 
proved their superiority over both, as we see today [this article was 
written during World War I] It follows, then, that European nations 
are living their own national lives in spite of the fact that they out- 
wardly have a common civilization 

Institutions, like language, have an aspect of form and one of mean- 
ing Institutions common within a civilization group are common only 
in appearance, that is, in form From the point of view of meaning — 
that is, of intimate life — each nauon has its own peculiar institutions. 
And the sum total of such institutions of a nauon constitutes its culture. 
When one nauon borrows certain insutuuons from another, it takes 
only certain forms whose real meanings are not defined When these 
forms enter into the national life, they assume new meanings which 
become indigenous, and sincere sentiments evolve in the national 
conscience When we borrowed words from the Arabs and Persians, 
we took only certain forms of words The national meanings we have 
attached to these words are unintelligible to their original owners, and 
it is because of this fact that those who look at the QSmSt or the 
Burhar 1-1 Qati' for the meanings of these words are doomed to remain 
foreigners to the national language In short, certain concepts and 
institutions in words and forms, and the civilization which is die sum 
total of them all, may be common to several nations; but national 
conscience is never commonly shared. 

VI 

The change and the evolution of social institutions depend upon the 
changes in the social structure. For that reason, there is a discipline 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 169 

that studies the social structure of nations which we might call national 
morphology. The science derived from the comparative study of 
several nations might be called comparative morphology. The science 
called comparative linguistics or comparative law may also be called 
sociology of language, sociology of law, etc Comparative morphology 
is simply called social morphology There is a more general and more 
abstract science derived from the comparative study of these sciences 
which 1$ called general sociology The subject-matter of general 
sociology is the comparative study of the cultures of all nations We 
might call the discipline derived from the study of the culture of a 
certain nation national sociology 

The sociology of a nation is a synthesis of social disciplines relating 
to that nation, national linguistics, nanonal ethics, national law, etc 
If certain nations belong to the same social species, their cultures are 
Similar, if they belong to the same civilization group, their civilizations 
are similar to each other. Therefore, for the establishment of sociology 
on the basis of comparison it is first necessary to establish national 
sociology, but national sociology presupposes the findings of sociology 
in order to know to which social species and civilization the nation in 
question belongs. Thus, all social sciences and social disciplines have 
to utilize each other's data Social disciplines are always national, 
because their subject-matter is the institutions of a nation They are, 
however, objecuve disciplines at the same time because they are 
interested in observing and discovering the institutions existing in the 
nation They will show not 'what it should be’ but ‘how it is’ They 
are, however, normative disciplines also, because once the rules of 
national institutions are discovered and become known, they assume 
an obligatory character for the members of the nauon. We do not learn 
the grammatical rules of our language with only a theoretical interest, 
but w e make the rules we has e teamed norms in our speech and writing. 
Thus, social disciplines are both objective knowledge and practical arts 
based on objective information Tins is true also in national history 
National history is, on the one hand, an objecuve discipline based on 
facts substantiated bj evidences, and also an art of an educational and 
normative character We see, therefore, that soaal disciplines are 
national on the one hand, and normanve and educational on the other 
The soaal sciences, on the other hand, are both objecuve and inter- 
national like the other exact saences such as mathematics, physical 
saence, and biologj. Their bearing upon the arts is in much (he same 



X70 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
■way. In mathematics, physics, and biology there is nothing practical; 
but the am such as engineering, chemistry, or medicine apply only on 
the basis of the knowledge discovered in these sciences. In much the 
same way, there is nothing of a practical nature m the social sciences, 
but arts such as education and politics can only exist on the basis of 
these sciences. The only difference between these two categories of 
science [the physical and the social sciences] is the fact that the subject- 
matter of the social sciences is national phenomena, in general and 
in abstract if not of a particular concrete nation. 

We may conclude that if the books of a particular nation contain 
knowledge concerning the social disciplines relevant to that nation, 
as well as knowledge concerning the general and abstract social 
sciences, these books are a source of exceedingly fruitful and useful 
learning ( irfan ), because this learning teaches the particular and con- 
crete rules constituting national culture, and the general and abstract 
laws to which this culture is subject. Otherwise, if it consists of the 
arbitrary wishful thinking and dreams of the ideologists as to *how 
should it be 5 ’, or of the traditional and unscientific doctrines borrowed 
from other nations, learning to be acquired from them is merely morbid 
and harmful A person corrupted by the acquisition of such learning 
cannot think in terms of how he lives or cannot live in terms of what 
he thinks His whole life is wasted in mdeaston and pessimism due to 
the failure to solve the contradictions between Life and Book. All of us 
have experienced this in our lives In spite of the fact that Turkish 
culture is living bke a hidden treasure of genius in our unconscious 
conscience, there has risen a thick curtain betw een it and ourselves by 
learning acquired from instruction. The language, the morality, the 
law, the fine arts, etc., with which we actually live are different in 
nature from that learning relating to them which we acquire from 
books. As our life is not reflected in our books, our learning does not 
affect our life. As our culture does not penetrate into our learning, our 
learning does not extend to our culture. As there is no connection or 
mutual understanding between our consciousness and our conscience, 
we live as double-minded sick men. The only way to put an end to this 
malady is to study Turkish culture, to develop our national sociology 
from it, and to entrust our education only to works written on this 
principle 



SOCIAL VALVES AND INSTITUTIONS I71 

THE METHODS OF CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY 7 

I 

Human phenomena are of two kinds those which are associated 
with consciousness and those which are not. Those which always 
remain unassociated with consciousness are biological phenomena and 
are studied by biology. Those which are always or sometimes associ- 
ated with the states of consciousness are treated by psychology. 
Psychological phenomena are sensations, perceptions, or behaviour, 
and may be generally classified into two groups (a) the individual 
psychological ones, such as the sensauons or actions originating from 
the biological organism of the individual — the science which deals 
with them is psychology; (£) the social psychological ones, such as 
those patterns of thought and action which originate from the social 
group m which the individual lives — the science dealing with them is 
sociology. 

The patterns of thought and acuon imposed by the social group to 
which the individual belongs are called traditions (an one [in Arabic 
Wuria]). Traditions are classified into religious, moral, legal, linguistic, 
aesthetic, and economic groups Religious tradiuons, for example, con- 
sist of the religious beliefs and rituals Linguistic, aesthetic, and 
economic norms are the traditions of their respective spheres of life 

The sum total of these tradiuons, which are related to each other in 
their origins, is called a civilisation. Such traditions are shared by 
different societies, are found m common forms in different socieues, 
and, hence, are of an international character. The sum total of the 
peoples belonging to a common civilization is called a civtltiatton- 
group. A nation may sometimes have the traditions of more than one 
civilization and, thus, may belong to more than one avilizauon-group 
The Ottoman Turks, for example, have retained several traditions 
stemming from the old as ihzanon of the Turks as well as those coming 
from the Islamic and European civilizations. 

A tradition is a pattern of thought or of action which implies a 
judgment of goodness or badness, or, in recent terminology, value 
judgment But in esery nauon there is a social conscience w hich is made 
up of mores ( common opinion, ‘ urf ) determining the judgments of good- 
ness or badness, or value judgments, which are entirely peculiar to that 
nauon. The traditions are international but the mores are only nationally 
accepted The forces which make a nation consist of association 



172 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
(ta'aruf) among its own members, and of dissociation (tanahir) 9 
between them, on the one side, and the members of other nations, on 
the other. Association (ta'&ruf) is a participation in common mores 
(‘urf), and dissociation (tanakur) means divergence in mores. The 
hadith- ‘The souls are arrayed armies: those which recognize one 
another become akin, those who are strangers to one another become 
mutually opposed* [al-anvahu ajnildun mujannadatun fama ta'arafa 
minhu 'talafa wama tanakara ’ khtalafa ] is an expression of this truth. 
As each nation has been living in particular social conditions it is 
natural that each should have its own particular value judgments or 
mores (‘urf) The real ethos of a nation is reflected, not in its tradiuons 
but in its mores. There may be conflicts between the traditions and the 
mores of a nation A certain tradinon may be congruent or incongruent 
with the mores. Congruence between the two gives rise to an institution, 
otherwise, if the tradition remains but plays no part in the bfe of the 
nation, it is the fossil of an extinct civilization If it still lingers on as a 
continuation of the past in the present without fitnng itself to present 
mores , it is then called a survival 

It follows that the social conscience, the ethos, of a nation is reflected 
only in its institutions Institutions are not intemauonal but national 
The sum total of the instituuons of a nation constitutes its culture. 
Like mores and institutions, culture is thus of an entirely national 
character An institution is not necessarily a by-product of the adapta- 
tion of a tradition to the mores There are insututions which come into 
existence merely by asstmilauon into the mores even when they have 
no place in traditions Thus, for example, the Mevltd [recital of the 
Prophet’s Birthday Poem] is even today a living nrual [in Turkey] in 
spite of the fact that it never had any place in the traditions of fkh 
[Islamic jurisprudence] A tradition may be just a fossil in one country 
and a living institution in another. The criminal injunctions of the fkh, 
for example, became fossils in Turkey because they did not fit into the 
Turkish mores, but they are still living institutions in Hejaz or Yemen. 
Polygamy could maintain its existence among the Turks only as a 
survival Just as there are institutions directly emerging within a cul- 
ture, there are also certain traditions which are taken from international 
avihzationVnd fitted into its /now. In some cases, a culture may borrow 
traditions frhrn more than one civilization, as we see in the Turkish 
culture [of the Ottoman Turks] which has taken tradiuons from old 
Turkish, Islamic, and European civilizations. 



>74 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
thus, they were either forgotten entirely or evolved along with the 
national mores by fitting themselves into the latter. But Islamic tradi- 
tions and the traditions coming from Europe have remained immune 
from this assimilation thanks to the conservatism of the old medrese 
and [to the formalism] of the old mektcp. Turkish culture has thus 
assimilated the old Turkish traditions but has faded to do so m relation 
to die Islamic and European traditions and, hence, it did not realize 
its formation completely. Two factors are needed to do this, one being 
a new type of medrese and the other a new type of mektcp. 

Traditions may dash with two kinds of conscience,* one being 
individual and the other social The individual conscience is the con- 
sciousness of the person, and its function is to observe sensations. The 
observation of sensation is an individual experience and consists mainly 
of the act of distinguishing qualities Whenever a conflict arises be- 
tween the tradition and individual experience, it gives nse to scientific 
cnuasm from which originate positive knowledge and the faculty 
which we call pure reason. 

The social conscience, on the other hand, with whidi the traditions 
may come to grips is the more*. Just as consciousness is the perception 
which distinguishes the qualities of things, so the mores give nse to 
another kind of perception whose function it is to distinguish the 
values of things. The perception of qualities is an individual process, 
the determination of values is a social process. Just as the observations 
of consciousness are an individual experience, so the expression of the 
mores constitutes the social experience. Clashes between tradiuon and 
social expenence give nse to cultural cnnasm as a result of which the 
faculty which we call common sense arises together with the national 
learning (irfan). Kant named abstract reason ‘pure reason’ and common 
sense ‘practical reason’. Having demolished metaphysics, which is the 
support of the social values — e.g religion and ethics — by hxs critique 
of pure reason, he constructed it over again in his critique of pracucal 
reason. This indicates that abstract reason is the child of the clash 
between tradition and individual expenence, and common sense the 
child of the dash betw een traditions and mores. Hence, in the determin- 
ation of good and bad, or of the social values, abstract reason cannot 
be used as a criterion. Abstract reason plays its part only with respect 
to judgments of reality. As traditions were derived basically from the 
mores, they could be used as criteria in this matter, but m most cases 
they fall short in their performance of this function because, since they 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS I7J 

do not contain the mores in themsek es, they are either empty containers 
[forms] or misleading survivals. The real criteria for value judgments 
are, therefore, only mores or common sense, which are the product of 
the instinctive criticism of the traditions through the mores. But the 
most inspiring expression of common sense is the man of genius. The 
genius is the person who excels in common sense or the person who 
feels and experiences the mores in their clearest form. The mores are 
like rays of light diffused into the conscience of the people. They do 
not turn into burning flame, however, until they are intensified by the 
focus of a lens. The soul of the genius is that lens. He is like a lens held 
to the sun of society. As the burning force of the lens comes from the 
sun, so the effecnv eness of the genius lies in his being a reflection of the 
mores. Those who put the dictates of common sense into practice are 
heroes. A genius is the hero of theory and the hero the genius of 
pracuce. Another type of man who is the earner of common sense to a 
lesser degree is he whom we call the sage (‘ anf ). The real representa- 
tives of a nation are the men of genius, the hero, and the sage. It is a 
mistake to look at the average man as a national type. We ought to see 
the nauonal type in the men of genius. The average man represents only 
the sum total of the individual consciences, but he never represents the 
social conscience or the nauonal personality The £hte of a nauon are 
the men of gem us, the heroes, and the sages The scholar and the 
scientist acquire only certain skills through training. Even a simple 
person may become a scholar or a scientist, but never a genius, a hero, 
or a sage. Hence, the scholar or the saenust cannot be regarded as the 
<hte of a nation unless they are endowed also with common sense. 
They may achieve greatness in scientific and technical fields through 
their acquisiuon of abstract reason, but as abstract reason cannot be 
used as a criterion in matters of value, so neither their ideas nor their 
actions can be taken as a gauge in nauonal sociology. Among the 
specialists of science, the only persons who can say anything with 
regard to matters of value are those who are specialized in nauonal 
sociology because, although they also conduct their studies through 
abstract reason, their subject-matter consists of common sense or its 
source, the mores, and thus they have authority. 

The nauonal n pe manifests itself also during great soaal upheavals 
or in times of crisis which immerse the souls of individuals within the 
social souL Thus, for example, the nauonal type of the Turk emerged 
in its most sinking form during die critical defence of die Dardanelles. 



176 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
National life is not that life which we live in ordinary times of tran- 
quillity In these times we live only our individual lives. It is because 
of this that the genius and the hero do not appear in times of peace. 
Great men appear only in critical times. Extraordinary events obliterate 
individualities Individuals m the day s of crisis and exatement live only 
tlie national life. The individual seems indifferent to values in the times 
of tranquilbty, while the crowds arising at times of crisis sanctify Or 
condemn an object towards which they project their whole attention. 
Then thoughts become faith, ideas become ideals, wishes become wills, 
and feelmgs become ecstasies (vecJ) A state of crisis may be likened to 
a microscope, it has a magnifying power which brings social feebngs 
into distinct shapes. The mores of the nation, which under ordinary 
conditions remain concealed, unfold themselves clearly in this manner. 
In order to discover the sources of the new Turkish revival, which is 
in itself the full expression of the Turkish mores, we have to trace back 
to the Graeco-Turkish War [of 1897], leading ulumately to the emer- 
gence of certain forces which had remained hidden until then. The 
Reval Meeting was the event which suddenly worked the forces which 
unul then had been fighting only against the Macedonian bandits and 
the people of Rumelt who until then had remained only as spectators 
of the fighting into a frenzy. The events of July a-jth [the so-called 
Young Turk Revoluuon of 1908] and the counter-revolution of 
'March 31’ [Apnl 13, 1909], die Turko-Irahan and the Balkan wars, and 
finally the present World War [ 1 ], all contributed to the rise of various 
national movements [among the Turks]. In short, if one of the mirrors 
of the national values is die elite, the other is the nauonal endiusiasm 
created by extraordinary events. 

The common sense of a nation expresses itself best m exceptional 
persons and at excepnonal times. Although it is reflected instinctively 
in the genius, in the hero, or in the sage, this is not, however, enough. 
It must also be possible to grasp the common sense of a nation by 
methodical means. If this were not possible, one could not speak of a 
nauonal sociology based on method To grasp the common sense of a 
nation simply means to be able to identify its mores. In other words, 
it means to distinguish them from the fossilized pracuces and from the 
survivals. Thus, the problem amounts basically to the question of how 
the mores and the ins am uo ns of a nauon are distinguished. 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 


*77 


ra 

To do this, the first method to be eraplojed by cultural sociology 
is the method of ‘convergence’ (ta'Sruf). This'procedure aims at seek- 
ing common ground among the conflicting trends which take place in 
national life. Within the national life there are certain social trends 
which may clash with each other. They may be contradictory on several 
points. However, they may also converge on certain points These 
common points are, therefore, the ones which signify the mares. 

In Turkey, for example, there have been three major social move- 
ments, namely, the movements ofTurkism, Islamism, and Modernism. 
The existence of these divergent movements is a lively evidence of the 
fact that the elements u hich we took from three civilizations are soli 
not assimilated and still conflict with each other. All of these three 
movements represent the same traditionalism. In spite of these diver- 
gences, however, there is also a convergence (ta'Sruf) among them 
since all of them refer equally to the same problems of the same nation. 
The existence of this convergence between them and the existence of 
divergence ( tanakut ) between them, on the one iiand, and those of the 
other nations, on the other, are indications of the fact that all three 
movements agree on the same mores. 

Groups existing in a society are like connected containers. Just as the 
water in these containers always maintains an equal level, the groups 
within a nation also maintain a relation of convergence (ta'aruf) among 
themselves. But as the mores normally remain concealed in the con- 
science of the people and those which have been made manifest are 
tradmons, the outsider, observing the behaviour of individuals, sees, 
at first sight, only the div ergence of ideas and does not nonce the basic 
similarity in the souls [of the people] There may be certain tradiuons 
represented by one of the groups which are, in many cases, accepted by 
others too That means that these traditions, whatever may he their 
sources, have become commonly accepted beliefs and practices, or the 
institutions of all. As examples from language are more convenient 
than others, let us menuon a few 10 illustrate this. We have borrowed, 
for example, foreign w ords like telefon (telephone), telegraf (telegraph), 
or salon, w hich are used by both an Islamist and a T urkist That means 
that these w ords have become established institutions of the language. 
There are several Arabic and Persian words which were likewise 
accepted by the Turkists as parts of the Turkish language, such as 



I78 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
kxtap [fcr5i=book], millet [mtlla~ nation], and devlet \dawla= state], 
all referring to institutions. No Turkist w ould entertain any desire to 
replace them by equivalents derived from pure Turkish. The Islamists 
and the Modernists, on the other hand, hav e never thought of expelling 
the pure Turkish words sail in use among the Ottoman Turks. 

These facts show that there are common points or msutudons agreed 
on by the three groups with respect to language. The simple reason is 
that there are IinguisUc mores. Not all of the originally Turkish words 
have become assimilated to the Ottoman Turkish Several Turkish 
words which the linguistic mores did not assimilate have been rejected 
from the Ottoman Turkish, that is to say, words such as sayru, savcu, 
go{gu have become mere fossils. Some, on the other hand, could have 
entered Ottoman Turkish only by undergoing modificauon either in 
spelling or in meaning, as olu from oluk, son from sang, ulu from ulug, 
yordam from erdem, and deny: from ungii- In the same manner, all 
Arabic and Persian words borrowed could not be used in die Turkish 
language in their original forms. In most cases they underwent con- 
siderable changes when they were incorporated into Turkish; thus 
nerduban became mcrdiven, farfube became (erf eve, ghtrbal became 
kalbur, f ukdk became sokak. The first forms in these examples are per- 
fect examples of the fossils, and the second of the msutuuons. Words 
derived from the European languages have undergone the same pro- 
cess of modificauon. 

As the existence of common points among the divergent three 
groups derives from the accepted mores , the conflicts are the conse- 
quences of their tradiuonahsms. The tradiuonalisr Turkist, for 
example, attempts to introduce such fossil words as ulug or gofgu, 
which had been rejected by the mores of the people- Such attempts 
cause resentment among the Islamists and the Westemists. Or, when 
the traditionalist Islamist insists that the correct Arabic form for the 
word ‘attention’ is tahdik or 1 ltifat and not the current dikkat [which is 
also derived from Arabic], and that the correct form should be used in 
Turkish, or when he attempts to revive nerduban , farfube, iukak, and 
ghtrbal to take the place of the Turkified forms, others just laugh. 
Those who prefer to pronounce Europe , Parts , and cigarette the French 
way instead of saying Avrupa, Pans, and cigara, simply make them- 
selves ridiculous, as we read in Recaizade Ekrcm's novel Araba 
Scvdast ( Love in the Carnage ). 

Those examples indicate that Turkish culture is not identical with 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 179 

the civilization of the Turks. The latter is the sum total of Turkish 
traditions. The culture of the Turks, on the other hand, is the sum 
total of the institutions which are actually ahve in the mores of the 
Ottoman Turks and which have come down from various origins. 
It is only the tradiuonahsts of the Turkists that over-emphasize and 
want to revive the old civilization. The culture-ist Turkists, on the 
other hand, put the emphasis on the living culture of the people. 

If we extend these observations on the language to other fields of 
soaal life, we shall always nonce great differences between the tradi- 
nonalist Turkist and the culture-ist Turkist, and it will become evident 
that the latter can reconcile himself with the Islamist and the Modernist 
without difficulty. Since the factors that bring a nanon into existence 
are the principles of convergence (ta'aruf) and divergence ( tanakur ), 
the traditions taken from among mtemanonal traditions are assimilated 
into the forms of msntuuons, and these insntuuons are always more or 
less different from the mtemanonal forms of the tradinon It follows, 
then, that the nanonal culture, even if it has not yet become a conscious 
one, always exists. It is necessary only to bring it into consciousness 
by distinguishing it from mtemanonal avilizauon In order to do this, 
it » necessary to distinguish the living institutions of the mores from 
the survivals which no longer live in the mores Since the traditions 
mutually agreed upon by the opposing groups in a nanon are nanonal 
tnsutunons living m the mores, we can discover the nanonal mores and 
Culture by discovering the common ground of all contending groups. 

The second method to be employed in cultural sociology is that of 
discovering the latent or explicit divergence (tanakur) between the 
msntuuons of various nanons belonging to the same sphere of aviliza- 
non. This procedure will lead us to the point where we can see how a 
tradinon undergoes alterauons in the process of its assimilauon within 
different nanons and how it creates msntuuons within these nanons 
which differ from one another. Nanons belonging to the same civiliza- 
non often look alike from outside, but are different in reality In order 
to realize this point, the observer should not be deceived by super- 
ficial similarities existing betw een certain tradmons He must look at the 
vanauons between the msntuuons existing m different nanons re- 
spectnely. 

European civihzanon, for example, is commonly shared by various 
European nauons. But the German nanon, for example, tends to dis- 
tinguish us own religious, cultural, ethical, and legal values, and 



l80 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

differentiates its own aesthetic and literary taste, and even its scientific 
and economic practices, from the corresponding ones in the other 
nations. It is through such acts of differenuauon that the culture of the 
German nation marks its own existence. Likewise, the Ottoman Turk 
would distinguish his peculiar mores, and thus make his culture a 
conscious reality only by discovering how its own institutions differ 
from those of the other Turkish peoples, from those of the other 
Muslim peoples, and from those of the Europeans. 

The third procedure to be followed will be the method of concilia- 
tion ( te'ltf) Although a nation is a group of people sharing the same 
mores, divergent groups within it might be conciliated In order to do 
this it is, first of all, necessary to differentiate the avilizaaonal and the 
cultural forms found among these groups Thus, for example, the 
avilizaaonal form of Islamism ts fikh-ism. To be a Muslim, it is not 
absolutely necessary to be a Jikh- ist however. Fikh is a scholasnc 
( medresevt ) tradmon which had its origins only in the second century 
of the Hijra. The most glonous period of Islam was the period preced- 
ing the rise of fikh And today we see that an Islamic life is being lived 
without being perfectly fitted into fikh In the history of Islam, the 
ahl al-Hadith had rejected fikh, the Afutakaddimun had rejected kaldm, 
and, later, the Alutasawwtfs lived a lively Islamic culture by replacing 
the 'reason’ {kdl) of fikh and of kaldm by ‘experience’ (kal). The sup- 
porters of ‘urf today also want a living Islamic culture. 

The avilizaaonal form of Turkism, on the other hand, is the doc- 
trine which claims to revive the old [Turkish] tore [customary law] 
But those who accept it do not realize that before the tradiuonal 
customary law came mto existence there was a nvikzaaon of the Turks 
and, furthermore, the customary law took different forms in the 
Gultekin [Orkhon] inscnpnons, in Kutadgu Bilik, in the Yasa of 
Jengiz, in the Tiqiikdt of Timur, and in the Kammname s of Fatih 
[Mehmet the Conqueror] and of Suleyman [the Magnificent] Further- 
more, the contemporary cultural life of the Ottoman Turks is creating 
a new Turkish avihzanon through its disseminauon among all the 
Turks. Thus, just as Islamism does not mean fikh- ism, in much the 
same way Turkism is not tort-ism. And again, it is a mistake to take 
Modernism as necessarily meaning European :sm. Modemizauon and 
Europeanization are quite different dungs. There is similarity but not 
identity between the two. 

It follows, then, that fik-vuxs, tora-isto, and Europearzira. ace twt 



SOCIAL VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS l8l 

reconcilable with each other at all Each is equally traditionalist and 
imitationist On the other hand, the genuine Islamism, the true Turk- 
ism, and the real Modernism are reconcilable With each other, not only 
in the unconscious conscience of the nation, where they are already 
coexisung and co-operating, but also on the conscious level. 

The fourth procedure to be followed in cultural sociology is the 
method of exemplification (tsttjhad). Newspapers and journals like to 
discover social trends by using the quesnonnaire technique. As the 
national conscience is not exemplified in the average type of person, 
tins method is useless in discovering sociological truths The national 
conscience is exemplified only in the genius, in the hero, or in the sage 
The questionnaires should, therefore, be applied only in their cases. 
However, even then it is far from being always useful because these 
men would tend to express, at the ume of the inquiry, not their feelings 
but only their Intel lectualued opinions. Furthermore, those who are 
not living now cannot be quesuoned. On the other hand, these men 
have in their most sincere, least artificial moments made utterances and 
performed deeds, v, itliout any formalism, which are the most valuable 
documents for national sociology. It is therefore the task of the method 
of exemplification to uulize such exemplary ideas or acts as documents. 
Thus, for example, u e can obtain many data from the acuviues and 
writings of Namik hemal because his refosal to accept Tanjimat in row, 
his belief in the sovereignty of the rights [of the Mushm-Turkish 
people] as expressed in the letter he wrote to Abdul Hamid during the 
preparation of die Consutution of 1876, are exemplifications of the 
nauonal conscience Apart from great men, great events also are 
important sources of data for understanding the trends of the national 
conscience The events of 'March 51’ [April rj, 1909], for example, 
v ere a reaction against die tendencies u hich w ere curtailing the position 
of the sovereign, the posiuon of the Turks and of the Muslims, and 
exaggeraung the importance of the policy of reeonahauon between the 
religious communities [within the Ottoman Empire] 

The fifdi procedure to be uulized in discovering the nauonal ethos 
is aimed at the detcrminanon of social types. Comparauve sociology 
constructs social types by classifying the forms of society into genera 
and species. Tlius, every nation occupies a posiuon as a species in a 
genus. As the mores and die msntuuons found in each genus and specie* 
and die law governing them are knowable, it will be possible to under- 
stand the mores and die ujsutuuons of a nauon once its genus and 



181 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
speaes are determined. In this manner the institutions will be distin- 
guished easily from the fossils and survivals. 

Societies are divided into two great genera: tribes and states There 
are three speaes of state* city-states, sultamstic states, and modem 
states The Turks in their pre-Islamic period m Asia belonged to the 
first speaes During their Ottoman period, they constituted a Sultanate 
by substituting sancakbcys for hoybey% From the time of Ta/t^imat and 
the Constitutional Revolution, the Ottoman state began its trans- 
formation towards a modem sate A modem sate is one which is 
based on a legislative organ, an independent culture, and a national 
economy. 

Once the genera and speaes of soaeties are determined, it becomes 
easier to identify which traditions are the survivals [of a previous 
speaes] and which ones have become institutions. Mores and institu- 
tions are normal soaal facts [for each speaes]. The fossilized ones and 
the survivals, on the other hand, are pathological phenomena. The task 
of national soaology is to devise measures to be taken against the 
revival of fossils, to eliminate the survivals, and to strengthen the 
institutions However, m some cases both mores and institutions may 
become pathological, as in the case of an institution which becomes 
retarded in its evoluuon by certain arresting factors, and thus fails to 
reach the stage of development it should reach with reference to the 
speaes in which it is normally found Because of arrested growth, 
certain mores and institutions lag behind. Thus, for example, since the 
division of labour is not developed among us in the field of religion, 
and since the men of piety and the men of [religious] law have not 
assumed specialized functions, everybody considers himself charged 
with these functions This has been the mam factor in the co-existence 
among us of religious laxity, fanauasm, and hypocrisy. The discovery 
of the speaes to which a nation belongs will remedy such anomalous 
conditions. 

To measure the authority and effectiveness of value judgments or 
soaal values, we have one more method, and that is statistical pro- 
cedure. It is possible to ascertain statistically to what extent people 
observe a certain tradition which exists among different nations. 
Through a comparative analysis of these stanstical data, it will he 
possible to show that a certain tradition is practised among various 
nations in varying degrees Through this procedure the mores of the 
nations will be ascertained in a comparatively objective way also. 



SOCIAL VALVES AND INSTITUTIONS 183 

Cultural sociology may develop methods in addition to those •which 
we have enumerated so far. For the present we deem these sufficient. 
However, there is an important point with regard to the problem of 
the determination of national mores which should be taken into account 
above everything else - the investigator engaged in research work on 
the national mores should not have any monopolistic bias in favour of 
any of the civilizations to which the naaon belongs For example, 
those who seek to identify the mores of the Ottoman Turks should not 
have any excluding preference for any of the old Turkish or Islamic or 
European civilizations. The traditionalists cannot perceive the living 
mores. It should never be forgotten either that the mores never rest on 
official sanctions and that, on the contrary, the official rules derive their 
moral sanction from the mores. The faiths and laws lose their moral 
sanction as soon as they contradict the mores, and thus they cannot for 
long have a material power to enforce them since through non-use such 
instituuons become obsolete by themselves. 

The greatest danger m cultural sociology is to confuse mores with 
customs and usages. There are accepted or rejected customs and usages. 
As long as they conform to the mores, they are regarded as accepted 
customs and usages, as long as they remain discordant with the mores, 
they are regarded as rejected customs and usages. Therefore, customs 
and usages are not of the same category as the mores. The word 'urf 
used m the Kur’an corresponds to the term opinion [in French] The 
mores of a nation are the social conscience of the time m which they 
exist. And this social conscience can only be an accepted one; it can 
never be a rejected one. 



CHAPTER VII 


RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 

£ 


SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION 1 


The social functions of religion differ according to various types of 
society. In one of our previous essays we specified two such types, viz. 
primitive societies and organic societies. 

In primitive societies there is only one kind of authority— that is, 
religiousauthonty — because no political or cultural authority developed 
in them independently. The authority in primitive societies is sail 
based on mores (or in die Kur’aroc term, on ’urf), and the mores among 
primitive societies are of a religious nature. There are no political or 
cultural mores among them. 

In organic societies, at first political mores and later cultural mores 
take shape in addition to religious mores In the same manner, a 
political and a cultural authority exist in organic societies in addinon 
to the religious authority 

A collectivity {hey et) united by religious mores and subject to a 
religious authority is called an ummet. A collectivity united by political 
mores and subject to a political authority is called a state. The collec- 
tivity which is the product and the union of cultural mores under a 
cultural authority is called a nation. 

It follow's, therefore, that primitive societies axe of the character of 
an ummet No political or nauonal institutions have dev eloped among 
them- In organic societies, on the other hand, all three exist simul- 
taneously but separately, ummet giving nse to the state which prepares 
the way for the nauon. The organization of the independent but 
auxiliary religious, political, and cultural mstituuons in these societies, 
as a result of the differennauon of functions, gives nse to the three 
kinds of mores and the authorities based on them. Keeping in view this 
differentiation between the two types, let us now discuss the social 
functions of religion within them. 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY l8j 

In pnmiave societies, the religious institutions perform the functions 
of the other two insumuons because these societies do not have 
political and cultural organs In other words, ummet functions also as 
state and nation. All social tnsmuuons, in general, derive their power 
and value from some authority or, more correctly, mores In primitive 
soaeaes there is only the religious authority and mores All institutions 
of primitive soaeaes, therefore, necessarily spring from religion and 
acquire their power and value from this source of sacredness. 

The fact that in organic soaety only a part of the insntuuona! life 
rests on religious mores while in pnmiave soaety all insatuaons rest 
on religious mores , should not lead us to think that religion is serving 
a more useful task in primitive soaeaes Religious mores invest the 
insatuaons to which they are related with a supernatural or, in clearer 
terms, a chansmauc power and value This power may be useful in its 
relauon to insatuaons which are relaavely spiritual and represent the 
collecave conscience of society, but it becomes harmful when it is 
extended to worldly or secular, and especially to material, insatuaons 
because it prevents these msutuaons from adapting themselves to the 
expediences of life. Therefore, the predominance of religious mores 
over all insatuaons is not something to be desired for organic soaeaes. 

In organic soaeaes religious mores soil exist, but they cover only 
those ideals and senuments which have to remain spiritual and sacred. 
They do not extend over those msntutions which are of a worldly and 
secular character The latter insatuaons derive their power and role 
either from political or from cultural mores and evolve in accordance 
with the expedienaes of life Poliucal mores transform themselves into 
laws when they win the support of legal sancaons. Cultural mores, 
which have several forms such as moral, aestheuc, linguisac, economic, 
and technical, do not invest the tnsutuaons to which they are related 
with chansmauc sanaions, as in the case of religious insutuuons, but 
they determine the right in human conduct, beauty m works of art, 
correctness in language, economy in commodities, rationality in 
economy, and utility in techniques. 

In the organic soaety these come mto existence through division 
of labour, and develop independently of standards ofsoaal values or of 
mores. Each of them performs its fiincuon in its own field indepen- 
dently Therefore, we should seek the funcaons of religion in organic 
soaety because only there can we see religion in its own sphere. 



1 86 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


II 

One of the great tasks of religion in organic society is to leave other 
institutions free within their own spheres. As religion consists of a 
body of beliefs and ntuals, it is necessary to seek social functions of 
religion (in terms of their worldly functions) with respect to these two 
groups of phenomena* 

There have always been certain convictions on the worldly functions 
of rituals and beliefs For example, some confuse religious purification 
(ser't taharet ) with the ‘purification in accordance with medicine’ 
(tibht taharet ) and try to interpret the religious obligations of washing 
( gusul and abdesi) as if they were wisely meant to eliminate germs. Since 
the religious purification means essentially avoidance of moral filth, 
there is no justification for attributing it to some other motives. 
Washing with ordinary water is no substitute for antiseptics, and 
secondly, religious purification may even be carried out, if necessary, 
by simply using earth, which would be essentially a symbolic act. 
Again, some people attempt to evaluate prayers in terms of utility, 
that is physical exercise, or fasting in terms of dietary exerases. It is, 
I believe, a mistake to reduce religion to such matenalisac terms 

We have to seek the social functions of religion, not in any utilitarian 
sense but in the moral functions they perform because all social facts 
are basically moral or ethical or ideational phenomena The study of 
soaal facts should be undertaken only in accordance with the methods 
of soaology Let us, then, attempt to see the soaal role of religion in 
terms of soaological methods 

Religion divides everything into two categories — the sacred and the 
profane * The thing worshipped and everything connected with it are 
sacred, everything outside of the sacred is profane The fundamental 
principle of religion consists of prohibiting the profane thing from 
approaching or from being in contact with that which is sacred. There 
is an absolute and irreconalable contrast between the two It is the 
greatest sacnlege to bring the profane into contact with the sacred and 
to profane the sacred Besides the other-worldly sanctions behind this 
prohibmon, there are also worldly charismatic sanctions for tt This 
worldly power charged with a mysterious charisma is believed to 

• Showing the other-worldly function of religion » beyond the subject of this essay 
This is the task not of the sociologist but of die theologian and the scholar of fikk 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 187 

strike like lightning those believers who commit sacrilegious acts and 
destroy them. 

On the other hand, the nature of ritual consists of an act of approach 
by the man who is profane to his deity. Thus, ritual can take place 
only when the worshipper cleanses himself from the state of profanity, 
the worshipper himself becomes sacred in order to approach deity 
For this reason, worship consists of two phases: in the first place the 
worshipper tries to extricate himself from the profane things This is 
negative ntual In the second place, the pious who is now outside of 
the profane begins to present his spirit to his deity. This is the positive 
ritual The negative ntual consists of the following acts [in Islam] 
(<j) ablution of the whole body and parts of the body, punfication from 
bodily excrements, cleanliness from menstrual discharges, covering 
pnvate parts of the body, and fasting, (A) turning towards the Ka'ba 
( Kibla ), performing prayers at certain places and times, Starting to do 
things from the right side, (c) prohibiting the utterance of profane 
words and looking around during prayer, wearing the clothes of ihram 
at mikat and prohibiting clothes of luxury, prohibiting adornment by 
cutting hair and nails when in ihram, (d) sacrifice of animals as a symbol 
of self-sacrifice, paying alms ({oAar and . . Jitra), jihad , and pilgrimage 

We can see in these prohibiuons and obligauons, first, certain 
personal organic funcuons and the acts of eating and drinking, secondly, 
the times and places men enjoy (such as houses, places of business and 
of enjoyment which are not places of worship)* thirdly, things that 
men are inclined to do, such as talking, dressing, adorning themselves, 
and, fourthly, things that men are ambitious to do These are all pro- 
fane, in general In other words, anything individual is profane. 
Therefore, the aim of negauve ntual is to isolate the individual from 
his individuality, to elevate him to the status which is ‘the negation of 
individuality’, that is ‘forsaking the world'. Moral uncleanness is 
nothing but the desires of the individual, or individuality, from which 
rituals like abluuon purify him symbolically. Other negauve ntuals 
are also designed to isolate the individual from all desires and ambiuons 
and moral blemishes Man, looked at from a physiological point of 
view, is only an egoistic ammaL To have society, it is, above every- 
thing, necessary to weaken this love for the ego. So long as man 

•There are tacred places, and times in nhich prayers calce pbee — Ka'ia {Mecca], 
KMi {the direction to which the worshipper turns J, mosque, holidays, fasting month, 
Fnday {the Sabbath], hours of prayer The social nature of these will be noted later 



l88 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
remains unable to control his individual desires and egoistic ambiuons 
and so long as he is trained not to be ready to make great sacrifices of 
his individuality, he cannot be ‘civilized by nature’. 

Social hfe imposes several obligations such as observing the rights 
of property, hfe, and honour of others, working and refraining from 
sloth, learning readmg and writing, justice and honesty, paying taxes, 
making sacrifices in times of war, and helping the families of the dead 
and of invalids by certain financial sacrifices These are all irreconcil- 
able with egoistic inclinations To fulfil these dunes, one has to develop 
a will powerful enough to overcome individual ambiuons. In short, the 
individual has to ‘negate’ himself in community before he may ‘sur- 
vive’ in il Regarding everything which has an individual character as 
profane, regarding it as transitory, bad and taboo, neganve rituals arm 
man against temptation He elevates himself to the status of a genuine 
human being by acquiring a will-power to overcome his desires in this 
training school of self-control. In this way, a self-seeking being be- 
comes a sacrificing citizen. It might be argued that if this religious 
policing did not exist, a moral and a legal policing of men would not 
be possible. Negative ntual transforms the individual into a social 
being by a continuous and effecuve training. Thus, even the neganve 
rituals of religion are by themselves important social factors. They are, 
in a sense, nothing but means to attaining positive ntuals 

But certain men of piety seriously take them as ends in themselves. 
These great heroes of faith spend their days in fasting and nights in 
prayer, live in solitude for years, kill their desires by renunciation and 
self-torture, make poverty an object of pnde, renounce property, 
wealth and even, as Ibrahim Edhem did, crown and throne, family and 
children, and train themselves to respond to humiliation and insult 
with kindness and compassion It is neither possible nor without harm 
to make everybody a man of piety, but among every people it becomes 
indispensable to have a limited number of them symbolizing the power 
of character and self-discipline They serve as models for those who 
are weak in will, who strengthen their own morale by seeing what 
miracles an intensified will is capable of performing 
Against this characterization of piety, one might say that the pious 
man is retiring to a purely individual hfe by his withdrawal from 
society Does this not mean that he escapes society and retires to indt- 
viduahty J The answer will be as follows' the solitary escapes from the 
world of business and of enjoyment only as centres of desire and 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 189 

ambition. He deprives himself of the comforts and delights of life, 
such as talking, sleeping, eating, drinking, and of avoidance of pain 
and displeasure. By doing these dungs, he fights against the desires of 
individuality and elevates himself above these desires. It is true that 
this is not sufficient for becoming socialized, but it is an indispensable 
prerequisite. Furthermore, as long as the individual desires remain 
exunguished in his soul, social counterparts may take their place. The 
solitary seeks escape from the earthly plenum in order to reach the 
heavenly one. 

in 

The positive rituals are based on three conditions — they should be 
performed after negauve rituals, they should be performed in a collec- 
tivity; and they should be earned on periodically 

The reason for the pnonty of negauve to posiuve ntual is given 
already. To explain the second condiuon — that is, performance in a 
collecuvity — let us first discuss the effects of the collecuvity upon the 
souL 

When we see that other people do not share a senument or an idea, 
we too do not attach value to il True, we feel or think it, but we do 
not will or believe it as a belief. The individual mind is unable to 
elevate feelings into will, ideas into ideals, or intellectual aiutudes into 
dogmas; it is both quanutauvely and quahtadvely incapable of il It is 
quanutauvely incapable because the mind cannot reach the boiling- 
point, the state of ecstasy, without the inspiration of the collecuvity 
Without reaching this point, intense psychological experiences such as 
determmauon, convicuon, and faith cannot be attained It is qualita- 
tively incapable because our senses can perceive only the material 
qualities of bodies such as colour, smell, taste etc., and are unable to 
perceive good and bad in objects because they lack the 'sense of value’ 
Animals do not have a normative faculty which might enable them to 
form judgments of goodness, sacredness, or reverence Values and the 
faculty of perceiving them exist only where there is social life. 

When a number of individuals commutes a collecuvity, a new 
psychological element which we call the collecuve soul comes into 
existence as a product of interaction between individual souls. The 
collecuve soul is different from the individual soul both quanutauvely 
and quail tamely. When individuals form a collecuvity, a wave of 
excitement and ecstasy begins to invade their souls. You can never see 



190 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
individual psychological states such as insensitivity, indifference, and 
quietism among the individuals in a crowd. Their souls are under the 
captivity of an intense emotion, a deep rapture Such states, further- 
more, are different from individual experiences such as appetite, anger, 
and fear, which sve also find among animals, and are even opposite to 
the collective emotions. Individual emotions work upwards, from the 
oragmsm towards the soul, collective emotions, on the other hand, 
originate in the soul and are new factors commanding organic emouons 
in the soul These emotions are not amoral like bestial emotions They 
are charged with judgments of approval or disapproval, reverence or 
contempt, sanctificauon or condemnauon towards the particular things 
to which they refer As long as the individual is not surrounded by the 
collectivity, he remains m a state of moral indifference. In this state his 
only concern is the avoidance of pain and the search for pleasure He 
has neither an ideal to venerate nor anything to hate. He neither 
sanctifies anything nor condemns anyone He knows neither kindness 
nor enmity. The collectivity, on the other hand, has faith and firmness, 
it is never indifferent. It believes in what it thinks, sanctifies what it 
believes, and condemns those who are against it The collective soul 
knows no scepticism, hopelessness, or pessimism. The faith, hope, and 
optimism which we see in individuals are products of social life. As 
all individuals live in a social environment, no one can escape the 
impacts of the collecuve soul Society creates the personality of the 
individual through its language, literature, traditions, science, law, and 
morals, in short, through its culture The more the individual partici- 
pates in various aspects of social life and the more he specializes in his 
particular occupation, the stronger the personality he will acquire In 
individuals who are deprived of the common and special blessings of 
social life, personality is almost non-existent 

Once these points are understood, it becomes quite easy to explain 
why positive rituals should be performed in collectivity We have 
pointed out above that the ritual means the approach of the profane 
worshipper to the sacred object of worship and that the profane is 
prohibited from approaching the sacred The worshipper first frees 
himself from individuality, that is, from the profane state through 
negauve ntual But for the approach to the sacred this is not enough. 
It is also necessary that he make himself sacred or fill his soul with a 
sanctifying power. We say that this faculty does not exist in the indi- 
vidual state Therefore the reason for the necessity of performing the 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 19I 

ritual m collectivity is the fact that to become sacred it is necessary to 
become social. The -worshipper seeks to reach an audience -with his 
deity, a sacred communion with il To do this, it is necessary, above 
all, to silence the ‘bestial ego' w hich is awake in the soul, and then to 
arouse 'the sacred self which lies in a dormant state. To do the fust it 
is necessary to be freed from individuality, to do the second it is neces- 
sary to come into a state of collectivity It is only when a person frees 
himself from profanity and acquires a sacred nature that he can enter 
into that audience for which he longs so much. 

Posiuve rituals consist (in Islam] of prayers five times a day, teravih 
[Arabic, tarduiA\ prayer [during the fasting month], Friday prayer, 
holy-day (fayram, [Arabic, ’U]) pray ers, and the pilgrimage Of these, 
daily prayers and the teravih prayer may be performed individually 
although, m principle, they are expected to be performed collectively 
Individual performance of them is permissible because the personality, 
as the product of culture, carries a permanent sacredness in the soul. 
The power of sanctity needed for approach to the sacred does exist in 
a person when he is alone, but if isolation from collecuvity continues 
for a longer period, this power may weaken Thus, performance of 
Fnday and holy-day prayers individually is not permitted 

Prayers should, furthermore, be performed in places which are 
consecrated, that is separated from ordinary places. Quite naturally, 
such places are regarded as more sacred than the profane places. 
Places of prayer in Islam are masjuk, mosques (camt [Arabic, yomi‘]), 
great mosques ( cdmi-t kebtr), Ka'ba, and Arajat. In every neighbour- 
hood and village there exists a masjid in which daily prayers and 
teravih prayers are performed. In every district and county there is a 
mosque, m which Fnday and holy-day prayers are performed in 
addiuon to the above. The necessities of life led to the existence of a 
great mosque in every big ary besides the ordinary mosques and, thus, 
a larger meeung-place is provided for Fnday prayers However, there 
is no definite general rule on this, both Fnday and holy-day prayers 
may be performed in the ordinary mosques as well as in the great 
mosques 

Thus, the masjid is the soaal space w here the people of a neighbour- 
hood or a village get together, die mosque is the one w here the people 
of a distnet or county form the congregation, and the great mosque is 
the one where people of a big aty or province form a religious 
collectivity. 



192 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

As the local groups coming together in these places of worship are 
members conscious of belonging to a nation, these gatherings assume a 
national character. The Kaba and the Arafat , on the other hand, bring 
a huge collectivity every >ear from among the able-bodied members 
of the ummet of Islam. AH nationalities within Islam attend these 
gatherings through their representatives. Fasung dunng the month of 
Ramadan is nothing but a negative ritual, preparing for this posiuve 
phase of ntual. The time extending from the end of Ramadan to the 
beginning of the Feast Month of Sacrifice [‘idadha) [about two mondisj 
is the interval in which pilgrims from distant lands may travel to the 
holy place. 

The periodicity of positive ntuals is a fact also necessitated by social 
life. Besides the religious aspect, social life also has economic, aesthetic, 
etc., aspects Individual members of society find enjoyment in eating, 
sleeping, working, leisure, entering legal relauons, etc. There must be 
certain periods of time for prayer so that the people may come together 
at the places of worship Thus, like all social affairs, religious activities, 
too, become periodic and punctual. Every religion has its own calendar. 

We do not need to go into further details to show the social func- 
nons of the posiuve rituals. They simply bring together at certain 
places and at certain times individuals who, because of die necessiues 
of life, have to live scattered and make them convene with each other 
for a holy aim As all kinds of meetings produce a sense of holiness in 
souls, so the meeungs with a holy purpose certainly generate die same 
feeling in a much more intensified manner. The feeling of holiness is 
such an elixir that w e may apdy call it 'sacred power". Any idea touched 
by it turns into a belief, any sentiment into a convicdon It turns the 
sad person into a cheerful one, the pessimist into an optimist, the 
scepuc into a believer. The ‘sacred pow er" makes the coward courag- 
eous, the slothful industrious, the sick healthy, the unmoral virtuous, 
the indifferent an idealist, the weak determined, the egoist altruistic. 
Men who in ordinary times and places seek different gods are brought 
together at national nmes and places by these gatherings to experience 
a national life. 

In short, the social function of ntuals expresses itself as the renuncia- 
tion of individuality, and the social function of positive ntual as die 
fulfilment of nationality. Religion is the most important factor m the 
creation of national consciousness as it unites men through common 
senuments and beliefs. It 1$ because of this that genuinely religious men 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY I93 

are those 'who have national fervour, and that genuine nationalists are 
those who believe in the eternity of faith. 

ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE AND SOCIOLOGY 3 

Human actions may be studied from two points of view; namely, 
from the point of view of uulity and from that of goodness or badness. 
The disciplines which study human actions from the point of view of 
utility and non-utility, such as hygiene, economics, and the science of 
administration, may be called the sciences of management (tadbir 
[T. tedbir]). These disciplines may take different names such as teSir-i 
rufi, tedbir-t menjtl, ttdhin-x Jevlet, depending on the relevance of 
utility and non-uulity to the individual, or the family, or the aty, or the 
state. 

The science that studies human actions according to the criteria of 
goodness or badness is called fikh in Islam Actions which are classified 
on the basis of goodness or badness may be divided into religious ntes 
(menaiik-t hlamtje) and legal relations (hukuk-u Islamtye ) * Thus,_/fW 
contains two sections, Islamic ritual and Islamic jurisprudence. (Since 
the last century the term fikh has been applied to the second section and 
has become almost synonymous with Islamic jurisprudence ) 

The utility or non-uuhty of actions is defined by reason based on 
experience. The goodness or badness of the actions is also defined, 
according to the Mutazilites, by reason. But the goodness or badness 
of an acnon when judged by reason is nothing but its utility or non- 
uulity. To distinguish the utility or non-unhty of an action is some- 
thing different from distinguishing its goodness or badness Good is 
not good because ic is useful, it is good because it is believed to be 
good. It is true that good is also useful from the point of view of 
society. But the usefulness of ihe good is not the cause of the belief in 
its goodness, it is the result of it. Good, when circumscribed by utility, 
ceases to be good It is because of tins fact that good has to be absolute 
and categorical. This observauon is not limited solely to religious 
values, it is true also in die realm of political and nauonal ideals When 
a people tries to revive its language from oblivion, it does not do it 
because of any consideration of utility. It does it because it chenshcs 
its language. A patriot, dying for the sake of his fatherland, does not 

* Since the morality of action* u nothing but jut aspect of these no categories of action 
fkk did not codify ettucs separately as a special branch. 



194 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
believe that the fatherland is merely the place where he gets his daily 
bread. Sometimes thousands of soldiers risk their lives just to keep 
the enemy from getting hold of their flag although there may be 
no actual harm in its being captured by the enemy since it is just a 
piece of cloth. The sun is obviously more useful to men than the moon, 
but m spite of this truth, we conunue to bebeve in the crescent as a 
cherished symbol. When the people prefer the fez or fur cap to the 
hat, they do it not because they think one is more hygienic or cheaper 
than the other, but because these objects symbolize a meaning, a value 
cherished in the national consciousness These examples indicate that 
when we measure sacredness with utility and analyse the cherished 
objects in terms of reason, what we call ‘social conscience’ becomes 
nothing other than ‘practical reason’ ( mudcbbire ). Hy giene or economics 
takes the place of morals when se consider moral values in terms 
of practical interests. 

The rationalist or utilitarian approach to morals, which is rejected 
in contemporary philosophy and sociology, had also been rejected in 
the past by the scholars of Ahl al-sunna According to them, good or 
bad is determined by religion (the ihar'), though it may be compre- 
hensible in terms of reason. The shar' determines the goodness or the 
badness of actions using two criteria. The first is the nass and the 
second 1$ 'urf. The runs is expressed in the Book and ui the Surma, 
while the 'urf is the conscience of the society expressed m the actual 
conduct and living of the community Actions with respect to goodness 
or badness are judged obligatory (incumbent, vajdi) or forbidden 
(haram) in terms of the nass, and as customary (equitable, ma’ruf) 
or rejected (munkar) in terms of the 'urf. The actions that are neither 
obligatory nor forbidden, and neither customary nor rejected, are 
accepted as permissible ( mubak ).♦ 

Yet, the funcuon of 'urf does not consist only in distinguishing 
between actions that are socially accepted and those that are socially 
rejected The hadith ‘ma ra’ aha' l-rrni minuna hasanan fa- kuna' in Ja 
'Uaht 'l-hasanu (what the faithful regard as good is good with God), 
and the maxim of the JHh ‘action according to 'urf is like acung on the 
nass ‘ imply that under necessity ‘urf may take the place of nass. 

Muslims have to obey the commands and prolubmons expressed in 
the nass as they have to command that which is customary ( ma'ruf) 

•The action* classified as commendable (mamLS) and objectionable (matriA) are 
only graduations beraeen those that are obligatory and rejected 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY I9f 

and forbid that which is rejected {munkar) But ihe latter is nothing 
more than those actions which are cherished or rejected by the social 
consciousness. 

Therefore, on the one hand,_/flfcA is based on revelation, and on the 
other, on society. In other words, Islamic shart'a is both divine and 
social. The transmitted principles of fikh are absolute and unchangeable. 
The Holy Kur’an is preserved and the Surma is recorded as far as 
possible The divine part of the shana , being a divine act, is in a 
state of absolute perfection, hence, it is exempt from any evolution or 
progress. The fundamentals of the faith cannot be subject to the law of 
evotuuon like social institutions. Religion is religion when it is believed 
in as free from any defect. A religion ceases to be religion when its 
ultimate principles are believed not to be absolute and unchangeable. 

The social principles of fikh, on the other hand, are subject to the 
transformauons taking place in the forms and structures of society, 
and hence are subject to changes along with society Every 'urfi is 
invariably the ‘urf of a certain social type. A norm which is customary 
in a certain social type may be a norm rejected in another social type. 
Even a glance at history and ethnology will show us that the customs, 
the usages, and folkways do change from time to time and differ from 
society to society. 

It is true that good or bad is not an individual and rational product 
as the mtellectuahsuc philosophers held but is supra-rauonal and social 
as the idcahsuc philosophers hold. But this social and absolute charac- 
ter does not pres ent these norms from being subject to change from 
soaety to society. Social absoluteness cannot be reconciled with being 
conditional, but may be reconciled with rebus lty The soaal absolute- 
ness of a norm implies its being unconditional and categorical in a 
certain soaal type. For example, the laws of a state have an absolute 
character of enforcement within their own territory though the laws 
of different states may not be the same This is so also in the case of 
morality. The goodness or badness of acuons is relative to the type of 
soaety in which they are current. For that reason, the norms have to 
change not only with die changes in ume but also with the transforma- 
tions of die types of the soaeties to w hich they are relative. For example, 
in a tribe the gens is responsible for die actions of the individuals, 
whereas in the avd soaety dus rule cannot be applied. Again, in a 
uibal soaety pnvate aulhonty — that is, the authority of ihe chief of 
the clan — is more powerful than the public authority, that is, the 



Ip6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND -WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
sovereignty of the mbal chief. In cavil society the gens narrows down 
to the family and the tribe grows up to be a state. Through this trans- 
formation the application of this rule would lead to the infringement 
on, and decline in, the public authority -which is the basis of public law. 
Sociology shows us that the family has passed from the stages of the 
maternal clan to the patriarchal and the dual type of family (moiety). 
The families observable today among various peoples belong to either 
one of these types, or to transitory forms. In each type, the legal rela- 
tions between husband, wife, and children differ. Therefore, is it 
possible to subject all of them to the same laws’ As a matter of fact, 
is it not because of this that changes of the rules are allowed to be 
made considering the fact that social types undergo transformation? 

It is true that, in the matters of nass, ijtihad [the exercise of one’s 
own judgment as to w hat the law is in a given matter] is not permissible, 
but in cases where nass docs not exist, acting according to 'urf is like 
acting according to nass According to certain scholars of fikh, if nass 
is the product of ‘urf, ijtihad is permissible in matters of nass too Then 
the scope of urf in fikh becomes more expanded 

From the above discussion we amve at the following conclusion: 
The sources of fikh are two. traditional (ruJJi) than' a, and soaal 
shari' a. But the social shari' a is in a continuous process of 'becoming’, 
like all social phenomena. It follows, then, that that part of fikh is not 
only liable to evoluuon in accordance with social evoluuon, but also 
has to change. The fundamentals of fikh related to nass are eternally 
constant and unchangeable, whereas the social applications of these 
fundamentals which are based on the 'urf of the public and on die 
yma (consensus) of the scholars of fikh have to adapt themsehes in 
accordance with the necessities of life. 

THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE* 

One of the sources of fikh is nass, the other is ‘urf. The first source 
of fikh is conceived with utmost care, and dius there has originated, 
besides the several sciences based on the Kur’an and Hadith, a special 
science called the Fundamentals of Fikh, which show s the ways in w hich 
the provisions of fikh are derived and differentiated from the body of 
nass. Would it not have been possible to make similar careful studies on 
'urf* Would it not have been possible to elaborate a sociological method 
to show how ‘urfhss varied within different soaal groups and changed 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY IJ7 

with the stages of the evolution of these groups, and also to show how 
the variations and evolution in 'urf have influenced fikh itself' 1 It 
w ould be unjust to expect the past centuries to create a science based on 
such studies, since sociology was developed only very recently as a 
positive science 

In every community there is the ‘urf, the by-product of its real legal 
life, which constitutes the living law of the community. It is the norms 
living in the consciousness of the people which interpret, and apply to 
the actual, the formulae written in the law books. It is because of this 
fact that the 'urf, w hich was not at first regarded as an ongmal source of 
fikh, forced itself into being accepted by the fakihs through other means 

The Islamic community first resorted to the Kur’an in its search for 
legal satisfaction But this community was in a process of continuous 
growth and expansion, and it was inevitable that its social life, and 
hence its ‘uifs and customs, should be subject to grave transformation. 
Then, the community, being unable to find an applicable answer in 
this source [Kur’an] for some of the 'urfs which were of almost un- 
limited varieties, had to resort to the tunna and ha&th. Even Imam 
Malik accepted the social traditions of the people of Medina, by assum- 
ing that these were the forms of the tunna diffused among the people 
(sunnet‘1 But w hen the endless necessities of life which had been 

covered by 'urf in the past raised questions that proved to be un- 
answered even in these sources, ijma and qtyas were resorted to. At 
the same time the Great Imam [Abu Haiufa] realized that the 'urf 
should be taken as an independent source, and he established the rule of 
approbation (istihsan), which consisted of preferring the practices most 
expedient to the public, to qiyai. And Imam Abu Yusuf formulated 
the following rule. ‘When a nasi and an ‘urf differ from each other in a 
particular situation, the ‘urf is to be preferred if the runs was derived 
from 'urf 

There has been only one scholar of fikh who did not accept the ‘urf 
and the ijtihaj, and who accepted no principle other than that of the 
acceptance of the ostensible ($ahtr) meaning of the nasi He was 
Davud bin 'Ah, the imam of the Zahiri sect. This sect, which denied 
the necessities of life, receiv ed a punishment deserving of its attitude 
— that is, it was not accepted by life. Thus, in spite of all the efforts of 
some persons who sere seeking fame by attempting to revive the 
Zahiri sect, it could not survive anywhere and left almost no irate of 
its influence. 



ip8 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

It is seen, therefore, that as ijtihaJ was bom from ihe need for 
adaptation to the 'urf, so the growth and differennanon of fikh vent 
hand in hand with the development and differentiation of the 'urf- In 
order to write the history of fikh, it is necessary to know the 'urf of the 
Muslim peoples. Yes, the Islamic shari'a is the tree of Tula which has 
its roots in the heavens, but the raison d'etre of this tree is to hve in an 
earthly environment and atmosphere, and to get its air, heat, and light 
from the soaal ‘uif to satisfy the avil needs It cannot be said that this 
tree, after giving fruits during some centuries, does not need to get its 
food any more. Those who believe that the Islamic short a will 
remain the s hart' a of every age to the last have to accept the fact that 
the tree should always be living and fruitful A law which does not 
live and give life cannot be the regulator of life It is evident, therefore, 
that there must be soaal fundamentals as well as dogmatic funda- 
mentals of fikh It remains for the scholars of fikh and the sociologists 
of our time to elaborate this branch of knowledge which has so far 
been neglected I say scholars of fikh and soaologists because the job 
cannot be done by either group alone. This science cannot be 
established without the co-operauon of the tw o. 

The various forms of expression of the ’urf, are public opinion, mores, 
customs, usages, and tradition. The consensus of the scholars o (fikh 
and the negauve decisions of the shura are a kmd of expression of the 
‘urf too We may question even sociologically whether unbroken 
tradition ( tavatur ) is also free from the negating influence of the ‘urf. 

We have, therefore, first, to classify and define saentihcally the 
vanous forms of ‘urf Secondly, ue have to define the moral, legal, and 
poliucal aspects of the ‘urf and discover the differences between them. 
Thirdly , as in studying other natural phenomena, w e must study ‘urf 
to see if there are certain and necessary laws according to which its 
changes and evolution operate 

European soaologists show by the comparative methods ofethnol- 
ogy, history, and stausucs that under 'similar soaal conditions* certain 
moral and legal institutions and certain religious beliefs assume certain 
soaal patterns and that where identical forms of soaal life e*ist» there 
is a development towards identical institutions. It has even been 
demonstrated that in societies of the same type, even the secondary 
customs and usages show complete similarity in spite of the fact that 
these societies have been so remote from each other both temporally 
and spatially as to preclude any possibility of contact. The uniformity 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY I99 

of this similarity observed between the institutions which belonged to 
the same social type is the best proof of the existence of the law of 
determinism in social life. Certain of our 'ulama have regarded the 
natural laws which are observable in natural phenomena as the s wma 
of God. Is it not compatible with religious feelings to extend this 
understanding to the natural determinism observable in the natural 
laws of society? 

If social consciousness, moral beliefs, legal usages, and political 
opinions of peoples and nations are dependent on natural laws which 
are independent of individual will yet governing them, what can be 
the power which establishes these sunna and the laws other than the 
eternal purpose * Therefore, does not ‘urf too have a divine nature in 
an implicit and figurative sense, if not in an actual and open way-* 
Imam Abu YGsufsays, ‘If now is derived from ‘urf, then ‘urf is prefer- 
able’. Therefore, is it not possible to say that the nass relative to 
temporal affairs and social life is a derivative of the ‘urf> When we 
accept social determinism and the uniformity of social phenomena as 
the expression of the way of God, it becomes natural to regard this 
divine sunna as the basis of the nass relating to the social life 

Yet, the sociology of the sources of fikh, although studying the social 
origins of fikh, can in no way claim to replace the science of fikh In the 
same way, nass also never claimed to hold such a monopoly over fikh. 
The funcnons of tfta and qada are not the business of the scholars of 
the sources of fikh, but of the scholars of fikh whose duty it is to apply 
the rules of the fikh As to the scholars of the sources of fikh, they have 
two functions: to lead the scholars of fikh in the field of the nass on the 
one hand, and in the field of sociology on the other The scholars of 
fikh cannot dispense with either of these methods. 

RELIGION AND LAW* 

In a pnmiuve society every person is required to satisfy all his needs 
by himself In advanced societies, on the other hand, each person per- 
forms the work in which he is trained The factor that relieves people 
from doing se\eral jobs is what we call social division of labour 
Now , why should this principle, which is accepted in every sphere of 
life, not be applied tn religious life * Are branches of [religious] teaming 
so simple as to be mastered by every person without having specialized 
training* Why should there not be trained specialists in religion who 
would master religious knowledge, with all its sublimity and pro- 



200 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
fluidity? Are matters of the propagation of faith, religious education, 
and piety so insignificant as to be left to the private inraame of 
ordinary persons 3 

It is observed that soldiers drafted from Anatolian villages are piti- 
fully ignorant of their religion This is due to the fact that the job of 
teaching religion is believed to be within any person’s competence. 
As a consequence, a special religious organization has not developed 
to handle religious teaching properly. 

It is true that there were religious institutions in Islam. But, as «e 
[Muslims] always tended to combine things rather than divide them, 
these institunons assumed several functions at the same time, in spite 
of the fact that Islam, from the beginning, had differentiated matters of 
piety (diyaiut [Arabic tiiyanaA]) from the affairs of jurisprudence (kop 
[Arabic qada\) From the earliest centuries the office of the mufti and 
of the qadl nere separately established to issue judgments relating to 
matters of piety and of law respectively. The Great Imam [Abu Hands], 
who was in his time the mufti of the umma, persistently refused to 
accept any appointment as the supreme judge, and he even risked his 
life for this cause. He believed that the two offices could not be united 
in one person. 

Piety and the matter of jurisprudence are so different from each 
other that in several cases the same dung may be impermissible from 
the point of view of piety jet possible from a judicial point of view. 
For example, taking interest is not permissible from the point of view 
of piety, whereas it is permissible through dawr-i thar'l [the method of 
pajing interest by a fictitious transfer]. The tight to sue may become 
null and void by the lapse of time but never from the point of view of 
piety. To bequeath to an heir is not permitted by piety, but it is judi- 
cially practised through [the principle of] disposal of possession (jwfy^i 
mulk) or the principle that an heir may be appointed as trustee for the 
property bequeathed to notable righteous persons. Likewise, hulla is 
not permissible by piety, but it is practised through judicial ways. 
Polygamy is impermissible by piety because there is no possibility of 
righteousness, and its impossibility for the common people is con- 
firmed by the Kur’an, jet polygamy was permitted by the judiciary. 
Divorce is the most hated of what is permissible (fabghai at-kalal) for 
piety, but was not restricted [in law] by any negauv e condition. 

These examples show that piety and judical judgment are different 
things. When a judgment is demanded from a mufti, to which should 



his judgment refer* Undoubtedly it would refer to the provisions of 
piety. The decree of the qddl, on the other hand, is a judicial judgment 
Obviously these two things are not the same. When the Great Imam 
[Abu Hanifa) avoided uniung the two functions in his person, he was 
acting so righteously that it was for him worthwhile to risk his life. 
The following verse shows the necessity of the existence of a class 
of men charged with the duty of dissemination of faith. ‘The believers 
should not march forth altogether, and the believers should not all go 
out to fight. Of every troop of diem, a party only should go forth, 
diat they (who are left behind) may gam sound knowledge in religion, 
and that they may warn their people when they return to them that 
they may beware’ [Kur’an, IX, 122, Pickthall's trans.] From the 
beginning there w ere persons charged with the duty of the dissemina- 
tion of religion, such were muftis, teachers, shaikhs, imams, khatifc, 
preachers, and pilgrimage guides. 

If these ever become organized as an orderly religious organizauon 
under a Ministry of Pious Affairs, we may be sure that the funcuon of 
religious teaching wall be fulfilled everywhere in the World of Islam 
Why should die principle of division of labour not be applied in this 
sphere of life too 9 A person may be a specialist in jurisprudence, but 
may not be in religion, and sice versa. Why should the same persons 
combine the two competences in themselves? Even if we accept that 
they do, still it is absolutely impermissible to charge them with the 
two functions which are irreconcilable in one person at the same time. 

Piety has to do with diat aspect of life that is sacred, and it is not 
permissible to mix eardily considerauons with it, such as expediency, 
concession, and casuistry. The legal aspect of life, on die other hand, 
lias to be subjected to economic, hygienic, technical, and many other 
secular considerauons 

The reason for our lagging behind other nauons in religious heed- 
fulness lies in the backwardness of our judicial methods and pracuces 
in spue of the utmost perfecuon of the principles of our religion. It is 
because of die confusion of the two dungs diat those who are dissatis- 
fied widi judicial conditions become unfaithful to religion in the long 
run. Whenever these two dungs are mixed, each becomes harmful to 
die odier, because their respective foundations sen e different purposes. 
When mufas issue their religious judgments and qaJis perform their 
judicial functions separately, both will succeed m maintaining the punty 
and integrity of their own fields. 



102 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

A wise man once said that the expression ‘differences in community 
of the nass saying, 'the differences in my community are a blessing to 
it’ ( ikhttlaf ummati rahmatuhu ) implied division of labour and special- 
ization, and it seems to be a justifiable interpretation If it is so, let us 
pray to God to bestow that blessing upon us. 

STATE and RELIGION* 

The discussions that took place in the annual convention of the 
[Party of] Union and Progress have given expression to a sincere con- 
tention that Islam can be reconciled with modem civilization. 

There have been men in Turkey who have held this view. Especially 
Namik Kemal and Cevdet Pa$a should be mentioned among them. 
There is, however, another group which believed the contrary. 
According to the latter group, Islam would neither be reconciled with, 
nor would u ever adapt itself to, contemporary civilization. 

It is interesting to note that each group contained within itself two 
factions which represented certain diametrically opposite views. 
Theoretically, both started with similar premises but arrived, in prac- 
nce, at entirely contradictory conclusions. One of these factions we 
may call ‘the zealots of Europeamsm’, and the other ‘ihe zealots of 
scholasticism’ 

The first believed that, as the principles of Islam cannot be recon- 
ciled with contemporary civilization, we have to drop them altogether 
and adapt ourselves, m a material as well as in a spiritual sense, to 
European civilization. The second believed that as the bases of Islam 
are irreconcilable with contemporary civilization, the latter civilization 
ought to be rejected in toto in order to maintain the existing traditions. 

It is obvious that both views are entirely blind to the facts. People 
can neither entirely drop the rthgion they ho\d sacred, nor can they 
dispense with the necessities of contemporary civilization. Reason 
demands, not that one be sacrificed at the expense of the other, but that 
an attempt be made to reconcile the two. 

Unfortunately, the leaders of Tany/nat did not follow this latter 
course when they initiated die drive towards modernization. In their 
reforms diey wanted to modernize the Ottoman state, but because of 
their mistaken interpretations, they reduced the state to an inorganic 
condition and divested it of its Islamic form altogether. 

The first mistake they made was their belief that the Caliphate of 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 20J 

Islam and the Islamic states ere different things -which disregarded the 
fact that the Caliph was actually the temporal head of the state and that 
the organization of the Caliphate corresponded to the organization of 
the state. 

As can be seen in Mawardi's Ahkam al- Sulfamyya, the Sultanate is a 
function of the sovereignty of the Caliph and cannot be separated from 
it. Thus, contrary to the conception of the leaders of the Tanqimat, 
Caliphate and Sultanate are not two separate functions united tn one 
person The Grand Vizir was not an unconditional deputy of the 
Sultan, who was believed to be independent of the office of Cahphacy, 
but was actually the unconditional deputy of the Caliph, and the 
imperial seal that he earned was the seal of the Caliph, as was the case 
among the Abbasi Caliphs To assume that the Shatkh-ul- Islam was 
the unconditional deputy of the Caliph, and to attribute to him a 
spiritual leadership comparable to that of lhe Pope, is a grave mistake 
from the point of view of the shart'a 

The second mistake of the leaders of T animal was their acceptance 
of two kinds of judiciary To them. Sultanate and Caliphate, though 
united in one person, were two independent authorities each having 
separate judicial functions— one delegated to the office of the Shaikh- 
ul- Islam as the deputy of the Caliph, and the other to the Grand Vizir 
as the Sultan's deputy Following this assumption in 1 836, they placed 
the qadi-asken and the qddt of Istanbul under the office of Shaikh-ul- 
Isldm and, as the shar'i qddls were under the qadi-askers , the office of 
Shaikh-ul-I tldm became the highest [judicial] office. In the past, how- 
ever, these judges had always been under the office of Grand Vizir, 
because in Islam there were not two kinds of judiciary and die funcuons 
of 1 fta and qadd could not be united m the same person Judicial pow er 
was the exclusive right of the Caliph and the absolute deputy of the 
latter was the Grand Vizir. Qadis were the Caliph's delegates, and 
exercised judicial funcuons on his behalf. Therefore, they were selected 
and appointed by the Caliph’s deputy Muftis [who exercised the func- 
tion of tfta\, on the other hand, were not officers of the Cabph. They 
were simply announcers ( mubalhgh ) of the commandments of God 
Consequently, their office was too lofty to be subjected to a higher 
earthly authority. The funcuons of tfid and qadd could not be joined m 
one person, and it was for this reason that the Great Imam Abu Hanifa 
and Zenbilli Alt, the Shatkh-ul-ltldm of Selim I, did not accept the 
appointment to die office of the highest judiaary These examples 



204 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
show sufficiently how lofty and saaed was the office of ifia in Islam. 

As both mufti and qadi v ere guided by ihe law of fikh, why should 
this difference in status between the two exist? The reason is that the 
fikh contained provisions with regard to both piety and justice, and 
that qadis tv ere charged with the execution of the judicial pro- 
visions while the muftis were conveyers of religious injunctions on 
behalf of God Religious injunctions impose religious obhganons 
whose sanctions are exclusively other-worldly, whereas judicial injunc- 
tions are backed only by earthly sanctions Therefore, judicial injunc- 
tions, although sail rebgious, constitute an independent category out- 
side of the injunctions concerning matters of piety. They are what we 
today call law. Thus, in Islam law refers to the provisions of religion 
(Jin), but not to those of piety (dtyanei). All injunctions of religion are 
one in nature, but owing to die separation between earthly and other- 
w orldly sanctions, they are necessarily divided into these two categories. 
As the qadi is charged with the task of maintaining an earthly order 
and with the fulfilment of social needs in general, he has to take the 
various expediencies of life into consideration. 

Thus, the qadi had to judge or accept judgments on various matters 
whose execution was not permissible from the point of view of piety. 
For example, charging interest is not permissible from the point of 
view of piety at all, because all Muslims are brothers and exacting 
interest from brothers is something to be morally condemned in every 
nauon The qadi, on the other hand, was forced by the necessities of 
social life to permit this absolutely impious act when, under the name 
of rtbh-i mulqam (unavoidable interest), he had to lend at interest the 
funds deposited for orphans. Likewise, while it was not permissible to 
bequeath to an heir (Id wanyya bi al-waniA), the qadi ga\e implicit 
permission under the principle of ‘the disposal of property’. Contem- 
porary judicial expediencies forced them to regard intoxicating drinks 
as mal-i mutaqawwtm [a commodity capable of legal ownership and 
transfer], but this compulsory acceptance did not imply acceptance of 
intoxicating dnnks as lawful objects from the point of view of piety. 

Urnung fid and qaid under the same office and having the judicial 
decrees of the shaii'a courts ratified by the if a has giv en rise to the 
impression that things permitted judicially are also permissible from 
the point of view of piety. This is harmful from the point of view of 
morality and piety Islam has manifested its moral sublimity in its 
injunctions of piety. Judicial injunctions are nothing but acts of 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAUILY 20* 

tolerance on behalf of religion in accordance Math the necessities of 
time. When the Prophet said: ‘ Buiihtu bdhamfyyati-s-semka (‘I was 
sent with a straightforward and the most generous faith'), he meant 
that the provisions of piety were hanif (straightforward) and the judicial 
toleration was samih (generous). The hamfs are those who act in 
accordance Mich the religious commands given by the mufti, and the 
sanuhs are those who benefit from the implicit permission of the qadl 
The tasawwuf calls the first ahl-i afimtt [men resolved to act according 
to law without concession] and the second ahl-i rukhfat [men of con- 
cession] The right of the claimant may become null and void by for- 
feit, but the right itself is not nullified. 'The man of concession’ may 
refrain from paying his debts on the basis of such a judicial permission, 
whereas ‘the man of resolution' does not hesitate to pay such a debt 
in compliance with the faiwa which demands that which is due from 
the pious. 

To idenufy morality with law is a sign of moral decline in a nation, 
and again, in the same manner, to identify piety with legality indicates 
ethical decadence Putting the short a courts under the office of Shaikh- 
ul-Islam has given nse to this lamentable consequence Seeing that this 
office became an authority based on the earthly sanctions of coercion 
like those of the judiciary, the people began to disregard other-worldly 
sancuons As the office of i/tJ began to handle matters of judiciary and 
undertook the task of ratify ing judicial decrees, die idea that the short a 
was nothing but the judicial judgments became a firm belief among the 
people. The multiplicity of the judicial authorities undermined the 
safety of the provisions of piety and gave nse to the belief that Cali- 
phate and Sultanate were separate authorities. This led some people to 
believe that there were two kinds of Islamic government in this 
country. Under the impression of such a belief, there are not a few 
persons who think that Islam is a religion with two governments, as is 
Catholicism. The erroneous interpretations of the men of T animat 
have been responsible for these unsound beliefs so that gradually the 
state lias ceased to be an Islamic state. 

Was this policy necessitated by their efforts to modernize the state’ 
It will be shown below that, on the contrary, they made the state even 
less modem. 

The aim of a modem state is to unite all its organs within its own 
organization by legal ties in order to make them organs of public 
service or of private associations. In modem states public services are 



zofi TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
incorporated into official departments of the go\ eminent. Private 
associations are constituted in accordance with the laws of the state 
and with the authorizing permission of the state. Thus, their existence 
does not infringe on the political authority of the state. In a state where 
this policy is not followed, associations and organizations tend to 
establish their own authority over their members, and actually tend to 
become states within the state. The sociological criterion indicating the 
existence or non-existence of a political authority m any organization 
is the existence or non-existence of a judicial authority. When a social 
group is in a position to exercise the judicial function, it is vested with 
political authority and thus possesses something which is peculiar only 
to the sate. 

It is known that before the period of Tan^imat, foreign embassies 
and Christian Orthodox patriarchates had judicial rights and they 
exercised a kind of political authority thus We cannot blame the sates* 
men of the Tanpmat for these ancient deviations. However, they 
accepted them as reasonable and legitimate and, furthermore, they 
themselves attempted to create a similar situation ev en for die Muslims. 
Thus, instead of abolishing or diminishing these deviations, they 
furthered and strengthened them 

To understand the Taa^tmamxs' view of government, it suffices to 
discuss the meanings of two terms which they introduced into the 
vocabulary of government, namely ‘community’ [Cerrumt in Turkish 
usage, mdkt in Western publications] and 'affairs of cult’. To under- 
stand the first, let us look at the groups which correspond to these 
communities’ in Europe. We find, for example, Protestant and Jewish 
eongregations living in France, or Russian and American nauonats 
living in Pans. However, neither these non-Cathohc Churches nor 
these foreign nationals are of the same nature as these so-called ‘com- 
munities . The communities’, native or foreign, which existed in 
Turkey enjojed political powers, legal immunities, and ev en a pobucal 
authority none of which was possessed by those communities in 
ranee. Protestants, Jews, Russians, or Americans in France are under 
die exdusiv e jurisdiction of the sate of France in all their legal dealings. 
And thw is not peculiar only to France or ev en to Europe. It is the same 
everywhere wherever a modem sate exists, including Japan. 

It follows, then, that in modem sates there cannot exist any organ- 
izauon of the nature of these ‘commuames’. It is one of the truisms of 
public law to see them e.ther as organs of public sendee or as private 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 207 

associations. The statesmen of Tan{imat were not follow ers of this 
pnnaple. For them, the Ottoman state was not a pohncal community 
made up of citizens, but a confederation made up of ‘communities’. 
Since they assumed that under the headship of the Caliph there existed 
a 'community* of Muslims like those of the native or foreign ‘communi- 
ties’, therefore this confederauon of ‘communities’ did not seem to them 
anything unreasonable. The Sultan, from their point of view, would 
be the suzerain of the confederauon and the Caliph, the Greek Patriarch 
or foreign ambassadors w ould be his vassals. But as the Sultan was at 
the same time the Caliph, they believed tliat the nghr of precedence of 
the Muslim ‘community’ had been guaranteed by this policy 

This conception of ‘communities’, each vested with a partial auton- 
omy, which was held by the statesmen of the Tarvpmat was, according 
to them, a result of their respect for the pnnaple of religious freedom. 
They called these groups ‘religious communities’, and the legal pro- 
visions by which these ‘communities’ were vested with autonomy, 
they called provisions of 'the affairs of cult’ Thus, judiaal matters 
with respect to the family, for example, became matters of cult and not 
of law 1 All scholars agree that rules having judicial sancuons are legal 
tides. Of the nutters t elating to family, those which are not brought 
before the judge, or those which do not necessitate any judicial sanc- 
tion, aie not matters of law. Among them, those w hich are based on the 
sanctioning power of public opinion are matters of morality and those 
w Inch are backed by other-worldly sancuons are matters of piety The 
statesmen of the Tan^imat called these matters umur-u me\hebiyt 
(affairs of cult), exploiung the ambiguity of the word me[ktb [Arabic 
madbkab\. This word, how ei er, means exactly w hat the w ord 'Joanne' 
means in French. The meikeb of an imam refers to a doctrine of JikJi. 
For urruir-u meffiebi) t the French use the term affaires culm tiles, as they 
also use the name minute res Jes cuius for the ministry of meffieb%. 
As the w-ord for cult in Islam is ‘ibaJa, the coned translations would be 
umur-u (a 'abbuliye and ibaJat najareti respectively. The first means 
nothing but umur-u Jijaruyc (affairs of piety). Freedom of religion 
should mean freedom in the affairs of worship or piety. In order to 
realize this freedom, it is not necessary to create political commumnes 
out of communities of cult or to unest them with legal privileges. 
Ah Paya, on e of the leading statesmen of the period of Taniynae, 
found nothing objectionable in granting the Armenians the nght to 
have a kind of ‘national assembly’ and ‘nauonal consutuuon’, in 



208 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

addition to the already existing privileges of the Armenian 'com- 
munity'. 

One of the logical consequences of the Tanpmanst view was the 
idea of establishing a Muslim 'community’ alongside the others As a 
first step towards this end, thari'a courts were connected with the office 
of Shaikh-ul-Islam. The projects to establish Muslim ‘communities' 
were to constitute the second step. Happily the only one, constituted 
in Edtme, was never extended to other provinces. As we have seen 
above, these communities had, in fact, a political character. In other 
words, they were, so to speak, pseudo-states As our state was an 
Islamic state under the Caliphate, there would be another Islamic 
state under the name of the Muslim 'community' — a situation full of 
grave inconveniences. Besides the inevitable clashes that were likely 
to anse between these two Islamic organizations, there was a soil 
greater danger because, by our own example, we should have formally 
recognized and confirmed the legitimacy of the external and internal 
Capitulations. 

Although this project of organizing a Muslim ‘community’ was 
never materialized, something else was done w hich was equally harm- 
ful in addition to the judicial function of the state, another judicial 
function was created for the office of fatwa. It was believed that accept- 
ing the duality of the judicial office and identify mg the affairs of piety 
with those of the judiciary were in accordance with the principles of 
Islam. Thus, the Islamic state could never have become a modem 
state, confirming a claim put forward by certain European scholars, 
and consequently could never be independent internally or externally. 
We should have had no nght to abolish the Capitulations. However, 
there were further consequences. As is known, the Ministry of Justice 
is enutled to submit laws to the Legislative Assembly whenever it deems 
any law unsatisfactory or contrary to the demands of contemporary 
life. By accepting these proposed Bills as a whole or with modifications, 
a continuous improvement of the laws is guaranteed. The same need 
was also recognized in the office of ifta. The procedure accepted by this 
office under such a condiuon was as follows, in case a judgment, 
believed to be m accord with the needs of the time, was not found 
existing in the HanafitejfLi, it was compared with either other disputed 
opinions of the Hanafites or other doctrines of the four schools of 
jurisprudence. It was finally decided on the basis of the principle that 
it is necessary to follow whatever the head of the believers commands 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 20 $ 

in questions subject to gtthaJ’, and was subnutted for the ratification 
of the Caliph. This procedure, which was the result of connecting the 
ihari'a courts to die office of tfta, is in accordance neither with the 
Constitution nor with skarVa. It was not in accordance with the first 
because, since the decrees of the Caliph are of the nature of law, the 
procedure necessarily leads to the promulgation of laws not passed by 
the Legislauve Assembly. And it was not in harmony with than a 
because the ftd authority is not \ested in the Caliph but lies in the nass 
whose interpreters and conveyors are the muftis. As an ijuhdd cannot 
abrogate other tjtthads, the decree of the Caliph cannot force a mufti to 
comply with it. 

As the decree of the Chief Administrator is of the nature of law, and 
as die qadts are the delegates of die Caliph, his decrees are incumbent 
only upon the qadts Therefore, preferring one judgment to another on 
questions that are subject to tjtthad is a procedure already followed by 
the legislauve authority m its enactment of laws and has nothing to do 
with matters of tfta In short, the acceptance of such a procedure has 
given rise, on the one hand, to the practice of submitting the rauficauon 
of the fatwa to the Head of the Believers, which is contrary to the 
than' a, and, on the other hand, to the anu-consutuuonal practice of 
allowing the office of fatwa to legislate laws directly and without the 
knowledge of die government or of the Legislauve Assembly 

Another consequence of this system of a muluple judiciary that 
aggravated die situauon further was the non-existence of a codified 
than' a law, because whenever a case came before the court, the 
judicial ruling for die case was sought by the court from the office of 
fatwa. Tlus fatwa is a kind of law applicable only retrospeem ely, 
whereas die provisions of modem codes of law are applicable only to 
future cases and die right to prepare such laws is reserved exclusively 
by die legislative body. By issuing such laws, the office of fid peiforms 
a legislauve act according to one opinion, and acts as a legal counsel 
according to another But the latter is absolutely prohibited, as the 
conversation — recorded in the Yearbook of Atatkikhat—v. hich took 
place between Selim I, one of our greatest Caliphs, and Zcnbilh All, 
one of our greatest Shaikh-ul-lslams, shows the way in which matters 
of piety should be differentiated from those of the judiciary 7 As to the 
legislauve funcuon of the office of the tfta, we have already shown that 
it is contrary to the consntuuotul regime. An addmonaJ drawback to 
the system of a muluple judiciary follows from the fact that avil and 



210 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
shan'a courts issue different and even contradictory decrees on the 
same issues, and thus throw the government into uncertainty. 

Al! of these effects which we have enumerated so far are compatible 
neither with the modem state nor with the Islamic state The affairs of 
piety and those of the judiciary constitute different areas of public 
service in a state They should be taken care of by independent mini- 
stries As the Ministry of Jusuce deals with judiaaJ affairs, all the 
judicial organs should necessarily be connected with this Ministry; 
and as the office of the Shatkh-ul-Islom is the Ministry of Affairs of 
Piety, the complete administration of religious affairs should be given 
to tlus sublime office The sharia courts together with the Board of 
Shan'a Affairs and the organizations of the Qadt-asker should be 
attached to the Ministry of Justice, but neither their activities nor their 
organizauon should be changed Already Clause 118 of the Constitu- 
tion makes it clear that the provisions of fikh should be the basis of the 
preparauon of laws in general, and the scholars of law admit that legal 
provisions concerning the family, in comparison with other fields of 
legal provision, are, comparatively, more deeply bound by tradmon. 

The good results of the institutional separauon of affairs of piety 
from those of the judiciary will not be simply a better distribution of 
justice Its greatest advantage will be rather with regard to matters of 
piety The office of the Shatkh-iJ-Islam, which so far has had no time 
to be interested in matters of piety because of its preoccupation with 
material affairs, such as the interest transactions on the property of 
orphans and the administration of the ahhyya courts , will then be freed 
from such non-essential activities and will be able to look after ‘the 
care of our other-w orldly affairs’, as Ah Zenbilh has put it, and to 
care for the necessary religious education of the people of Islam. 

The affairs of piety, wluch will be the supreme religious task of the 
office of the Mashikhat of Islam, consist mainly of tw o things — matters 
of belief and matters of worship f'tbadd) Worship in Islam may be 
performed at anyplace, that which should be earned out in a congrega- 
tion takes place only in the mosques The inculcauon of the beliefs 
and the education about the ntes of prajer are based on knowledge 
(‘ifoi) and earned through experience (hal). The centres of the first are 
medreses, and of the latter, convents It seems, therefore, that the 
mosque, the medrese, and the convent are three basic Islamic institu- 
tions which will be administered by the Mashikhat These institutions 
so far have been administered by the Ministry of Evkaf ( awkaf ). But 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 211 

this ministry, being a kind of Ministry of Finance, can administer only 
their material and financial affairs Matters of learning and of education 
have been entirely neglected by it With the administration of these 
religious affairs by the Mashikhat, there will certainly be a new develop- 
ment in the affairs of piety, because this office has two supreme councils 
composed of men who have authority on matters of Islamic learning 
and education which did not exist in the Ministry of Evkaf One of 
these councils is the Board of Fatwa (fetva emaneti ) w hich is an academy 
of Ftkft, and the Other is the Board of MashayikA ( 'Meclis-i-MtfayiA ) 
which is a kind of academy of tasawwuf If, in addition to these, a 
Board of Mutakallimin (Meclts-i Muttktlhmm ) is instituted as an 
academy of kaldm, a complete Learned Council of Religious Studies will 
be obtained by amalgamating these three boards 

Since Islam is a religion based on learning and enlightenment, its 
guides in matters of piety should be men of learning and wisdom 
( I'ulamS and ' urafa ) Whenever we look for the organization of piety 
in Islam, which is free from such (tid'd) institutions as priesthood and 
spiritual government, it is found exclusively in the organizations of 
teaming In Islam religion is nothing but a form of intellectual en- 
lightenment For Muslims, the mufti is nothing but an erudite scholar 
in fikh, the mutakallim a doctor, a scrutinizing student of Islamic 
beliefs, and the shatkji a sage (an/) who has insight into matters of 
conscience Thanks to this superior feature of Islam, we may regard 
these boards as academies of piety. 

Three other departments are needed in the Mashikhat in addition 
to these boards for the administration of the mosques, of the medreses, 
and of die convents The department now called the Department of 
Instructions corresponds to the second of these three, but for each of 
the others none exists because, until now, appointments to positions 
such as those held by the professors of religious seminaries (mudarns), 
the prayer leaders (imams), the sermon readers (khaui%), and the chief 
shaikh of consents ( postmshin ) were made by the Ministry of Evkaf 
As the Mashikhat did not appropriate these tasks to itself, it was not 
equipped by the department to handle them. 

Let us now survey the unfortunate consequences of the failure to 
include these funcuons under the Mashikhat As the Ministry of Evkaf 
was a purely financial admmistraaon, it could not deal adequately 
eidicr with the training of the ministers and preachers in their proper 
tnsuoiuons of learning or with appointments to proper positions. One 



212 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
can calculate the unfortunate consequences of tins failure from the 
experiences of the army officers in charge of training new conscripts. 
According to their reports, most of the soldiers coming from the villages 
do not know their mt^hth or even the name of the Prophet. But this 
religious ignorance is not peculiar to the peasants You will find the 
same state of ignorance amongst the poorer classes of the towns and 
ernes How can such a grave state of religious ignorance be allowed to 
reign in a religion whose basis is learning 3 

One of the groups for whose training no special care was taken is 
the teachers of religion m the {secular] schools. The position of these 
teachers before the young students who have learned something about 
mathematical and positive sciences is really tragic. These persons, 
utterly unable to give reasonable and logical answers to the questions 
asked by students, do nothing but say, ‘Shut up, you infidels!' and 
thereby degrade their religion before the eyes of the younger genera- 
tion The youngsters cannot understand tliat what has failed before 
their quesuons is not the religion of Islam itself but the teacher of 
religion. Thus, the teacher’s ignorance gives rise to a shaking of the 
faith in the students. The decline of religious beliefs in the schools is 
due not to an insoluble conflict between the Islamic faith and posmve 
science, but to the utter incompetence of the teachers of religion. A 
religion like Islam, which is based on reason in metaphysics and on ‘ urf 
in sociology, cannot be in conflict with posiuve sciences. In addinon 
to the incompetence of the teachers of religion, a condition which has 
favoured disorganization in religious teaching in schools is the inade- 
quacy of the religious text-books These books should be written only 
by genuine scholars The training of ministers and preachers and of 
qualified teachers of religion in die secular schools as well as the 
preparation of scholarly books on faith and worship — all these could 
be handled adequately by die AlashMat 
The damage created by the dissociation of the Mashikhat from the 
matters of piety was not confined only to the growth of ignorance in 
religion and to the decline of faith Another consequence has been a 
decreasing parucipauon ui the performance of religious worship and a 
diminishing attendance at the mosques Is nothing going to be done to 
counteract this trend 3 Would an honest and sympadieuc minister, an 
eloquent reader of Kkutba , a wise preacher, a mu’a^in, and a k afc 
with good voices to make the call to prayer and to reate the Kur’an 
not increase the number of attendants 3 Is it not possible in this age of 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 213 

hygienic appliances to build running-water facilities so that ablution 
might be taken comfortably and to have clean prayer-grounds un- 
touched by wet socks ? Today there are several measures demanded to 
be taken by modem hygienic, aesthetic, and rauonal standards. Not 
only are there no religious prohibitions against these, but also they 
imply several materia] and spiritual benefits. With the use of electric 
bulbs in Istanbul die mosques look more hygienic and more aesthetic- 
ally pleasing It is obvious that the application of such measures, 
decided by adequate and competent authorities, will help to increase 
the attendance at the mosques These could be planned and applied 
only by a supreme authority which wrould have matters of piety as its 
sole concern, and this supreme authority can be no other than the 
Mashikhat. This authority must educate functionaries such as ministers, 
preachers, and readets of Khutba as welt as the muftis, the piofessors of 
the medrese s, and experts in religious knowledge in order to give a 
proper onentauon to matters of piety. Professional and specialized 
medrese s, therefore, should be established to educate them In addition 
to the exisung medrese s, specialized schools to educate preachers, 
sermoners, muezzins, and Kur’an reciters, and the leaders of the 
religious orders, should be established. And finally, a school which 
would be on a higher level than the others for educating medrese pro- 
fessors should be opened The latter medrese should contain depart- 
ments of Arabic Studies, tafsir, hadith, Kalam, and fikh. 

One more funcuon of the MashikAat of Islam should be to make the 
tarikats a social insutuuon in accordance with their original aims and 
to transform the convents into genuine educational institutions. 

Besides these tasks, it should educate the misted men ( umana ) of 
religion to be sent all over the World of Islam for the purpose of the 
furtherance of piety 

The Board of Fan. a should prepare an Encyclopedia of the Fa two, 
the Board of Mutakallumn should prepare books on the Science of 
Kalam, the Council of Alashayddi on tasawwuf, and a Committee of 
Authors and Translators should be instituted to prepare or translate 
from Arabic such works as are needed by the public, e.g. on the 
history of kalam , the history of tasawwuf, the siyar of the Prophets, 
tafsir, and the compendia of the hadtihs 

In short, the organization of all the insutuuons and organizations 
needed to meet the requirements of the affairs of piety, the building of 
mosques in villages which do not have any, the opening of medrese* 



214 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
wherever they do not exist, the support of needed personnel by pro- 
viding them with ad equate salaries so that the functionaries and scholars 
of religion can live decently — all these tasks should be earned out by 
the office of the Shaikh-ul-Islam 


ISLAM AND MODERN CIVILIZATION® 

I 

In one of our previous essays we have put forth the thesis that Islam 
and modem civilization are compatible. There are two possible pro- 
cedures to verify this thesis the first is to compare the foundations of 
Islam with those of modem civilization directly, the second is to 
enquire whether the points of incompatibility or agreement between 
Christianity and modem civihzauon present favourable or unfavour- 
able implicauons for Islam Here we shall first follow- the second course 
because it will show us that to the extent to w hich Christianity remained 
remote from the pnnaples of Islam, it failed to reconcile itself with 
modem civilization, and that it wws able to reconcile itself with modem 
civilization only to the extent to which it approached [the pnnaples of] 
Islam. 

There is strong evidence for the argument that Islam is the most 
modem religion and m no way conflicting with modem science. 

The first reason for the existence of a fundamental opposition be- 
tween Chnstianity and Islam should be sought in the social conditions 
existing at the ame of their nse. Chnstianity onginated within a com- 
munity that was under the domination of a powerful state and that had 
no hopes for political independence. Islam, on the other hand, flounshed 
among a people free from external domination who had the capacity to 
establish an independent state although they lacked such an organiza- 
tion at the ame. ‘State’ means a public authonty which has the power 
to enforce ns judicial rules over the individuals whose safety it under- 
takes. At the ame of the nse of Chnsuaoity, the Roman state and its 
laws were in force. Christianity found a political organization already 
in existence, and thus it took the matters of organizing a government 
and maintaining laws as matters outside the concern of religion- It 
accepted the separation of state and religion as a pnnaple, and formu- 
lated it in the slogan ‘render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and 
unto God that which is God’s’. Thus, Christianity seems at first sight 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY Z1J 

l ik e a religion that has left judicial powers entirely to the government, 
and has concerned itself exclusively with pronouncements on matters 
of righteousness and ethical teachings. 

The real nature of things, however, was not that way at alL Christian- 
ity, by accepting the sate outside of religion, was relegating the sate 
to a non-sacred realm. It did not appropriate the sate to itself because 
it looked down on il This attitude, originally due to the fact that the 
Romans were foreign to the early Christians both from the point of 
view of nationality and of religion, did not disappear altogether even 
when the conditions changed. Although Christianity took on political 
government outside of the realm of religion, it nevertheless brought to 
the world a new government under the name of Heavenly Kingdom. 
Thus, two kinds of government came into existence in Christendom, 
one as the non-sacred, temporal government, and the other as the 
sacred, spiritual government. If Chnsnamty had not found an already 
existing order of sate at the time of its birth, it would have attempted 
undoubtedly to create one, and then tt would have regarded it as a 
sacred being of its own creauon. As this government w ould have been 
within the religion, and as such a sacred institution, no need would have 
been felt to establish a spiritual government. If this had happened, 
there would be no duality of temporal and spiritual governments, but 
something similar to the case existing in Islam. 

Europeans who have compared Chnsnamty and Islam usually 
believe that Islam's accepance of judicial matters as part of religion, 
and of the state organization as part of religious organization, is a 
defect in Islam. Even some Muslims who hav e receiv ed their ideas from 
the same sources think the same way. However, when the problem is 
mvesugated more carefully, it appears that this is not a defect but, on 
the contrary, a merit. 

In Islam, religious provisions are divided into three categories — 
those relating to pietj, to morality, and to judicial affairs. All of them 
are religious because they are sacred Rebgion is the sum total of all 
beliefs dm are taken as sacred by an umma. Aesthetic and rational rules 
are non-sacred, and therefore they are outside of religion. Islam takes 
ethical and legal rules as religious rules and thus makes them sacred. 
Tlus conception is contrary to die interpretations of ethics and law 
from the point of view of utilitarianism, historical materialism, and the 
doctrine of social contract. Over against these points of view, it 
attributes to them a supra- individual, sacred, and transcendental 



21 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
character. Modem sociology entirely justifies and confirms this point 
of view of Islam. 

Although Islam brings everything sacred under religion, at die same 
time it divides them mto three categories, ascribing to each a different 
sanction The sanctions of the rules of piety are other- u orldly sancnons; 
those of the judicial rules, legal sanctions, and of the ethical rules, the 
sanctions of ‘urf. In Islam, which commands in accordance with manif 
and prohibits tn accordance with mvnkar, criteria of ethical rules are 
mores (‘urf, or opinion of the whole). All the investigations of modem 
sociology have but confirmed the same thing. 

When Christianity accepted the need for a spiritual government, it 
did not take it as a mere metaphysical expression This government, 
although spiritual, would not content itself with a mere spiritual 
sanction, it would also demand a material sanction. Islam believed in 
the existence of a supreme court in the Hereafter and that the accounts 
of piety of our actions be settled there. Chnsuamty, in its attempts to 
support its spiritual government by a material sanction, went much 
farther by bringing that court mto this world and insutuuonalizing it, 
in the Middle Ages, in the so-called courts of inquisinon. In Islam, the 
maxim ’than a decides for jdAir’ [outward appearance] is well known. 
The spiritual courts of Christianity extended their penetrating inquisi- 
tiveness to the realm of the inner private conscience of man and 
attempted to measure the faith of persons. But the spiritual government 
was composed not only of these courts. It also had its councils, which 
were a sort of parliament legislating laws on matters of piety and mak- 
ing ecclesiastical laws. 

As poliucs is based on national senuments perceived by men of 
action through experience, the rule of the majority in political matters 
may be an adequate basis. On these matters the opinions of the ex- 
perienced ignorant may, in many cases, be better than those giv en by 
inexperienced learned persons. Thus, in politics, the fact that the 
learned are few and the ignorant many may not be an obstacle to the 
rule of the majority. Matters of piety, on die other hand, are entirely 
matters of learning and specialization. Thus, it is not permissible to 
deade matters of piety on die basis of the role of the majority in such 
Councils, and to make such decisions obligatory. The opinion of die 
majority cannot be binding on matters of piety, just as it cannot be on 
questions of science. The majority commits few mistakes on political 
matters, and no great harm proceeds from them. On matters of piety, 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 217 

on the other hand, the error is greater and its consequences for other- 
worldly salvation are more dangerous For this reason, Islam never 
constituted any Council and never made enactments on any matter of 
faith or worship on the basis of majority opinion as if this were issued 
as law. The Councils did not content themselves with promulgating 
beliefs and prayers in the form of laws, but they issued laws providing 
earthly punishments for matters of conscience, forgetnng that only the 
sublime court of the Hereafter can do this As spiritual public authority 
was vested in the Councils and in the Papacy, the decrees of the latter 
were regarded as binding when the Councils were not m session. The 
interpretations of the Popes were infallible, like those of the decrees of 
the Councils. The meaning of the Islamic saymg ‘ijtihad does not 
abrogate ijtihad' still be understood better when we compare it with 
the idea of infallibility of the Popes and Councils, which may abrogate 
all opinions of the learned In Islam, the fatwi issued by a certain office 
does not prev ent the mufus from issuingjenvas in accordance with their 
own opinions The ha&th saying: 'Consult yourself, etc.' ( Iuaftaka 
nafsaka ua tn of aka, etc.) shows how wide are the limits of the free- 
dom of ijtihad in Islam. The acceptance of the maxim 'ijtihad does 
not abrogate ijtihad' does not mean that a judicial decision (qadd) does 
not abrogate others A judicial decision (qada) abrogates another act 
of a court, but one fa does not abrogate another tftd. The Board of 
Examination of Shar ' ( Meclu-t Tedkikat-i fer’ije) abrogates the 
decisions of the shar courts by cassauon, and the qadis, as delegates of 
the Caliph, are under the obligauon of following w hat the Caliph has 
decreed on those matters which are subject to ijtihad The muftis, on 
die other hand, do not have to make their tftas within such limitations. 
In Christianity the 'muftis' have to follow the ‘far*ds of the Pope or 
of die Councils In the Greek Orthodox Church, too, the decrees of 
the I loly Synod have die authority of a kind of iftd in a similar manner. 
In Islam any person who has the qualifications to if id has the right to 
exercise it, but no one may ever have the same authority on the basis 
of position Only Rev elation is the authority behind the if a 
Islam’s inclusion of judicial provisions into the provisions of religion, 
and its acceptance of die sacredness of the state is not a shortcoming 
but a ment, for if it had seen government and law as profane and 
secular mstituuons it would hav e inv ented a spiritual government such 
as we find m Christianity. It was because Islam did otherwise that 
organuauons having a spiritual authority or the authority to issue 



218 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
decrees on matters of faith, such as Councils, Holy Synods, Inquisition 
courts, and ecclesiastical courts, were not established in it. Islam did 
not establish institutions contrary to the laws of nature and life such 
as a priesthood It was because Islam had brought state, law, and court 
into the realm of the sacred that those traits such as loyalty to the 
secular ruler, a genuine fraternity and solidarity among the believers, 
sacrifice of interests and life for the sake of jihad, tolerance and respect 
towards the opinions of others, which are the very basis of a permanent 
order in society, were cultivated among all Muslims as common virtues. 

Let us now look at the modes of relation between spiritual and tem- 
poral governments, and the differences existing between these and the 
regime accepted m Islam 


n 

These modes of relations may be reduced to four basic regimes: 
The first form is what ve may call Papahsm, which is based on the 
universal authority of the Popes In this form, all authority on matters 
of both piety and politics are combined in the office of Papacy Accord- 
ing to this system, Christian ecclesiastical sovereigns in general, such 
as bishops, are subject to the authority of the Pope. Gregory VII had 
said ‘Why should not the Papacy, having acquired the right of leader- 
ship in spiritual matters, also acquire the right to conduct temporal 
affairs’’ Temporal powers may see the glories of sovereignty higher 
than those of the bishops The differences between the two will be 
understood by looking at their origins Rulership is the product of the 
vanity of man while the bishopric is the institution of God ’ Long before 
these words were uttered. Saint Ambrose had declared that the superior- 
ity of the bishop over the ruler is like the superiority of gold over 
silver These dedarauons from the authorities suffice to expound the 
Catholic view on the matter. 

The second form is the papacy of the Caesars (Caesaro-Papism) 
This existed in Russia and means that the ruler has the funcuons of 
papacy Since the end of the sixteenth century the Muscovy patriarchs, 
supported by the Russian episcopates, severed themselves from the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople, and since then they began to get 
supreme pow er into their hands, which caused the Tsars some concern. 
Consequently, at a Council which convened at Moscow in 1667, Nikon 
was dismissed from his office. However, this defeat did not stop the 



RELIGION', EDUCATION, AND FAUILY 219 

successors of Nikon from following the older policy. Finally, in 1719, 
Peter the Great declared himself the head of the Russian Church and 
put an end to die ambitious aims of the Patriarchs The next year 
Peter assembled a Holy Synod composed of archbishops, bishops, and 
archimandrites The Holy Synod was headed by the Tsar, the mem- 
bers were appointed and decisions were ratified by him to be enforced. 
Thus, the Tsar became an absolute ruler in religion over matters of 
faith, worship, and discipline. 

This regime disrupted the safe conduct of both political and religious 
affairs In accordance with political considerations. Tsars could inter- 
vene in die foundations of religion by forcing the Holy Synod to issue 
decrees contrary to the provisions of religion. They thus arrested social 
progress and prevented poliUcal and social innovations, by utilizing 
men of religion, who became their most loyal instruments, in their 
attempts to keep people under their absolute rule However, that was 
the result of the efforts to find a remedy against the principles of 
Chnsuamty which were unfavourable to the establishment of an inde- 
pendent government. The Russians could establish an independent 
state only by accepting the papacy of the Tsars. 

The third system is the concordate system. The relation between 
temporal and spiritual governments found a solution in the Orthodox 
Church in die form of a harmful but durable system, while in Catholic- 
ism it remained in constant anarchy Popes used to claim authority 
over political matters, and the rulers declined to accept such claims 
because just as religion cannot recognize a power above itself neidier 
can the state. In the Ordiodox Church religion was sacrificed for the 
sake of die state In Roman Catholicism, on the other hand. Popes 
wanted to sacrifice the state for the sake of religion, and sought as 
vicars of God to become the rulers of the rulers over the earth follow- 
ing the ancient Roman Caesars. When the temporal rulers w ere power- 
ful, diey rejected such a condition of dependence, w Inch is contrary to 
die nature of state, and issued decrees about the limits of this authority 
of the bishops widnn their territories When the Popes realized diat 
they w ere unable to curb the powers of the kings, they began to negoti- 
ate wrdi diem, trying to conclude concordats that would be m their 
own favour as far as possible. But these concordats were never made 
sincerely. The Popes accepted them only temporarily in order to 
regain once again complete jurisdiction under a favourable situation. 
They even did not conceal dieir belief diat these concordats were 



220 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
unilateral only and that they were not binding on the Church. The 
history of Europe is full of such concordats, continuously changing 
and always dragging both sides into conflicts. 

The fourth system is the separanon of the state from the Church. 
The impossibility of maintaining the relationship between the state and 
die Church under die concordat regime was realized at last in France 
and the French Parliament decided to separate these two powers from 
each other completely From that time on, France did not have an 
official religion, and the churches ceased to have any official character 
They would be just private assoaauons under the Statute of Associa- 
tions. Thus, the state became completely laiazed and religion un- 
official Although this has been a gra\e source of sickness for the French 
nation, it was nevertheless a necessary consequence of Cathohasm. 

The only natural consequence of the conflict of Christianity with 
the political government could be either Caesaro-Papism or laicism. 
The ideal [of the universal authority] of the ‘Popes' has been realized 
only m Tibet. But this was due to a tricky measure of the Chinese 
government In the first century of the Hijra, the kingdom of Tibet 
had conquered a great portion of China and Turkestan and had estab- 
lished a great empire. The Chinese succeeded in expelling the Tibetan 
king by encouraging the Dalai Lamas and supporting them with 
military forces From that lime on, Dalai Lamas remained in Tibet as 
absolute sovereigns, but the Tibetan people came to their present state 
of backwardness under such a government. 

The abov e explanations show that Christianity is irreconcilable with 
a modem state Let us now look at Islam from that point of view. In 
Islam, both state and law are within religion The provisions of religion 
comprise judicial rules and prescriptions of piety. The execution of 
judicial functions are giv en to the Caliph. The fahhs, proven to be 
qualified as muftis, are charged with the task of purveying the provisions 
of piety They are under the judicial authority of the Caliphs, but are 
not bound m their tftas by the latter's opinions. QaJis are delegates of 
the Cahph and exercise their judicial functions as his depunes and, thus, 
on the matters which are subject to tjtthad, they are bound to follow 
the judgment preferred by the Caliphs even if this judgment is not in 
accord with the ifta, or e\ en if it is beyond the opinions of any of the 
four schools of JUth, because the Caliph's opinion and decree is 'to be 
earned out judicially’ and, as such, it is of the nature of law, whereas 
any opinion which ts to be earned out as ifta is not of a legal nature. 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 111 

There are, for example, several judgments given as tftas in the fikh s of 
the Shafi'I, Maliki, and Hanbah schools which the muftis of these schools 
follow in their tftas. In the Ottoman lands, on the other hand, the 
qaJh judged only according to the HanafI fikh. Thus, only the pro- 
nouncements of the HanafI fikh were judicially followed and had 
assumed the nature of law; those of the other three schools remained 
subject to tfta. Furthermore, the Ottoman Caliphate had accepted only 
five of the books of fatwd of the HanafI school as subject to judicial 
application and the qadis judged only on the basis of these. But even 
the HanafI muftis were not under any obligation to restrict themselves 
to these five books of ft two. The codification of the MejclU-t Ahkdm-t 
Adltye [Compendium of Judicial Ruled) was meant only to show the 
provisions to be judicially followed by the qadis and not to be provisions 
followed in tftas of muftis 

It follows from these considerauons that muftis are absolutely free 
and independent in declaring the provisions of piety, although they are 
dependent upon the ruler or the Caliph, because the Cahph, although 
having judicial authority, lacks any authority over matters of piety 
such as the Catholic Pope or the Russian Tsar enjoyed However, the 
mufti does not have any authority over matters of piety either. The 
mufu only has the authority of tfta, simply because of his competence 
in learning. There is a great difference between ‘authority’ and ‘com- 
petence’ Thus, die judicial nght belongs exclusively to the Caliph 
since he has judicial authority But the tfta authority of the mufti does 
not gi\ e the nght of tfta to him exclusn ely There is no question of a 
nght of tfta, there is only the question of competence in tfta. The fact 
that the mufti has no authomy over matters of piety shows diat there 
is no tfta government of the muftis in addition to the judicial govern- 
ment of the Caliphs. There is only one government in Islam, which is 
the Caliph’s government. Thus, the Cahph is entirely independent in 
his judicial government, and the mufti is equally independent in teach- 
ing and declaring the prov lsions of piety. Neither do judicial provisions 
obstruct the safe appheauon of the provisions of piety, nor do the latter 
intrude into die safe course of the judiciary. 

In one of our prev ious essays [see supra, ‘Religion and Law *] we have 
shown that qadl and tfta cannot be united in one office. But there are 
cxccpuons to this rule. There was no harm in their unification id the 
Prophet Muhammad’s person. He was in a posmon which would not 
confuse the tw o because, in addin on to these two functions, he had the 



222 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
function of nsalah also. Whenever he failed in either of the first two. 
Revelation corrected him 

In a secondary form, ifta and qada may unite m the Caliph because 
the qadis who are the Caliph's delegates have to follow his opinion. 
If the qadi is dependent in his judicial action and independent in his 
capacity as mufti, he will be m a difficult position. What will happen if 
his opinion does not agree with the Caliph’s opinion’ Therefore, it 
would be strange for him to exercise his ifta according to his own 
opinion after judging the contrary opinion of the Caliph. Furthermore, 
judicial provisions have been compromised with certain exigencies 
under legal casuistry When the qadi follows them and when he acts 
as a sort of judiciary, how can he issue a fatwa in contradiction to it’ 
How can he have tw o consciences at the same time to pronounce the 
same thing both permissible and non-pemussible’ The qadi may exer- 
ase tfta only if he can face these difficulties in his position. 

Let us now turn to our mam topic. It has been seen above that 
Islam is not contrary to a modern state, but, on the contrary, the 
Islamic state means a modem state. But how did it happen that the 
modem states came into existence only in Christendom? 

When we study the history of Christianity, we see that, following 
the Crusades, a new movement started in Europe which was then 
acquainted with Islamic culture. Tins movement aimed at imitating 
Islamic civilizauon and religion It penetrated Europe with time, and 
finally culminated in Protestantism as a new religion entirely in contra- 
distinction to the tradiuonal principles of Christianity This new' 
religion rejected the priesthood, and the existence of two kinds of 
government, spiritual and temporal. It also rejected the Papacy, the 
Counals, the lnquisiuon, in short, all msutuuons which had existed in 
Christianity as contrary to the principles oflslam. Are we not justified 
if we look at this religion as a more or less Islanuazed form of Christ- 
ianity’ The modem state came into existence in Europe first in the 
Protestant countries The consntuuonal regime appeared in England, 
the first nauon state was established in the United States, and the first 
culture-state came into existence m Germany. The racialist soaologists 
would believe that the superiority in avibzauon of these nations and 
of trtje Scandinavian nations was due to the fact that these nations 
belong to the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon races The soaologists of 
religion, > on the other hand, believe that the decline of the Laun nauons 
was due tic> their Catholicism, the backwardness of the Russians was a 


RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 22} 

consequence of their Orthodoxy, and the progress of the Anglo-Saxon 
nations was the result of the fact that they had freed themselves from 
the Catholic traditions and approached the principles of Islam. If these 
principles taken by Protestantism from Islam Here factors in this 
progress, do they not also constitute an experimental proof that Islam 
is the most modem and most reasonable religion J This being so, how 
is the attempt of the statesmen of Tarqimat to organize the Islamic 
community in imitation of the [minority] 'communities’ existing in our 
country justifiable * Christian organizations appeared m a dependent 
people and they might suit only dependent 'communltles , Free nations 
and free states can reconcile themselves only with the institutions of 
Islam because Islam originated w a free people who named to create 
an independent state. 


THE CALIPHATE 

I* 

Foremost among a man’s social dunes is that of knowing his nation- 
ality and his religious community (ummet) One has also to know and 
understand the differences between the social grouping called 'nation' 
and that of 'ummet'. As Europe is in a much more advanced stage of 
social evolution, every person there knows this difference, and is 
consciously aware of his connecuon with a certain nationality and 
religion In the East, on the other hand, the connotauons of these two 
terms are not }ci dearly known and, hence, many people cannot give 
an adequate answer when they are asked. ‘To what nauon do jou 
belong* And to which ummet do jou belong*’ It is necessary, therefore, 
that we clarify the meanings of these two terms in order to identify our 
social position. 

Ummet is the grouping consuruted by men of the same religion 
Chnsuans, for example, constitute an ummet Likewise the Jews 
constitute another, and so do the Muslims Thus, each religion existing 
in die w orld consurutes an ummet. The common connecting element in 
eadi ummet is religion. In the grouping called 'nation', on the odier 
hand, language, morals, law, and political insutuuons, fine arts, 
economic organization, science, philosophy, and technology, are also 
common uni I) mg dements, in addition to religion. Within a certain 
ummet, there may be different languages, moral standards, legal and 
pohucal institutions, aesdieue tastes, economic and educauonal insutu- 



224 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
tions. Within a certain nation, on the other hand, these spheres of social 
life have to have a uniformity and unity. And the totality of these we 
call ‘culture’. Culture is an all-inclusive term, comprising all social 
insatuuons. Therefore, we may define the nation simply as the ‘sum 
total of men who belong to the same culture’. 

It follows from these definitions that the group which we call society 
as the one comprising all spheres of life is not ummet hut nation. 
Ummet is, in most cases, a collection of several societies or nauons 
And thus ummet is, in many cases, international. As a matter of fact, 
intemationality first emerged with the emergence of ummet. Early 
international insututions were nodung but religious insututions. In 
the Middle Ages, European intemationality was nothing but Christen- 
dom Its intemauonal msutuuons were insumuons of the Church. 
National institutions were not fully differentiated from the mstituuons 
of religion. Among us, too, these two areas of orgamzauon were fused 
with each other until recently 

Social evolution leads to increasing division of labour, and this, in 
turn, necessitates a differentiation between groupings referring to 
different social categories As this took place in Europe, among us, too, 
nauonal orgamzauon began to be differenuated from the ummet 
orgamzauon After the armistice [following World War I] particularly, 
two important factors accelerated this differenuation. The first is the 
dissolution of great empires which had contained several nationaliues 
and, as a consequence, the emergence ofeachnauon as a state Formerly, 
die religious head of an ummet could, to some extent, be the political 
head of an empire comprising several nations. When these nations 
emerged as separate states, the religious head of the ummet could not 
be the political head of only one of these nauons The function of the 
head of an ummet is to serve the religious life of die Muslims The func- 
tion of the state, on the other hand, is to serve nauonal life. When the 
two are united in one person, there may be occasions on which either 
the general interests of the ummet will be sacrificed for the sake of the 
parucular interests of one nauon or the poliucal aims of a nation for 
the sake of the ummet ideals. 

The second factor causing differenuauon between groupings is the 
nse of the principle of popular sovereignty, which gamed force in 
recent times as a result of the development of pohucal consciousness 
and which obviated the claims of single persons to be the sole posses- 
sors of sovereignty. Historical experiences have shown that the interest 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 22; 

of nations and those of dynasties are different things Especially 
after the armistice, the treason of the ruler and of the prime minister 
•who was his son-in-law, their alliance with the enemies of the nation, 
the crimes against the nation which they committed as tools of these 
enemies, were all due to the usurpation of the rights of the people for 
the interests of the court. These bitter experiences have shown to the 
Turkish people that from now on it ts impossible for them to trust 
their political fate to the hands of court governments which think of 
nothing but their own selfish interests. Consequently, the Turkish 
nation resumed the right of sovereignty which was its own, and rele- 
gated its legislative and executive powers to the Grand National 
Assembly. In this way national organization assumed a particular form. 

When national organization took this particular form, the organiza- 
tion oi Ummet had the chance to manifest itself in a more striking and 
brilliant form The person who is at the head of the ummet organization 
and who is regarded as the religious guide is the Caliph The Prophet 
had delegated Abu Bakr to lead the prayers during the illness which 
ended with his death. The office of Caliphacy was bom out of this 
delegation of religious leadership It is very well known that in Islam 
prayers are performed in congregation five times a day. In order to 
perform this worship, the congregation is led by an imam Friday and 
holiday prayers should be performed not only m congregation but 
also as an ummet It ts for this reason that the two latter prayers cannot 
be performed in village and neighbourhood masjiJs They can be per- 
formed only in the great mosques of the ernes The imams and the 
khatibs who read prayers and deliver sermons in these mosques have 
to be specially commissioned by the Caliph. This obligation shows that 
as the congregations are led by a particular imam, so these latter are 
also led by a higher and universal imam. Thus, on Fridays and holidays 
the whole Islamic ummet performs prajers as a unified community 
under the universal leadership of the Caliph. For this reason, the office 
of Caliphacy is defined as the ‘supreme imamate’. The fact that the 
Friday and holiday sermons are delivered in the name of the Caliph, 
and the existence of various altemauves as to the performance of 
Friday and holiday prayers in the absence of the Caliph, indicate that 
the essential function of the Caliph is the fulfilment of the supreme 
imamate. 

During the Prophet’s We- time there was only one imam, who was 
none other than his blessed self. The one- ness of imamate was regarded 



226 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
as the clearest symbol of the unity of the ummet. Later on, the number 
of masjids and mosques as veil as imams increased. This multi- 
plicity could lead to the curtailment of the idea of the one-ness of the 
Islamic ummet. With the establishment of the office of Caliphacy this 
danger was overcome The Caliph meant the highest imam , the imam 
of imams The several imams had to be guided by a highest imam in 
such a way as to single out the unity of the ummet. 

From that time on, the Islamic ummet has taken the one-ness of this 
highest imam or Caliph as the expression of its existence, unity, and 
solidarity. How could it be permissible to defame such an office, the 
symbol of the unity of the Islamic ummet , through the poliucs of a 
particular nauon, and inevitably to disfigure it through the unavoidable 
and human faults of politics 4 In the time of the Seljuks in Baghdad and 
of Koltmera [Mamluks] in Egypt, the headships of the ummet and of the 
nauon were naturally separated from each other In these periods the 
Caliph was performing only a religious fiincuon with regard to the 
ummet All affairs with regard to pohucal authority were earned on by 
the sultans of the Seljuks in Baghdad and of the Kolemens in Egypt. 
These were the greatest penods in the history of Islam, both politically 
and religiously It was only when Selim I had again unified these two 
offices that the decline of the Ottoman Empire ensued, its religious as 
well as ns pohucal kfe began to detenorate A study of the history of 
Islam from this point of view will bring several important truths to 
bght. 

The ceremony of the elecuon of the new Caliph m all mosques of 
Islam last Friday 10 was a day of great rejoicing w Inch spiritually united 
all Muslims of the world. That day all Muslims, who had gained a 
supreme imam as the head of the ummet exclusively, realized their 
solidarity in a sense more intense than in die past. Unul now the 
religious authority of the Ottoman Caliphs was confined to those 
Muslims who were dieir pohucal subjects. Their religious authority 
over Muslims in other states was rejected by the other governments 
because they could not be sure that this religious audionty was free 
from pohucal designs. Now that the Caliph will no longer be subject 
to the polincs of any nauon, he will enjoy free communication with the 
Muslim muftis of all lands, hewill issue decrees to all imams and hhatils, 
in short, he will exercise his right of religious authon ty ov er all religious 
insutuuons. No Muslim of non-Muslim state will prev ent the fufilment 
of this religious fiincuon. 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 227 

We see, therefore, that the present-day Cahphacy is a thousand 
times more pow erfol than it was in the past. Although Turkey and the 
Turkish nation is its main support, all Muslim states and nations will 
support it materially and spiritually But its real and most powerful 
source will be the greatness of Islam which has today forced the 
European world to respect il 

As to the question of confining the nght of election to the Cahphacy 
only to the house of Osman, we believe it is correct. This respectable 
family is a blessed dynasty which has served and elevated the Turkish 
nation for a thousand years and both Islam and the Turkish nation for 
six centuries. With the acceptance of this rule, a nght acquired hiscon- 
cally through competence has been recognized by its uihentors, and 
at the same tune the conflicts and ambitions of the elecuon will be 
reduced to a minimum. We are deeply thankful to the Grand National 
Assembly and its famous President for their success in giving to the 
office of the Cahphacy a character that is compatible with the principle 
of popular and national sovereignty, which is the foundation of 
modem states and dirough which genuine Islamic unity in religious 
life might be realized 


II 1 * 

Our Prophet sent letters to each of the rulers of his time— to the 
rulers of Byzantium, of Egypt, and of Ab>sinma These letters invited 
neighbouring nations to embrace Islam and delivered to them a pro- 
posal which read approximately as follows ‘Your political organiza- 
tions and governments will remain as they are arid you will rule in 
j our countries as m ihe past. The only thing which 1 want from you is 
the acceptance of die faith and prajers of Islam.' 

Let us suppose that these rulers and their subject peoples had accepted 
Islam How, then, would Islam be organized 9 We can only imagine. 
Each nation in the Islamic w orld w ould have its political independence. 
Each nauon would possess a governmental organization suitable to 
its race and culture. However, this political independence could not 
impede religious unity All the Muslim nations would be united into a 
great religious community under the name of the Muhammadan ummtt 
At the head of this religious community would be the Prophet himself 
as long as he lived and die Caliphs after his death, and their mission 
would consist of ini itrng non-behev ers to the right path and believers 



203 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
to devotion. Thus, beside the political organization of nations there 
would be an entirely independent Islamic organization. 

But, unfortunately, history did not follow the course here envisaged. 
Neighbouring rulers did not accept the Islamic religion through 
preaching and teaching. Under these conditions, the declaration of 
jihad became necessary. Neighbouring countries became incorporated 
into the realm of Islam by means of war. 

At that time, the Arabs had not yet established political institutions 
and a gov ernment. For this reason, the organizations of state and com- 
munity developed side by side among the Muslims. The two organiza- 
tions ceased to be independent by being fused with each other. But, 
lhe Kur’an confirms the necessity and the importance of nations by 
the verse: ‘We have created >ou male and female, and have made you 
nauons and tribes that you may know one another’ [XILIX, 13, 
Pickthall’s trans] ‘Knott mg each other* means undertsanduig and 
communication. Communication between men is earned on by means 
of language. Individuals speaking different languages cannot know 
what one another thinks, there is mutual opposition ( tanaha ) among 
them. But among those who speak the same language there is mutual 
understanding (ta'amf). The Prophet said in one of his haditk s: 
‘Spirits are like arrajed armies Those who know one another become 
akin, those w ho are strangers to one another become mutually opposed.’ 
Therefore, in order to have agreement it is always necessary to know 
One another. Mutual opposition (tanakur), on the other hand, gives 
rise to disagreement. Thus, teal and complete agreement which is a 
prerequisite for the state can be realized only within a nation, which 
is a group with ta'druf These revealed pronouncements imply that 
Islam does not condone imperialism. 

An independent Islamic organization, which would undoubtedly 
have been realized if the conversion had taken place of those rulers and 
their peoples who at the beginning of Islam received the letter of our 
Prophet, was not fully established until now. Today, we are in a posi- 
tion to expect the realization of such an organization in us proper form. 

The outlines of this organization should be somewhat as follows: 
in ummtt orgamzauon, the basic unit is the masjidoi the neighbourhood. 
Masjlds should be ued to mosques and mosques to the great mosques 
of the aues. Each great mosque should be headed by a mufti. The 
muftis of each stare must be connected to the mufti of the capital, the 
Shatkh-td-Itlam. And the Shaikh-id- 1 'slims of all nations must be under 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAUILY 229 

the office of the Caliph. The medrescs and the establishments of religi- 
ous orders should also take their places in this orgamzauon according 
to their rank. 

The Cahphacy, until now, has not been able to create such an 
organization, because it was not independent When the Cahphacy and 
the Sultanate were united in one person, either one of the two domi- 
nated the other. At the dme of the early four Caliphs, when piety 
preceded everything, the Cahphacy was essential and the rulers hip was 
a secondary function. In the reign of the Umayyads, Abbasids, and 
Ottomans, the Cahphacy was subordinate to the Sultanate, as it was 
captured by the swords of the amirs who had material power. As a 
consequence, in these epochs the Cahphacy was not independent, 
whereas in reality both the powers of the Cahphacy and of political 
sovereignty should be independent 

The Turkish revolution of today has assured the complete indepen- 
dence and freedom of these two powers. As the right of sovereignty of 
the Turks has passed entirely to the people, the Cahphacy too has won 
us independence by being separated from die Sultanate. Now the office 
of Caliphate, having won us independence, will be able to establish 
the religious organization mentioned above, and w ill be able to call, 
at such times as it shall deem necessary, international religious councils 
such ascounal o( muftis, of 'ulama, and council of religious education. 
It goes without saying that these religious meetings will be as creative 
as die ummet organization. Thanks to these creauve meeungs, our 
religious life which has been for many centuries in a state of lethargic 
slumber will re-awaken, and, in accordance with the promise of our 
Prophet, the splendour of Islam will slune in much the same way as it 
shone m its Golden Age. 


m«* 

The Cahphacy lus taken four forms m the history of Islam. As these 
four types are each of a different nature, we shall call them by different 
names. 

The primary function of the Raihulun Caliphs was Cahphacy. Since 
diere was no state organization at that time, these Caliphs w ere invested 
widi political audionty or sovereignty in addition to their original 
function. We call this type the 'Caliph- Ruler' type. The primary func- 
tion of the Umayyad, Abbas 1, and Ottoman Caliphs, on the other 



230 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
hand, was political mlership. They were invested with Caliphal auth- 
ority in addition to their ongmal political authority. We shall call this 
type the ‘Ruler-Caliph’ type In Baghdad at the time of the Seljuks 
and in Egypt during the reign of the Mamluk Sultans, the Caliphs were 
not only divested of any political authority, but also were without any 
religious organization, which they needed to carry out their religious 
functions As they themselves were not mujtahids and muftts, they 
needed an organization composed of competent scholars and, as they 
were unable to go everywhere, they needed a vast religious organiza- 
tion Because of the non-existence of a religious organization, these 
Caliphs failed to perform their religious functions in a real sense. They 
had under their control neither a ShaMi-ul-lslam nor a Board of 
Religious Scholars As the office of Supreme Judge was only a state 
office, it could not be regarded as part of a religious organization. We 
shall call this type 'Cahphacy without organization’. Finally, the last 
type which is to lie bom now will be separate from political sovereignty 
and will be able to produce a vast ummet organization, and thus wall be 
in a position to fulfil its religious functions in a true sense. We may call 
this type the ’independent and organized Cahphacy’. 

Let us now discuss the four different forms the funcuons of the 
Cahphacy hav e taken, now that w e hav e established these four types. 

1. Under the ‘Caliph-Rulers’, leadership in prayers, in preaching on 
Friday and holiday gatherings, and in the guidance of pilgrims and 
execution of the ntes of pilgrimage was actually earned on by the 
Caliphs themselves As they -were personally qualified to have the 
au thorny of ijiihad, they dev eloped their interpretations on questions of 
beliefs and worship like any other mujtahtd As at that time there were 
no schools of law and theology or mysuc sects, there were naturally 
neither separate imams on matters of belief and w orslup nor spiritual 
guides to direct the inner life of the believers. On these matters, too, 
leadership was actually the task of the Caliphs The same Caliphs also 
collected the Sura’s of the Kur’an and edited it as a codified book. To 
protect sacred places, e g Mecca and Medina, to preserve holy trusts, 
to propagate the Book of God and the Sunna of die Prophet over the 
whole world, were also their primary tasks. These Caliphs, in short, 
were performing the tasks of imams, preachers, masters of pilgrimage 
and heads of pilgrims, mufus, spiritual guides, collectors of the Kur’an, 
guardians of sacred objects and propagators and preachers of the faith 
all at the same ume. As they personally had reached a supreme status 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 23I 

and were to be looked upon as genuine examples in matters of piety 
and righteousness, they were really the imams of the ummet of Islam. 
Unfortunately, how ev er, even these Caliphs assumed political authority 
and rulership, and thus they could not remain aloof from the inevitable 
conflicts of political life. As a consequence of involvement in politics, 
religious schisms arose which divided Islam into Sunnis, Sfii'is, and 
Khartjis. It seems that, if they had not assumed pobucal in addition to 
their religious authority, they w ould have been able to fulfil the latter 
function more fully 

2 In the ‘Ruler-Caliph’ type, the Caliphs did not have any superior- 
ity with regard to matters of piety and righteousness and lacked any 
competence and authority in religious scholarship As a consequence, 
there originated imams of religious scholarship, such as the Four 
Imams, among persons who had these qualities. The Caliphs ceased to 
perform personally functions of leadership and preaching, in prayers 
and in pilgrimages, and delegated others for these functions Works 
such as preaching, teaching, interpreting, and propagating were earned 
on disinterestedly by pious members of the community on their own 
initiative The religion of Islam was elevated through these individual 
efforts, vanous branches of religious scholarslup were established, and 
the ummet of Islam developed a nch culture. In all these activities the 
Ruler-Caliphs not only failed to play a posmve role but even played a 
negative one Their political activities had reduced their religious 
functions to a secondary posiuon 

3 The reasons why under the 'Caliphs without organization’, the 
Caliphs failed to perform their funcuons properly, have been explained 
above. As Ruler-Caliphs emphasized their pobucal funcuons, they did 
not need to build a religious organization- Thus, die Islamic ummet of 
four hundred million bebeveis remained devoid of even a simple 
religious organ uauon The third type of Cahphs had inherited, from 
their predecessors, an office which was not based on any orgamzanon 
Places of worship were vakfs and were independent of each other 
(without any supporting organizanonal structure], and there was not 
a connecuon between them and any central authority connecting each 
wadi die rest. When the whole system of sensory and motor nerves 
becomes paralysed, no relauon may exist between the brain and the 
organs of the body. The Islamic unmet, having innumerable mosques, 
retigious colleges, and mystic orders, was in such a condition although 
it was supposed to be lied to a central authority under die name of die 



Z)2 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
Caliphacy. As there were none of the international means of communi- 
cation such as newspapers and telegraph during that period, the centre 
and outlying areas had no knowledge of each other. Furthermore, 
the Caliphacy, even in the centre, did not ha\ e any consultative organ 
composed of religious scholars comparable to the present-day Board 
of Religious Scholars These Caliphs, who were not necessarily experts 
themselves, could not perform their religious functions without the 
aid of religious councils composed of scholars of religious affairs. 
Even if they had had these bodies for the propagation of religion, they 
could not have mobilized the great body composed of muftis, scholars, 
imams, shaikhs, preachers, teachers, and missionaries to elevate God’s 
word 

4 The future Caliphs will be able to perform their religious duties in 
a much better way than their predecessors, as they are independent of 
political authority and have a religious organization. Dar-ul-Htkmat 
al-lsldmiyya is a kind of religious academy designed to be a consulta- 
tive staff to the Caliph. The most distinguished scholars all over the 
Islamic world should be appointed to this board. The Islamic ummtt 
will entrust matters of scholarship to the scholarly authority of this 
board rather than to the personal scholarship and virtues of the Cabph. 

Some people have for a long time proposed an ummtt organization 
comparable to the religious community organizations which existed in 
the past among the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. These 
organizations of non-Muslims were, in fact, not simply spiritual 
organizations. They also had legislative, executive, and judidal powers 
as if they were temporal organizations. These powers were internal 
extra-temtonal rights or Cult Privileges ( Imtiya[at-i Mefitbiyt). 
Each of the religious communities havmg these political privileges was, 
in fact, a state on a small scale. The modem conception of national 
sovereignty cannot sacrifice to any group other than the whole nation 
even a small portion of the three pohncal functions of the state. 
Therefore, the new religious organization has to be different ftom that 
of the non-Muslim communities. This organization may be appropri- 
ately termed mosque-orgamzanons, havmg the office of mufti at every 
district centre and mashikhat at every state capital As politics has so 
far not entered into mosques no harm may come from the mosque 
organizations. As religious communities (cemaats) so far have been 
centres of political separatism the use of ihis word may lead to an 
unconsaous imitation of previous events. 


RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 233 

In a previous essay I have shown what an ummet organization should 
he like. As this organization would simply connect the already existing 
instituuons to the office of the Caliphacy, it wall materialize easily. If 
the whole ummet establishes the necessary contact with the central 
religious office, the Caliphacy will be able to fulfil its religious func- 
tions in their true sense Since telegraphs, postal services, railways, and 
steamers are bringing distant places into proximity, very soon the 
Islamic ummet will become a great family. It is up to the men of religion 
and to the members of the Boardof Religious Scholars (Dar-ul-Hihmat 
al-IsISmtyya) to decide wbat will be the nature of religious dunes 
appropnate to the needs of our time. We only wish that God might 
make our beloved Caliph successful in carrying out these sacred 
tasks. 


THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION” 

The term ‘Islamic educanon' implies two things the educational 
views of Islam and the education of children in accordance with 
Islamic beliefs. 

To study the educational views of Islam is the job of the history of 
education Here I shall not discuss the history of education in Islam, 
but rather present-day problems In other words, I shall try to show 
that the religion of Islam is one of our ideals in education. 

If we study the curriculum of a [Turkish] school, we notice that 
[Turkish] children are taught according to three categories of learning: 
(i) They are taught language, literature, and history, which are Turkish 
language, literature, and history, (i) they are educated in the Kur’an, 
tecvit [reading the kur’an with the proper rhythm and pronunciation], 
ca t edits m, and the lustory of Islam and Islamic languages [Arabic and 
Persian], (3) they are also trained in mathematics, natural sciences, and 
foreign [European] languages, which will aid them in their further 
studies m these sciences, as w. ell as such skills as handicrafts and 
gymnastics. 

This shows that the aims we pursue in our educanon are three. 
Turkism, Islimism, and Modernism. No Turkish father can fail to 
hat e his child educated in the Turkish language or allow him to remain 
ignorant of Turkish history Also he cannot let him be ignorant of 
Islamic beliefs and rituals, or unacquainted with the history of Islam. 
But he also wants his child to be named as a modem man, ut addinon 



234 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
to his education as a Turk and a Muslim. It seems, therefore, that com- 
plete education for us would compnse three fields: Turkish education, 
Islamic education, and modem education. 

Before the Tany/nat, Turkish children were educated solely in 
Islamic studies Reforms of the Tanymat period tried to introduce 
secular educanon At first, there were grave conflicts between religious 
and secular education Instruction m drawing and the French language 
met with strong opposition when introduced into secular schools. It 
was chimed that teaching the roundness of the earth or the heliocentric 
system was contrary to dogma, and it became necessary to seek evi- 
dence in dogma to suppon the truths which have been proven by 
observation and reason. However, with the passage of time, secular 
education gradually became established and rooted. But, unfortunately, 
the more secular educanon gamed prestige, the more Islamic educauon 
lost its importance It is true that religious insmicuon in the [secular} 
school curricula continued to occupy an important place. But the 
decline seen in Islamic educauon was in quality rather than in quantity: 
Rebgious mstrucuon lost its vitality Teachers of religion continued to 
look down on the sciences as objecuonable upstarts (buT at), and thus 
lost their prestige in the eyes of the students Moreover, the application 
of scientific educational methods to this rebgious education had not 
even been started 

The confusions and the consequent calamines under which the 
Turkish-Islamic world was suffering at that ume led to the birth of two 
appealing ideals — Turkish nanonalism and Islamic lntemanonabsm- 
Young intellectuals awakened under the blow s of these calamines to 
realize that our difficulnes were due to our lack of ideals in educaaon- 
We did not wish, they said, to give our children either a national or a 
religious educanon, whereas it is evident that the real forces which lead 
individuals tD the highest sacrifices for cherished aims are religious and 
nanonal feelings. But not only did we fail to give our children a 
Turkish and Islamic educanon, we also did not succeed in giving them 
a modem educanon However, it is modem educanon which might 
have enabled our children to make and use the technical instruments 
which are produced and used by advanced nanons. By our failures, we 
proved that we w ere incapable of using modem techniques in military 
as well as m economic spheres The test of science is action. By oitf 
failures in acnon we demonstrated our ignorance in sciences. Thus, 
both our institutions of higher learning, which should have trained 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 235 

specialized scientists, and our colleges, which should have educated 
citizens, did not achieve their aims. 

At the present time, three groups of intellectuals are trying to lay 
the foundanons of a new education On the one hand, Turkist peda- 
gogues are poinung out the important role that national tradioons 
should play , the modernist pedagogues, on the other hand, are showing 
new methods to be applied m educanon based on the idea of the prac- 
tical and economic applications of modern science In the third place, 
however, it is also necessary to discover the foundations upon which a 
new Islamic education may be based 

These three aspects of education must aid and complement each 
other. But if tie fail to define the function and delimit the sphere of 
each tn a reasonable way without overstressmg any one of them, they 
may be contradictory and even hostile to each other When secular 
educauon transgresses its own material realm and reaches into the 
spiritual realm, it clashes with the education of Turkish and Islamic 
ideals To distinguish the boundaries between national and religious 
educauon, on the other hand, is more difficult. It requires extensive 
studies to show which of the Islamic tradinons definitely belong to the 
Islamic rebgion, and which of them, in fact, were but Arabic, Persian, 
or Turkish tradioons 

Thus, Islamic educanon must recognize the funcuon of national and 
modem educauon, but must not leave them to take over its own func- 
uon. In die meannme, Islamic educauon has to disnnguish the genuine 
beliefs and tradioons of Islam from the tradioons and addiuons 
(innovauons, buTat ) borrowed, first from the Arabs and later from 
other peoples 


NATIONAL EDUCATION 1 * 


We call the sum total of the value judgments that consutute the 
edios of a people its culture Educauon simply means inculcaung this 
culture in the habitual attitudes of die individual members of that 
people. We call the sum total of all reality judgments current among a 
people its techniques Training as opposed to educanon, therefore, 
consists of instmcung individuals in these particular techniques. Since 
value judgments differ from society to society, culture is always 
national , hence, educanon, w hich means the inculcanon of the culture. 



13 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTBRN CIVILIZATION 
should be national. Reality judgments or techniques, on the Other hand, 
are anational* and, therefore, training children m rational [scientific] 
knowledge should be anauonal 

We may classify societies into three types or stages of social evolu- 
tion, according to whether their education is national or not. (a) In 
pre-Iiteiate societies educauon is national but also incomplete. The 
child acquires the national culture within the life of die tribe without 
having books, school, or teachers. However, the culture he acquires is 
not the total culture of the ethnic whole, but rather the partial culture 
of only one tribe (A) The peoples whose religions are based on divine 
scriptures, or those who have adapted a secular innovation, become a 
part of a certain ctvilizanon-group. That civilization is taught to child- 
ren through books and teachers. National culture becomes over- 
shadowed by the traditions of international civilization. Civilization 1S 
the product of all reality judgments of the peoples who belong to the 
same ummet or to the same level of material development- Within a 
avilizaaon-group, education tends to be of an international rather than 
a national character. It tends to inculcate the international civilization 
rather than the nationa\ culture, ft) The modem nations regatw 
their political independence and cultural freedom from international 
civilization-groups immediately set out to re-discover their national 
cultures When they do this, they begin to emphasize education in 
national culture at the expense of training in the technique* °f a 
ticular avilizauon. It is then that national educauon rC’g 11 * over 
everything. 

We [Turks] also have passed through the same phases. Amor’S the 
Oghuz, the forefathers of the Ottoman Turks, nauonal edu cat ' on was 
regional and partial. When these Turks adopted Islam and founded 
Seljuk and Ottoman states, they adopted also a civilization with its 
books, schools, and teachers. This avilizauon, which was 3 collective 
product of the Arabs, Persians, and even Turks, impnnted itself upon 
the minds which it trained. Thus, [among the Turks] Jivafl literature 
replaced the jolen literature and the tore gave place to fikk. In the mean- 
ume, however, the folen Literature continued in the anonymous litera- 
ture of the folk, and was earned on by minstrels and mystic poets. 

• There n a difference between ‘anauonal and ‘non national* All valu« judgment* 
which are foreign to the national etho* of a people are non-nauonai. Aa reality judgment* 
are neutral from the point of view of nauonal etho*, they are neither nauotud nor non* 
nauonal hue simply anauooaL 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 237 

Turkish mythology and language maintained their existence silently 
in the hearts of the people. The tore of the Oghuz found its way into 
the Ottoman secular laws, and was taught in the Schools of the Pages, 
of the Janissaries, and of the Palace. When the medreze was transform- 
ing ihe Turks into non-Turks, these institutions were transforming 
non-Turks into Turks. Thanks to these national institutions, inter- 
national avilizauon failed to annihilate the national culture altogether. 
But with the continuation of culture alongside civilization, a senes of 
dichotomies in language, law, morality, and fine arts was created. Two 
systems lived side by side, one on the upper, the other on the lower 
level, without ever becoming assimilated. With the coming of the 
Tan^tmat era a new avilizauon shining with its modem advancement 
began to be imposed upon us. The schools, the books, and the teachers 
of this new avilizauon began to dominate our education. We now 
belonged offiaally to tw o avihzauons. As the old institutions of the 
folk culture were disintegrated, nauonal culture disappeared altogether. 
[Instead of the dichotomy and conflict between Ottoman avilizauon 
and Turkish culture] there now began a new conflict between the two 
avvltzauons whose sources and foundauons were different. Over 
against the divan literature appeared the salon literature, and modem 
[secular] law arose before the fikh. The medreze and the mtkxep [the 
secular school] became the centres of two opposite forms of educauon. 
Both were non-nauonal, both trained the youth without any cultural 
educauon. And finally came the trend of Turkism. It originally ap- 
peared as a result of the need felt to discover the nauonal culture, but 
was understood by some as an attempt to revive and re-insurute the 
anaent Turkish civilisation. Thus, the number of the avihzauons 
inhibiting our nauonal culture has risen from two to three. We axe 
even faced with strange proposals, such as reviving fossilized anaent 
Turkish words, or forging artificial words by using dead particles of 
Turkish, or introducing words from the Chagatay, from the Ka{ak, 
and from the Tatar dialects. There were those who advised dropping 
the living culture of die Turks and going back to the anaent Turkish 
avilizauon which had in reality been dead for a long time The 
genuine Turkists who turned their attenuon to culture rather than 
avilizauon w ent against such dangerous aberrations by clarifying the 
true meaning of this new movement. Consequently, it is now clearly 
understood that Turkism is nothing but a search for nauonal culture. 

In order to discover die nauonal culture one must, first of all, be 



*38 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
completely free from prejudice m favour of any particular civilization 
and tradition Anyone who is a particular admirer of European or 
Arab-Persian civilization cannot understand the nauonal culture just 
as one who admires the old civilization of the Turks cannot. Secondly, 
one has to discover and distinguish the obvious or latent differences 
between the institutions of the nations who share the same civilization 
It is only in this way that one can see what kinds of transformanon a 
commonly shared tradition has undergone in different nations, and 
how it has given nse to dissimilar institutions. Different nauons which 
belong to the same civilization may look alike on the surface, but may, 
in reality, be quite different from each other. In order to see this, one 
should not be deceived by the similarities between traditions, but 
should look at the differences between the insutunons And, thirdly, 
one should try to discover the latent points of convergence between the 
trends of social conciliation which seem irreconcilable. 

From the outside the life of a nauon may appear like a hetero- 
geneous mixture of tradinons derived from diverse civilizations, but in 
reality it is a homogeneous culture composed of insutunons in har- 
mony with each other. A naaon that lives and grows necessanly has a 
homogeneous culture The cnses seen among the intellectuals of a 
nauon are not necessanly expressions of certain maladjustments within 
the culture A healthy soaety may have unhealthy intellectuals because 
the store of knowledge (irfan)* of such individuals has been picked up 
from diverse international civilizations, and is, in most cases, some- 
thing quite different from the national culture Such a knowledge is 
healthy and creative only when it reflects national culture. Among the 
nations in w hich nauonal culture is not culuvated, individual education, 
in most cases, is entirely cut loose from the national culture National 
culture manifests itself in the thoughts of the men of genius and in the 
deeds of great men These two types of individuals represent nauonal 
culture and consutute the £hte Intellectuals, because they acquire their 
education only through their studies, are neither representauves of the 
culture nor are they the elite of the nauon. The confusions seen in the 
minds of the intellectuals should not necessanly be taken as symptoms 
of maladjustments in the culture of a nauon. 

In spite of the fact that our intellectual life is dominated by morbid 
minds, the people’s culture is healthy and creauve It is only when we 

• I use the term irfan to meet the French la exJiurt, u bile I use 'culture* (Jinn [Arabic 
Ad/rAJ) in us German meaning. 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 2J9 

discover it, by the scientific methods of sociology, that v.e shall be in 
a position to enter into a period of national education. 

n 

Until now our chief guide in education has been psychology 
Psychology, however, is a mixed discipline because it studies organic- 
psychic phenomena, on the one hand, and soao-psychic ones on the 
other, failing to make a clear distinction between the two In fact, the 
first is the legitimate subject-matter of btology, the second that of 
sociology. Psychology can treat only phenomena which pertain ex- 
clusively to the individual. Recent developments in sociology hate 
shown that socio-psychic phenomena are entirely different from the 
organic-psychic ones. The social mind is of a transcendental character 
in relauon to organic-psychic phenomena. Because of the fundamental 
difference between these two groups of phenomena, we have to dis- 
tinguish between their manifestation in the particular individuals by 
using the terns soul and mind Soul is an [organic-psychic] function, 
whereas mind is made up of religious, moral, aesthetic, intellectual, 
linguistic, and economic [soao-psychic] Junctions Therefore, the 
manifestations of the culture in individual minds can be studied only by 
sociology. 

This disuncuon is bound to give nse to a new approach to the 
problems of education . because the mind is something transmitted 
to each new generation through cducauon The mind acquired by the 
members of society is nothing but the culture of that society However, 
tins is peculiar not only to intellectual education, it is true also for 
physical educauon. Physical education does not consist simply in 
developing the kinetic activities, like those of baby animals which are 
produced by the natural growth of the organism, but is also a matter 
of die phy steal formauotv of the bodies of ihe members of a society 
in accordance with the ideals of that soaety. 

Since I view educauon from that angle, I do not approve the aims 
of cducauon formulated by Mr Ismail Hakki [Baltaaoglu] in the last 
issue of this journal. I do not believe that the educauonal aims of the 
twentieth century are represented only by those nanons which are the 
strongest and most advanced in this century. The peculiar culture of 
any one nauon may be the aim of educauon only for that nauon. If the 
Turkish child » to live in Turkish soaety, he must be educated accord- 



240 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
ing to Turkish culture. The survival of the Turkish nation in the 
twentieth century illustrates the feet that Turkish culture has a survival 
value for this century. This means that the Turkish child will get a 
contemporary education only when he is educated according to that 
culture. The reason why our educational msnruuons are yielding bad 
results is nor that our education is based on national culture but rather 
that it is tom between diverse international civilizations. To reform 
our education correctly, we will have to emphasize, not civiliza- 
tion over against culture but, on the contrary, culture over against 
civilization. 

The most advanced nations of the twentieth century are the earners 
of civilization. Our national culture has to reconcile itself with the 
fundamentals of that civilization But the traditions of European 
avihzaaon, like those of the Turkish and Islamic civilizations, should 
be permitted to be part of the life of the nation only when they have 
been thoroughly absorbed by the national culture Just as every nation 
erects customs houses and polmcal fronuers to inspect imported goods 
and foreigners, so they ought to erect cultural frontiers and customs 
houses. European civilization cannot be adopted by our national cul- 
ture simply by importations through certain individuals. On the con- 
trary, it will be the real property of the individual members of the 
nation only when it is absorbed by the national culture. I shall elabor- 
ate this point later 

Another point proposed by Mr Ismail Hakki as an aim of education 
is the desirability of training productive citizens Utilitarian considera- 
tions may be a legiumate aim in teaching But educauon can never be 
based on utilitarian principles In recent years education in Turkey has 
been onented in an extremely wrong direction - economic utilitarian- 
ism. ‘To gain money’ has been shown to fathers, teachers, and the youth 
as the main principle of educauon I wonder if the civilized nanons of 
the twentieth century really hold the same view. For me, educauon 
is something different from training in skills The main intenuon of 
training is to give basic knowledge, and then later to give instrucuon in 
professional and specialized skills Certainly, the aim of teaching is 
uulitanan. But, in addmon to instrucuon in knowledge and skill, there 
is also an educauve process whose aim is the culavauon, in the minds 
of an elite, of non-uulitanan and altruisuc senuments which do not 
seek ulterior interests. Primary schools, trade and professional schools, 
are insutuuons of training. But the lyc£es whose funcuon it is to 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 
educate the elite are purely educational institutions. Their gradua 
are the future lawyers, doctors, writers, government officials, « 
teachers who make up the 6 hte of the nation If they are not educa 
as unselfish, patriotic, self-sacrificing men, the nation cannot ben 
from their leadership in her difficulties. During their undergradu 
years the youth, who are later expected to specialize as doctors, en 
neets, chemists, etc., badly need teaching in literature, philosophy, 2 
social sciences, in other words, in cultural sciences. Later they 
gomg to study in great detail the sciences m their respective fields 
specialization. As they will not get a cultural education as gradual 
they need a thorough cultural education as undergraduates. Therefc 
these schools should be entirely devoted to education in the humanit 

nr 

What is die object of education * Is it the individual or the naac 
For psychologists it is the individual, for sociologists the nation 1 
psychologist claims the personality is found within the uidividi 
whereas the sociologist maintains that it exists within the naaon a 
whole. In making this claim, the sociologist does not intend to de 
the role of the individual. A naaon is composed of active and 1 m 
elements, and also of elements which are passive and lifeless The act 
and living elements are human beings and the lifeless ones are t 
traditions. These latter become insutunons only when they come 
hfe within the minds of the men who consatute the nauon. Th 
institutions are living expressions in the minds of men of inamm; 
traditions. The sociologist emphasizes culture because he sees 1 
traditions as the lifeless, and the human beings as the living, realm 
He seeks living society not in the avilizauon-group but rather in 1 
naaon, because the first is a medley of lifeless traditions while 1 
second is an organic whole composed of human beings. Funhermo 
individual members of a society may be classified as ananonal, nc 
national, or nauonal types. The child is an ananonal member of t 
society when he is bom into it because he does not automauca 
inherit anything relating to the culture or values of the naaon. Childi 
may become entirely devoid of any national culture if, in their schoi 
mg, they acquire only the lifeless traditions of an old or new emit 
non. Traditions cannot become living insocuuons in the passive mi 
of children. Their minds can register the tradiaons like a phonograj 



24* TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
but they are unable to give life to them. This is not, however, peculiar 
to children Aged persons too, as individuals, can fail to give life and 
meaning to the lifeless traditions. The transformation of the traditions 
into living insaruuons takes place only in a collectivity of individuals 
or, in better terms, m crowd situations Sociologically, the living 
members of a society are those who take part in collective national 
experiences. Trends of public opinion, changes in value attachments, 
movements of ideologies, come into existence as a result of the collec- 
ts e behaviour of the members of the society As I have explained the 
rise of new ideals dunng the times of great nauonal crises, disasters or 
victories sev eral tunes, 1 will not repeat the explanation here. Since the 
basis of the value structure of a society is the national ideals, naturally 
the whole value system changes following a transfoimauon of the 
ideals of a nation. Therefore, the nse of the living institutions from the 
lifeless forms of tradmons can be expected, not from the pnvate 
experiences of individual beings but from their collective experiences. 

Therefore, when the formal tradition of the formal civilization is 
replaced in the education of the children by the religious moral, legal, 
aesthetic, etc, values which live in the heart of the nation, only then 
will the educational insmuuons produce thoroughly nauonal members 
of the nation It will be only then that the school will exerase an educa- 
tional role in the midst of our nauonal crises. Certainly, the most 
important source of educauon lies in nauonal crises. Just as a nauonal 
disaster once educated Prussia, so now our nauonal crises are educating 
us. The idealism of our children and youth is the product not of the 
teachers but rather of our nauonal crises. Today they experience an 
intensive education which is given not by the school but by the nauonal 
life. 

We can, however, not expect this educauve role to be play ed always 
by nauonal crises. Crises cannot and should nor go on continuously. 
When a crisis in the life of the nation passes on, the ideals which it 
creates are symbolized in a nauonal day or in slogans and symbols. 
These continue to influence the educational life of the nauon. The 
educauon resulting from the nauonal crises should also be continued 
by the schools, particularly the lycdes Undergraduates constitute the 
portion of die youth that is most vulnerable to arses. Young minds 
snmulated by posmv e saences are prone to analyse values in terms of 
the logic of natural saences, and may fall into grave doubts which 
may cause acute crises in their minds. Disbelief in dungs once cherished 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 243 

is one of the most painful tensions that youth can suffer In Europe, in 
order to help students m this period of crises, the humanities are intro- 
duced into the lyaSe education to counteract the influence of the natural 
sciences. As the humanities serve to protea national culture against 
the natural sciences, they should be the main pillars of education and 
teaching. 

Three types may be differentiated among the youth during the crisis 
period (a) the type in which national culture has lost its entire meaning 
under the onslaught of the analytical effects of the natural sciences 
This is the Epicurean type which is found everywhere The Epi- 
cureans not only disbelieve in ideals, they hate them. (&) Culture may 
lose us rational basis in the mind of the individual, but may continue 
to hate a sentimental support The type which represents this state 
does not merely believe, hie the Epicureans, in ihe philosophy of life 
whose maxim is ‘the maximum pleasure and the minimum pain’ or 
‘the maximum gam and the minimum loss’ He, on the contrary, seeks 
pain. This is the Stoic type which is less frequently found. It is the 
type who is unable to believe in what he loves, (c) The third type is 
the one in whose mind culture has both rauonal and sentimental 
foundations. He is attached to the values and believes in them. These 
are idealists. The Epicurean is a complete non-national type The Stoic 
is national by emotion but non-national by intellect. The idealist is 
entirely a nauonal type. 

The aim of educauon is to develop this nauonal type The creauon 
of such types means the creauon of a nation. And it also means the 
creauon of individual personaliues because the individual acquires 
genuine personality only as he becomes a genuine representauve of his 
culture. Only infants and animals are anauonal, and therefore these 
human beings who disbelieve in their nauonal culture are degenerate, 
devoid of personality The individual has a genuine personality in 
direct relanon to the degree to which he has incorporated the culture 
in himself. If individuality means personality, it is absolutely incorrea 
to claim that nauonal educauon does not further the development of 
individuals. The aim of nauonal educauon is to build representauve 
personaliues, and thus, to build men as well as the nauon. 

Those who reject hts understanding of nauonal educauon hav e been 
misled by a wrong view once put forward by exponents of Volktr- 
pt)xhobgu, according to w hich the nauonal type is simply the average 
type- Modem sociology, which has enabled us to dispense with this 



244 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
pseudo-science called Volkirpsychohgu, has conclusively proven the 
inadequacy of that view on the national type. As Durkheint has con- 
clusively shown, the average is only an abstract of the individual type, 
whereas die national type is represented not by the average but by the 
type which incorporates the minds of the nation The real representa- 
tives of a nation are men of genius and heroes of action. The genius is 
the hero of the intellect, and the hero is the genius of the will. Only 
these chosen ones represent the intellect and the will of 3 nation. The 
national type is to be looked for, not among the library erudites who 
cany in their heads the anational learning, but in the heroic type of 
the nation. . . . 

After clarification of these points we should warn the reader not to 
get the impression that we claim that education is moulding children on 
the pattern of the national type, which might lead him tt> believe that 
we want our children to look like the peasants of Anatolia- < • • We do 
not believe that social values are represented in the average type. . . . 

It is believed erroneously by certain people that my view on educa- 
tion are like those peculiar to the Germans. These men believe that the 
Anglo-Saxon education is a non-national education. As a matter of 
fact, English educaaon is the most national education. No people are 
more attached to their national insnnmons than the British. They are 
distinguished from the Germans by their emphasis on the ‘community* 
as opposed to the Germans’ emphasis on the state. As w 6 also rely on 
the state, we are perhaps nearer to the Germans ... In short, it is not 
true that the German educaaon is collecdvisac whereas the Anglo- 
Saxon is individualistic. Both are national and cultural. Only among 
the French is educaaon avilizauomsuc rather than cultunsac. The 
French regard themselves not as the continuaaon of the Gauls but 
rather as the inheritors of the classical Greek and Roman civilisations. 
French culture is nodung but a modernized version of dus classical 
avilizaaon The Germans and ihe Anglo-Saxons have ceded from the 
Latin civilization by religious and aesdieuc reactions, such as the 
Reformanon and Romanticism. Luther and Shakespeare represent the 
nauonal reacuons, as opposed to Catholicism and the classical dramas. 
France remained both classical and Catholic without following the same 
reaction. . . . 

When I defined educauon as ‘the adaptauon of the individuals to 
the nanonal culture’, and when I added the ad;ecuve ‘nauonal* as 
natural and mdispensible, 1 believed lhat 1 was reacting against die 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 245 

French rather than against the Anglo-Saxon education. We have good 
reason to instigate such a reaction against French education, because 
the system prevalent in our country ever since the Tanjimat era has 
been precisely this French civilization-education. The system in force 
before that era was similarly a civilization-education At the present 
time we are proposing to instigate national education as culture- 
education and to dispense with civilization-education. 

IV 

Above I had distinguished education from training, the former as 
the individual's adaptation to culture, the latter as the individual’s 
adaptation to technology, showing that culture is national and tech- 
nology anauonal, I concluded that education is national w hereas train- 
ing is anational As I had discussed the relevance of education and 
training to nationality from the point of view of culture and technology, 
I will discuss here the same thing with respect to modernity, again from 
the same point of view. 

As educauon is a mamfestauon of culture, the existence of a modem 
education in a society vill be possible only with the existence of a 
modem culture in that society. 

The nation is the social type in which the state is based on popular 
sovereignty. . Among diverse types of society it is only the nation 
that can be called a modem state The word 'modem' does not neces- 
sarily refer to the present time, but mainly to the societal advancement 
attained today. The nation is a modem society just as its culture is a 
modem culture. Like modem culture, modem education can be found 
only in ihe social species which we call nation The Turks in the pre- 
Islamic period lived first as confederates of tribes . . , then in the Islamic 
era as an ummet The old Ottoman state, for example, was an ummet, 
retaining, however, certain aspects of the older Turkish confederates. 
As the Ottoman Turks founded a state on the basis of an ummet, they 
destroyed tribal and hereditary aristocratic institutions and replaced 
the [feudal] lords by die appointed lords of die emperor [In Persia] 
the Safauds [another dynasty stemming from ihe Oghuz Turks, from 
whom the Ottoman dynasty also stemmed], on the other hand, returned 
to the older [tribal] confederacy as they promised the Turkomans to 
restore the old tnbal and aristocratic institutions. In their organization, 
in which each tribe had a hereditary khan, the shah was the khan of the 



24<J TURKISH NATIONALISM ANP WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
khans. Two parts of the ancient Oghuz, thus, established two contra- 
dictory systems, one in Persia and the other in Turkey, Since die 
Ottoman Turks eliminated mbal chiefs and feudal seigneurs, Turkey 
became a national state, while in Persia both still exist The Ottoman 
Turks are today in a stage of transition from an ummtt form to a 
modem nation. They have a modem culture which is jet on an un- 
conscious les eL As it will not be difficult to awaken it, the foundation 
of a modem education already exists among us. As I indicted above, 
modem education can exist only in a modem state, and *t he 
realized only by awakening national culture, not by importing it from 
somewhere else. 

Modem training, on the other hand, presents an entirely different 
situation. Modem training means instructing the members of a nation 
m all of modem technology, which does not necessarily exist in the 
nation originally but may exist outside of it and may be taken from 
there. The modem technology of our tune is the basis of contemporary 
civilization, that is, of European avalization. Our joining European 
avilization is occasioned by its technology, just as our union with 
Islamic avalization was by religion. It is erroneous to think that the 
Turks having a modem culture is a result of their joining European 
avihzauon. Our culture is national because our soaal structure is 
national We can even say that at the time when European soaenes 
had a feudal structure, we had a democratic one. In order to under- 
stand lhat modem culture and technology owe their existence to 
different origins, it is enough to note that although the Turks had a 
national culture, at least uncoasaously, they still lack any part of 
modem technology. Or, Persia, for example, may introduce all modern 
techniques from Europe, but may not develop a modem culture as 
long as she lacks a modem soaal structure and as long as she continues 
her present-day tribal and feudal institutions. 

Modem educauon, like modem culture, is a manifestation of the 
very life of the nauon. Modem training, on the other hand, can be 
adopted from a civilization which. Idee modem technology, is inter- 
national. Therefore, we have to make our educauon thoroughly 
national. If we achieve this, if our soaety, in structure and type, be- 
comes a modem soaety, our education in the long run will acquire a 
modem character. Otherwise, that is, if our soaety is soil far from 
being modem, we must not expect to be able to giv e our children a 
modem educauon. . . • 



*47 


RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 
In short, in modem society children get their modem education 
only when they are given a national education. In a society which is 
not modem, the children will get neither a modem nor a national 
education merely through the attempt at giving them a modem educa- 
tion On the contrary, the product of such an attempt will be nothing 
but a youth devoid of character, stability, and culture. As we believe 
that we are a modem society, it is enough for us to see to it that our 
education becomes national When it does, we will inevitably have a 
modem education. For us, the aim of a national education w ould imply 
at the same time the realization of the aims of modem education. We 
do not have to adopt other cultural values or education from Europe. 
If our cultural values and our education are similar to those of European 
soaeucs, this is due not to any copying but to the fact that, perhaps, w e 
belong to the same social type . . . 

As the educator » a representative of the nation, the trainer «s the 
leader of modernity As the aim of education is national cultivation, 
the aim of training is modernity The professor and the teacher are 
both educators and instructors at the same nme Training has both 
educational and instructive funcuons. This double character serves the 
national Integra uon as well as modem progress. 

Let me, therefore, conclude my discussion in the following way: 
while w e are not in need of Europe from the point of view of culture 
and education, we badly need it from the point of view of techniques 
and learning Let us try to acquire everything in techniques from 
Europe, but let us find our culture only in our own national souL 
To nationalize education and to modernize teaching — these are the 
two goals w e should aim at in the field of education 1 

MODERN FAMILY AND NATIONAL CULTURE 15 


Psychologists divide psychological phenomena under three faculties, 
called sensibility, intelligence, and will. Like the individual, every 
nauon has its own soul, and if we wish to draw parallels between 
sociology and psychology, we may divide the soul of a nauon into 
three sets of mechanisms, namely culture, civilization, and state. 
Corresponding to the faculty of sensibility m individual psychology ,we 
may call die senuent experiences of a nauon its culture. Corresponding 
to the faculty of intelligence in individual psy chology, the rauonal con- 



248 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
cepts of a nation consatute a civilizaaon. And finally, corresponding to 
the will in individual psychology, nations manifest their will in the state. 

The culture of a nation is unique to itself. Its sources are the 
religious, moral, and aesthetic experiences of the nation. These ex- 
periences constitute the most intimate, the innermost feelmgs, of the 
nation These inner feelmgs are intimate expressions of the nation’s 
personality, as its language is a mirror of its lustoncal and social life. 

The civilizaaon of a nation, on die other hand, is not peculiar to 
itself alone Civilizaaon is composed of sciences, techniques, and 
methods which are transmitted from nation to nation. . . . The fact 
that civilizaaon is commonly shared by many nations indicates that 
nations do not live in isolation, that lhey are parts of larger groups: 
the larger circle comprising the naaons of the same civilization we call 
a civilization- group 

The differentiation of naaons with regard to culture and their 
similanues with regard to civilization resemble the disagreement about 
senaments and the agreement on rational matters between individuals 
The old saying ‘There is only one road for reason’ signifies clearly its 
unifying role. The pros erbs- ‘Do not argue about taste’, ‘You can 
argue about doctrine, but you cannot argue about manners’ show that 
in most cases men disagree on matters of feeling. Naaons unite in a 
civilization because there is only one way to attain that which ts rauonal 
for them, they differ in culture because their tastes and manners are 
peculiar to themselves. 

The state, which is the sum total of the msatuaons of law, should 
in its ideal form be national, like culture. But this ideal form has 
scarcely materialized up to our time, fn most cases, we find a nation 
either politically organized in several forms of state or a state compris- 
ing several nations . . . 

Over against the contention that specific religious, moral, and 
aestheuc feelings consatute the culture of a nation, one may say that 
several naaons are found which share the same feelings. It is true that 
several naaons share the same religion, morality, and aesthetics in their 
docmnal, technical, and methodological aspects. These rational or 
intellectual elements belong to the structure of civilizaaon irrespecuve 
of the instituuon to which they may refer. Contrariwise, senumental 
and emotional elements— such as taste, manners, and intmaon, no 
matter to what institution they may refer— always constitute the ele- 
ments of culture. 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 249 

II 

We belonged 10 Iranian civilization before the Tanpmat era. Our 
rational sciences, techniques, and methods at that tune (whether they 
had been taken o'er originally from Greece or India) were derived 
from the shuuliyah civilization, a product of the Abbasi period which 
was in general under Iranian influence Another name which we may 
use for this ihu'uiiyaA civilization is Iranian civilization. When we 
were in the period of transition from this civilization to European 
civilization, we should have changed only our reason and way of 
thinking, techniques, and methods. We should have taken over from 
Europe only the lessons of the new civilization But, as the leaders of 
die Tan^imat did not recognize the existence of culture as distinct 
from that of civilization, they wanted to extend the process of Euro- 
peanization even to die most intimate sources of our national personal- 
ity. That was their greatest mistake. 

Doubtless, we would not has e been able to survive at that age with- 
out accepting and assimilating European civilization unconditionally 
Since die leaders of the Tanymat realized dus and put it into practice, 
we are deeply indebted to them. Under the circumstances of their age, 
their understanding of a renascence could not be otherwise. But to 
dunk in this way today w ould be unpardonable. 

Yes, we sliall accept European civilization unconditionally But 
because of our national culture, we shall still remain distinct from the 
odier European nations in that civilization, just as the French, the 
English, the Germans, and the Russians are fundamentally separated 
from each other by dicir respective cultures, in spue of the fact that 
all of them belong 10 die same civilization. The differences between the 
cultures of these nations are deepening every day rather than disappear- 
ing. Nauonal personalities are becoming more and more strong, vital, 
and pronounced. In view of the fact that die European nations, al- 
though they share the same origins as far as religion and race are con- 
cerned, differ so profoundly from each other, is it not natural that the 
Turks, who do not sliare the same religious and racial origins, should 
have a culture more at variance with them? 

However, we do not claim that our old culture will remain intact 
once we enter European avilizauon. Just as the faculues of sensibility, 
intelligence, and will, in individual psychology, interact, so in the 
make-up of national personality, culture, civilization, and state affect 



2J0 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
each other. Therefore, the innovations to take place in our civilization 
and state will certainly pave the way for several changes and develop- 
ments in our cultural life. It is true that changes in culture depend 
upon changes in the social structure How ever, cultural changes are 
not due solely to structural changes, civic and political changes affect 
the social structure as well and, therefore, lead indirectly to cultural 
changes Just as there is an interdependence between individual 
psychological faculties, so the social mechanisms, culture, civilization, 
and state too are dependent upon each other. Therefore, we must 
admit that our national culture will undergo changes in the process of 
Westernization 

It is, however, wrong to think that this change will take place only 
by using Europe as a model and simply imitating it, as we did in our 
civic and political reforms Civic and pohucal changes may take place 
in a purely mechanical way, somewhat like the growth of inanimate 
objects, by mere additions from the outside. Change in culture, on the 
other hand, is comparable to the creative evolution which takes place 
in living organisms under the impulse of an internal elan. A new 
avalization and system of law can change naaonal feelings only when 
they penetrate into the soul of the nation and become assimilated 
within il Neither through instruction nor through legislation, neither 
through imitation nor through suggestion, can one directly change 
deep-seated feelings. Reformers can inculcate new feelings in a nation 
only when they have established a spiritual influence over the people, 
and this influence exists only in those men who have been influenced 
and educated by the nation itself The suggestive power of reformers 
and educators is derived, not from a common avilization but from the 
national culture. 

m 

It follows from these observations that we have to be the disciples 
of Europe in avilizauon, but entirely independent of it in culture 
With respect to law, which is the basis of the state, the situation is 
twofold to the extent that law is based on moral feelings it has one foot 
in culture, but as it is based on modem sciences, methods, and techni- 
ques, it has ns other foot in avilization. This double feature, which is 
found in the state and other institutions, is also characteristic of the 
institution of the family, which is the main subject of this essay. When 
we were patterning our avilization after that of Europe, the acceptance 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 2fl 

of certain European conceptions of family and womanhood, in place 
of the older ones, was inevitable. The rise of the movements for modem 
family and modem womanhood in our country were consequences of 
this necessity But when we study the question more closely, we find 
that each European nation holds a different and characteristic concep- 
tion of family and womanhood although there is a certain underlying 
attitude which is common to alL Undoubtedly, this common attitude 
is the product of their common civilization as much as different and 
unique feelings are expressions of independent national cultures Thus, 
within the same common European family-pattern we find the varieties 
of the typical English family, French family, German family, etc. As an 
example, we may take the problem of the fair treatment of women and 
feminism, which I have discussed in a previous paper These two prob- 
lems, which characterize modem European civilization with regard to 
family, refer to attitudes that are commonly shared in that civilization. 
These two attitudes, however, manifest themselves in each of the 
European nations in entirely different psychological forms. Each 
nation, being too jealous in presen mg its own uniqueness, does not 
deign to imitate the others The guardian of national culture is national 
pnde. Jealousy and pnde, which are usually bad traits with respect to 
other matters, are regarded as very praiseworthy with regard to the 
preservation of culture. A nation mam tains its existence by protecting 
its own national character A nauon which regards other nanons as its 
superior is degenerate. 

If so, w e Turks can recognize the Europeans as superior in civiliza- 
tion. In civilization w e can be their disciples and their imitators. But, 
beware, we should never view the culture of other nations as superior 
to our own* We should by no means be the disciples or imitators of 
other nations in matters of culture. We can take over unconditionally 
at ic modes of thinking from Europe. Our progress in civilization will 
follow the lines of the European civilization. There is no danger, no 
harm, m this. But the growth of our culture can never follow the same 
route. Our culture can grow only from inside and by an inner evolu- 
tion, although it will evolve in accordance with the changes taking 
place in our social structure and in our avic and polincal organizations, 
exactly as a seed grows and flourishes in its own inner development by 
utilizing earth, water, and air 

In Turkej , the institutions of the family as well as other institutions 
are now undergoing sev ere enses because of our failure to see these 



2J2 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
fundamental differences between the progress of civilizations and the 
growth of cultures. The Westerrusts, on the one side, are emphasizing 
the importance of progress in civilization because of their unawareness 
of the existence of national culture, thus, they urge, as they do for 
everything, blind imitation of Europe m matters of the family ulti- 
mately leading towards the destruction of the nauonal family as they 
stnve to attain the modem family. On the other side, the extremist 
Eastemists wholeheartedly reject the modem family and the modem 
conception of womanhood because of their fear of the disintegration of 
the traditional family. From our poult of view, both of these extremist 
views are wrong There is no doubt that the Turkish family will be 
modernized by the introduction of new conceptions from European 
civilization But the Turkish family will be a copy neither of the French 
or English nor of die German family- Turkish womanhood certainly 
will better itself by benefiting from the progress of modem civilization 
But the Turkish woman will not be a copy-cat of French or <?f English 
or of German w omanhood. 

The growth of culture follows the path of the inner evolution which 
all bang beings undergo. The cultural evolution of farady and w Q man- 
hood, therefore, can follow the same process. It is for tins reason that 
we can more or less predict the shape of the future Turkish family in 
its civic aspects, but we do not have at our disposal any objective 
criteria by which to decide the future cultural course that the Turkish 
family and w omanhood will follow. We can idenufy the product to be 
bom out of die living organism only when it is bom. 

Although we are unable to determine the future of our national 
family in a positive way, we can, however, help it to evolve normally 
in a negaav e way. Can w e not apply the method of negativ e education 
— which Jean Jacques Rousseau recommended to protect nature against 
avilizauon — in order to protect, in our case, our culture against 
civilization* In order to do this, we must reject everything that looks 
as if it were only sheer imitation of the types of family and w omanhood 
in other nations As we succeed in this rejection, social evolution wall 
follow its normal course and wall one day give nse to our national 
family and our own womanhood. 

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE TURKISH FAMILY 1 * 

In the previous essay we saw that we can guess the civic elements 
which the Turkish family is likely to assume in the future. A similar 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAUILY 2J3 

prediction, however, is rather impossible for the cultural elements of 
the family. 

This view is in accord with the philosophy of Bergson, the most 
original thinker of our time. For him the changes to take place in the 
realm of physical reality are predictable, whereas those to occur in the 
biological reality are not. . . In nay view, social reality too has a 
mechanical and 3n organic aspect. Progress and retrogression in 
civilization, for example, belong to the mechanical aspect of social life 
and, as such, they are predictable on the basis of our knowledge of the 
preceding causes. Cultural evolution and decline, on the other hand, 
belong to the organic aspect of social reality, and are elusive of any 
determination before their actual happening 

Although Bergson believed that we are unable to predict the events 
of biological reality, he, at the same time, believed that they could be 
grasped by intuition. Life, according to him, is an elan vital In order 
to grasp where this elan is driving us, we have to go back to its 
beginnings and experience continuously the cun-ent of evoluuon it 
has undergone. Only then can w e feel w hich phases this drive will pass 
through in the future. Bergson tned to grasp the orientations of the 
lion vital by using this method in his Creative Evolution. I believe that 
this method is more applicable in the field of cultural sociology. Thus, 
in order to anticipate the future course of the family among the Turks, 
we have to go back to its origins. 

In a p khous essay 17 I have shown that among the anaenc Turks 
women had a legal sums equal with, or even sometimes supenor to, 
that of men. . . . Why* 

Among primitive societies religious life manifested itself in two 
different systems: m religion and in magic. At this stage of society 
magic commuted a system partially separate from the religious system 
but not y et entirely divorced from it. Therefore, in societies at this 
stage the religious and magical systems were equal in importance. 
Rene Maurncr shows that in Melanesia harvest work, which consisted 
of a senes of magical activities, was done by w omen because they were 
believed to possess magical powers. He says ‘The idea of the magical 
pow ers of w omen explains how women were left outside of the religion 
in the relauvely advanced soaety of die Melanesians where women 
previously had had religious functions. The powers ascribed to diem 
were originally magical powers. This conception belonged to a penod 
ui which religion and magic were mixed. When religion and magic 



2J4 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
became differentiated from and antagonistic to each other, women 
were relegated to the sphere of magic because they were considered as 
earners of evil powers and were kept apart from sacred objects’ (‘Vie 
religieuse et vie economique', la division du travail, p. 36, note). . . • 
Among the ancient Turks, the magical system was represented by 
shamanism and the religious system by tote. ... As these two systems 
had an equal value among them . . . there was equality between men 

and women The non-equality between men and women in some 

other societies was connected with the unequal status of magic and 
religion. The more the antagonism between religion and magic 
deepened, the more the inequality of men and women widened In 
ancient Persian magiamsm . . . there was no difference between religion 
and magic . . . and women were not looked down upon. When 
Zoroaster founded his new religion which was based on asceticism, he 
divorced religion from magic, then women began to be looked upon as 
impure Thus, in all asceuc religions . . . magic is prohibited and women 
occupy a lower status Women were equal to men among the ancient 
Turks because their religion was not an asceuc one. The religion of 
Islam was, in die Prophet’s tune, a religion of enthusiasm, and women 
were not regarded as inferior, though it [Islam] prohibited but did not 
reject magic as false. But when the asceuc concepuons of the Iranian 
and Greek Orthodox religions penetrated through to the Muslims in 
the Abbasi period, the ideas about the inferiority of women spread 
among the Muslims too. When the Turks came into contact with them 
they also were influenced by the same ideas throughout die centuries. 
It was only when the importance of magic reappeared under another 
name [that is to say, as avilizauon] during the Tan^tmat period that 
women began to gam higher status Culture is a product of religion, 
whereas avilizauon is an evoluuon from ancient magic. . . . Con- 
temporary avilizauon is the successor of ancient magic. Bodi are not 
nauonal but intemauonal Both aim at uulitarian purposes and, thus, 
are antagonistic to asceuc religion and morality, both have given 
higher status to women If the intensity of the intrinsically altruisuc 
and sacrifice-demanding religious and moral feelings are not tempered 
by the secularizing influences of magic and avilizauon, these feelings 
become intensely asceuc. The basis of an ecstauc religion is love; that 
of an asceuc religion, fear The believer in ecstauc religion loves his 
God, whereas the asceuc is afraid of his deity. The one avoids only 
inferior pleasures, whereas the other extends tbs avoidance even to 



RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY 2J5 

aesthetic pleasures. Thus, the disappearance of magic intensified the 
ascetic character of the religions and led to the loss of the value of 
women as well as of fine arts. Now*, with the nse of [secular] civiliza- 
tion, religion is changing from an ascetic to an ecstatic character, and 
with this transformation women as well as fine arts are regaining their 
equal status . . . 

We see, in short, that the equality of men and women among the 
ancient Turks was connected with the equal status of the systems of 
religion and magic. The existence of a higher sexual morality among 
them . . . IS was due to the fact that the goddess of fertility, w ho was 
regarded as the enemy of chastity among the Chaldeans and Greeks, 
was held in esteem by the Turks as die guardian of innocence and virtue. 



CHAPTER VIII 


NEW ORIENTATIONS 

ib 


TOWARDS THE PEOPLE 1 

One of the fundamental principles of Turkism is the drive towards 
‘going to the people’. . . What is meant by going to the people? 
Who are to go to these people * 

The intellectuals and the thinkers of a nauon constitute its Ate. 
The members of the Ate are separated from the masses by their higher 
education and learning. It is they it ho ought to go to the people. But 
why* Some would answer, in order to carry culture to the masses 
But, as we have shown elsewhere, culture is something which is alive 
only among the people themselves The Ate are those who lack it 
Then, how can the Ate, lacking culture, carry culture to the common 
people who are a living embodiment of culture* 

To answer the question, let us first answer the following questions: 
what do the dlite and the people have* The Ate are the earners of 
civilization and the people the holders of culture. Therefore, the elite’s 
approach to die people should only have the following t« o purposes 
to receive a training in culture from the people and to cany civiliza- 
tion to them. Yes, it is only with these two purposes that the dlire 
should go to the people. The Ate will find culture only there and no- 
where else. — 

The Ate do not acquire national culture through education from 
childhood. The schools in which they study are not die people’s 
schools or national schools Our Ate get their education without 
acquiring national culture. Their education merely senes to de- 
nationalize them. They need to compensate the shortcoming by mixing 
with die people, by living with diem, by learning their language, by 
observing die way diey use their vernacular, by hstening to their 
proverbs, their traditional wit and wisdom, by noting their mode of 
dunking and their style of feeling, by listening to their poetry and 
music, by seeing their plays and dances, by penetrating into their 
religiosity and morality, by tasting beauty m the simplicity of their 



260 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
clothes, thesr architecture, and their furniture. They should learn the 
folk-tales, anecdotes, epics, and beliefs, which are survivals from the 
ancient tore . . They should read their books, the books of the 
minstrels from Korkut Ata onwards, the hymns of my sacs from Yunus 
Emre onwards, the people’s humour from Nasreddin Hoca onwards, 
and discover the karagoi [shadow plays] and the ortaoyunu [open-air 
plays] They have to find the old coffee-houses of the people where 
epics are being read, experience the nights of the holy month, the 
Friday communal feast gatherings, the religious holidays to which 
children look forward with so much enthusiasm. They have to build 
national museums in which works of art of the people will be exhibited 

It is only this way, only through such a contact with the national 
folk culture, and only by saturating their souls with the Turkish culture 
that the ilite of the Turkish nanon will nanonalize themselves It was 
through such a nauonal educanon that Pushkin became the nanonal 
poet of the Russians Men like Dante, Petrarch, Rousseau, Goethe, 
Schiller, D’Annunzio became great creators of art and literature only 
because they had received their inspirauons from the people. 

As sociology has shown, genius is hidden in the people. An artist 
becomes a genius only because he becomes a mamfestaaon of the 
aestheac taste of the people. The reason why we lack great anises is 
that our men of art do not receive their aestheac inspirations from the 
living museum of the people No one, so far, has valued the art of the 
people The old Ottoman elite scorned the peasant as 'stupid Turk'; 
the people of Anatolia were ndiculed as 'outsiders’, the ntle given to 
the people was ‘vulgar’ The ’refined’ were the Ottoman <51ite, who were 
the slaves of the court. As they had despised the people, nothing m 
language, poetry, literature, music, philosophy ethics, polices, and 
economics has survived from the hemage of this ancient elite. The 
Turkish people have to start agam from ABC. They did not even have 
a name as a nauon unul recently The Tsunami* said to them. ‘You 
are Ottomans. Don’t claim a nauonal existence disanct from other 
Fm° nS .■ TI? 0U d V OU U,U ause destruction of the Ottoman 


G R,’,t I th ln n 0t “ Turk ’ 1 ^ noUun S but an Ottoman.’ 
foreign ^ not •“ «> spite of whatever they did, 

OttnmiI n r n " TUrklS}l n , auons wou,d do their best to secede from the 
Ottoman ComnuMW eadi because such amficial commonwealths com- 
posed of several naaons could no longer survive. Each nanon would be 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 2<Jt 

independent and would have its own homogeneous, genuine, natural 
social life. This trend of social evolution, which had started in Western 
Europe five centimes earlier, certainly would start in Eastern Europe 
too. The downfall of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman 
Empires after the [first] World War has shown that this is very near. 
What would be the fate of the Turks once they faced this catastrophe 
without a realization that they themselves were a nation, that they too 
had their own home and their rights in the Ottoman Empire 3 Were 
they to say ‘As the Ottoman Empire fell, we do not have national 
hope, or political aspiration any more 3 ’ When the Wilsonian points 
were known, certain conscientious Ottomanists, who until then had 
remained indifferent to Turkism, began to say ‘What would be our 
state today if Turkism had not taught many of us that we had a 
national home ethnographically drawn, a national existence indepen- 
dent of the Ottoman Empire, a nauonal nght to rule in this home 
in complete independence 3 ’ It was only one word, that sacred 
word Turk, which showed us the nght path to be followed amidst 
anarchy 

Turkists not only taught the elite the name of the nauon, but also 
the beauuful language of the nauon As the name they gave to the 
nauon was taken from the people, this language also was taken from 
the people, because both iiad existed only among the people The ilite 
had beat living the life of somnambulists unul then They, like som- 
nambulists, had a dual personality Their real personality was the Turk, 
but they thought themselves Ottomans under the delusions of their 
somnambulism. While their real language was Turkish, they talked an 
artificial language in their delirium In poetry, they put aside their own 
metre and sang in artificial menes copied from the Persians 

Turkists, like a psychiatrist, tned to cure this split personality by 
making them believe that they were not Ottomans but Turks, that 
their language was Turkish, and that their poetry was the people’s, 
they even demonstrated these scientifically It was only then that the 
ihte were cured from this abnormal state of somnambulism and began 
to think as normal men. 

We must confess, however, that so far these men have taken only 
one step forward towards the people. To reach die people in a real 
sense, they must Live amongst the people and get the nauonal culture 
from the people. The only way to do this ts for the nationalist youth 
to go to v illages as schoolteachers. Those who are not young should at 



2<Sj TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
least go to the towns in inner Anatolia. The Ottoman elite will become 
a national £hte only by completely assimilating the folk culture. 

The second aim of going towards the people is to carry civilization 
to the people. The people lack civilization and the ihte have its keys. 
But the civilization that they should cany to the people as a precious 
contribution will not be Onental civilization or its offshoot, Ottoman 
civilization, but Western civilization, as we shall show below. 


TOWARDS GENIUS® 

. . Science 1 tells us what is normal and what is pathological, but 
this knowledge does not satisfy all our spinrual needs. Man wants to 
know what is 'normal' through his intellect, but he also wants to dis- 
cover what is 'original* through his sensibility. 'Original* is that which 
is nor a product of imitation but is genuine. . . . Anything ‘original’ is 
natural, sincere, beautiful, and unique. Thus, originality is the basic 
concept of an and aesthetics. 

When we look at our life with the eye of a real artist, what do we 
hnd as original’ > Our old literature was an imitation of Persian litera- 
ture and, therefore, was not original at all. Our modem literature is an 
imitation of French literature and, therefore, it too is not original The 
same goes for our music, old and new' Is there nothing ongmal in 


If we «arch for it only among the elite, no, we shall not find anj- 
thing ongmaL The two types of elite w hich w e had in our history were 
artificially created specimens The old-fashioned due of the Endtrun 
hi wfr-K a T d , d,te ? fthe w ere like flowers nused in 

□ , 6 m e soJ country never saw these artificial 

r k T' f l d Pe ^ e * ho 6™ naturally dtd not know any of the 
side corned rh ** ^ of ^ ellle drew their ideas from out- 
others and t unages from foreigners, borrowed their feelings from 

*° a «? ^ intellect. They were feudal 

attic and prottacrfS tTtT ^ IOOl “? ** P “ P . “ 

notfctnemnetdtanon^a,” 

them there'is^a mOi P<X> ^ e not ““tst only of these. Outside of 
maSS Uho Uere ,ooked U P°» * cattle before the 

SSiXt 11131 Ae *— “ n * 

j cm the people . In Turkey the people are 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 2 6j 

just the opposite of the elite. Just as there is nothing original in the 
ilite, so there is nothing which is not original in the people. Everything 
among the people, their way of clothing, their spirit of surrender and 
quietness, their unpretentious heroism, in short, their whole life, is 
original. We find the same originality in the people’s works of art. 
The West knows only two original figures among us— Nasreddin 
Hoca and Karagoz. But, xn addition to these, are the tales of Asik 
Keren, Safi Ismail, Koroglu not equally original * Are not the book of 
Dede Korkut, the hymns of Yunus Emre, die chants of the Bektashis, 
the Divan of Doth original 1 If we go farther back, the fairy-tales, 
ballads, epics, proverbs, and sayings hate the same original quality. 
In music, can we not say that the folk music of Aydin, Urfa, Diyar- 
bekir, Harput, and Egin are capable of being the bases of an original 
music* Our architecture, calligraphy, tile works, book-binding and 
illuminating, dyeing, textiles, arms, were all original pieces of folk art. 

It seems, therefore, that our people are the source of original beauty , 
and as the power which creates original works is called ‘genius’, the 
only source of genius for us is the people because there were no men of 
genius in [Ottoman] art Tlie first school of training in art, then, will 
be the life of the people, the natural and sincere experience of the 
people 

However, these original works of the people are technically primi- 
tive, they cannot satisfy refined tastes. Originality of a work does not 
necessarily imply perfection A real piece of art should be also the 
product of refinement. Therefore, our artists w ill not only be educated 
in the art of the people, but at the same time they should tram them- 
selves in die works of the great artists of the West. ... It is only when 
these two kinds of aesdietic educanon are thoroughly combined that a 
genuine national an will be created. 

Let us go back, for example, to die Renaissance penod of Italy The 
Italian artists of dlis period, es pea ally the painters and sculptors, were 
admiring the great w orks of the anaent Greeks and Romans because 
these liad attained die highest perfection in art. The artists of the 
Renaissance acquired die techniques of this anaent an with great 
enthusiasm and effort, but did not imitate diem because anaent 
mythology did not appeal to the people. For the people of the Renais- 
sance, die most beautiful woman was die Virgin Mary and the most 
beautiful man Jesus Christ. The duly of the artists of the people was 
to give an artistic expression to these symbols which were venerated 



164 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


and beautified m the soul of the people. Michelangelo and other artists 
discovered the right path. They gave the technical beauty of Venus to 
the Virgin Mary and transferred the corporeal perfection of Apollo 
to Christ. The saints were given all the beauty of the mythological 
figures The art of the Renaissance was bom as a national art, from, the 
synthesis of the two elements The Catholic Church appropriated this 
art and made itself a museum of it. The Orthodox Church continued 
to represent its sacred symbols not by following Gneco- Roman 
models but on the basis of crude patterns taken from the Semites, thus, 
the Orthodox Churches did not become places of any aesthetic mani- 
festation. Following the Renaissance, other nations did the same in the 
nse of their national art. Great men of genius, like Shakespeare, Rous- 
seau, and Goethe, had acquired an education in the people as well as 
in the classics of the ancients . . 

The reason why genuine arusts have not arisen among us is our 
failure to use these two great sources of creative inspiration. We have 
neither tasted the aesthetic experiences of the people nor been ac- 
quainted with the great works of art of the West. Even the objects of 
beauty of our people were shown to us by outsiders, by men like 
Pierre Loti We ourselves did not even see them. Who knows what 
other treasures of aesthenc value our people may have of which we are 
unaware 3 We are interested neither m them nor in the art of men of 
international attainment. We are restricting ourselves to that old and 
new literature of ours which are both devoid of any originality and 
genius And this not only arrests the advancement of our artistic life 
but even degenerates it. 


We see, therefore, that the source of genius is the people. Men of 
genius are conscious reflections of the people’s consciousness. But they 
have to attain the standards of international perfection in techniques 
in order to be the great artists of all nations. ... If one source of art 
is the creations of the people, the other source is the creations of men 
of mtemationa 1 attainment. Only those who dnnk the mag.c waters of 
bo* these springs will attain great achievements in art. . . . 
J* 1 ** 0 " and L m , oraI ^penences of the people are equally 
rnak J,I n “ 3 T h ° Ue “ I! them natlonaI culture The intellec- 
thevrTntJ' “T* * nat, ° n are ** leai of the nation only when 

JleCuICUreofthe P e °P ,ea ndon , y when their works bear 
SXSnl £ T* " hy ±e £ltK ° {the Western nations have 
this national character whereas ours do not, and why education raises 



NEW ORIENTATIONS l6f 

moral character there and why, when »t is not national, it lowers it 
here. 

To discover genius, therefore, let us turn towards the people and to 
the great works of the u orld 1 This is the second objective of the > outlu 

REVOLUTIONISM AND CONSERVATISM 4 
In one of my articles on political parties published in Hakumiytt-i 
Alilhytf I had pointed out the useful role of the conservative parties in 
the political life of a nation When revolutionists attempt to destroy 
past traditions and put new ideals m their places, conservatives raise 
their voices. ‘If you are going to destroy only the dead traditions', 
they say, ‘we are wuh you But if you attempt to destroy living tradi- 
tions, we shall oppose you 1 ’ 

What are living traditions’ What are the criteria by which one can 
distinguish dead traditions from living ones’ 

It is much easier to draw this distinction in Turkey than in any other 
country because there is among us, on die one hand, a whole tradition, 
called Ottoman civilization, that is entirely composed of such lifeless 
traditions and, on the other hand, another system which we call 
Turkish culture, whose traditions are all alive 

Are the grammatical rules of Arabic and Persian in the Ottoman 
language anything but examples of diese lifeless traditions’ Is aru{ 
anything but a dead tradition’ Are not gabels and kastdes, allafrango 
poems, ‘oriental’ music, mglu-club songs, literature of superstitions 
and phantasies, rococo architecture, decadent poetry, pessimistic and 
sceptic morality, etc., etc., all lifeless traditions’ Over against these, 
are not the language of the people, rhythms of folk poetry, the people's 
aesthetic taste, folk literature, folk morality, the wisdom of die people 
all living traditions in general’ 

The problem is quite dear we are revolutionists against Otto man- 
ism, but conservatives towards Turkish culture. The revolutionary 
Turkey of today is dunging only the Ottoman traditions Ottoman 
civilization is an Oriental avalization. Oriental avilizauon is not 
Islamic avilizauon. It is a continuation of Eastern Roman civilization 
Turkish revolutionism cannot by any means accept conservatism 
with respect to questions of avilizauon. Turkism is conservative only 
on questions of culture. Tins conservatism is not irreconalable with 
revolutionism. Liberal revolutionists have always served national 



266 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


cultures The only group which is not conservative on questions of 
culture is the radical group. Turkists cannot be radicals. Turkism, on 
the other hand, cannot be conservative on matters of civilization 
Civilization is the clothes of nations Just as individuals change their 
clothes so nations may do Turks, for example, have in the past turned 
from the civilization of the Far East to Oriental [Near Eastern] 
civilization And now there is no reason why they should not accept 
Western civilization provided they preserve their Turkishness and 
Islamic faith The latter two constitute w hat we call Turkish culture. 

In our acceptance of Western civilization, the most important point 
On which to be alert is the problem of the preservation of our national 
unity and integrity Turkish revolutionists should be conservauves 
only in this sense On this point we are in agreement with the conserva- 
tives. To be conservative on matters of culture is not at all an obstacle 
to progress National culture is something living , it is something which 
evolves by itself As culture is the product of the unconscious ego of 
“aety, no one can interfere with it on the basis of his individual 


consciousness National culture always inarches towards the right path 
and meets with success through divine guidance, it nev er errs. 

The only part of our life that we can improve by conscious control 
is civilization Civilization, in itself, is the product of individual con- 
sciousness. We have to accept the civilization of the West, because, tf 
we do not we shall be enslaved by the powers of the West. To master 
the civilization of the West, or to be mastered by die powers of the 
West between these alternatives we must choose' Today this truth is 
well understood in order to defend our freedom and independence 
against Europe, we have to conquer the civilization of the Europeans. 
European civilization consists of positive sciences, industrial technol- 
ogy, and social organization [division of labour]. If we had not intro- 
duced modem military techniques and methods of training from 
urope, how could we defend ourselves today against the aggressors’ 
The whole strength of Europe, the only superiority of it, lies xn its 
avilizauon It was only by means of us civilization diat Europe has 
been able to defeat Muslim nations and has become the master of the 


Why, then, should we ever hesitate in taking over this cmhzatioc 
which has proved so successful’ Did not our faith make it a duty form 
6 ° Ver r ^ nds ° f soence “d learning, as it is said : ‘Seek know- 
g even it be in China’, and 'Learning is the lost property of die 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 267 

believer; he should take it wherever he finds it* ’ And the science and 
learning of today are nothing other than what we call Western 
civilization. 

Western civilization is a continuation of ancient Mediterranean civil- 
ization. The earliest founders of the Mediterranean civilization were 
Turanian peoples, such as Sumerians, Elamites, Phoenicians, Hittites, 
Scythians, the Hyksos, and the Cumans There was a Turanian Age in 
history before the ancient ages. The early inhabitants of Western Asia 
v, ere Turks. These anaent Turks, w ho w ere attacked by Semites from 
the south and by Aryans from the north, were forced to turn tempo- 
rarily towards the Far East. But this temporary Eastern affinity does 
not prove anything against our affinity towards Western civilization. 
The earliest founders of the early Mediterranean civilization were our 
forefathers. Much later, Muslim Arabs, Persians, and Turks again 
improved this civilization and became the teachers of the uncivilized 
Europeans. By destroying the Western and Eastern Homan Empires, 
they brought about revolutions which twice changed the ages of 
history in Europe. Even today we have prepared the ground for the 
opening of a new era in history by causing the fall of the Tsarist 
regime in Russia.* We are connected with Western civilization through 
several contributions, and thus have a share in il 

What shall we take from European civilization 5 Not a national 
language, of course, because we ha\e a national language spoken by 
the masses. But we want methods of linguistics Thus, what we shall 
take is not the language but the science of language. We shall also 
develop our own modem neologisms corresponding to European 
scientific and industrial terms We shall certainly not take our standards 
of beauty from Europe because, fortunately, there is the national 
treasure of art of our own people But, again, we need the methods of 
aesthetics, and these we shall take from die West And, again, we shall 
certainly not take national morality from the West because our people 
have their own. But we do not know the methods of scientific inquiry 
in this field. Thus, w hat w e need is not a European moral code but the 
science of ethics. It is no more necessary, after these examples, to say 
that we shall not take religion from Europe. It ts religion that separates 
us from Europe more than anything else. Europe will always remain 
Christian as we shall remain Muslim. But, this, of course, w ill not pre- 
vent us from introducing the science of comparative religion from the 
West, because it is a science that studies all religions from the same 



263 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 


point of view and has elaborated methods u hereby religions are 
studied objectively. 

These observations lead us to the conclusion that we shall take from 
Europe not merely the results of these sciences in Europe Rather we 
shall take and use the methods of the sciences to reach the truth by 
ourselves We shall take not the products but the techniques of the 
applied sciences and technology. We shall, therefore, not copy the 
composition of European composers, but leam the methods and the 
techniques of modem music by which we shall harmonize the melodies 
sung by our people. The aim, therefore, is to arrange our national 
melodies on the basis of the techniques of modem music and produce 
our own modem national works of music In the field of literature, our 
aesthetic sense should be cultivated by translating Western classics 
mto our own language The classical literature of Europe is a healthy 
literature The kind of literature brought by decadents and phantasists 
is morbid The Ottomans copied only this morbid literature because 
Ottoman society was senile. The Turkish nation is a j oung nation 
which has emerged out of the ashes with full vigour. It is even yet in 
its infancy How can one give the w orks of w om-out and sick nations 
into the hands of the people of a jouthful nation 9 The emergence of 
such a healthy, young, and alert nation out of an old, sick, and senile 
Ottoman nation is one of the miracles of our ume How can we explain 
it 9 Was there a hidden world in Turkey which so far escaped the notice 
of everybody 9 Yes, indeed It was the Turkish people — living a life 
of Ergenekor 1 with their own language, literature, morality, philosophy, 
in short, with their own national culture The Ottoman civilization had 
fallen upon diem and concealed them from sight They are now emerg- 
ing from this Ergenekon under the leadership of the Grey Wolf as a 
healthy and gifted nation. 


TOWARDS WESTERN CIVILIZATION 8 

I 

As an old Turkish saying runs: ‘Know your work, jour food, and 
your mate’, so modem sociology would tell us ‘know your nation, 
j our religion, and your civilization’. 

The publications of the Turkists and national disasters taught us 
more or less where our nationality and our religious community he. 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 269 

On these two points there seems hardly any disagreement But on the 
question of the civilization to which we belong, there are still differ- 
ences and, perhaps, serious conflicts of view It is necessary, therefore, 
to begin with this question in our discussion of the problems of the 
nation. 

One of the reasons for the ambiguity in the question of civilization 
is the confusion existing with regard to the concepts ‘civilization’ and 
'being civilized’. Formerly, human societies were believed to belong 
to one of three states sav agery, barbarism, or civilization. Today, the 
word ‘savagery’ has been discarded altogether from the vocabulary of 
science. It is recognized today that even primitive peoples, once believed 
to be savage, have their own form of civilization It is even accepted 
that these primitive societies pass through certain stages of evolution 
and, thus, there are those who hesitate to use the term ‘primitive’ for 
these peoples 

If civilization is something which exists in all human societies, we 
might ask whether this is true also of animal societies. Civilization is 
the sum total of certain institutions, that is, of certain ways of thinking 
and acting. Animal societies are governed by instincts that are trans- 
mitted through biological inheritance. Among them, even division of 
labour and specialization are hereditary. Classes, the king, the labourers, 
and the soldiers are bom with certain organs necessary for die per- 
formance of their functions In animal societies there is nothing similar 
to the institutions that are transmitted through tradition and education. 
Thus, w e cannot speak of the existence of civilization in animal societies. 
We can, therefore, derive two principles with respect to avalization 
(a) civilization is found in all human societies, (i) civilization is found 
only in human societies As stated above, avilization is the sum total 
of certain institutions. The sum total of die institutions peculiar to a 
particular nation, however, is called culture As we also call all institu- 
tions widim a particular ummet, religion, what would be the position 
of die term civilisation with respect to culture and religion’ From a 
sociological point of view , we shall call the sum total of the institutions 
found commonly among different societies w Inch belong to different 
cultures and religions, a avilization. Societies foreign to each other 
from die point of v lew of culture or of religion may belong to die 
same civilization. Just as differences in culture do not necessarily bar 
sharing in die same religion, so differences in culture and in religion do 
not prev eat association within die same avalization. Thus, for example. 



270 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
the Jews and the Japanese share the same civilization with European 
nations although they differ from them both in culture and religion. 

A second reason for die existence of vagueness about the problem 
of civilization is the supposition that there is only one kind of avaliza- 
tion In fact, there are several kinds of avilizauon. Australian aborigines, 
North American Indians, African tribes, Oceanic tribes belong to 
different areas of avilization. In ancient times, there was a Mediter- 
ranean civilization shared by the nauons of the Mediterranean basin. 
The Ancient Greek and through it the Roman avihzations were off- 
shoots of this Mediterranean avilization. Later, Roman avilization 
gave way to the Eastern and Western avihzations In East Asia there 
was the avilization of the Far East to which Chinese, Mongols, 
Tungiiz, Tibetans, and Indo-Chinese hav e belonged, even until now. 
Archaeologists, studying human remains under the earth, can tell us 
the avilization areas of prehistoric peoples. Students of folklore also 
find that tales, myths, epics, and proverbs are distributed to different 
areas of avilization. These examples show that avilization areas had 
geographical bases and were delimited by distinct boundaries. A folk- 
ole or a tool, for example, was diffused to certain limits but not farther 
because every avilization had its own system. Each avthzanon had its 
own logic, its own aesthetic standards, its own Weltanschauung. For 
this reason, different avalizations could not mix freely with each other. 
Again, for the same reason, when a society does not take a certain 
civilization in its entirety as a system, it fails to take its parts also. 
Even if it takes some parts, it fails to digest and assimilate them. As in 
religion, so also in avilizauon it has to be taken from us inside and not 
from its outside. Civil izauon, too, requires sincere believing and loyalty. 
Our Tanjtmat reformas, who failed to understand this point, attempted 
to introduce European avilization by imitating appearances only. 
Their attempt was destined to fail. 

Just as geographic areas of avilizations are distinct from each other, 
their separate historical evolutions are also independent of each other. 
In each, evolution has a beginning and an end. But, as avilization- 
groups are wider than culture-groups, the life span of a avdization- 
group is longa than that of a culture-group. 

Furthermore, when a nation advances to the higher stages of its 
evolution, it finds it necessary to change us avilizauon too. The 
Japanese, for example, dropped the avilizauon of the Far East and 
took ova Western avilizauon. A striking example in this connection 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 271 

is given by the Turks. The Turks have adopted three distinct and 
dissimilar a vi! nations during the course of their social evolution. 
When they tv ere in the stage of ethnic-state organization, they belonged 
to the civilization of the Far East. When they passed to the stage of the 
sultamstic state, they entered uuo the area of Eastern civilization- And 
today, in their transition to the stage of nation-state, ue see the rise 
among them of a strong movement which is determined to accept 
Western civilization. Traces of Far Eastern civilization are still found 
among the illiterate masses who carry oral traditions. The traditions 
of tanJimame beliefs still living among them are nothing but the sur- 
vivals of beliefs and ntes which were basically derived from the Far 
Eastern civilization. Folk-talcs are survivals of old myths and epics. 
Comparative studies to be made between the old [pre-Islamic] religion 
of the Turks and religions of other peoples of the Far Eastern civiliza- 
tion, and between these religions and the folk-tales and beliefs of 
present-day illiterate people will reveal the truth of this statement. 
These studies may also show the nature of the relation of the Turks 
to the groups called ‘Altai* or ‘Mongolian race’. To classify Turks 
who are fairer and more handsome than Aryans with the ‘jellow race* 
lias no scientific foundation, as the supposition of a linguistic unity 
among the ethnic groups, usually called the ‘Altai race’, is far from being 
proven. It is very probable that all of these groups, which are vaguely 
called a 'race', are nothing but different groups all belonging to die 
Far Eastern civilization. If this is so, our only affinity with Fmno- 
Ugnans, Tunguz, and die Mongols consists of a common sharing of 
the same avalization and of our dominauon over them fora long period. 
It is quite possible that through such an association certain similarities 
in language hav e taken place. 

The conversion of the Turks to Islam and their entrance into the 
area of Eastern civikzauon took place simultaneously. For this reason, 
many would call the Eastern avilization Islamic avdizauon- As 
pointed out above, peoples belonging to different religions may belong 
to die same avdizauon. In other words, avilization and religion are 
two different things. Otherwise there could not be any institution 
common to die groups who belonged to different religions. Since 
religion consists only of sacred insutuuons, beliefs, and rituals, non- 
sacred institutions such as scientific ideas, technological tools, acstheuc 
standards constitute a separate system outside of religion. Positive 
sacnocs such as mathematics, physics, biology, ps> chology and soaol- 



271 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
ogy, industrial methods, and fine arts, are not connected with religions. 
Thus, no civilization can ever be called after a religion. There is 
neither a Christian nor an Islamic civilization. Just as it is incorrect to 
call Western civilization a Christian civilization, so it is equally incor- 
rect to call Eastern civilization an Islamic civilization. 

n 

We should seek the sources of the Eastern as n ell as of the Western 
civilization, not in the religions of Islam or of Chnsnamty but in other 
realms Mediterranean civilization was created in ancient tunes with the 
contributions of Egyptians, Sumerians, Hittites, Assyrians, Phoeni- 
cians, etc. This civilization had reached its perfection among the 
Greeks whom the Romans succeeded The Roman Empire carried this 
civilization to several natrons u ho were living under then- domination, 
but finally broke up into Eastern and Western states. This breach, 
however, was not only a matter of political partitioning It paved the 
way for the partitioning of the Mediterranean civilization into tw o parts. 
Smce Europeans were the inheritors of West Rome, they appropriated 
Western Roman civilization and improved it, and, thus, die new 
Western civilization tame into existence. Muslim Arabs, on the other 
hand, became the inheritors of the Eastern Roman civilization. In 
order to prove that this was the case, let us look at certain elements of 
Eastern civilization The earliest models of Arab architecture w ere of 
Byzantine origin Turkish architecture was a product of die combina- 
tion of the two It is true that neither Arabs nor Turks simply copied 
dieir models. They created their own original architecture by adding 
creative perfections through the inspiration of their religious belief* 
and moral ideals This process of making them original products was 
due to die religious temperament and national culture of Arabs and of 
Turks In spite of this, historians of art assume that their architecture 
was modelled after Byzantine architecture In the East there was the 
Oriental music of the upper strata. Farabi had taken this music from 
the Byzantines and adapted it to Arabic This music spread among the 
upper classes of Arabs, Persians, and Turks, but failed 10 penetrate 
into thedepths of the low er strata. It remained only within the circles 
of die upper strata. Thus, Muslim peoples failed to show as much 
originality in Eastern music as they did in architecture Turkish 
masses continued to play their older music which they had when they 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 


2 73 

belonged to the civilization of the Far East, and produced a folk music 
out of it. The Arab and Persian peoples did the same thing. Thus, 
Eastern music never became a national music among the Eastern 
peoples. Another reason why we cannot call this music Islamic is the 
fact that it is owned equally by non-Muslim peoples of die East, 
belonging to the Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish faiths. 

Through translations, the Arabs received logic, philosophy, natural 
sciences, and mathematics from the Byzantines, and developed their 
aesthetic and philological sciences, such as rhetoric, prosody, grammar, 
and syntax, on Byzantine models. Medicine was taken from Hippoc- 
rates, Galen, and their disciples In short, the Arabs took over from 
the Byzantines whatever they found among diem in rational and 
experimental sciences, in pure and applied science and philosophy, 
later the Persians and the Turks took these from the Arabs. Indepen- 
dent Arab philosophers were divided into peripatetic and illumination- 
ist schools. The first were Aristotle's and the second Plato’s followers 
Muslim religious thinkers were divided into muiakallunun (theologians) 
and mystics The fust were followers of the atomistic philosophies of 
Democritus and Epicurus, the latter of the Neo-Platonism of the 
Alexandrian Plotinus There were also disciples of Pythagoras and 
Zeno, the followers of the latter were called Riwaktyyun (Stoics) 
Muhiyyud-din Arabi’s aydn-i tkdbita (eternal essences) were nothing 
other than Plato’s ideal patterns Besides metaph^ics, ethics, politics, 
and economics were taken from AnstotJe. Books on ethics, such as 
Akhlaq-i Nairn, Akhldq-i Jaldli and Akkldq-i 'Alai, contained sections 
on ethics, politics, and teJiir-i men^il, and all w ere basically copied from 
Aristotle 

Throughout the course of the Middle Ages, Eastern and Western 
civilizations were nor much differenuated from each other As Muslims 
could not effect any appreciable transformations within Eastern 
civilization, so the Christians failed in bringing perfection within 
Western civilization. 

During the Middle Ages, however, we see die rise of two insntu- 
uons in Europe. Opera originated m feudal castles, in the south of 
Western Europe, chivalrous love and a new aesthetics of salon and 
womanhood developed. The first contributed to the perfection of 
music and gave rise to modem European music. As quarter tones 
which had existed in Greek music were not suitable for opera, they 
fell into disuse, but through the influence of the opera, [polyphonic] 



274 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
harmony was introduced into music and monophonic melodies were 
dropped. The second novelty contributed to the introduction of women 
into social life without their losmg their chastity and sanctity. When the 
Muslims vere introducing, from the Christian Byzantium and Magian 
Iran, the practices of feminine seclusion such as harem and veil, 
Western Europe was bringing women into social life. 

With the exception of such differences, there was much in common 
between the Eastern and Western civilizations during the whole 
medieval period Corresponding to medieval Muslim architecture, 
there was a religious architecture in Europe, the Gothic. Correspond- 
ing to the hikmat of Muslims, we find scholastic philosophy taught in 
European schools. ... In both [the Muslim and the Christian scholas- 
ticism] all truths were known, because they were given truths trans- 
mitted through traditions The task of the scholars of hikmat was to 
prove and confirm these truths through reason. Hence, they did not 
wish to be called philosophers because they regarded those as non- 
believers Scholastic thinkers of the Christian Church shared the same 
view Both Muslim thinkers and Christian scholastics took Aristotle 
as their teacher. For both, the aim of knowledge was to reconcile 
religion and Aristotelian philosophy 

m 

Ethical, religious, scientific, and aesthetic revolutions in Europe — 
such as die Renaissance, the Reformation, the new philosophy, and 
Romanticism — put an end to medieval life. The same revolutions did 
not, however, take place in the Muslim world, for that reason we are 
still living in a medieval age. Europe put an end to scholasticism, we, 
on the other hand, are still under its domination 

What is the cause of this difference, in spite of the parallelisms of 
several centuries > Historians have suggested several explanations, but 
we shall accept a sociological explanation In the great urban centres 
of Europe, the mcrease in moral density gave rise to the development 
of division of labour which, m turn, brought forth occupational 
specialization and the specialist. With this process of specialization, the 
individual ,won in Europe a personality with a new spiritual structure. 
With this iVndamental revolution there was bom a new Man with a 
new spint, aW mentality, and a new set of ideals. 

The new luV springing from the spint of the new Man did not fit 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 275 

into the old framework. Thus this was broken and destrojed The 
liberated new life turned its creative forces in every direction and 
achieved great developments and improvements in every field of life, 
especially through the industrial revolution it gave modem civilization 
its characteristic mark. 

In the East, on the other hand, great urban centres with advanced 
social density did not develop. The existing great centres of the East 
were not homogeneous in population and lacked the means of social 
contacts, hence of moral density Because of the absence of a social 
division of labour, specialization and individualist personality, large- 
scale industry did not appear in the East. As the nations of the East 
did not develop a new spirit and a new life, they w ere unable inevitably 
to move their civilization farther from its medieval form Things re- 
main as they are according to the law of inertia if there is no cause to 
move them 

While Western and Central Europe freed themselves from medieval 
civilization, the Christians of the Orthodox Church in the East still 
■were not freed from it. Russians, for example, remained within Eastern 
civilization up to the time of Peter the Great. Peter had many difficul- 
ties in his struggle to free the Russians from Eastern civilization and to 
introduce them to Western civilization In order to learn what sort of 
methods should be followed in transforming a nation from Eastern to 
Western civilization, u suffices to study the history of Peter's reforms 
While Russians, until then, were generally believed to be incapable of 
any progress, they began after these forced reforms to progress very 
quickly. This historical fact alone is enough to prove that Eastern 
civilization is averse to progress and Western civilization is the avenue 
to advancement. 


IV 

It was mentioned above that the basis of European civilization is 
the division of labour which produced, not only differennaoon of 
specialized trades and professions, but also specialization ui learning. 
We find the same differentiation in art. Social life underwent the same 
process of differentiation. Political authority was divided into legisla- 
te e, judicial, and executive functions. The w hole political orgamzanon 
was separated from the religious organization. Due to the progress of 
division of labour, administration of justice assumed a new strength; 



27fi TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
economic, scientific, and artistic activities were developed to their 
utmost. 

Muslim states, once equal or, from military and political points of 
view, sometimes even superior to those of Europe, began to sink 
lower as a result of the advancement made in Europe through the 
progress of the division of labour. A society can compete with other 
societies in both military and pohucal fields only if it is equipped with 
equal weapons. Thanks to their extraordinary advances in industry, 
Europeans are able to manufacture homble weapons of warfare. We, 
on the other hand, have to face these weapons with ordinary guns and 
nfles. How can the Islamic world ultimately survive under such con- 
ditions ^ How can we maintain our religious and nauonal independence 5 

V 

There is only one road to salvauon. To advance in order to reach — 
that is, in order to be equal to — Europeans tn the sciences and industry 
as well as in military and judicial insutuuons And there is only one 
means to achieve this to adapt ourselves to Western civihzauon 
completely* 

In the past, the makers of Tanpmat recognized this and set about 
to introduce European civilization. However, whatever they wanted to 
take from Europe, they always took not fully but by half. They 
created, for example, neither a real university nor a uniform judicial 
organization. Before they took measures to modernize national pro- 
duction, they wanted to change the habits of consuming, clothing, 
eating, building, and furniture On the other hand, not even a nucleus 
of industry on European standards was built because the policy makers 
of Tan^imat attempted their reforms without studying conditions and 
without putting forth definite aims and plans. They w ere always taking 
only half-measures in whatever they attempted to do. 

Another great mistake committed by the leaders of Tan^imat was 
their attempt to create a mental amalgam made up of a mixture of East 
and West They faded to see that the two, with their diametrically 
opposed principles, could not be reconciled The still existing dichot- 
omy in our pohucal structure, the dual court system, the two types of 
schools, the tw o systems of taxauon, two budgets, the tw o sets of laws, 
are all products of this mistake. The dichotomies are almost endless. 
Religious and secular schools were not only two different insutuuons 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 


177 


of education, but within each there was again the same dichotomy. 
Only in military and medical schools was education earned out ex- 
clusively along European lines We one to these institutions the 
generals and doctors who today save the life of the nation and the lives 
of the citizens. The training of specialists within these fields, in a way 
equal to their European colleagues, was made possible only because of 
the immunity of these two institutions from dichotomy If the methods 
of warfare of the Janissaries or the medical practices of the old- 
fashioned surgeons were mixed into these modem institutions, we 
would not have our celebrated generals and doctors today These two 
institutions of learning must be models for the educational revolution 
that has to materialize. Any attempt to reconcile East and West means 
carrying medieval conditions to the modem age and trying to keep 
them alive. Just as it was impossible to reconcile Janissary methods 
with a modem military system, just as it was futile to synchronize old- 
fashioned mcdiane with scientific mediane, so it is hopeless to cany 
the old and the new conceptions of law, the modem and the traditional 
conceptions of science, the old and the new standards of ethics, side 
by side- Unfortunately, only in the military arts and tned tone was 
Janissary-ism abolished It is still surv iving m other professions as a 
ghost of medievalism A few months ago a new society was founded 
in Istanbul in order to bring Turkey into the League of Nations. 
What wall be the use of it as long as Turkey does not enter definitely 
into European civilization’ A nation condemned to every political 
interference by Capitulations is meant to be a nation outside of Euro- 
pean civilization. Japan is accepted as a European power, but we are 
still regarded as an Astatic nation. This is due to nothing but our non- 
acceptance of European civilization in a true sense. The Japanese have 
been able to take die Western civilization without losing their religion 
and national identity, they have been able to reach the level of Euro- 
peans in every respect Did they lose their religion and national cul- 
ture? Not at all 1 Why, then, should we still hesitate’ Can’t w e accept 
Western civilization definitely and still be Turks and Muslims’ 

Let us review what we have changed since we introduced Western 
civilization and see w hether there was anything to do with our religion 
and nationality. We abolished, for example, the Rum! calendar, some- 
thing sacred for us. It was the calendar of the Rum, that is, of die 
Byzan lines. If an j one should ever regard it as something sacred, the 
Byzantines should do it. The same is true for dropping the use of the 



273 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
Rurru hour and introducing the Western hour. What damage to our 
religion and culture can one expect from replacing Aristotelian deduc- 
tive logic by the inductive logic of Bacon and Descartes and the 
scientific methods arising out of tt* What did we lose when we put 
ancient astrology and alchemy aside and took modem astronomy and 
chemistry * How much truth can one find in the old books of zoology, 
botany, and geology* Are we not obliged to get from the West the 
sciences which did not at all exist in the East, such as biology, psychol- 
ogy, and sociology? We had already taken our old sciences from the 
Byzantium. By merely replacing them with those taken from Europe, 
what can we lose in religion or culture* By enumerating these examples 
endlessly, it will be seen that whatever we drop in the name of Eastern 
civilization was all taken originally from the Byzantines Once this is 
realized, no one will ever seriously object to the dropping of the 
Eastern civilization and introducing Western civilization. 

The solution to our problem of civilization is of a pressing nature 
from another aspect also For a long time we have been concerned m 
our country with the question of education In spite of many efforts, the 
question is still unsolved. If we scrutinize the real nature of die question, 
we find that basically it is nothing but an auxiliary aspect of the prob- 
lem of civilization If we solve the basic problem, the question of 
education will also be solved In this country there are three layers of 
people differing from each other by civilization and education: the 
common people, the men educated in meJresc s, the men educated in 
[modem] secular schools. The first still are not freed from the effects of 
Far Eastern civilization, the second are still living in Eastern civiliza- 
tion, it is only the third group which has had some benefits from 
Western civilization. That means that one portion of our nation is 
living in an ancient, another in a medieval, and a third in a modem age. 
How can the life of a nation be normal with such a threefold life* How 
can we be a real nation without unifying this threefold education* 
The sources of our know ledge are. fust, folk-lore (the books of the 
minstrels, folk-tales, folk literature, proverbs, superstitious beliefs), 
secondly, the books translated from Arabic and Persian and taught in 
the medrese s, thirdly, modem schools and their books translated from 
European languages. We shall succeed in unifying our learning and 
education only when we have one civdization, only then shall we be a 
nauon homogeneous intellectually and spiritually. We cannot afford to 
hesitate any longer. 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 279 

In short, on the basis of our above analyses the foregoing principle 
of our social policy will be this: to be of the Turkish nation, of the 
Islamic religion, and of European civilization. 


TOWARDS MODERN SCIENCE* 

In order to join the ranks of the contemporary nations, certain 
conditions should absolutely be fulfilled. At the top of these comes the 
dm e towards science. As individual persons think, feel, and will, so 
do the nations — from this develop science and philosophy, religion 
and art, morality, politics, and economy A modem nation is a creature 
which thinks in terms of die positive sciences. Although philosophy is 
more or less a matter of intuition rather than of scientific thinking, it 
has to be compatible wnth the positive sciences, and thus it is m very 
close relation to them. Therefore, if a nanon does not want to say 
farewell to thinking, it has to acquire the positive sciences. 

The sciences show us the causes of phenomena. If we know the cause 
of a certain fact, we can produce or remove it, depending upon its 
desirability or undesirability At the same time, science shows us the 
effects and functions of facts Therefore, it is a practical guide showing 
the means to be used to reach ends. When some people say 'We must 
have, not men of science, but men of practice', they talk nonsense. 
Look at die nations of Europe and America’ The most practical ones 
are diose who think scientifically. 

Another function of the sciences is to unify the members of a society 
through certain common ideas. As each person thinks in his own way, 
those who do so exclusiv ely tend to believe that what they think is the 
correct way of dunking while what others dunk is not true. This 
prevents co-operation and even a common universe of discourse 
among people. It is for that reason that we need an impersonal frame of 
dunking that would unite persons on certain common ideas, and by its 
practical results would also prove its applicability to the nature of facts. 
This impersonal frame of dunking is provided by the modem sciences, 
w hich are based on objectiv e experiments, manipulated through instru- 
ments, and subjected to positive methods. 

Another function of the sciences is to tell us the good and the bad. 
Determining the good and bad gives nse to several conflicts in social 
life. For die conservauv e, cv erydung old is good and cv erydung new 
is bad. The radicals believe just die contrary. Both are groundless. 



280 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
There is no relation between the badness or goodness of something 
and its being old or new. We expect the solution to this important 
problem from science. For science this problem is a question of normal 
versus pathological Biology can tell us whether a fact in the organic 
world is normal or pathological. Why should the same not be done 
in psychology and sociology’ . . Sociology has made great progress 
m recent years, so that it is in an equal position with biology in deter- 
mining the normal and the pathological. ... As societies are classified 
into species and genera, it becomes possible to determine for which 
social species a certain institution is normal and for which it is patho- 
logical Furthermore, as die course of social evolution reveals the 
various stages of evolution, it becomes not impossible to predict what 
institutions will rise in a certain society in the future As other nations 
have already passed through the stages through which we are going to 
pass, it becomes possible to determine which institutions will be normal 
in any one stage and which ones will not be 

The modem state is a government of science as much as it is the 
sovereignty of the people. A modem nauon cannot survive without 
large-scale industry, without public hygiene, railways, electricity, and 
all comforts And a modem state also cannot survive without develop- 
ing an organization based on modem law, without building a national 
economy and realizing real freedom and equality on the basis of 
democracy. 

It is the positive sciences that can bring these material as well as 
spiritual attainments. Therefore, our first objecuve, as individuals and 
as a nauon, is science. 

CULTURE AND REFINEMENT 10 

In French the term ‘culture’ has two different meanings. We may 
express one of these by the word ‘culture* (Ann) [Arabic harth], and 
the other by ‘refinement* [Arabic taJidJui] Many of the mis- 

conceptions regarding culture come from this dual meaning of the 
word la culture. . . . 

One of the differences between culture and refinement is that the 
first is democratic while the second is aristocratic. Culture consists of 
the folk traditions, the usages, mores , oral or unwritten literature, the 
language, music, and religious beliefs, the moral, aesthetic and econo- 
mic insutuuons of the illiterate. Since the people are the source and 



NEW ORIENTATIONS 


1S1 

earner of these products, culture is democratic. Refinement, on the 
other hand, is something peculiar to the intelligent elite, to the educated 
and sophisticated intellectuals The basis of refinement is the 
acquisition of a good education and a sincere and unpretentious lose 
for thinking, fine arts, literature, philosophy, science, and religion 
(provided it is free from any fanaticism) Thus, it is a special way of 
feeling, liv ing, and thinking fostered by a special education. 

Another difference between the two is that the first is national 
while the second is international A man, probably under the influence 
of his own culture, may overestimate the culture of his own nation, but 
if he is sophisticated enough he wall like the culture of other nations 
and try to enjoy it- Thus, refinement makes men more humanistically 
minded, more tolerant and benevolent towards everybody and every 
nation, and more eclectic. 

This point of difference leads us to discuss the problem of national- 
ism and internationalism A nation is the sum total of those men who 
participate in a common culture Intemauonality is a group of nations 
who participate in a certain avilimuon which we may equally call a 
avihzation-group Some people would believe that there are not 
several cav ihzations created by different groups of nations For them 
there is only one avalization, common to all men, w hose members are 
not nations but persons This is the view of him whom we call the 
‘cosmopolitan’. A cosmopolitan is a man who believes [as Tevfik 
Fikret, the Turkish poet, expressed it] ‘My people is mankind and 
my home die earth’ This v iew of aviloation is irreconcilable w ith that 
of the nationalists- T o the latter, mankind is the human species studied 
together with other zoological species by zoology, whereas human 
beings — that is, socialized individuals — live only as nauons. As 
Turkism does not agree w ith those doctrines which deny the pnnaple 
of nationality, it naturally rqccts cosmopolitanism Internationalism, 
on the odier hand, is 'omething wholly opposite to cosmopolitanism. 
For die internationalist, avdization does not extend to the totality of 
mankind. There are several civ iltzations. Each has its own sphere or 
area and each is made up not of individual human beings but of 
individual nations. ■ A avdizauon may be called a Soaety of 
Nations. . . . 

It follows that each av llizanon-group is a circle of intemauonality. 
The existence of the national culture of a nation does not preclude its 
participation in an international avdization. Civilization is the sum 



282 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
total of the institutions commonly shared by the nations which belong 
to the same intenutionahty. Within each intemattonality, therefore, 
there is the one civilization common to all nations within it and die 
several cultures of ihe individual nations. Thus, when we adopt 
Western civilization, ue not only will share an international avaliza- 
tion but at the same time will get the opportunity to enjoy the cultures 
of the nations who belong to that civilization. As national societies are 
differentiated into occupational groups because of the division of 
labour and specialization, so also an international community is 
differentiated into nauonal and unique cultures as if there were a kind 
of division of labour and an international specialization among diese 
nations. 

When we judge by our own nauonal standards, we appreciate only 
those v orks which fit into our nauonal culture. But, just as w e become 
bored with eating the same dish every day, we also tend to be satiated 
with the literary works, music, or architecture of our culture. As the 
connoisseur changes his menu frequently, so the sophisticated person 
also wants to taste the works of other cultures. . . . International 
relations within a civilization-circle are something like a symposium. 
Each nanon contributes its own culture, and to the degree of its contri- 
bution it is enutled to enjoy the cultures of others. One should not 
confuse, however, the national taste, which appreciates only the 
national culture, With exotic taste, which appreciates only foreign 
cultures. The normal partem which we find among the European 
nations is that of the prevalence of the national taste as basic and 
permanent with the exotic taste remaining in second plane. That was 
not the case among the Ottomans. Among the havas (die elite], exotic 
taste had become the basic and permanent norm while national culture 
did not have even a secondary value For that reason, its old literature 
was a product of Persian and its modem bterature of French taste and 
no national literature ever flourished. 

Therefore, when refinement takes such an abnormal dimension, it 
becomes harmful. Refinement is normal so long as it recognizes the 
value of the national culture. When it denies it, it assumes a morbid 
and unhealthy nature. Turkists, therefore, reject cosmopolitanism as 
cosmopolitans reject Turkism. But there is no point of contradiction 
and opposition between Turkism and internationalism A Turkist is at 
the same time an internationalist Everyone of us lives a national as 
w ell as an mtemauorul life. Our national life means living our own 



ORIENTATIONS 


28} 

national culture- Our mtemauonal life consists of our participation m 
international civilization, on the one hand, and in several unique and 
original cultures, on the other. The civilization in which we have 
participated since the Tan^anat era is definitely that of the West. . . . 

We can see, therefore, that the ‘culture’ of the Turkists is neither 
la culture of die French nor die Kultur of the Germans 11 For the 
French, French culture has acquired a world-wide form of refinement, 
thanks to its literary power The Germans believe that then Kultur 
would have conquered the whole world, through their military and 
economic forces, if their armies had not been defeated Our under- 
standing of culture is not as aggressive as these We shall build our own 
culture for our own taste and enjoyment. . . Our enjoyment of other 
cultures will never go beyond the limits of an exotic interest. For us, 
anything French or English or German or Russian or Italian may only 
have an exotic beauty. Although we admire it, w e cannot be captured 
by it. Our hearts are given to our own culture. For us the most beauti- 
ful is nothing but the beauty of our own culture. We do not deny that 
we are far behind European peoples in civilization, in learning, in 
economic life, and in refinement, or that we have to work hard to catch 
up with them. But we cannot regard any nation as culturally superior 
to us For us, our own culture is the best of all cultures imaginable. 
Therefore, we can mutate and follow neither French culture nor Ger- 
man Kultur. We consider them, like the cultures of all other nations, 
original cultures peculiar to their own nations and get only an exotic 
enjoj mail from any of them. 

We see, therefore, that Turkism being the love of our own original 
culture is, nevertheless, not chauvinistic or fanatic at all It is deter- 
mined to adopt Western civilization unreservedly and as t whole, and 
docs not entertain any disdain or contempt for the cultures of other 
nations. To the contrary, it appreciates and respects all cultures. How- 
ever little w e may sympathize with the political methods of die nations 
from whom we have seen enmiucs, we shall admire ihevr avdization 
and culture and venerate their great thinkers and artists. 



CHAPTER IX 


THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 

£ 


WHAT IS TURKISH* — -A RECAPITULATION 1 
In a previous article I quoted the ‘New Life and New Values’ which 
appeared originally some seven or eight y ears ago.* The ideas expressed 
in that article have taken clearer form with the passage of time. In it, 
for example, the search for genuine values, on the one hand, and the 
creation of a civilization for die Turks, on the other, w ere presented as 
representing the same goals A statement such as ‘the genuine civiliza- 
tion is the Turkish civilization which will begin with the growth of the 
New Life’ shows this confusion clearly Such a statement is undoubtedly 
chauvinistic. But every new movement inevitably goes to extremes in 
the beginnings. As time passed, we began to see that international 
civilization and national culture are different from one another. We 
realized that the genuine values which the proponents of the New Life 
were to create were not universal values to be valid for all men, but the 
national ideals peculiar only to the Turkish people. Furthermore, as 
these existed already in the soul of the nauon as unconscious gropings, 
they had only to be uncovered and, therefore, it is incorrect to say 
that they should be created. As these points were now clarified, it 
automatically appeared that the New Life meant nothing other than 
the National Life. 

However, one would say that if National Life is one which is already 
being experienced, why take pains to discover it* Something existing 
evidently exists even if it is not discovered Ideals that exist in the 
unconscious are still motivating forces even though they are not 
conscious. It is true that we believed in the existence of the Nauonal 
Life which we are after, as existing unconsciously in the soul of the 
people and that we gave the name ‘Turkism’ to the w ork of making 
this unconscious conscious If our people were not consciously pre- 
sented with ‘cultures’* other than their own, it would not be so urgent 
to make nauonal Culture conscious because only the unconscious 
Culture of the nauon would affect our life. But, since our nauonal 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISM 285 

Culture has been in a state of unconscious stupor, and since non- 
national 'cultures’ — either as survivals of the past or as imported new 
elements — have reigned over our life as our nauonal consciousness, 
we had to proceed urgently. 

Let me put it more dearly before the nse of Turkism there were 
two 'cultures’ in our country — the religious (ummet) ‘culture’ and die 
Westemist (Tanjtmat) ‘culture’ — which were inimical to each other. 
The souls of the educated Turks were tom in the struggle between the 
two In reality, neither reflected the true inner life of die Turks of die 
time because long before the ummet educauon and the [modem] secular 
education existed, and long before the existence of the Ottoman Turks, 
the Turks existed as an organized nation The Ottoman Turks could 
create a Culture with a national character only out of their own life 
If the [Ottoman] Enderun ‘culture’ had penetrated into the masses by 
following a course of independent growth and by becoming rooted in 
the soul of die people, it might liave produced a vehicle of nauonal 
education. The first step taken in the Tan^imat reforms was to eliminate 
this Enderun ’culture’ w hich was aheady mixed with religious (ummet) 
‘culture’. 

It seems, therefore, that when the Turks entered into a phase of 
modem and nauonal life, they were sentenced to remain under the un- 
natural tutelage of an ummet ’culture’, which was not modem at all, 
and of the Tanjimntm educauon, which was not at all nauonal Both 
’cultures’ w ere kept side by side artificially without any attempt being 
made to reconcile and co-ordinate them. The contradictions between 
die two were reflected in the souls of young men who had the psycho- 
logical aputude of synthesis and produced crises in their lives Both 
’cultures’ were called civilizations. The Turks were destined to carry 
these two civilizations, w hich w ere diametrically opposed to each other, 
without ever being able to reconcile them, and to ignore the existence 
of die conflicts and contradictions between the tw o 

In reality, however, die two mentalities represented by these two 
civilizations appeared diametrically opposed to each other only under 
die influence of certain traditional catchwords and convictions and 
were not at all irreconcilable. First of all, what had existed then was a 
national Culture, on the one hand, and two ’culture’ patterns in die 
form of international civilization, on the other. The ummet ‘culture’ 
constituted one element of the nauonal Culture in the form of religion. 
As die Turks were Muslims, Islam would naturally remain in dieir 



28 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

Culture as an important element Thus, there would not be a conflict 
between the ummet ‘culture’ and the national Culture. Since religion 
constituted one of the sources of the national Culture, there should be a 
close solidarity between the two. And, equally, there would be no 
contradiction between the national Culture and the European 'culture' 
introduced with the Tanpmat. Only those forces which are of the 
same nature may he contradictory. For example, the Eastern and 
Western civilizations are absolutely irreconcilable. As these contradict 
each other, the people cannot combine both within themselves at the 
same time Just as there can be no man with two religions, there can 
be no nation belonging to two civilizations at die same tune. It is for 
this reason that the Turks had either to remain within Eastern civiliza- 
tion or to adopt Western civilization unreservedly In doing the latter, 
however, they would not lose anything from their national Culture 
because national life, 1 e. the sum total of national values, will maintain 
its independent existence as a national lore, which we have called 
Culture, so that when Western civilization and Turkish Culture con- 
front each other within our souls, there will be no conflict at all and no 
crisis suffered by the youth 

Before the Turkist amved at these conclusions, the false representa- 
tives of our culture were the representatives of the ummet and those of 
the civilization the Twi^imansts. Yes, the first were the false representa- 
tives of the old ‘culture’ because in so far as Islam was confined to those 
highbrows who were educated m Arabic and Persian, it failed la 
penetrate into the masses Therefore, with the exception of the religious 
life, the rest of the ummet ‘culture’ cannot be called Culture. It is only 
the religious life within the ummet ‘culture’ which is a part of the 
national Culture. Thus, whereas the ummet ‘culture’ is not reconcilable 
with Western civilization, the religion of Islam is Since the ummet 
‘culture’ refused to view religion as a sphere of bfe which changes and 
evolves alongside the mores [of the people}, since ir insisted on identify- 
ing it with the fikh, which is nothing but a crystallization of the mores 
of a particular period, and since it viewed itself as a civilization inclusive 
of ail elements of Culture aside from religion, it was unable to reconcile 
itself either with Western civilization or with modem science. 

The T a/ifi/mitists, on the other hand, were false representatives of 
contemporary civilization. While European civilization did not aim at 
destroying the particular Culture of any nation, the Ztwjwidfists 
entirely neglected the national Culture, equating Culture with civihza- 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISM 287 

tion which is common to all nations. Their understanding of European 
civilization did not go beyond that of the Levantines of Pcra. 4 They 
could see Europe only through the eyes of these Levantine Frenis. 
They simply imitated the superficial lustre, the luxury, and omateness, 
and such other rubbish of Europe, and never seriously tried to assimi- 
late the science, philosophy, art, and moral standards of its civilization. 

We can now argue definitely that a serious interest in Culture is 
absolutely requisite for the rise of a genuine interest in civilization 
For a civilization-group is a society above societies, made up of culture- 
groups or nations As ctvihzanon consists of the sum total of the com- 
mon features of several national Cultures, each national Culture would 
naturally distinguish itself from others, and then seek the international 
features it has in common with other Cultures. The nauons will cling 
first to their own ideals, it is only after they have realized the value of 
national Culture that a Soaety of Nations is conceivable. The cosmo- 
politanism that existed before the era of national idealism is diametric- 
ally opposed to present-day internationalism, which is based on inter- 
national law. In the Europe of today, this old cosmopolitanism no 
longer exists Every person is first of all a member of a nation and then 
of an international community. Among us, as the meaning of national- 
ism is not understood ui its red sense, the fiction of cosmopolitanism 
is in vogue over against internationalism. In Europe a person is first 
a man of Culture and then of avalization One can understand the signi- 
ficance of av ilization to the extent to w hich he grasps Culture Among 
us, those w ho have grasped the significance of Culture are few, and an 
interest in international av ilization is yet to be bom The ‘avalization' 
of die 7anjomuists was nothing but a mixture of an understanding 
devoid of any method and a practice stripped of any system. 

Since truth results from the conflict of ideas, as Nanuk Kemal said, 
die conflict between the ummet 'culture' and the Tanjimat ‘culture’ 
would inevitably give nse to 3 new sparkle of truth in the souls of the 
youth who were capable of yearning for a synthesis. Tliat long- 
awaited sparkle was Turkism wuh its substitution of die national 
Culture for ummti 'culture' and of modem av ilization for the Tan^imat~ 
tst 'culture' Turkism is nothing but the method of nght feeling and 
right dunking for die Turks. Right feeling means die avoidance of 
error in our value judgments, right dunking means the exactness in 
our judgments on reality. Religious, moral, and aesthetic judgments 
require nght feeling, science, industry, and techniques are based on 



288 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
exact thinking Since subjective feelings are national and objective 
ideas Internationa], right feeling means sharing the feelings of the 
nation and correct thinking means reasoning as all civilized human 
beings do, on the basis of scientific thought. As die artist, the moralist, 
and the philosopher constitute the elite of feeling, they will fulfil thar 
functions to the extent to which they think objecm ely and in a way 
detached from national values. 

In ‘New Life and New Values’ we had stated that the political 
rev olution w ould be based on ulus-forces, w hereas the social rev olunon 
would be based on sentunents-forces. Pohtical revolutions everywhere 
have been the products of the dissemination of new international legal 
ideas. In other words, pohtical revolutions are products of civilization 
and progress S octal revolutions, on the other hand, symbolize the 
victory of the living values of a nation ov er against the dead ones. 
And this is realized only with the awakening of the national Culture 
to replace imitative and conventional ‘cultures’. Since the values consti- 
tuting a national Culture inspire enthusiasm and excitement in the soul, 
they are apdy called semunenu-forces And since scientific and technical 
concepts, on the other hand, are only cold truths free from any attach- 
ment to the emotions, they are by themselves only ‘shadow ideas. 
They become ulus-forces only if they combine with the senumerds- 
forces of a particular Culture. Therefore, unless the elements of a 
civilization are absorbed by the Culture of a nation, they never pene- 
trate into the life of the people. Unless the science and techniques of 
the West are appropriated by our national mores, they will not take a 
place in our schools or in our life. That is w hy a nation does not become 
civilized if it has not attained Cultural consciousness Civilization pro- 
duces hints only when it is grafted on the tree of the national Culture. 
The Tanymat failed because it tried to adapt the civilization of Europe 
without building the national Culture. The Turkists have learned a 
lesson from their experiment, hence they are convinced that an under- 
standing of civilization is a prerequisite to an adequate understanding 
of Culture. It is only then that the ideas emanating from the avvhzanon 
of the West will not remain mere ‘shadow ideas’ among us but will 
become genuine ulus-forces . . . . 

We see, therefore, that Ttirkism first started as a philosophical 
movement under the name of New Life, and then evolved into a 
practical mov ement inevitably arriving at conclusions that are corrobor- 
ated by present-day sociology. This common conclusion teaches us 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 289 

that human Culture is nothing but a synthesis of nauonal Culture and 
international civilization and that humanity is heading towards an 
international society by the federation of free nations. 

THE AIM OF THE TURKI5TS* 

. . . Once u e understand these relations betw een culture and civiliza- 
tion, u e can determine the meaning of Turkism and what it is expected 
to do. The Ottoman civilization was destined to fall for two reasons 
first of all, like all other empires, it was a non-permanent community 
of peoples Not communities but societies are groups which have ever- 
lasting life, only nations are soaenes. Subjugated nations may forget 
their nauonal identity only temporarily under the cosmopolitan rule 
of the empires. They are destined to awaken from their slumber of 
serfdom and demand their cultural independence and political sover- 
eignty. This process started in Europe five centuries ago It was inevit- 
able for those empires — the Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires 
which, so far, had remained safe from this process — to undergo 
dissolution like their predecessors. 

The second reason is the fact that the more Western avihzanon 
advanced, the more it increased its power to wipe out the civilization 
of the East. In Russia and among the Balkan nations the civilization of 
the West took the place of that of the East [u hich is not an Islamic 
civilization but a continuation of the Byzantine], and sooner or later 
the same transformation w ould take place within the Ottoman terri- 
tories. ... As the avalization of the West is taking the place of that 
of the East cv eryw here, quite naturally the Ottoman av dizauon w Inch 
was a part of Eastern avihzanon would fall and leave its place to 
Turkish culture with the religion of Islam, on the one hand, and to 
Western av ihzauon, on the other. Now, the mission of the Turkists is 
nothing but to uncov er the Turkish culture which has remained in the 
people, on the one hand, and to graft Western avihzanon m its entirety 
and with all its living forms on to the nauonal culture, on the other. 

What the reformists of the Tanymat era did was a mere attempt to 
rcconale the av ihzauons of East and West. But two opposite aviliza- 
uons cannot live side by side. As then pnnapks are opposed to each 
other, each tends to comipt the other. The principles of Western and 
Eastern music are irreconcilable. The experimental mind of the West 
cannot get along with the scholastic mind of the East. A naaon is 

TJCwaa — if 



2$0 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

either Eastern or Western. Just as there can be no person with two 
faiths, so there can be no nation with two civilizations. As the reform- 
ists of the Tanjtmat era felled to see this, they felled in their reforms. 
The Turkists will succeed, because they have determined to adopt 
Western civilization as a whole and to drop the originally Byzantine 
civilization of the East. The Turkists are those who aim at Western 
civilization while remaining Turks and Muslims. Before they realize 
this, they have to discover and revive our national culture. 


THE TURKIST PROGRAMME LANGUAGE* 

I 

Turkey’s national language is undoubtedly the Turkish of Istanbul. 
However, we must distinguish the Turkish dialect spoken there from 
the 'Ottoman Turkish' which is wntten but not spoken. Which one 
of these is our national language? . . . 

The duality of written and spoken language is entirely peculiar to 
Istanbul Any condition which is not found anywhere universally but 
only partially in one particular place is not a normal feet. Therefore, 
the duality which we speak of as existing in Istanbul is a pathological 
case. ... In order to remove this duality, one of two courses can be 
taken" either the written language will be made the spoken language 
or the spoken one will be made the wntten language. 

The first alternative is impracticable because the wntten language of 
Istanbul is not a natural language, but artificial like Esperanto. This 
‘Ottoman Esperanto’ — the vocabularies, grammars, and syntaxes of 
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish put together — how can it be a spoken 
language * This mixture of artificial superfluities — three different w ords 
for the same thing, at least three grammatical rules for relative cases, 
for example, and at least three forms of a certain particle — how can it 
be a natural spoken language 11 . . . The impossibility of the policy of 
making a spoken language out of this written language is already pros ed 
by the complete failure of all the efforts that have been made for 
centimes. Even if it were possible to enforce this strange language by 
dictatorial methods, it would still not be the language of the people 
because it would be necessary to disseminate it among all Turks. 
Obviously it is impossible to impose a language upon a vast nation. 

Thus, the second alternative remains; to follow the spoken language 



292 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
nunciaaon; in otter words, they assimilated them into Turkish. . . . 
The people assimilated borrowings, and made their language a living 
whole m which every word had a definite function. This was done not 
consciously and rationally but unconsciously and instinctively. In the 
language of the people every word has a definite meaning distinct from 
the meanings of other words, and there is a definite word for any 
intellectual or sentimental meaning which the people experience. The 
Ottoman scholars and writers believed that the modifications made by 
the people in order to assimilate foreign words were corruptions, and 
called the products of this assimilation galaiat (corrupted words). . . . 
To ihem,fasaAat (correct pronunaauon) meant only to use the words 
that had entered into Turkish from Arabic and Persian, not in their 
Turkified but in their original forms because, to them, the Ottoman 
language was not an independent language and had no capacity of 
assimilation We see, therefore, that for the people ‘a corrupted 
w ord (galat) w hich has become established is better than an un familiar 
w ord in its correct form (fasti)', while for the ulema the contrary was 
true. For the people, the T urkish language is the sov ereign .Arabic and 
Persian words must accept its phonetic and lexicological laws . . For 
the other group, sov ereign ty and the nght of independence belonged 
only to Arabic and Persian words, Turkish had to obey their nobility 
and purity Turkish could not claim any independent existence, as it 
was believ ed to be runety-nine per cent Arabic and Persian. 

It seemed, therefore, that the job facing the Turkists was to reject 
the view of the ‘correct-pronun canonists' and accept that which the 
people had unconsciously maintained The Turkists regard the pure 
(fasti) words of the Ottomamsts as incorrect (gakj) words. They 
accept it as a principle to follow the corrupuons of the people not only 
in pronuncianon but even in spelling 

m 

The principles of the Turkists ui language are not, however, 
favourable to the views of the (Turlust) punsts In the punsts’ view', 
for a w ord to be really Turkish it had to be dem ed from an originally 
T urkish w ord Therefore, for them the w ords . . . that were intoduced 
into the language of the people from Arabic or Persian origins should 
be liquidated and replaced by forgotten old Turkish words, by words 
found in Chagatay, Uzbek, Tatar, Kirghiz, and other dialects, or by 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKJSM 293 

new words to be coined according to newly invented grammatical 
rules Turkists reject this view First of all, no Turkish root can be 
claimed to be originally Turkish when we trace it to the ultimate 
origins. It is a scientifically established fact that many words which we 
think are originally Turkish were derived from Chinese, Mongolian, 
Tunguz, and even Indian and Persian origins In the second place, 
words are symbols of the meanings they refer to and not definitions 
It is not necessary to know the origins and derivations of the words 
Tins is useful only for philologists and linguists It is even harmful to 
the system and idiom of the language because, as we have seen in 
connection with the words that were derived from Arabic and Persian, 
also in the originally Turkish words, the actual meaning is sometimes 
different from the etymological one . . 

ForTurkists, every word that is known to, and used by, the Turkish 
people is Turkish For a word to be Turkish, it is not enough to be 
derived originally from Turkish Several words derived from 
Turkish roots have become obsolete and cease to live Just as the 
fossils in plant and animal nature cannot be revived, so it is with 
linguistic fossils The language of a people is a living organism 
made up of its own living organs and not of dead roots Therefore, the 
purification of Turkish — should not be based on the extremist 
claims of the purists 

The purists' insistence on borrowing words from various Turkish 
dialects should also be rejected. For various Turkish dialects, once 
differentiated from the ancient Turkish mother tongue, followed 
separate lines of development and became alienated from each other in 
phonetic, morphological, and lexicological aspects. If we introduce 
words from these dialects, we shall destroy the beauty of the Turkish 
oflstanbul As a matter of fan, we do not need these words because 
w e already have others corresponding to them Only the ancient words 
that were the names of old Turkish institutions wall enter into our 
language and then as scientific terms, as studies on ancient Turkish 
history discover them. But thiswould not implya revival of fossils. . .. 

The purists' proposal to coin new words by inventing new rules 
should also be rejected. Just as it is impossible to incorporate a new 
organism into the In ing body of an animal or plant, so it is impossible 
to introduce an insented rule into a language. . . . 

Leaving aside the extremist radicalism of the purists, we still find 
that there are manj words in Ottoman Turkish to be discarded since 



294 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
there are several superfluous terms introduced unnecessarily into 
scientific neologisms. ... In a medical dictionary, for example, there 
are very many Arabic and Persian words which are not needed at all 
Words for which there exist Turkish expressions that are in no 
way different in meaning should be dropped altogether. 

IV 

Tuiktsts believe that a language may borrow words from other 
languages provided there are no exact equivalents of these words in 
that language. They believe, however, that a language cannot borrow 
rules from other languages ... All Arabic and Persian borrowings 
in the Ottoman language are used either as mere words or as forms 
[denoting person, gender, number, etc.] We believe that 1 he first group, 
provided they do not dash with already existing Turkish equivalents, 
should be retained while the other group ought to be dropped entirely. 
For example, the Arabic word katib should not be u«ed in Turkish in 
the meaning 'one who writes' But as kdnp, the same word has been used 
by the people as an independent word meaning ‘derk’ or ‘secretary’ 
[thus, the word should be retained in this sense] . . . 

It follows that when a word is borrowed from Arabic or Persian as 
a term, other words etymologically related to it should not be taken 
along with it . . . The plurals of Arabic or Persian words should like- 
wise be rejected. . . . Languages cannot exchange particles . . ., m 
other words, a language cannot borrow morphemes from another one 
. . Only in some cases certain foreign words used in Turkish have 
assumed this character of morphemes and become mere words, such as 
nouns. . . . 

As an exception, three particles from the Persian have entered into 
the popular use of Turkish. One is the partide of reference or relation 
(-f), the other two are kkane and name which in Persian are, in fact, 
nouns and not particles . . . The first has almost become a Turkish 
particle, because it is added to Turkish words. But in all other cases it 
is certainly not a Turkish particle. . . . Although we can reduce the 
number of borrowed words that are constructed with this parade, 
unfortunately, and contrary to one of our basic principles, we have to 
adopt this parade in forming many of the scientific terms. Turkism, 
which lias succeeded m overcoming all obstacles in creating a new 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 295 

The words khanc and n&me may be accepted as particles since they 
serve to ennch the language. 

Just as a language cannot borrow forms and particles from other 
languages, neither can it borrow rules to make [possessive and adjecti- 
val] constructions. The old Ottomans accepted all kinds of such rules 
from Arabic and Persian. These constructions, too, are like forms and 
particles, like morphemes In every language the words in possessive 
and adjectival constructions are all morphemes ... As all kinds of 
construction exist in Turkish, there is no need for any Arabic or 
Persian constructions. These were taken over by Ottoman writers, not 
because of any vital necessity but simply because they believed that 
Arabic and Persian were more beautiful than Turkish. To them, that 
was true with respect to words, forms, panicles, and construction In 
fact, no one can claim objectively that a certain language is more beauti- 
ful than another Every language has its own beauty Every nation 
subjectively finds its own language beautiful. Certainly Arabic is 
beautiful, and so is Persian But they are more beautiful for Arabs and 
Persians. And to us, Turkish sounds most beautiful. The beauty of 
words, forms, panicles, and constructions is also a relative matter. 
They are beautiful within their respective languages An Arabic word 
is beautiful in the Arabic language, a Persian construction sounds 
beautiful in a Persian sentence If you could transfer the very beautiful 
eyes or nose of a woman to the face of another, they would not seem 
equally beautiful In the same way, the beautiful aspects of a language 
are only ugly when put into the sentences of another language. . . . 

V 

Some think that the Turkist view on language questions has only 
certain negative principles. . . . But the new Turkish cannot be created 
by merely clearing away the superfluous elements borrow ed from other 
languages. To do tins is only the negative aim of Turkism. Turkism 
has also certain positn e aims. The abnormality of the old Ottoman 
language did not consist only in laving superfluous foreign words, 
verb forms, idioms, and particles. If it w ere so, it would be quite easy 
to ameliorate the language simply by dropping all these superfluous 
elements. The old Ottoman language suffered also from another 
malady: It lacked many necessary words. If is significant that a philo- 
sophical essay could not have been written [in Turkish] until the rise 



29 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

of the Turkist movement; neither could the masterpeices of -world 
literature have been translated [into Turkish] clearly and adequately. 
Therefore, a real amelioration of our language would also require the 
filling of these gaps by putting missing -w ords into their proper places 
in the organism of the language. This is the positiv e aim of the New 
Turkists 

The words in which our language is deficient are of two kinds The 
first consists of certain idioms used by the people. There are several 
words, expressions, and gallicisms used by the people which have not 
yet been incorporated into the written language. In fact, these consti- 
tute a mine of richness and beauty for the language. . . . The second 
deficiency consists of words of an international nature. A nation has to 
appropriate the words that express scientific concepts, philosophical 
ideas, literary images, poetic experiences of ihe civilization-group or 
wtemationabry to which it belongs. Now that the Turks are deter- 
mined to adopt Western civilization, they need new w ords that will 
express all Western concepts and meanings. 

What shall we do to create these words in our language 11 The most 
fruitful course of action is to have first-rate stylists carefully translate 
into Turkish all the literary masterpieces and scientific and philosophi- 
cal treaties written in European languages Through these translations, 
several new words and modes of expression will enter mto the New 
Turkish in addition to several means of linguistic refinement, gram- 
matical tools and organs, syntactical mechanisms and constructions, and 
new possibilities to express senumental and symbolic meanings- Then, 
the New Turkish will become a vehicle to express the most complex 
ways of thinking as well as the most sincere and original experiences. 

In this process of translation, we shall come across several concepts 
and meanings which are entirely new to us, and it will become neces- 
sary to find equivalent words to express them in Turkish. How should 
this be done * For many of them there will be equivalents m our spoken 
Turkish, which is rich m zoological, botanical, physical, and techno- 
logical terms as well as in geographic ones- The words expressing 
emotions and sentiments also are numerous. Thus, m the attempt to 
create new terms and meanings, we shall above all go to the language 
of the people. Then we shall create new words by using the rules of 
Turkish for particles, forms and relative and possessive cases. And then, 
if there are still w ords missing, we may resort to Arabic and Persian to 
borrow words, provided they are accepted as simple and single words 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 297 

. . . Some of the foreign [Western] words should be adopted as they 
are. Some of these words are those that express certain conditions with 
respect to a nation, a period of history, or an occupation, and have 
become adopted in all languages, e g ‘feudalism’, ‘chivalry’, 'Renais- 
sance’, ‘Reform*, ‘Jacobinism’, ‘socialism’, ‘Bolshevism’, ‘aristocracy’, 
‘democracy", ‘diplomacy’, ‘theatre’, ‘classicism’, ‘romanticism’, etc. 
Another category of these words is those that are used as the names of 
tools, machines, and objects of industrial techniques. Most of them 
have been taken over directly by the people and, in most cases, are 
not translated by other nations, such as steam, railway { chemtn defer), 
telegraph, telephone, tramway, gramophone, etc. 

In short, the New Turkish will come into being, first, by clearing 
our language of the superfluous words taken unnecessarily from Arabic 
and Persian, second, by enriching it with nationally used but literally 
ignored words and expressions, and, third, by creating international 
words that tie do not jet have. The first process is one of clearance, 
the second one of culturation ( tahru [Arabic tahrith ]), and the third is 
the process of refinement [Arabic taAdAii]) 

Let us summarize the principles of Turktsm on language- 

1 . In order to build our national language, w e must ignore altogether 
the Ottoman and, taking the Turkish which is the basis of the folk 
literature, accept the pronunaauon of the people — especially of the 
women of Istanbul. 

2 Those Arabic and Persian words for which Turkish equivalents 
exist must be dropped completely, but those for which there are no 
exact equivalents must be retained 

3 Those Arabic and Persian words that have become incorporated 
into the vernacular of the common people wall be retained in their 
corrupted forms and meanings as Turkish, and will be spelled in 
accordance with the Turkish pronunciation. 

4 Old, fossilued Turkish words shall not be revived when there are 
equivalent new w ords. 

5. New terms will be made, first of all, from words in the vernacular. 
If this source fails to suppl) the need, new w ords may be coined, pro- 
vided they are made in accordance with tegular rules of Turkish 
grammar with res pea to particles, conjugations, and word compounds 
If such words are not found, then new words may be derived from 
Arabic and Persian, provided they are not compound words [made 
according to Arabic or Persian grammatical rules] Foreign words 



298 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

referring to certain ages, certain conditions of professions, and tools 
used in industry will be accepted directly. 

6. All linguistic ‘extra-territorial rights' of Arabic and Persian shall 
be abolished altogether, no rules of tenses, particles, or compounds shall 
be taken at all 

7. Every word known and used by the Turkish people will be re- 
garded as Turkish. Every word that is familiar and not artificial to the 
people is national The language of a nation is a living organism built 
up, not by ns lifeless roots, but by its vital usages. 

8 As the phonetics, morphology, and vocabulary of Istanbul 
Turkish are die bases of new Turkish, words, tenses, particles, or rules 
of word compounds shall not be taken from other Turkish dialects. 
These dialects, hon ever, shall be studied carefully from a comparative 
point of view in order to understand Turkish syntax and idioms 

9. As investigations on the history of the ancient Turkish civiliza- 
tion increase in the future, several ancient Turkish words, such as the 
names of ancient institutions, will enter modem Turkish These old 
words should be used only as terms for the institutions to which they 
refer, they must not be revived as parts of general vocabulary. 

10. Words are not definitions of the meanings to which they refer. 
The meanings of the words cannot be discovered by simply knowing 
their etymologies. 

11 A. dictionary and a grammar of modem Turkish should be 
worked out on the basis of the above-mentioned principles In these 
works, Arabic and Persian words and terms that have become incor- 
porated into Turkish should be given, together with information on 
their structure and composition, not in the sections concerning the 
dynamics of the language, but m the sections concerning etymology 
which deal with the dead past and the genealogy of the language. 

LITERATURE AND MUSIC 

I 7 

In the Turkist programme, our literature will go through an educa- 
tion in two schools of art for its development: One is folk literature 
and the other is Western literature. Turkish poets and writers should 
take as their models the products of the folk art, on the one hand, and 
the masterpieces of the West, on the other. Without passing a period 
of apprenticeship in these two schools, Turkish literature can be neither 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISM 


299 

a national nor a developed literature. Therefore, our literature will 
partly approach that of the people and partly that of the West. 

What are the products of folk literature > They are (a) tales, anec- 
dotes, legends, myths, narrations of the miraculous deeds of the saints, 
(i) proverbs, riddles, (c) songs, ballads, epics, hymns, (J) tales of Dede 
Korku t, Ajtk Kerem,Sak Ismail, Koroglu, and other popular romances, 
(<) the works of mystic poets and minstrels such as Yunus Emre, 
Kaygusuz, Karacaoglan, Dertli, and (/) the humorous literature of 
Nasreddin Hoca and Karagoz. The more our literature benefits from 
these models, the more cultured it will be. 

The second set of models for our literature are world classics 
extending as far back as Homer or Virgil The best models for a new- 
born national literature are masterpieces of classical literature. Turkish 
literature should avoid the romanticists and later schools before it 
drinks the good old wines of the classical masters’ works. Young 
nations need a literature that glorifies ideals and heroes. Classical 
literature is, in general, of this kind The establishment of the school of 
neo-classics in France in an attempt to give the youth a new impulse 
towards idealism is an example showing the educational importance of 
classical literature. We cannot, however, dispense with the romanticists 
altogether and concentrate solely on the classicists because romanticism 
is ultimately based on folk literature. The romanticist movements m 
Europe began as movements towards the people and by taking folk- 
rates and epics as models It follows, then, that we have to pass through 
both classicism and romanticism in our strivings for culture and for the 
cultivation of our literature. In our effort to imbibe the spirit of Western 
literature, we shall at the same time try to understand how Western 
romanticists utilized folk literature. By this apprenticeship m the school 
of the immoral works of the Wesr, w e may revive the process of 
cultivation of our own literature. 

It is only after these tw o periods of schooling, the one in Turkish 
culture and the other in Western traditions, that our Literature will 
become national as well as Western. 

II* 

Before the introduction of European music, there were two kinds of 
music in Turkey, one was Eastern music, which Farabi took from the 
Byzantines, the other was folk music, which was a continuation of 
anaent Turkish music. 



300 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

Eastern music, like Western music, was derived from that of the 
ancient Greeks The ancient Greeks, finding insufficient the full and 
half tones that existed in folk music, added quarter, eighth, and six- 
teenth tones and called them quarter tones. Quarter tones were not 
natural but artificial For this reason, they do not exist in the folk 
music of any nation. Therefore, Greek music was an artificial music 
based on unnatural tones. Furthermore, there was in this music a 
bormg montony due to the repetition of the same tones, which again 
is something unnatural 

Opera, which originated in Europe m the Middle Ages, eliminated 
these tw& shortcomings of Greek music. Quarter tones were not suit- 
able for opera Composers and singers of opera were from the people, 
thus, they were unable to understand quarter tones Under these con- 
ditions, Western opera eliminated quarter tones from Western music. 
Furthermore, as opera was a representation of a succession of human 
feelings, emotions, and passions, it adopted [polyphonic] harmony 
and saved Western music from monophony These two innovations 
prepared the way for the nse of a more fully developed Western 
music. 

Eastern music, on the other hand, remained in its previous state. It 
preserved quarter tones on the one hand, and remained foreign to 
[polyphonic] harmony, on the other. This morbid music, after being 
transmitted by Farabi to the Arabs, passed to the Persians and Otto- 
mans chiefly because of the esteem in which it was held at the courts. 
The Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Chaldean, and Syrian churches and 
Jewish synagogues also accepted the same music from Byzantium. In 
the Ottoman lands this music was the only institution common to all 
Ottoman ethnic and religious communities, and for this reason we may 
properly call it the music of the Ottoman peoples. 

Today we ate faced with three kinds of music- Eastern music, 
Western music, folk music. Which one of them is ours 5 Eastern music 
is a morbid music and non-nationaL Folk music represents our culture. 
Western music is the music of our new civilization. Thus, neither 
should be foreign to us. 

Our national music, therefore, is to be bom from a synthesis of our 
folk music and Western music. Our folk music provides us with a rich 
treasure of melodies By collecting and arranging them on the basis of 
the Western musical techniques, we shall have both a national and a 
modem music. 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISM 3OI 

This ■will be the programme of Turkism in music It is the task of 
our composers to bring this aim to fruition 

RELIGION 9 

Turkism in religion simply means having religious scriptures, 
sermons, and preaching all in Turkish A nation that is unable to read 
and understand the scriptures of its religion quite naturally fails to 
understand the real natureofitsrehgionortheteachingsofirspreachers, 
and also fails to enjoy worship The Great Imam Abu Hamfa even 
believed that reciting the verses during the daily prayeis in national 
languages was permissible The joy to be derived from prayers depends 
entirely upon a thorough understanding of the verses read during 
worship. 

If we examine the religious life of our people, we shall nonce that 
among the ntuals that inspire ecstasy to the highest degree are those 
sincere and silent supplications which are offered in the native tongue 
after the usual prayers Another source of the highest religious joy, 
which the Turks enjoy in prayers, are the hymns that are also recited 
or sung in the mother tongue Again, it is essentially the singing of 
hymns in Turkish which gives a special colour to the Ramadan night 
prayers, as they combine poetry and music. Dunng Ramadan, or in 
ordinary times, sermons given in Turkish are another source of 
religious feelings and experiences among the people But the recital 
of the Birthday Poem \Mtvhd\ composed in Turkish is the ritual that 
gives the greatest rapture and joy to the Turks. This ritual, which 
combines in itself poetry and music and dramatic events, became one 
of the most vital forms of ritual among the Turks in Spite of the fact 
that it was a latter-day religious innovation. The Turkish hymns and 
mystic poems sung in mysuc convents dunng the nte of ir have also 
been a great source of ecstasy 

These examples show that the real force which from time to time 
inspired religious expenences among the Turkish people, was the 
existence, among the religious rites, of certain rituals long permitted 
to be performed in the nauonal language Thus, in order to ensure to 
our religious life a greater enjoyment and stimulation, it is necessary 
to hat e the Kur’an — except during the rearals, die litanies, the suppli- 
cations that are read after prajers, and the sermons — read tn Turkish 



302 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
MORALITY 10 

Patriotic Morality 

Among the anaent Turks, patriotism reached its highest levels. No 
Turk ever hesitated to sacrifice his life or his most beloved possessions 
for his people. . . . 

In the future, too, patriotism should be die most important area of 
morality for the Turks because the nation and its sod are ultimately 
the only independent and self-existent unit. The family and occupa- 
tional groups constitute only the cells and organs of this -whole, while 
religious and international federations, although wider in scope than 
national unions, constitute no real social organisms but only collec- 
tions of societies. These groups cover only particular aspects of the 
life of their members, w hereas the nation is the group that is all-inclusive 
with respect to the life of its members. 

Therefore, the ideal of the nation is above the ideals sought by other 
social groups, such as the family, professional group, church, and inter- 
national union. Patriotic morality should rank above other moralities. 
. . . Turkism should give the highest value to the Nation and Father- 
land. 

Profuuonal Morality 

Professional morality follows patriotic morality. 

The ancient Turks considered professional solidarity to be more 
important than kinship solidarity. . . . The ruling institution among 
them was divided into four professional groups . . . which later on, 
among ihe Ottomans, corresponded to the civil, military', bureaucratic, 
and scholarly estates. In addition to these, there were occupational 
organizations. The Ahh organization of the Anatolian Setjuks was a 
professional order based on the futuwwa principle. . . . The artisan 
syndicates of the Ottoman period were nothing but a continuation of 
these older organizations. These urnons were organized on a regional 
basis and, therefore, lost their usefulness when national economy 
replaced regional economy. . . . For this reason, it is foolish to attempt 
to revive these old institutions. Instead, it is necessary to organize 
nation-wide syndicates that will have their central organization in the 
capital of the state. ... In every a :y there must be a central committee 
composed of the syndicate representatives; . . . their function will 
consist of running the common affairs of the syndicates of the dty and 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISM 303 

of organtzmg the economic life of the city. . . . Federations of different 
syndicates should establish central committees in the state capital 
■which, in rum, Mill constitute, through their representatives, a general 
confederation of syndicates . . . Scholarly professions should join the 
federation also . . . and, thus, all professions wall be organized as an 
army and constitute the basis of the new professional morality. — 
These organizational bases . . . should control professional behaviour 
. . . and provide a professional ethic . . . and establish institutions of 
professional and mutual help. 

Family Morality 

The ancient family and sex morality of the Turks . . . which had 
readied high standards, is completely lost today. Under the influence 
of the Iranian and Greek avalizations, women have become enslaved 
and have sunk to a low- legal status 

When the ideal of a national culture arose among the Turks, the 
revival of, and return to, these traditions were inevitable. It was for 
this reason that feminism in Turkey developed alongside the nse of 
nationalism. Turkish nationalists are both populist and feminist, not 
only because these two principles are valued in our age, but also be- 
cause democracy and feminism were two bases of ancient Turkish life. 
Other nations, in their efforts to adapt themselves to modem civiliza- 
tion, have to keep far away from their past, whereas for the Turks it 
is enough to turn and look at their ancient past for inspiration. The 
ancient Turkish religion, being free from ascetic ntes and negative 
rituals, from fanaticism and bigotry, had made the ancient Turks very 
tolerant with respect to women and to foreign peoples. ... An im- 
partial historian of the future wall admit that democracy and feminism 
originated with the Turks. 

Thus, the Turkish morality of the future wall be based on the 
principles of democracy and equal rights for women as well as on 
national, patriotic, professional, and familial values. 

C1V7 e and Personal Morality 

...Civilization-groups originated with the clans. In pnminve 
societies only those who belonged to the same clan were regarded by 
others as having rights and respectabilitj. In these societies, there 
could be no feud between the relativ es within the clan , peace prevailed 
among its members. With the evolution of human society, the phratry 



304 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
took the place of the clan, and was follow ed by the tube and tribal 
confederations, city-states, ethnic states, and empires as units in which 
peace prevailed. With the widening of these units, the circle of persons 
recognized as having rights and being objects of moral obligation was 
increased. Thus, personal morality or avic morality gradually grew in 
scope. 

Civic morality has two aims, one positive and the other negative. 
The negative aim of avic morality is justice, which implies pTofubsw® 
the violation of the security of other persons The positive goal of 
civic morality is kindness, w hich means doing good to others. A second 
positive aim of civic morality is fidelity in contracts . . . 

Civic morality in the individual necessitates belief in the sacredness 
of personality. . . . One of the important aims of Turkism is to elevate 
civic morality, which ts next to those moral codes of the nation, pro- 
fession and family. 


LAW U 

The aim of Turkism in law is to establish modem law in Turkey. 
The most fundamental condition for our success m joining the ranks of 
modem nations is the complete cleansing of all branches of our legal 
structure of all traces of theocracy and clericalism. 

Theocracy is the system in which laws are made by Caliphs and 
Sultans who are regarded as the Shadows of God on earth. Clericalism 
refers to the acceptance of traditions, claimed to be originally instituted 
by God, as unchangeable laws and to the belief that these laws can be 
interpreted only by spiritual authorities, believed to be die interpreters 
of God. 

The state that is completely freed from these two characteristics of 
the medieval state is called the Modem State; In the first place, in a 
modem state the right to legislate and to administer directly belongs 
to the people No office, no tradition, and no other right can restrict 
and limit this right In the second place, m a modem state all members 
of a nation are regarded as equal to each other in every respect No 
special privilege is recognized for any individual, or family. Or class. 
Sates that fulfil these conditions are democratic, that is, they are 
governed by the people. 

If the first aim of Turkism in law is to create a modem sate, its 
second aim is to free professional organizations from the interference 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURK ISM 


J°5 

of public political authority and to establish professional autonomy 
based on the authority of the professional specialists On the basis of 
this principle, civil law, commercial law, laws on industry and agricul- 
ture, and laws giving professional autonomy to professional orgamza 
tions such as universities, the bar, medical associations, teachers’ 
associations, engineers’ associations, etc., should be codified 

The third aim of Turkism in law is to create the institution of the 
modem family The principle of equality in the modem state necessi- 
tates the equality of men and women m marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
and in professional and political rights It is, therefore, necessary to 
fashion the new family code and the law of elections on this basis 

In short, all provisions existing in our laws that are contrary to 
liberty, equality, and justice, and all traces of theocracy and clericalism 
should be completely eliminated 

POLITICS 1 * 

Turkism is not a political party movement It is a scientific, philoso- 
phical, and literary movement In other words, it is a movement of 
cultural drive and regeneration For this reason, Turkists so far have 
not entered into any political struggle as a political party and certainly 
will not do so m the future 

Since this is so, however, Turkism cannot remain altogether indiffer- 
ent to political ideals because Turkish culture, in addition to other 
values, implies certain political ones For example, Turkism can never 
reconcile itself with clericalism and theocncy Turkism is a secular 
movement and can reconcile itself only with movements of a secular 
nature. 

The Turkism of today is supporting the People s Party because that 
party has materialised the sovereignty of the people, it has called our 
state the Turkish state and our people the Turkish nation Until the 
resolution in Anatolia, the name of our state, our nation, and even our 
language was ’Ottoman’ No one could dare use the word ‘Turkish’ 
for them. Nobody could claim to be a Turk When Turkists dared to 
do so, they became hated enemies to the court and to die conservatives 
Under the leadership and direction of our great Mustafa hemal, die 
Society for die Protection of Rights, from which the People’s Party 
was later bom, delivered the country from invasion and, ar the same 
time, called our state, nation, and language by their real names and 



3 06 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
delivered our political life from the last traces of absolutism and 
cosmopolitanism. We maj ev en sa> that this society put the political 
programme of Turkism into practice without being aware of it Truth 
is one and cannot be two. Those who seek it will finally arris e at the 
same end*, ev en if they proceed along different ways. 

Turkism and Populism met on the same [polincal] programme be- 
cause both were products of necessities and reiliues. As both reached 
the real truth, the} ate in complete agreement One of the evidences of 
this agreement is the fict that all Turkisrs, without exception, have 
joined the struggle in Anatolia and have become its most ardent 
defenders. God's sword was in the hands of the Populists just as God’s 
pen was in the hands of the Turkists. When Turkish soil was threatened, 
the sword and the pen joined forces. From this union was bom a new 
Turkish nation. 

In the future Populism and Turkism will always march hand m hand 
towards the realization of our ideals. Ever} Tuxkist will remain a 
Populist in politics and everv Populist will be a Turhist in the field of 
culture. Our religious catechism tells us that our doctrine m theolog} 
is that of Ma runtii, and in jurisprudence that of HanafL In a similar 
expression w e can put forth this maxim ‘Our doctrine in politics is 
Populism, m culture it is Turkism.’ 


ECONOMY 

P» 

Patriotism assumes various forms with respect to religion, moraht}, 
law , and fine arts. A real patriot should be loyal m all these spheres of 
life. In the Middle Ages, religions patriotism meant loyal t} to the 
Catholic Church, but w hen the modem states arose, the religious stale 
assumed a different significance. 

If there are religious, moral, legal, and literary manifestations of 
patriotism, can we not speak of an economic patriotism 5 Economic life 
has been taken customarily as the most cosmopolitan sphere of life. 
The Manchester [school of political] economy which is still taught in 
our schools teaches that the economic mind [vicdxn (conscience)] B 
something total!} cosmopolitan' When there is such an o facial school 
based on the theorem of Lnssep-fairt, louse^-passer, how can we dare 
to speak of a patnouc economic mmd ) 



THE PROGRAMME OF TCRKISM 307 

We do not need to be frightened, hou ever Everybody knows now 
that Manchester economics is not at all a cosmopolitan doctrine, that 
it is nothing but the national economics of England which 'tands for 
big industry and, thus, derives only benefit from the freedom of ex- 
change abroad and suffers no loss from it. It was the American econo- 
mist John Ray and the German Friedrich List who discovered this 
truth; each developed a theory of national economy for his own 
country. The economists of other nations later followed them. It was 
only we poor [Turks] who remained captives of British economic 
theory, just as we still blindly imitate other nations and fail to free 
ourselves from cosmopolitanism tn morality, in law, and m literature 
In spite of certain sporadic attempts, [the Turkish] state was 
dominated by that Manchester tradition 
The abolition of the Capitulations has been not merely a step towards 
freeing ourselves but also a decisive move. In order to protea national 
industries, it was necessary to have control over the customs tariffs, 
this became possible only through this great effort The [Turkish] 
state, following this deasive step, is showing signs of pursuing a 
national economic policy by establishing the National Credit Bank and 
by its decision to construct the Ankara railways The decision to make 
an Internal Loan (as of last week) may be taken as a dear sign of our 
government’s determination to pursue a national economic policy 

W* 

This nation which has performed a miracle during the war can do 
the same m the economic field during the time of peace. What would be 
the path to follow to perform this miracle •“ 

We can find the nghr way if we leave the wrong road that w e have 
been following since the Tan^imat era. English political economy, 
which did not suit our national spirit, has misled us since that period. 
People believed that the state is incapable of building industries, that 
it cannot encourage and protea national industries, that the municipal 
administration is unfit for economic enterprises, and that economic 
enterprise s are expected to be earned only by individuals and com- 
panies. Theories of this nature, which have no umv ersal validity, have 
been responsible for the decline of our old economy and have pre- 
vented us from developing a new one. Before the Tan^imat era, we 
had a nch industry. We had developed aesthetic crafts, such as tile 



308 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
works, rag w eaving, dye techniques, book-binding, gilding, iron w ork, 
carpentry, etc. Each of these constituted a field of aesthetic creation 
that could be an object of honour for a great nation After the Tan^imat, 
these techniques disappeared and were not replaced by new ones. In 
the same way, our old commercial and guild organizations were totally 
destroyed 

Why did the theories of English political economy not fit our 
national life’ 1 England herself was not an agricultural country She did 
not have enough land for agriculture She had, on the other hand, 
abundant coal and iron reserves Large-scale industry was developed 
spontaneously by the people Overseas trade, too, made great strides 
in the same way Economic growth was not dependent upon the 
encouragement of the government Non-intervention of the govern- 
ment in business and the non-existence of import and export restrictions 
w ere enough for the growth of economic life. Therefore, the economic 
[interests] of the people could be expressed thus’ ‘Just don’t disturb 
us, we’ll do the rest.’ 

In our country the situation was just the opposite. Private initiative 
did not exist We did not have the capacity to form companies We did 
not know even the ABC’s of large-scale industry. We were entirely 
ignorant of the skills necessary for it Therefore, die mere existence of 
needs was not enough to produce a [new] economic life. Without the 
guidance of the state, we Turks could not take even a step in this 
direction. The governments, however, avoided such a policy because 
of the teachings of the political economists Furthermore, it already 
had an important excuse Economic Capitulations. There were various 
possible forms of economic aid to which the Capitulations would not 
be a hindrance, but the government did not want to use them. They 
seemed to be afraid that the spirits of the Manchester pohncal econo- 
mists would be displeased 

Fortunately, w e realize today that this theory of political economy 
is the one suited only to the condiuons of England and that each 
nation must develop her own system of national economy. 

There is a great need for the growth of big industry in Turkey. 
This cannot be realized by private enterprise, it needs central and local 
government 'entrepreneurship* Industries built for military needs 
constitute a good example. When peace comes, these wall be needed 
no longer. Thus, will it not be possible to replace them wadi civil 
industries that will cover the needs of the country s There are several 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 309 

officers of the army "who know industrial management It will be a 
great advantage even if they can only run the already existing plants 
After the peace, on the other hand, it will be easy to get machinery, 
technicians, and engines from Europe Great sums now being spent 
for the trade schools are just wasted Technical knowledge cannot be 
transplanted through instruction, it can be acquired only by apprentice- 
ship The best trade schools are industrial plants Plants to be estab- 
lished by central and local governments will bring big profits When 
private citizens, as individuals or as companies, want to buy them, they 
may be sold to them and new ones can be opened by the government 
If the Grand National Assembly pursues such a policy by drawing up 
a national economic plan, it 'nail be possible to see an economic 
miracle after the establishment of peace The Turkish nation is capable 
of performing miracles in every field if it makes each aim a matter of a 
National Pact and realizes each goal with the aid of faith and idealism 
and by mobilizing its National Assembly, its army, and its govern- 
ment agencies 

We want one more miracle, following the peace, from Our glorious 
fighters who hate non independence and freedom for our country 
This miracle will be nothing but the economic miracle which will lay 
the foundations of the civilization of our nation 

m u 

The needs of a nation do not consist only of those spiritual needs 
that give rise to religion, morality, art, and language There are also 
material needs that give rise to what we call economic activities . 
which are the bases of other social activities In a society where there 
are no persons of means who do not have to worry about their daily 
bread, no science and no art or philosophy can exist As a weahhy 
class did not arise in Turkey through economic progress, the number 
of men of leisure w ho might occupy themselves with work done only 
for enjoyment has been very limited The non-existence of great 
scientists, artists, and philosophers in Turkey is due to the backward- 
ness of our economic life . Those who had been more or less 
interested in intellectual activities m Turkey were government func- 
tionaries . . . The only incentive in their intellectual preoccupation 
was the desire for ‘personal glonfiration’ In Europe such persons are 
called ‘dilettanti’. In Europe the dilettante is not an admired type, 



310 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
whereas among us these 'ommsaents' are the most preferred of the 
elite. In Europe the work of the specialist is valued, w hereas among us 
dilettantes are regarded as authorities. This is due also to economic 
conditions The degree of economic advancement of a nation is pro- 
portional to its degree of division of labour. Specialization in higher 
activities is possible only where division of labour has reached a highly 
advanced stage. Professional specialization m science, art, nnd philos- 
ophy is dependent upon the development of an economic division of 
labour . . 

The advancement of economic life is necessary, not only for increas- 
ing the number of specialists. The dev elopmenr of other fields of social 
activity depends upon the degree of economic prosperity m each of 
them- In a country where economic life remains backward, science, art, 
philosophy, or even morality and religion, can never achieve higher 
manifestations . . . 


I\™ 

The modem state is based on large-scale industry. New Turkey, to 
be a modem state, must, above all, develop a national industry. What 
should we do to realize this s 

The new Turkey, which has to introduce the btest and most 
developed techniques of Europe, cannot afford to wait for the spon- 
taneous rise of the spirit of enterprise among individual, in order to 
industrialize. As w-e have done in the field of military techniques, we 
have to reach European levels in industry through a national effort. 
We have to start by utilizing the btest developments in European 
techniques, without necessarily following the stages of gradual evolu- 
tion. The starting-point, for example, should be electrification- We 
must utilize the hydraulic power of the country and put it into an 
electric netw orlc. The people of Turkey, who have been abb to adopt 
European military techniques in all their details, can learn and master 
the most modem industrial inventions and discoveries- Military 
techniques, however, were not introduced by the private Initiative of 
indiv iduals. This was accomplished through the state. Our medicine, 
which is equally advanced, was also initiated through state action. 
Therefore, only the state can achieve the task of introducing brge- 
scale industry in every field The Turkish state has the power to be an 
independent [national J state. Turks are temperamentally /earner. They 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 3tl 

expect the state to take the initiative in everything new and progressive 
Even social changes are introduced through the state in Turkey, and it 
has been the state which has safeguarded social changes against the 
forces of reaction 

In order that the state itself may become competent in economic 
enterprises, it must become an economic state The statesmen and 
government employees should have economic experience and know- 
ledge Tlie modem state, selecting its personnel with this point in 
men , is like a big business concern . ... By following the same line, 
our state will, at the same time, perform a moral service because the 
rise of a new class of speculators will be prevented The ambitions 
manifested m the Peace Conference clearly showed what a criminal 
people these capitalists, as they are called in Europe, are’ Present-day 
European imperialism is based on private capitalism. If we accept the 
system of state capitalism, we mil be able to prevent the rise of those 
insatiable and predatory capitalists in our country 

The state and provincial or local councils may follow one of the 
four possible lines with regard to economic policy (a) the simplest, 
direct state enterprise to be earned out by its own employees, (£) the 
authorization of certain pnvare entrepreneurs to undertake economic 
enterprises, (c) mixed enterprise, to be carried out through the 
combination of state and pnvate capital, (</) another mixed system . . . 
which is the same as the method of tax farming already used in our 
country. . . 

By following these major economic policies, an economic revolution 
can be achieved in our country. For example, a big programme of 
electrification can be applied under this system . We do not need 
to wait for these covetous European capitalists to come and do it for us 1 

V” 

In ancient times the Turks lived a nomadic life. The Turkish 
economy was a pastoral economy . . Industry among these nomad 
Turks used animal products . . The ancient Turks were not strangers 
to commerce During the imperial periods, the greatest source of state 
revenue was Turkish trader caravans carrying silk from China to 
Europe and velvet from Europe to China. The main trade routes 
between China, India, Iran, Russia, and Byzantium were dominated by 
Turks . . . We sec, then, that the old Turkish emperors were inter* 



3*2 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
ested not only m maintaining political security in the vast area of Turan 
stretching from Manchuria to Hungary, but also in creating an organ- 
ization of international trade and exchange between the nations of 
Asia and Europe 

In the future, Turks must again attain this economic prosperity 
which they enjoyed in the past And the wealth which they shall 
accumulate must belong to the public . . As Turks love freedom and 
independence, they cannot be communists But as they love equality, 
they cannot be individualists. The system most suited to Turkish cul- 
ture is solidansm Individual ownership is legitimate only in so far as it 
serves social solidarity The attempts of the socialists and communists 
to abolish private ownership are not justified However, private wealth 
•w hich does not serve social solidarity cannot be regarded as legitimate 
Furthermore, ownership is not necessarily individual Together with 
private ownership there must be social ownership Surplus profits that 
are not produced by the labour of individuals but that are the product 
of the sacrifices or hardships undertaken by society should belong to 
society Appropriation of these surplus values by individuals is not 

legal 

The capital accumulated through the appropriation of the surplus 
values on behalf of society will be invested in industrial plants and 
large farms to be established for the benefit of society The profits of 
these institutions of public enterprise will be spent to build houses and 
schools for the poor, orphans, widows, the sick, invalids, the blind 

and deaf, to found public gardens, museums, theatres, libraries, hygienic 

housing for peasants and workers, for the electrification of the whole 
country, in short for everything that will ensure the prosperity of the 
people and put an end to all kinds of misery When this public wealth 
reaches a certain quantity, it may even become unnecessary to collect 
taxes from the people any longer, or it may at least lead to a reduction 
of the varieties and percentage of taxation 

The social idealism of the Turks, therefore, means preventing the 
usurpation of the social wealth by private individuals without abolish- 
ing private ownership, and preserving and increasing it in order to 
invest it for the benefit of the whole The economic ideal of the Turks 
would mean, in addition, industrialization. Some believe that Turkey 
should always remain an agricultural nation and never indulge in 
industry. This is wrong It is true that we shall never dispense with 
agriculture, but if we want to be a modem nation, we have to be 



THE PROGRAMME OF TURKISH 313 

industrialized. The most important revolution in Europe was the 
Industrial Revolution This revolution meant the rise of a national 
economy in place of a regional economy and the rise of big industry 
in place of handicraft industry 

A national economy and large-scale industry can be achieved only 
through a protectionist policy In this respect tie shall follow the 
theories of the school of national economists John Ray in America 
and Friedrich List in Germany have proved that the political economy 
of the Manchester school in England ^as not a universal and inter- 
national science, but a system for a national economy peculiar to Great 
Britain. These two economists put forward sj stems of national econ- 
omy for their own countries vhidi ensured their industrialization so 
that today die United States and Germany have reached a stage in 
uhtch both can boast of being equal to Great Britain. Now they follow 
the same open-door policy as Great Bntam This was made possible 
only through the application for many years of the protectionist 
policies proposed by the exponents of national economy 

Now, the firs t job of the Turkish economists is to study the economic 
conditions of Turkey and to develop a scientific and comprehensive 
economic plan on the basis of these scientific researches. Once this 
economic plan is prepared, everybody should work in accordance widi 
it in order to industrialize our country, the Ministry of Economy 
should co-ordinate all of these individual activities. 



TRANSLATOR’S NOTES 


Chapter I (p. 35) 

1 ‘Babamui Vassyen , published in Kupuk Mumua (no. 17, Diyarbekir, I? 1 }) 

1 Namik Kemal (1840-88), Turkish poet and thinker who fought for a constitutional 
regime and infused the ideas of liberty, progress, and patriotism among the Turkish 
intelligentsia 

3 MeJrese, traditional Muslim schools. 

4. Tlocaimn Vasiyen , published in Kufd Mumua (no 18, Diyarbekir, /9 2 j) 

J A revolutionary organization formed originally by Abdullah Cevdet, Ishak Sukflti 
and Ibrahim Temo in 1889, which later developed mto the Party of Union and Progress 
Gokalp came to Istanbul in 1893 

6 ‘PJnnun Vasiyeti 1 , published in Kufii Mumua (no 19, Diyarbekir, 1923) 

7 Gokalp refers to Mustafa Kemal whose nationalist movement in Ankara he had joined 
upon his return from Malta where he had been sent by the Allies as a political prisoner 

8 From Millet Ncdir* published in Kufuk Mumua (no »8, Diyarbekir, *9 2 j) a"^ ,n 
You Mumua (IV, nos 70-4, Istanbul, 1923) See note j, Chapter V belosv The section 
taken here was dropped from the essay when at was reprinted in TurlpJufun Eiaslan. 
I have put it under this section as it has relevance for the biography of the author 

9 As Gokalp’s birthplace, Diyarbekir, was considered to be a Kurdish-speskmg area, his 
adversaries— mostly from among the Islamists and Ottomamsts, whose views Mid 
policies he enuened — cl aimed that he himself was not a Turk but a Kurd ft *««« 

he was annoyed by such claims and wrote the above article. However, a* 1,1 his 500 c> " 
logical understanding of nanon he rejected raaahsm and even a common ethnic origin, 
he would not have ceased to preach modern Turkish nationalism even if he had been 
racially or ethnically a Kurd He expressed this in a poem at a reply to AJ> ^ emaI T * 1< 
latter had for long been a controversial and shady character among the Young Turks in 
exile in Europe and, finally, following ihe end of the First World War, he became a 
member of the puppet ana-nationalist government of Istanbul Because °f his wild 
attacks on the leaders of national independence, he was regarded as an arch traitor and was 
finally kidnapped and lynched by a mob. Gskatp, in this poem enuded 'T° The Man 
Who Calls Me Not A Turk , said 

Even if I were a Turk or not, 

I am the friend Of the Turk, 

Even if you were a Turk or not. 

You ate an enemy of the Turk 

ta The following paragraph appeared originally in 'What Is A Nation y (s*« "0“ ft 
Chapter V below), following the part I have translated under die above he 2 *h n S f have 
transferred it to the end of the remaining part which is translated here, as it has relevance 
to the biography of the author 

Chapter II (p 41S) 

1 ‘BugunkiJ Felsefe’, published in Coif XalemirC Young Pens') (no a, Salonika, 1911), 
under the pseudonym Tevfik Sedan 

X. The auihot intentionally used the word vudaei (conscience) instead of fuu' (conscious- 
ness) The distinction will be encountered in other wnerngs to be found us this volume 



translator’s notes 


315 

For the sake of English style, I have rendered it in many cases by the word 'conscious- 
ness 1 , and sometimes by mucunc* m the French sense. Cf p j 74 , s ee also GokaJp » foot- 
note to the essay Community and Society*, Chapter TV in this volume, and the first 
paragraph of the second section of the essay ’Manifestations of the National Ethos*, 
see below, Chapter VI 

3 'Muktddin 1 Arab!*, published w Getty JCaltnJee (no 8, Salonika, 1911), under the 
pseudonym Tevfik Sedat 

4 Abu Bake Muhammad, i ‘All Muhyil-dm (1165-1140) 

J ‘Yen Hayat ve Yem Kiymetler*, published in Genf KaUmltr (no 8, Salonika, 1911), 
under the pseudonym Demina; 

6 Gokalp here refers to the Young Turk Revolution of 190S 

7 This word, the Turkish form of the Arabic arnra, means the politically organized 
community of <11 Muslima, and plays an important role in Gokalp’s wrcnngs. The reader 
u ill come across it frequently in the following essays. In the absence of an exact equiva 
lent, I have retained the word m most cases m its Turkish spelling I have, however, 
sometimes used 'religion’ or 'church for 11 whenever these expressed the meaning 
intended Gokalp defines dus term dearly in his essay entitled What Is A Nation* , 
which will be found in this volume, see below. Chapter V 

8 Gokalp wrote on 'New Life in Fthtft Mtcmuan ("Review of Philosophy’) (no ij, 
Salonika, 191 1), in which he said 

‘New life is an ideal n hich is at the process of emerging from the social consciousness. 

Today this ideal has to remain somewhat ambiguous. This ambiguity mil be cleared 
away by a me and by the guidance of the social consciousness. The New Life is today 
in a state of unconsciousness Ii is an ideal emerging [ noi from the minds of the 
individuals who criticize the old values and grope for a new ideal , but) from the social 
consciousness The ideals have to correspond to reality , any idea without this property 
is not an ideal and has no basis.’ 

And again, in the same review (no 18,1911) 

• Ideals one their sanctity and sublimity to the social consciousness Patnoostn, 
nationalism, piety, ann militarism, anarchism socialism, humanism are all diverse 
expressions of the social consciousness. The ideals governing men change with 
changing social consciousness. Religious ideals played die major role for a long period, 
but now the ideals directing all nations are national Utah Present-day social and economic 
life necessitates this. This is the ideal which it hope the youth will follow Is our 
social consciousness likely to give birth 10 such an ideal* Yes. Everyone has realized 
today that the only ideal for the Turks is Turkism. There is a growing tendency 
towards nationalism among the Turkish youth today What we want is to transform 
this tendency into a great and sacred faith. There is a movement and sentiment of Turkism 
today, but it is not yet present ai an Util and as a faiih ' 

And (iki, no. 17, 1911) 

’We all want, let us say, to achieve a revolution in die ethical foundations of our social 
life W e have first of all to know how comempo-wry ed ical values have come into 
existence. What factors have kept them alive until now * Do the same factors still exist 
today* After we have answered these questions, we shall have to answer the following 

What are the conditions governing our social bfe today* Are these cond nona compatible 

with the ethical norms* What kinds of change are present social conditions likely to 
produce tomorrow in these educal beliefs* The extent to which we answer these questions 
will determine die revolution which we want 10 produce in our ethical life. That is 
the New Life which we expect from the social consciousness. \k e accept the social 



31 6 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
consciousness as our guide We shall determine our path according to the truths which we 
derive from it. Thus, we do not want the changes which the socialists seek to produce 
because we believe that they are mere utopias and will remain utopias.' 

9 Tanht Maddecihk ve I^timat MefkOrealik', You Clm (Ankara, March 8, 192)), 
reprinted in Turkfulugun Etaslan (Ankara, 192}), pp 60-9 Although this essay does not 
belong to the period of the previous essays, it is taken here to show the perseverance of 
Gokalp s idealistic stand in his later years 

10. Despite the several striking similarities in the conceptualizations of Gokalp and his 
contemporary Max Weber, there is no reason to believe that either knew of, let alone 
was influenced by, the other The term 'charisma' (ad) , charismatic), coined by Weber, 
is used here throughout as it is an exact equivalent of Gokalp’s meaning 
1 1 Gokalp here refers to the publication of the IktuaJiyai Meemuati (Review of Econo- 
mics) which he founded in 1916 with the financial help of the Party of Union and Progress 
The review continued publication for about two years, and seems to have ended with no 
67 in 1918 Gokalp s own articles ui this review were on national economy See Osman 
Tolga, Ztya Gokalp vo IktuaJi Ftktrlen (Istanbul, 1949), and Cavit Orhan TUtengtl, 
Ztya GSkatp HakktnJa Bit Biiiyograjya Dtnemtu (Istanbul, 1949), p 16. 
ia 'MefkOre', published in Turk YurJu (V, no 31, Istanbul, 1913), reprinted in TutkUfmtk, 
tilamlafmak, Muaitrlafmak (Istanbul, 1918) 

jj The quotation actually refers to the verses taken from 1 porm by Tevfik FUtret, the 
Turkish poet and contemporary of Ziya Gokalp 

14. Gokalp here uses the words irfan and meJrniyit to denote something for which he 
later introduced the term kart (Arabic karth) which is translated throughout this book as 

Ckapter III (p 71) 

1 Os Cereyan , published in Turk YurJu (III, no 33, Istanbul, 1913), reprinted in 
Turkitjmk, Islamlafmak, Muarirlafmak (Istanbul, 1918) 

1 The policy of reforms initiated by the promulgation of the Reform Charter of 1839 
3 'Miller ve Vatan , published in Turk YurJu (VI, no 66, Istanbul, 1914), reprinted in 
Turklrjmrk Islamlapnak, Muaiirlapnak (Istanbul, 1918) 

4. Tut an or Transoxarua, the name of the territories beyond the River Oxus, the ancient 
home of the Turks. 

3 Gokalp had used the word btynelmileliyet (intemationality) when this essay was pub- 
lished in 7 uri YurJu but changed this term 10 ummei when it was reprinted 10 the book 
TurkUfmek, tilamlafmak , Muaitrlafmak 

6 ‘Milliyet Mefkfiresi , Turklefmek, hlamlajmak, Muajirlafmak (Istanbul, 19 1 8) 

7 'Lisan', published in Turk YurJu (ID, no 36, Istanbul, 1913), reprinted in Turklefmek, 
tilamlafmak, Muaitrlafmak (Istanbul, 1918) 

Chapter IV (p 89) 

1 ‘Halk Medemyeti', published in HaDta Dogru (I, nos. 14-15, Istanbul, 1913) 

a. The Turkish word used is ocak, which means 'hearth' In this essay it Is translated as 

'informal group* or as 'confraternity* 

3 "An'ane ve Kaide', published in Turk YurJu (TV, no 39, Istanbul, 1913) 

4. Published in Turk YurJu (TV, no 41, Istanbul, 1919), under the title of 'Genual ve 
Cemiyet* ( Community and Society") , reprinted in TurkUfmek, IslimUfmak Muaitrlafmak 



translator’s notes 


3«7 

(Istanbul, 1918), under die title of ‘Hars Zlimresi, Medeniyet ZSmresi’ ( Culture-group 
and Cmhauon-grovp > Note be/e that Gdkalp first used the terms community' and 
'society', but then dropped them, preferring to use 'culture and civilization' I have 

5 See Chapter II, note 2 

6 From 'Cemaat Medeniyeti, Cenuyet Medemyen' ( The Civilisation of Community 
and the Civilization of Society"), published in Turk YurJu (TV, no 47, Istanbul, 1913) 
When the preceding article appeared in Turk YurJu , a certain Armenian intellectual using 
the initials H § sent a comment to the renew which was published in no 46, in which, 
after praising the Turkist understanding of nationalism, he criticized Gokatp s idea that 
the basis of 'community' was religion I have taken here passages from Gokalps rejoin 
der, as a further illustration of the argument in his discussion ui the previous essay 

7 Cf Social Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence , Chapter VII in this volume 

8 ‘Hars ve Medeniyet’, Turkfutugun Eituhn (Istanbul, 1913), pp 17 38 The remaining 
portion of this essay (from pp 38 to 40) will be found in this volume undet Chapter IX, 
below See note 3 of the same chapter 

9 Ibrahim $m»si (1814-71), the Turkish editor and poet, initiated the movement of 

democratization 0 { the Turkish language 

10 Mehmed Fuzuli (1495 1 553), a Shi 1 Turkish poet who bved in Iraq and wrote Jtvaiu 
tn Turkish, Persian, and Arabic Ahmed Nedun (16S1 1730), an Ottoman poet who 
lived in Istanbul and brought Ottoman divan literature to perfection See E J W Gibb, 
A Hutory of Ottoman Parity, III (London, 1904), pp 70-10 8, and IV (London, 1903), 
pp 29 ff 

11 Mahmud of Kashgar (a town in Chinese Turkestan) wrote a dictionary of Turkish 
in the second part of the eleventh century 

11. Jab'» (767—868) wrote a treatise entitled Ruala ft Faji J al Turk in which he des 
enbed the chatactenstics and merits of the Turks 

1 3 Sirvtt-i Furwn, a literary school which received 11s name from the literary and scientific 
magazine of the same name The school flourished from the last decade of the nineteenth 
to the early decades of the twentieth centuries. 

14 The so-called Kizilbaj, who were regarded as the mosi heretical group of rhe hetero- 
dox Alcvis. 

13 Yunus Emre (cirra 1249-1311), Turkish myrnc poet and a younger contemporary of 
Rlmt Recent researches have shown that he was a spiritual descendant of Had Bektaj, 
the rhitteenili-century Turkish heterodox mystic. In contradistinction to Rumi, Yunus 
wrote his mystic poems in simple pure Turkish 

Output V (p 113) 

1 Br Kavrrun Tetkikinde Takibolunacak Usui, Ah Hi TeuAAular Alecmuau (The 
Review of National Studies’) (T, no 1, Istanbul 1915) In ibis essay the word kavm 





318 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
5 "Millet Nedir* originally published in Kufuk Mecmua (no 18, Diyarbekir, 192)), and 
in Yens Mecmua (IV, nos. 70-4, Istanbul, 1723), re-wntten and pitnted in Turkfulugun 
Esaslan (pp 15 aj) under the heading 'Turkjululc Nedir*" ( What is Turkism* ) (See 
the essay on My Nationality’, Chapter I, note 8, above) The essay printed here originally 
included the portion which I have put under the last mentioned essay, but this portion 
was dropped when it was re-wntten and published in the above-mentioned book. 
Between the two versions there is little significant difference, several sentences are exactly 
die same The re- written form is longer than die original version while omitting a few 
sentences which appeared in the latter Only two sentences from the earlier text are given 

6, $ehir MedemyetJ, Koy Mederujeti , KCfSk Mtcmua (no 30, Diyarbekir, 1923) 

7 ‘Koy ve 5ehir‘, K-r~k Mtcmua (no 33, Diyarbekir, 1 923) 

8 "Turkiye Asti BirCemiyet misgiven as a lecture m 1918, published in Dogu (nos. J-6, 
Zonguldak, 1943), from the notes taken by E. B $apolyo 

9 "Tevfik Fikret ve Ttuk Renesansi", MualTim (Istanbul, 1917), a special issue in com- 
memoration of Tevfik Fikret, the Turkish poet who died in 1913 This article is the more 
interesting and significant as Gokalp was far from an unconditional admirer of Fikret and 
his ideas, cf Chapter II, note 13, also p 281 

1 o The Book of ZWa Korku: is a collection of twelve tales which represented pre-Islamic 
Turkish epic literature surviving after the IsUnurauon of the Turks. 

Chapter VI (p 148) 

1 Kiymrt Hukumlen , Islam Mecmuasi (I, no. 18, Istanbul, 1914) Islam Mecmuasi was 
one of the reviews that Gokalp founded, with the financial help of the Party of Union 
and Progress, to promote the publicaDOn of his ideas as well as those of his associates or 
disaples This bi-monthly review continued publication from 1914 to 1917 and appeared 
in fifty-four issues. Gokalp published several articles in this review, a few poems, and 
some articles which did noi bear his name (see Klzim Kami Duru, Ztya Gokalp, Istanbul, 
1949, p 95) Duru reprinted the article entitled ’Dm ve Jenai’, which appeared in Islam 
Mecmuasi without author’s name, as Gokalp's, and claimed ih at there w ere others written 
by Gokalp, but pruned similarly without his name. See below, note 6 , Chapter VII, in 
this volume It seems to me that these unsigned articles w ere written in co-eperanon with 
Halim Sabir, who was the editor of the review and who had written there several articles 
to expound Gokalp's writings emfkk and religion, which, incidentally, are clearer and 
more interesting than Gokalp s 

2 Ahlik Iptunai Midir**, Ipumasyat Mtemuasl 0, no 3» Istanbul, 1914) 

3 "OrfNedir*", Islim Mecmuasi (\,no 14, Istanbul, 1914) 

4- The Arabic word ma'ruf is from the root of *urf, which is translated here as mores 
The English word moral stands in the same relation to the Latin word mores 
I Tsnmaiyat ve Fiknyat Cemiyette Buyuk Adamlann Tesin’ ("Sociology and Ideology 
The Influence of Great Men on Society*), Iftunaiyat Mecmuasi (I, no 2, Istanbul, 1917) 
6 . See Chapter II, note 2. 

7 "Mdlt tsumaiyat! ( National Sociology 1 ), /f tinvnyst Afecmuan (I, no 1 , Istanbul, 1917) 

8 The author used the French words ’sympathie’ and ’antipathic’ respectively for diese 
two terms in a senes of articles, included in this volume, entitled ’National Education’, 
see Chapter VII, below However, I have preferred to use "association’ and 'dissociation' 

9 See Chapter II, note a. 



translator’s notes 


3*9 


Chapter VII (p 184) 

1 'Dunn f^ticnai Yazife/cn*, Islam Afeemtsatt OH, (101 34 and Istanbul, 191 f) 

а. Goi-ilp introduce! the Arabic word pjnim for 'profane*, and in a footnote he points 
to the non-existence in Islamic terminology of a word for this concept as an antonym 
for 'sacred' and proposes the word mentioned abos e as a term. 

} ‘Filth ve I{timaiyat , Islam Mtcmuan (I, no 1. Istanbul, 1914) 

4. ' I ■* 1 1 mi I Urul-u Filth', Islam Mecmssaji (I, no a, Istanbul, 1914) 

9 'Diyanet ve Ka2a' p Islam Mrcmssan (II, no. 35, Istanbul, 1913) 

б. Itdhat ve Tcrakki Kongresi Munascbenyle', Islam Mecmustsi (IV, no 48, 1916, 
\ , nos. 49-50, Istanbul, 1916-17) This and the following essay cannot be claimed for 
Cbkalp without some reservation Neither appeared under his name in Islam Mtemuast 
Both betray a style wluch is not exactly his. However, the ideas expressed are his, as 
found in his other writings incorporated in this volume. It is known that he wrote these 
essays originally as reports to the 1916 convention of the Parry of Union and Progress 
and that they wete distributed to the party organization, I have included them here 
expressing also my guess that they were either written with the help of someone else, 
or later re-touched by another person. See Unel I leyd, FounJasusns of Turkish ft’anonalssm 
(London, 1990), pp J3 and 90, Ench Pntsch, D e islamische Sraarsidee. Em gesducht 
idler Oberblick', Zattchn/i fir vergUuhenJt Rahuwusensshoft (III, no t, Stuttgart, 
I9J9), pp. 38 ff See Osman Nun, Mtrtllta Umur-u BiltJiyi (I, Istanbul, I9aa), pp 
»74 ff, and KJnm Nanu Dura, Ziya Cokalp (Istanbul, 1949), pp 6o ~9, for another 
version of the first essay which was distributed to the party organization as a memoran- 
dum. Cokalp was assigned by the Central Committee of the Parry of Union and Progress 
to prepare a memorandum 10 be submitted to the government. The ideas contained in 
this article were fupgested in that memorandum In the general contention of the petty 
die transfer of the Shar courts from the office of the Shaikh- J Islam to the administration 
of the Ministry of Justice mas accepted in accordance with Gokalps proposals. The 
schools under the £»*a/admimstnnon were also transferred to the Ministry of Education, 
(see Emin Enpigil, Bit Fsitr /IJaminssi Romans (Istanbul, 1931), pp 100-1 These were 
eatly steps towards the secularization of religious courts and schools. Midi die fall of 
die government of die Parry of Union and Progress following the end of the First W orld 
M ar, die older rdgime of the courts was restored by the reactionary Mehmet VI and hit 
government. However, much more radical reforms started by AtatUrk brought this 
process of secularization ro its completion. In die mcannme, die office of Shaikh-ul Islam, 
d e Shar courts, and die ministry of Evkaf were all abolished, together with the instinr- 
oun of die Cihphacy Thereupon, Cokalp • speculations tbout the Caliphacy and its 
future organization rururaDy remained mere utopias. However, for the sake of historical 



ccmua (nos. ji, J4, 3 s . jl.fctanbl 

. , . — . Istanbul, >917) 

'Turk Ailesmin Tenlellen , Yens Mecmua (I, no 11, Istanbul, 19(7) 

‘Aile Ahlakl, Dugiln Adederi , Ken Mecmua (I, no 21, Istanbul, 1917) 

Gdkalp here gives a description of a rue for Auyt, the goddess of fertility 1 
ikuis, on the basis of an article by Sieroaewskj in RIvue Je V 'Histotre det 
>1 46 Ills Summary and quotations have been omitted while bis conch 
tludcd 

dopier VIII (p 259) 

Hallca Dogrn , TurlfuLgun Erosion (Ankara, 1913), pp 41 5 
‘Dehaya Dogra', KCfut Mecmua (no 1, Diyarbekir, 1922) 

See below, Tom aids Modem Science’ 

InkdipjiUk ve Muhafazaiartik', Yens Gin (Ankara, May if, 1923) 


translator’s notes 


% The newspaper HShntytt i MJUyt was founded by Mustafa Kernai (Ataturk), and 
was the organ of the nationalist government of Ankara. Gok3lp published five articles 
in tt on political parries (April 17, 19, 23, 29 and June 13, 1923) These articles are re 
printed m /into titJSrf (Zonguldak, 1997), edited by E B Japolyo 

6 Gokalp apparently alludes to the closing of the Straits by Turkey during World War I, 
which, according to the belief of some, prevented the Western allies from helping Russia 
and, thus, contributed to the fait of the Tsanst rfgime 

7 Allusion to the so-called Ergtntkan captivity of a branch of the Turks. According to 
an old Turkish myth, the Turks were confined in 1 valley for four centuries until a black- 
smith, by irtelnng iron rocks, opened up a gate, and they were delivered under the leader 
ship of a Grey Wolf The allusion in the last sentence of this essay is apparently to 

Mustafa KenuL 

8 Medemycurnis , Kem Mtcmua (no 68, Istanbul, 1923), reprinted in Turkpilugun 
Era, lan under the title 'Garbe Dogru (Towards the West 1 ) (Ankara, 1983) 

9 lime Dogru , KnfCt Mumua (no a, Diyarbekir, 192a) 

in *llars te Tehaib , TarkfuJ*£un Ejailan (Istanbul, 1923), pp 89-93 The word refine- 
ment ' is used for tehzib' which is derived from Arabic r akJhib, originally meaning shaping 
a tree by cutting leaves or branches. The German word Bildung* is the exact equivalent 
of this term as used by Gokalp 

11 Cf p 16S above and Gokalp town footnote in the essay entitled *Naaonal Education 
(p 218 above) I le seems to modify his opinion about the relation between the meanings 
of the German JU Kultur and of his own term hart' 

Ckapu. IX (p 2S7) 

■ *T(lrk;uluk Nedir J , Krai Afaemua (no 28, Istanbul, 1917) 

2. See Chapter IT, New Life and New \ alues' 

9 Irfan. In Golalp s terminology this word should not be translated here as culture 
because he used it previously In a more general and ambiguous tense covering both 
culture and 'civilisation (see p 68) or m the sense of lore , the whole body of know 
ledge possessed by a people, or of learning', knowledge’ possessed by the intellectual 
dlite pertaining to particular subjects (see pp 170 and 238 above) Here £ have felt forced 
to render 11 as 'culture I draw the reader's attention to the fact that ut thu may I have 

used Cuhun, with capital C, (criarj 

4 Pera, the Europeanued section of tlie aty of Istanbul where the Europeans, called 
Fnnkt by the people, who settled in die Levant, used to live 

5 From TUn ve Mcdcmyct , TarkpJugun Erailan (Istanbul, 1911), pp 38-40. The earlier 
and main portion of this essay Is found In dus volume under Culture and Civilization' 
See Chaplet IV 

4 . Li ran I THrk(Ohii\ Ztrkfabgnn EiaiUn (Ankara, 1913), pp 96-111. 

7 Edcbiyannuiin Tahns veTehzibi , TbrkpJt&n EsaiLm (Ankara, 1913), pp 127-9- 

8 Milli Mowin', Tyrifulafan KsajLtn (Ankara, 1913), pp 1 30-1 

9. *D nl TQrk^uIiiV, T*rkpJ*£an Eaaitan (Ankara, 1923), pp 163 4. 

>a katanl AhllV, 'Meslckl AW lk , fctikbalde Aile AMaki Nial Olcnali**, Wedero ve 
$ahst AhUk, TJtlpij'vi Eaailan (Ankara 1913), pp 138-41, 142-4, 153-6, 137-8 
re sp e c tively 


322 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
II 'Hukukl TtilL^lllUk*, Turkfulugun Eiaslan (Ankara, 1923), pp 161-2 

■ 2. Siyasi Turk^uJuk , Turijulugut Esaslan (Ankara, 1923), pp 170-1 

■ 3 tktisadi Vatanpervcrbk’, Kufut Mtcmua (no 43, Diyarbekir, 1923) 

19 'llctisadi MOC12*', Kutpik Alttmua (no J3, Diyarbekir, 19*3) 

1J From Iktiiail Dogru", Kuful Mermua (no 7, Diyarbekir, 1923). 

16 tktisadi Inkilap tjm Nasil ^alifmaliyir’’, Kufuk Mecmua (no 33, Diyarbekir, 19 

17 Iknsadi TurkguJuk', TuikfuLgun Esaslan (Ankara, 1923), pp 165—9 



GLOSSARY 


This glossary contain* only those Turkish, Arabic, and Persian sards that have passed 
m the lest without being translated or defined (T denotes Turkish, A Arabic, P , 

Persian.) 


AM aUHathik (A-), those Muslims who adhered strictly to the traditions aitnbured to 
Muhammad 

AM al'Suma (A ), the people of prophetic tradition who refrained from donating from 

dogma and practice 

AUtvya tvuru, the courts handling family affairs. 

AM al-dkimma (A ), non Muslims possessing scriptures such as Christians and Jews, 
living under Muslim jurisdiction 

MUtr* AW. AkkLy, JiLSl, AiUifi AIT, treatises on ethics written by Tust, 
Dawwani, and AJi t^elcbi respectively 
•Ml (V a/u) a member of the guilds of the thirteenth century in Anatolia 
eitiuiii/, lit white-beard, the head of the village community called oko 
AUvt (A. Alnt), die followers of Ab, the Prophet s Son in Law in his claim to succeed 
the Prophet they were in opposition to the Sunni* (p) 
aru{ (A. arwf) Arabic prosody, poenc metres used commonly by Muslim writers of 
different lands. 

even; (A. ‘tvJnJ), general taxes levied by the Ottoman rulers. 

iy on, the Local thitfs or digroianes recognized by the central gov eminent whose increased 
strength in the eighteenth century allowed them to defy the central authonnes 

AiAr Lit. father, the sptntual leaders of the Turkish religious orders when undifferenti- 
ated, usually refers to Bcktashi leaders 

Bjihhm, union' in Albanian, die name of the Albanian nationabst society founded m 

i«W 

fart e/ umnm (A.), international. 
fojuytt, being aesthetic. 

My, die Turkish word originally corresponding to lord which tit modem Turkish usage 
follows the given name to denote Mr' as Ismail Hakkl Bey 
Ary, Turkic mbe. 

Aryfayi, tribal lord 

huJun, ethnic community nr nation 

BurkJn-i Qln , the ode of an Arabic dictionary 

yjrjvie (P ), (T (turvO, frame 

Deji Ao'iuf, see Chapter V, note to. 
dp: (“*»'{), sea. ^ 

PiyJn-t Lugut^ut Tuft, a dictionary of Turkidi-Arabic written by Mahmud of Kashgar 
during die second pari of the eleventh century, see Chapter IV, note it 

fairs", the personnel of the household services of the Ottoman rulers, 
fa/tsilia, see Chapter % HI, note ? 
r*ii/(A. avyi/), Muslim pious foundations. 



324 TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 

faith (A. ftqtk), a sdiolar of Is’anuc jurisprudence, see fiik 

fetra (A. fatwo), the responses given by the mufas on religious-jundical questions. 

fikh (A. fijti), the fcnovi ledge of Islamic jurisprudence. 

fikr, idea 

fitra , the alms given at the dose of Ramazan, the month of fasting, see Ramadan. 

Freni, the French, Europeans generally m Onoman-Turkish usage. 
futuwwa, the ethics of generosity and chivalry practised by the Muslim guilds, 

£i;lE (A. gkojai), an ode of not mote than tnhe disuches. 
fnnui (A. ghust), total ablution of the body 

hadixh, tradiuon recording an act or saying of the Prophet. 
kafil (A.), one who knows the whole test of the Kur’an by heart. 

Haivruyn t AfuHvt, the newspaper founded in January i jao by Mustafa Kem.il (Ataturk) 
as the organ of the Nationalist Government in Ankara. 
kali (A. Half), common people (ui Turkish usage) 
kalhyat (A. ikalqtyyat), folklore (in Turkish usage) 

Hrtnafl, those Muslims who adhere to the religious jurisprudence founded by the jurist 
Abu Hamfa. See Shaft *. 

hamf one who possesses the real and true religion. 

hare (A. kartk), a word coined by Gokalp from the Arabic kanaka ( to culnvate 1 ) for 
culture , see Chapter n, note 14. 

Hijra (T Hicret), the Prophet s migration from Mecca to Medina, the starting point for 
the Islamic, Hijra, calendar 

hulla (A.), a legal but ficticious marriage between a woman divorced three times consecu- 
tively b) one man and another man in order that she may remarry the first husband, 
the holla was customarily dissolv ed by a formal div ore* after one dav 

tfil the act of issuing a fitra (j v ) 

Aram, a state of abstention from many ordinary acts for the purpose of making a pil 
gnmage to Mecca, signified by the wearing of a special dress also called thram. 

Ijttksj, exerting one s self to form an opinion on a rule of law 

imam, the leader of a congregation at prayer, also the head or leader of the Muslim 
irfan, see Chapter II, note 14, and Chapter IX, note 3 

jikjJ, onginally, fight or struggle, later, struggle against heretics and infidel, roll later. 
Holy V. at 

Ka la, the cubical temple at Mecca which is the most sacred place for Muslims. 
ialam, Islamic theology 

iarmnnam* (P kamuynamak), die codes of temporal ordinances issued by the Ottoman- 

kaiule (A. qaiila), a form of poetry used by Muslim poets containing distiches numbering 
m the hundreds. 
ia^a (A. qada) judicial function. 
ikon, old Turkish word for 'pnnoe* 

fddnji, lit. secessionist, a member of the earliest Muslim sect which ceded over the 
question of die successorship 10 the Prophet. 

Haiti (T kaup), one who reads the formal sermon on special occasions, especially at 
Friday prayers. 

Hulla (T hutle), the sermon rea 


ad by the Haul 



GLOSSARY 


3*5 


Ktgsl Etna , liL Red Apple , Originally referring to Home as the goal of Ottoman conquests, 
the original and tost home of the Turks in Central Asia in the Turkist ideology 
Kshls, the direction of die Ka ba which is faced by Muslims at prayer 
Kdtmtn, the Turkish word for the MamJuks. 

KsstaJgu Bid, a treatise in verse on morality and statecraft regarded as the oldest estant 
Turkish document written under Islamic influence. Its author, Yusuf Khass-Ilajib, 

UvtnJ, Ottoman seaman 

Lugai I fegaroy, a dictionary of the Ottoman and (jagatay Turkish dialects written by 
Shaikh Suleyman al Buharl and pruned in ilka. 

ma'tuf, see Chapter VI, note 4 
mullyitl, pL of iWA (j v) 
mashskhat, the office of Shaikh 1 J Islam (f v) 

masjtJ (T merptf), die Arabic word the corruption of which gave the English word 
mosque , a small mosque math no minaret (in Turkish usage) 

Hawaii, she category of Muslims who were non Arabs during the Usmyyad rule 
MiJemyri-s Islsmsye Tarihs, the Turkish translation of 7 a rikh al TamaJJun al Islam! 

(•The History of Islamic Civilization ), by Juj]i Zaydan (1S61 1914) 
mtJrtu (A. maJraaa), medieval Muslim schools of learning 
mtJresfvl, belonging to mtJrtst (? v ) 

mtkttf (A. moitoi), m Turkish usage, the secular school as distinguished from the 

«*/«««(, -> 

MitliJ (A. MawtU), the Turkish poem composed by Suleyman Qelcbt at the end of the 
fourteenth century as the birth song of the Prophet. 

Mikas (A. Mtqai), a stage on the road to Mecca where shram (j v ) is assumed 
milltt (A mslla ), in modem Turkish nation , in classical Arabic, a community of 
language oral fatdt, in medieval Arabic, a sect, in medieval Ottoman Turkish, a non- 
Muslim community 

.Mu attajas, pte-Islamic Arabic poems hung so as to be read publicly 
(T mur^jur), the person who calls die congregation to prayer 
mufil, person who issues a ftsva ( ? r > 
mujsahij , person who is authorized to exercise tjtshad (f v ) 
mutakallmln (T munkrllmun), theologians 
muuyaJJimuA (T mws*kaJJurun\ the early predecessor* 


(P ,4i*iinak), year-book. 

nasi, a verse of die hur In or a haJith (f v ) decisive of any point in Islamic law 

Fa/a, pasha, the highest rank in the Ottoman military and, later, also die civil hierarchy 

taSl, ace ka;a 
yXfl (T A oJs), judge 

Qj /1 ashr (T ka;osktr), die judge occupying the highest pidicia) rank in the Ottoman 

QJuuo, the Arabic dictionary of FIruzahIdl (1519-1411), translated into Turkislt by the 
Ottoman chronicler Asm (J. 1*19) 
ftvJr, analogical teasoning 



GLOSSARY 


326 

Ramadan (T Ramadan), the month of fasting 
Risalak, prophethood 

RashiJun, right-guided ones, an adjective applied to the first four Caliphs 


saneakkty, commander or lord of a sancak (standard), a unit in the Ottoman military 

Sart, a member of a people of mixed Turkish and Persian origin inhabiting the territory 
extending from Samarkand to Tashkent. The word is not an ethnological term, as it 
originally meant merchant. 

Stlcuk (Sslfuk), the branch of Turks who ante-dated die OrtomanTurksinestablishing 
Turkish rule in Anatolia 

Jiimw Fiman , & literary review appearing in Turkey from iSfd onwards as jn organ of 
the writers who introduced into Turkish the Western literary forms and ideas 
Shafi 1, those Musbms who follow the religious jurisprudence elaborated by the jurist 
Shaft 1, see Hanafu 

shaikh (T ft yh), in Arabic, the patriarch of the tnbe or family, in Turkish, the spiritual 
head of a mystic order 

Shaikh-ut-Istam, the highest religious authority in the Ottoman system 
Skar\ of shan ah (A ), the path, the sum total of the rebgious-Iegal rules of Islam 
thar'l qiJt, the judges applying the than a(jr) 

Shi 1, the sects recognizing Ah, Muhammad s son-in-law, as the leginmate successor to 
the Prophet and opposed to Sunni (j») 

Sku'ultyak (A ), those who represented the movement under Abbast rule the object of 
which was to inculcate equality among all Muslims as against the discrimination made 
by Arab against non-Arab Muslims. 
skuro, a council 

stpahi, a holder of a benefice in the Ottoman tmpenal organization 
styar (A ), a biography or book describing the conduct of the prophets 
Siyastmamt (P -namaS), a treatise on statecraft written by the Seljuk Vizir Nizam al- 
Mulk in the eleventh century 
sufi, Muslim mystic, see tasawwuf 

sultan f, in Arabic, pertaining to a king’s authority, or simply authority, impenal, in 
Turkish. 

sunna, the Prophet’s trad non. 

Sunni (T Sunni), the followers of the historical successors hip, as established by the first 
three Caliphs, to the Prophet believed to be the orthodox, as opposed to the Sift 
(f v ), Muslims 

soten, pre-Islamie tribal feasts of the Turks. 
fuur (A. shu*ur), consciousness (in Turkish usage) 


saftr, a branch of Muslim learning dealing with the exegesis of the Kur’an. 

TanJirname, lit fireplace book, oral beliefs in magic contained in folk tales told by old 


Taniimat, reforms initiated m Turkey with the proclamation of a charter in 

Tat, Or Tata, probably a Chinese Word from which came the word Tatar 1 
tedbir-i ntfs, rrdtu r mtnftl, teJhm-i denies, medieval Muslim terms for 
sciences of self, of household, and of government respectively 
tekke, a convent of the Turkish mystic orders. 

ungtf (Jtntf), sea 

ttravih (A. sarauiA), the prayer performed in congregation only during 
timer, a benefice allocated to a sipahs (;>) 


‘ **39 

the practical 


: Rama Jan Uu) 



GLOSSARY 


327 


lore, pre-Islanuc Turkish customary law 

tuba, a legendary tree believed to have its roots in Paradise and its branches spreading 

Turan, the country north and east of the River Oxus believed to be the home of the 
Turanians or the Ural-Altaic peoples of whom the Turks constituted the majority 
Tu[ukai, the ordinances of Timur (Tamerlane, 13)6-140;) 

Uka[ (A ), a place between Ta if and Nakhla in Hejaz where a fair was held annually in 

ulema (A- ‘uloma), the corps of the Muslim scholars. 
ummei (A. ununa ), see Chapter 11 , note 7 
urf, see Chapter VI, note 4 

vakf (A. waif ), «ng of rvkaf (;v) 


yam, pre-lslamic public law of the Turks believed to have been codif ed by Jengtz 
[lamer, an Ottoman benefice larger in yield than a ri mar (}») 

jikr (A. rOukr), die collective, repenove channng of the attributes of God as practised in 
the i tkkt (q v ) by the mfit (;*) 



INDEX 


Ab basi (see also Cal phait), no, lit, l SO, 
*0J| *54 

AUest, iSS f , ji) 

Abdul Aziz, 66 

AbduQiab HAmid, 146 

Abdul Hamid, ill 

Abdullah Cevdct 314 

Abdullah lla>im 39 

Abu Bair (ju oho Caliphate) Ilf 

Abu llamfa, 197, aoof , 103, 301 

Abu \u»uf, 197 

Aesthetics (jn oho Architecture, Ait, and 
Music), to*. »7i, method* of, 96, 59, 
rol, aif, a6a ff, aS~, ala, Turkish, id), 
26) 

Ahl at-Jkunma, >a», }») 
dt/aAlmH |J| 

Ahtlvya coum aio, JIJ 
Ahmed \eftk, 66 

Albanian 4 j 73, 137, iwconalum, 4f, ji, 

•)' 

Alt Kemal 314 
All Pa*a, 107 
All 3» it. 

Aifura, Yusuf, 10 

AUl, 301 

Akkoyunlo Turk*, 43 f 
al Arabl, Muh>l Ud n Ibn, 30-3 

Anglo-Saxon culture («« also Culture) 94, 
100, 104 io*, iio~i, 11B, 136, t48, 

111 f, 144 *\ 149 131.1lj.307 

Arab (in also Arabic) civilization, 11*, 
2 J3, »3«, 1*7, 171 culture, loSf.rjof, 
')(. «J*f. nation, 74, 78, n 7 f, i|», 

Arabic architecture, 171 f language forms 
ut Turkish, jS 43, 74, 77. t)-3 *03 
l<S, 177 f, 163, i-l, lS4, 190, 194 t, 
*77 f, muse, 17a. 300, sciences, 173 

Ara/lt, 191 f 

Architecture, 107 t, 171, 174 
Aristotle, 17) t, 1-* 

Armenian (m also Non Muslims), 19, 
107 f-,)ce, nationalism, 4 f 131 


Art, 107 f, 162 0 
ArtabogulUn, 44 

Asceticism, Turkish traditions concerning, 

19. loS . »T4i 3°J 

Afti Keren, (Keren, ike Lover) 33, 263, 
177 

Ajti Paja, 93 

Atatdik, Mustafa KemaJ, '3 f , 63 f , 117, 
303. 3«4,3'9,3»' 

Authority (ere aha Competence, Mores, 
and Sanction), 1191b, 139 L, 184 b, 
193 f , iijf, 173, of Cabphs, «4f, 
> 30 -). )°4 
A2en Turkish, 43 


B 

Bacon Francis, 178 
Bail, ,44 

Balkan Wan, «4, 73, 73,95. 97* '7* 
Baltactoglu, Ismail Haiil, 139 f 
Bekrashi, 4f 26), 317 
Bcnalogullan 44 
Bergson, Herat, 4i 94 133 
Berkeley, Bishop pr, ff 
BiJa, tf»f, lit, 1)4 f 
Binet, Alfred 4t 


Caesaro- Papism, 218 f 
Cal phate, 120 20), 103, 207 ff, lioff, 
iif )) abolition of, 14 319 f 
Capitalists, Jll 
Capitulations, 108, 277, 307 f 
Cemoas ( tee also Community), 104 ff , 

307 f 

Cevdct Abdullah, 314 
Cesdet Papa, 10a 

Chansmanc poster (see also Great Men), 
43 183 f , Goltalp *, 13 use of term, )|4 
Chauvinism, 1S3 t 

Chnstaaruty and modem civilization (see 
also Civilization, European, and Civi- 

lization, 3* estem), 73, *4. lot £» *43. 

Civilization . earners o£, 239, 242, sea 

also Cna Men, definition of, 2J— 4, 

*7-92, 104 f , 109, i«7. 171 £| *54. 244, 



INDEX 


330 

2 69, 2 82 development ofj 68, 74 B, Corporative basis, nations Kith, izt 
95 f 142, 167! ,239, 27® £> 309 Cosmopolitanism, 18,74, 107, 281, 287, 


Civiloation, Eastern, 29, 75, «7», 236, *40, 
149 254, 265(7, 270-3 277 f , 286, 
289 f 300, European, 167 f, 179, 183, 
aji, 266 f, 270, 27; if, 2 ,-9, 286, Far 
Eastern, 167, 270 £, 273, 2’8, Greek, 
144, 3°J» Iranian, 130 f, 133, 238, 249, 
303, Islamic ( see also Umsetet), 28, 16?, 
172, 183, 222 2<Sjf, 271 (, 289, 
Mediterranean, 267, 270, 272, Oriental, 
262, 263, Ottoman, to*, 108, 237, 262, 
26), 268, 289, Roman, 265, 270, 272, 
Taoist, 167, Turkish, 60, 269, 271, 284, 
298, Western, 13, 23 f, 26, 28, 30!, 
63, 101 f, 104, 230, *62, 266 f, *70, 
272-8, 282, 189, 296 

Civilizanon-group, 23, 97 too, tio, 12S, 
171, 236, 241, 248, 170, 281, 287, 303 
Clan, 118-21, 124! 

Class, social (r« alto Consciousness and 
Solidarity), 61, 79, too, 107 
Classicism in Europe, 144 f , in Turkey, 
*45 f 

Clericalism, 304 f 

Collective, conscience 22, 158, 163 1, 183, 
consciousness, 62 3, <38, idea/, 68, 
representations, 62 3, sennments, 158, 
163, soul, 189 

Collectivism (see alto Culture), too 
Collectivisnc education (i« also 
Education, national), 3*0 
Collectivity, 184, 189 ff, *42 
Commune, 101, 120-5, *3 8 ff 
Communism, 311 

Community (see also Cemosst and Ommet ), 
64 f , 97, loaf, 113-23, 125-32, 138(1, 
153-6, 225, 227, 287, 289, 317 
Competence, authority ihtough, 221, 227 
Concordate system 219 f 
Congregation ( see also Collecnv ity), 213 


306 f 

Cult, affairs of, 206 ff , 232 
‘Culture', 13,23,89,98,141,238,245,239, 
316, 321, de&ucon of; aj f, a; £, ra8, 
104-9, t*o f , 166 £, 172, 224, 233, 254, 
269, 280-3, nauonal, 136 ff, 243 £, 
245 f , 248 ff , ajr f , 259, 261, 264, *66, 
281 ff, 284-9, 303, Turkish, 29, 143, 
172 f , *46, 25 1 £, 265, 284-9, 3°S 
Culture-group, 97, tot, 120, 270, 287 
Customs, 1 16, 131 £ 

D 

D Annun&o, 260 
Dante, 260 

Deis Korkul, 143, 263, 299, 318 
Demirtas, pseudonym of Gotedp, 315 
Democracy (set also Populism and Con 
satuuonal regime), 14, 18, 18, 40 ft, 
«3».t43.J0J 

Demolins, Edmond, 98 ff 
Derth, 263, 299 
Descartes, 5 3, 1 1 5, 278 
Determinism, 49, 60, 1519 
Divan 1 CtigSt-ut-Turk, 167 
Division of labour, social, 62, 64, 66, > 19, 
124, 157, 139 HI, 182, 2S6, 269, 274 ff, 
282,310 
Dtya, 129 

Diyarbekir, 20, 43 ff , 130, >41, 3*4 
Durkheim, Emile, 22 n., 60 ff , 64, 95, 97i 
99,113, 159 n., 164, 244 

E 

Eastern civilization, set under Civilization 
Ecclesiastical councils, 216-19, 212, 
absence in Islam, 217 
Economic patriotism. 


Eternal essences, 51—5, 273 
Ethics, theory of, 30, science of, 267, 31 3 
Ethnic unity, zee Kavm 
European civilization, zee under 


Eykaf (zee alto Vaif), ISO, 319, 313 
Ministry of, 210 f, 319 
Evolution, 24, 49, 113, 195 f , 23$, 233, 


Great Men («» aho Genius, Hero, In 
venter, Reformer, and Sage), 30, 121, 
ij2, 136-9 i6jf, 176 138, 264 
Greek(s) (ire aLo Non- Musi ms), J9, 63, 
74, 7*. *4 90, 131, 207 133, joo 
Greek Orthodox Church, 64, 206, 117, 
219 214 27J 
Grey Wolf 268 321 

GuycamJ M Ji, 150 

Gultekin (Orlthon) inscnpnom, 89, 180 


Farabi, 106, 172, 299 f 
Fatwa, 201, 208, 217, 221 f , 324 
Feminism, 17 , joj 
Feudalism, 138 f , 140 £, 142 f , 262 
Feudaluauon of the Ottoman Empire, 
*7 

Fichte, 67 

Fikk, 23, to), 172, 180, 19J-9, »*6, 324, 
—um, 29, 180 

FiLret, Tevfik, 20, 14S f , 281, ]if, 318 
Fintvo-Ugnuw, 71. to, 167, 171 
Folk, 127, civilization, 89 f , literature, J J, 
9J, 236, 263, 271, 291, 198 f , —lore, 
30, 44 f , 89 f , 9j, 99, 160, 283, 270, 278, 
music, Joo. organizations, 90 ff, 117 
Formalism, 17, 91 ff, icy, 174 


HaJith 12, 196 f 
Hiktmtjt'-e *6j 311 

Halim Sabir 318 
Heft,*. Folk 
Halkiya' are Folklore 
I limit), Abdulhak, 146 
Hanafi, 44, '°3, 208, 211, 306 
Han ball, 221 
ffaruf , 38, 105 
Hare, .68, 280 284-9, J» 

I la Jim, Abdullah 39 
//aval, 107.281 
ffayy.t }8f 

Hero (zee alto Cteit Men), 30, 41, 68, n 

139,173,181.244 

Holding, Harald, 61 
Hulla, too 

Humanities, place in education 241, 24: 

Hungarian, 73, 131 

Hygiene rerun ritual, 1 88, IJJ f 


Genius (zee alto Great Men), J0 , 4 ». «J, 
■64,173 ill, 244, a6o, 183 f 
Gharrali, 33 
Goethe, a 60, 1S4 

Gdkalp, Zjya, biographical, 13, 20 ; 


‘IkaJa, 207, 110 
Ibrahim Temo, 314 

Idealism, 40, 241, nanonal, 287, phil- 
osophy of, jo-| 193, 243, sociological, 
21, 37-66 pan , 31 j, Turkish, 89, 241, 

311, Turkist, 66, 76, ioj, JiS 

Ideals (zee al 10 Collective lepresentauons), 
J6. 17. J*f,4l 3^"3 fats , 78 -9,98, 
■ *3 '9J, »*7. defnmon of, 49 1, 37 , 
63, S', *ȣ iji, 166, 184 develop- 


INDEX 


332 

tfta, 199, 20J ff , 208 f , 217, 220 ff, 324 
}jma, 19S, 197 

IjllhaJ, 103, 19 6, 209, 217, 220 
* I Im, 210 

Imam , 107, 201, 207, 22J f 
Iroitauomsm, 17, 23, 39, 89, 94, 97, 250, 
2«2 

Imperialism, 228, 31 K 
Individual, (S3, 188-91 

Individualistic education, 23;, 238 f , 241, 
243 ff, 320 

Institutions, social, 17 f , 64, 79, 8 1, 89-9;, 
•o8, 1 17, 167 ff, 172, 184, 241, 269, 280, 
282, 298, 300, 302 

Internationalism, 26, 74, 181 l, 287 
Intetnanonality (ki also Civilisation, 
Ottoman, Ummet), 7J f , 316 
Inventor (set also Great Men), 157, 160 f 
Iranian civilisation, set under Civilization 
Irfan, 68, 168, 170, 174, 238, 384 f , 316, 

3 « 

Irk (see also Race), 127 
tshak Sukuti, 314 

Islam, 13, 20, 17, 63, 67, 74!, 78, 80, 84, 
103, 108, 126 f, 129 f, 143, 180, 191 f , 
*93 *31 /■'*"> *M»* S S 1 
Islam Mecmuast, 317, 318, 319, 320 
Islamic civilization, set under Civilization 
Islamic education, set under Education 
Islamic state, 20;, 208, 210, 221 ff 
Islamism, 19 ff , 27, 76 f , 79, 177-81, 202, 

*33,*J*,3M 

Islamizaoon, 71, 75, 84, 10S, 130, 222, 279 
Ismail Hakki [Ballad oglu], 239 f 

Isukbal, 38 n 


Jahiz, 106, 317 


K 

Ka ha, 63, 287, 19E f , 324 
Kalam, 180, 324 
Kant.lt, 5t. tjo, t«*,i74 
Karacaoglan, 299 
Karagdz, 260, 263, 299 
Karakoyunlu, 43 f 

Kavm (ethnic unity), 80, 8z, 98 f , 1 13, 
«*S-3S, 3'7 
Kaygusuz, 299 
Kemal, All, 314 

Kemal, Mustafa (Atarurk), 13 I, 64, 227, 
3°S> 3M, 3'9> 3 21 

Kemal, Namik, 18-21, 22 n., 24, 36, 146, 
163, 181,202,287,314 
KJinnjt, 231 
Khwanzm, 44 
Ktpl Elma, 9 6, 32J 
Krjdhaf, 107, 317 

Kdlemen (Mamluk), 92, 226, 230, 325 
Koprulu, Fuad, 29 
Korkut Ata, 260 
Koroglu, 263, 299 

Kulsur, die (set also Hart), |6S, 238, 283, 
3« 

Kur’an, 63, 103, 1 jj f, 183 f, 193 ff , 
20lf , 212 f , 230, 233, 301 
Kurd, Kurdish, 43 f, 6j, 75, 130 f, »3 S * 
140 f, 314 
Kutadgu BiUk, 1 80 


Labour, social division of, 62, 64, 66, 1 19, 
124, 157, 159 ff, 282, 366, 269, 274 ff , 
282, 310 

Language (see also Culture, Turkish lan- 
guage, and Turkist), 104 f, 177 f, >93. 




333 


Literature, see under Classicism, Renais- 
sance, Romanticism, and Turkish 
literature 
Lon, Pierre, 264 

M 

Mahmud of Kashgar, rod, 317 
Makruh, 1 94 ru 
Mahki, 197, an 

Mamluk (Kcltmen), 92, 216, 230, 32; 
Manchester School (of political economy), 
3odff, ji3 

Manchurians, 73, 167 

‘March 3 1% 176 iti 

Maruf, 133 133 f, 194 216,318,325 

Mart Karl, 60 ff, 98 

Marktkkat 2 10-13, Yearbook of, 209 

Matjii 191, sif f , 128, 313 

Materialism, 48, historical, 60 IT, 115 

Maudsley, 61 

Maunier Rend 253 

Mawati 11*, J25 

Mawerdi, 203 

Medemyet (sit also Civilization), 68, 316 
Mediterranean civilization, nr under 
Civilization 

Medreie, 29 36, 66, 90, 173 f , aro, 213 f , 
219, 237, 278, 3"4. 3»5 
Afefkure (see Ideals), 70 
Mehmed Bey of Karaman 90 131 
Mallet 133 

Aftjclle-t Akkam-t A Jhye, 22r 
Mtktep, 173 f , 237, 313 
A lejrunyet, 18 139, r8a 
Mctapl ysics, 46-9, 96, t49, 174 
AfevbJ, 108, 143, 172, 301, 323 
Ateikeb 207,212 

A! Met (see also Nation) 24 76 f , 206 323 
Ministry of Economy, 313 Etkaf 210 f 
319, Justice, 208, 210, 319, Pious 

Modernism, Modernists (see oho Euro- 
peamsm 2nd Westernism), 177-81, 233 

Modernization, 71, 73 f, 101 180, 202, 

“ 3 . MS 

Mongolian, 73, 167, 271 
Moral density, 274 f 

Morality, 27, 37, 73i >06, 149-32, 203 267, 

Aborts, jj 132-6,17! 83, l>4f, I9I 2t6 


Mosque, 191, 212 f 
AiubaA, 194 

Alufu, 200 f, 203 f, 217, 220 If, 228 ff, 
* 3 *, 3*3 

Muhammad, 63, 227 If 
MujtaAid , 230, 323 
Afurtkar, 133, 136, 194 f , 216 
Music, 29, 268, 272 If , 289, 299 ff 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 13 f, 64, 227, 303, 
3 * 41 3 *?» 3 21 

Mysticism {see also Bcktashi, Sufi, and 
Tasawwuf), 37, 50 93, 273 


N 

NamikKemal 1S-21 22 n , 24, 36, 146, 
i«3 181 202,187,314 
Nasreddm Hoca, 2S0, 263, 299 
Nett, 194, 19S-9, 323 
Nation, 38 f 41 75,89,104,165,167,170, 
181,183 249 282 f 286 If , definition 
of 24 f , 27, 72, 76 If, 82, 119-22, 128 
>33 *34-8 pars , 143, 184 223 f, 247 f, 
28i,nseof 25 74 92 124 f, 126, 128- 
34 pair , 16) f 179 f 214 f, 238, 240, 
243, 280 • Turkish, (9 too, 127 126, 
130 f , 134 8 part, 223, 246, 260 f , 
168, 276 If 290 301, 303 ff 
National arts, 263 f, 268, 27J, 300, 
aspirations, 42, economy, 66 73, 182, 
280, 302 307, 309 f, 313, education, 
235 47,160 language 82 95 290,297, 
life, 38, 166, 184 308, values, 39 81, 
194 241 ff past , 284, 288 303 
National Assembly, Grand, 113, 217, 309, 
310 

National Pact 309 

Nationalism, 19 f, 21, 71 f, 74, 100, 
Albanian, 65, 71 131, Arab, 67, 71, 
Kurdish 65, Non-Muslim (Ottoman), 
at, «7 7>, 9 2 . >J>. Turkish (ret oho 

Turkism, and Turlusr), 63, 74 f, !7«, 

*34 

Nationalism and fine arts, 73 and inter- 
nationalism, 281 ff and language 129, 

religion, 143 

Nationality, 15, 39, 43 f, *3 70, 71 f , 
75 f '9-*». «3>, >J4, i3«-8, >43, 






334 


INDEX 


Nd m, 106, 146, J17 
Neologisms, 74 *67, 294 

New Life, 53-60, 9J, 284, 288, jij 
N ietzsche, 51 164 
Nizam al Mult, 130, 316 
Non Muslim free also Armenian, Greek, 
and Ottoman), 56, {8 £, 130, 232, 273, 
nationalism, 21, 71, 92 
Nordau, Max, iff 

Normal , 21, 30, 66 , 181, 262, 280, 290 
O 

OAa , 138 ff , 16a 
Obligations, 187, 204 

Oca*, Jifi 

Oghuz Turks, 136, IjG, 243 
Onenral avalization, tte un.br 
Civilization 

Ottoman (m alto Non-Muslim, Ta+^imat, 
Turkish), tfr-ao, 29, 43, 38 £, 72 f , 7 6, 
78 f , 90 ft, 103, 103-8, 142, 171 1 179, 
182 f , 226, 229, 236, 243 t, 260 ff, 2S2, 
28f, 28?, 290—3, 297, joo, 302, 303, 
civilization, tit unJtr Civilization, 
Commonwealth, 63, 260 , Empire, 13, 
16, 19 t, 71, 92, 128, 1)0-3, >42, 181, 
226, 2(5 1 , nation, 71 t, 93, 168 
Ottomanism, 19 £, 72, 7tS, 79, 136, ifiof, 

2«5 


Pan Islam («« aha Islanusm), 19 20, 40, 
>J«.>59 

Pan Turamsm, 7 t, 20 

Pan Turkism (rtt aLo Turkism), 20 2a 

Papacy 143, 217 >i8ff 

Pathological’, 22 23, 30, 66 , 95, too, 182, 
262, 280, 290 

P2tnonsm, 36, 73 8i, 193 f, 302, 306, 
economic, 306 

Pauihan, 61 

People’s Party, 305 

Persian, 36, 43, 74, 83 t, 90, '°5 f io8„ 
136, 168, 177, 238, 243 f, 265, 272 f , 

Personality, 132, 190, 241 ff, 249 

Peter the Great, 17, 40, 273 

Phenomenalism, 51 

Philosophy, 46-55 9*. trj £, *73, 295 f , 
Jio, Cokalp s, 2t, 31, 37 £, 312 


Plfiy, jf, I IS, 200 f, 204 f, 207-IJ, 21), 

210 f, 228 f 

Pious Affairs, Ministry of, 201, 210 

Polygamy, 29, 200, 231-3 fats 
Populism, 22, 224, 259. 3°3. 1 06 
Positivism, 4? 

Prayer 111 Islam, 187 F, >91 £ 

Press, role of, 17, 41, 6;, 71, 74 f 
’Profane’, iSG L, 190, 319 
Prohibitions, 187, 190, 194 
Protestantism (re* aha Reformation), 221 
Psychology, 39, 171, 239, 249 
Pushkin, 2 Go 

Q 

QaJj, 199, 203 £, 217, 221 £, )24 f 
Q*JS, 230 £, 103 £, 209, 220 ff, 323, 
— atkrr, 203,210, 323 
Q>vat, 197, 323 

R 

Race, if, 60, 7f, J26 f, 1)4 1, 27 1 , 314 
Racialism, 14 

Radicalism («« alto Revolutionism), 92 C, 
95, »G6, 179. >9) 

Ramazan, 192, 301, 31G 
RitkiJua Caliphs, 219 ff, jiG 
Rsaatuhun, 194 
Ray, John, 307, JtJ 

Red Apple (Ktfd Elmo), 9 6, 3»| 
Refinement, 280-3, >97 
Reform policy, effects of earlier («< alto 
Tanfimaz), 17 f 

Reformation (nt aha Christianity and 
modem awhiation and Protestantism), 
•J«. >45. 244, 274 

Reformer (jar Great Men), 1 37 ff > •*'. J5° 
Religion, 39.6j.7J f . 80 ff, 96, 99. >«t ff . 
119 f, 129, ijj, IjG, *43. >59 f . '>*. 
1*4-*)) past , 253 ff.jot.j to, compara- 
tive, 167! , and education, 199 £,110-14, 
ijj ff , and la» , 200 £, and nationality. 

Renaissance, I4J-7. 2<j, 174 
Revelation, 67, 193, 211 
Revolutionism, 265 ff 
Ribot, Theodule, 6 1 

Rjtuil, 27, 187-92, 193. J°>. 1°i 
RomanQasm, 22, 145, 147, 244. >74 
Rousseau, Jean Jactjues, 252, *60, 2S4 



INDEX 


335 


‘Sacred’, 185-91, «7f 

Sage (jee Great Men), 175, 1S1 
$ah Iitnad, };, 263, 299 

Sanction, power of, 69, 97, 1 8 j 204 f, 216 

$ef1un, All, 38 n 

Shan’t, 44, 221, 316 

Shaikh, 108 ( , 201, 2lt, 326 

Shaikh ul Islam, 203, 20; 208 10, 214, 

Shakespeare, 264 
Shamanism, 154 

Shamaiust Tungux, 75 , Yakuts, to 
Shar' (iharf a, shtnai), tg, 21, 27, 31, 103, 
194 IT, 198,103,108 <7,319,316 
■Mi 1, 13', 3>6 

Shmati ($masi), 19, ioj, 146 <,317 
Shura, 198, 326 
Shu Bhiyah, 118, 249, 326 
Sipahl, 16,81,91, 141,316 
Siyauvumt, 130, 316 
Socialism 37,79,81,316 
Society, 14 f, 63, 113-6, 141 f, 161 f, 1 66, 
173, , * , i '*4, >93 f , *41> >*9. »8o, 289, 
30if, 311, 317, democranc, I3if, 
ethnic, 132 f , feudal, 113, 161, organic, 
62, 124 < , 18417, 194 f , primitive, 61, 
114$ , 184 f, 269, 303, segmentary, 62, 

1147,131, 197 <7 

Sociology (Sociologists), 11, 27, 39 |6, 
■ 24, 244, 1647, 169 ff, 171 8] part, 
186, 193, >9*-9, “if, *39. 233. 260, 
269, 174, 180, 288 
Sohdansm, 13, 311 

Solidarity, I?, 73, 114 7, '39. MI, '37, 

21S, 28S, 302, 312. 


Sunni, 130, 231, 326 
‘Survival', 29 272, 179, t8i, 260 
Symbol-terms, Gokalp’s, 1 j 7 
Symbols, 77, 139, 194, 293 
Syndicalism, 15 
Syndicates, 302 7 


72 , 133 MS, ‘ 59 . ,8 ‘ f . 202, 205-8 
** 3 . »34 237, 245 249, 254, 260, 261 
170 176, 285-90, 316 
Tarde, Gabriel, 71 74, 97 7 
Tasawvuf (tet Sufitm), 14, 50,32, 145 205 
316 

Tat, 89, 316 
Tatar, 237, 292, 326 

Technology (ttt alto Civilization), 73, 96 
Tthfii (ttt Refinement), 280-3 
Temo, Ibrahim, 314 

Terminology (/« aLo Neologisms), 74 77, 
84 f , 1047, Gokalpi, 13 7 , 20 
Tevfilc Fikret, 20, 146 7 , 181, 316, 318 
Tevfik Sedar pseudonym of Gokalp, 314, 
I'S 

Theocracy, 24, 27, 1 19 '11,303 

Theology, 37, 95, t*6TL, 306 
Tuner, ,1, ,16.3,7 
Timur, 180 

Tort, 61, 8, 180, 1,6, 214 , 260 317, 

— um, 180 

Traditions, 23, 91, 94 <T, 171-4, 271 2S0, 
303 f , Ottoman, 1 8 163 
Tunguz, 75, 270 271, 



INDEX 


290, reform policy, 14, 16, G 6, 84 f, 
91, >43, * s 7, 290-8 

Turkism, 20, 22, 27, 63,71 f , 76, 75, 154, 
177, 180 f , 237, 259, 261, 265 f , 282 f , 
287 f , 289, 297 301-6, 31 f 
Turkist, 64, 77f , 134®, 177^,233, 2J7, 
261, 266, 282, 288, 289, 250-4 pars , 

Turkoman, 130 f, 141, 243 
Tuiuk, 89 
Tujuktrt, 180.327 


16J, 189, 194, 242 4, 184, 288, 302 f. 


Weber, Alfred, 22 n. 

Weber, Max, 316 

U'eltanschauung, 146, 270 
Western civilization, 1 u under Civiliza 
Westernism, Western! sts f see afro Ei 
peaiusm and Modernism), 14, 19 ff, 
27, 178, 252, 285 
Wilsonian principles, 261 
Womanhood free also Family, Fenum 
and Polygamy), 29, 252-5, 273 f , ; 


Ornmei (see Vmma ), »i, 24, 59, «3, 65 f , 
73, 76 ff, 79, *4, 91, 9*~ 10 *> >03, 117, 
126-9, IJI, 133, 13 6, >45 ff, 163, 
'84 ff, 2*3-6, *27, 245 £, 285 ff, 315, 
327 

Urffsee Merer), 152, 156, 183, 184, 194-9, 


Yarn, 89 f , 180,327 

Young Turk Revolution («< Mtjrut^ti), 
>76,3*3 

Yunus Ernie, 108, 260, 263, 299, 317 
Yusuf Akfura, 20 


ZaJcSl, 187 

Zanun, fret Profane ), 319 
Zaydan, J , 158, 323 
ZenbiHi Ail, 203, 209 £, 319 
Zurmet , 142, 327 
Zrkr, 3°*, 3>7